In the Matter of Registrant J.R. ( 2024 )

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0380-22
APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE MATTER OF
January 31, 2024
REGISTRANT J.R.1
_______________________ APPELLATE DIVISION
Argued December 5, 2023 – Decided January 31, 2024
Before Judges Haas, Gooden Brown and Puglisi.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. ML-
0222.
James H. Maynard argued the cause for appellant J.R.
(Maynard Law Office, LLC, attorney; James H.
Maynard, on the briefs).
Randolph E. Mershon, III, Assistant Prosecutor,
argued the cause for respondent State of New Jersey
(Yolanda Ciccone, Middlesex County Prosecutor,
attorney; David Michael Liston, Assistant Prosecutor,
of counsel; Brian Dennis Gillet and Randolph E.
Mershon, III, of counsel and on the briefs).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PUGLISI, J.S.C. (temporarily assigned).
1
Although this case was entitled State of New Jersey v. J.R., we have
amended the caption on appeal to reflect the protocol for registration matters.
In this appeal, as an issue of first impression, we are asked to consider
whether a New Jersey court may consider a motion to terminate the
registration requirements of an individual subject to Megan's Law 2 in New
Jersey but residing in another state. We hold that although a New Jersey court
may have jurisdiction to decide the motion, it must decide on a case-by-case
basis whether the registrant has standing to bring the motion. Because the
Megan's Law judge correctly determined J.R. lacked standing to have his
motion decided in New Jersey, we affirm.
In 1993, J.R. pleaded guilty to endangering the welfare of a child,
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a), and was sentenced to five years' probation. Because he
was on probation on October 31, 1994, the effective date of Megan's Law, J.R.
was required to register commencing at that time. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(c)(1). In
2002, he pleaded guilty to failure to register, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(a)(3), and was
sentenced to three years' probation. Although the exact date is unclear from
the record before us, J.R. moved to Montana sometime in 2021.
Megan's Law is intended "to protect the community from the dangers of
recidivism by sexual offenders." In re Registrant C.A., 146 N.J. 71, 80 (1996)
(citing N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1(a)). The statute requires offenders who have been
convicted, adjudicated delinquent, or found not guilty by reason of insanity of
2
N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -23.
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certain sex offenses, including an out-of-state offense that is similar to an
enumerated offense, to register with the appropriate law enforcement agency in
New Jersey. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2 to -4. It also requires non-resident offenders
who are required to register in their home state to register in New Jersey if
they are enrolled in an educational institution in New Jersey or engaged in
employment or a vocation for a requisite period of time in New Jersey.
N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(a)(2).
Megan's Law contains a termination provision, which permits "a person
required to register" to
make application to the Superior Court of this State to
terminate the obligation upon proof that the person has
not committed an offense within [fifteen] years
following conviction or release from a correctional
facility for any term of imprisonment imposed,
whichever is later, and is not likely to pose a threat to
the safety of others.
[N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f).]
Montana's version of our Megan's Law is the Sexual or Violent Offender
Registration Act (SVORA), Mont. Code Ann. § 46-23-501 to -520. Under that
statute, a sexual offender is defined as "a person who has been convicted of or,
in youth court, found to have committed or been adjudicated for a sexual . . .
offense" enumerated in the statute. Id. at -502(11). A sexual offender includes
an individual who has been convicted of "any violation of a law of another
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state, . . . that is reasonably equivalent to a violation listed" as a sexual offense
"or for which the offender was required to register as a sexual offender after an
adjudication or conviction." Id. at -502(10)(a)(xvii).
SVORA also contains a provision permitting a registrant to petition the
court for relief from the registration requirement. After ten years for a low -
risk offender or twenty-five years for a high-risk offender, the "offender may
petition the sentencing court or the district court for the judicial district in
which the offender resides for an order relieving the offender of the duty to
register." Id. at -506(3). A court may grant the petition if it finds "(a) the
offender has maintained a clean record during their period of registration; and
(b) continued registration is not necessary for public protection and that relief
from registration is in the best interests of society." Ibid.J.R. filed a motion to terminate his registration requirements in the
Superior Court of New Jersey, Middlesex County. Although he is statutorily
barred from relief under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f) because he has a subsequent
conviction for failure to register, he sought to challenge the constitutionality of
that provision.3 Setting aside the merits of his request for relief, J.R. argued
that the New Jersey court was the only court with jurisdiction to decide his
3
We have since upheld the constitutionality of the "lifelong registration and
community notification requirements on registrants who fail to satisfy
subsection (f)." In re M.H., 475 N.J. Super. 580, 595 (App. Div. 2023).
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motion because Megan's Law provides that a registrant "may make application
to the Superior Court of this State to terminate the obligation." N.J.S.A. 2C:7-
2(f).
In the Law Division and on appeal, J.R. and the State focused their
arguments on the court's jurisdiction to hear the matter; however, we agree
with the Megan's Law judge that the determinative issue was not one of
jurisdiction, but of standing.
"Whether a party has standing to pursue a claim is a question of law
subject to de novo review." Cherokee LCP Land, LLC v. City of Linden
Planning Bd., 234 N.J. 403, 414 (2018) (citations omitted). "We therefore
accord no 'special deference' to the 'trial court's interpretation of the law and
the legal consequences that flow from established facts.'" Id. at 414-15(quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366,
378 (1995)).
Jurisdiction and standing are two separate threshold determinations
pertaining to whether the court may hear a case. N.J. Citizen Action v. Riviera
Motel Corp., 296 N.J. Super. 402, 410-11 (App. Div. 1997). Subject-matter
jurisdiction involves "a threshold determination as to whether the [c]ourt is
legally authorized to decide the question presented." Id. at 411.
Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to "the power of a
court to hear and determine cases of the class to which
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the proceeding in question belongs. It solely rests
upon the court's having been granted such power by
the Constitution or by valid legislation, and cannot be
vested by agreement of the parties."
[Ibid. (italicization omitted) (quoting State v. Osborn,
32 N.J. 117, 122 (1960)).]
There is no question the New Jersey Superior Court has jurisdiction to hear a
motion to terminate a registration requirement, as its authority is plain in the
statute.
Standing, ripeness and mootness, however, are justiciability doctrines,
Jackson v. Dep't of Corr., 335 N.J. Super. 227, 231 (App. Div. 2000), and they
"refer[] to whether a matter is appropriate for judicial review." N.J. Citizen
Action, 296 N.J. Super. at 411. "In order to possess standing, the plaintiff
must have a sufficient stake in the outcome of the litigation, a real adverseness
with respect to the subject matter, and there must be a substantial likelihood
that the plaintiff will suffer harm in the event of an unfavorable decision." Id.
at 409-10.
Other justiciability doctrines include mootness and ripeness. The
doctrine of mootness requires "that judicial power is to be exercised only when
a party is immediately threatened with harm." Stop & Shop Supermarket Co.
v. Cnty. of Bergen, 450 N.J. Super. 286, 291 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting
Betancourt v. Trinitas Hosp., 415 N.J. Super. 301, 311 (App. Div. 2010)). But
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"controversies which have become moot or academic prior to judicial
resolution ordinarily will be dismissed." Ibid. (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth &
Family Servs. v. W.F., 434 N.J. Super. 288, 297 (App. Div. 2014)).
Ripeness seeks "to avoid premature adjudication of abstract
disagreements." Garden State Equal. v. Dow, 434 N.J. Super. 163, 188 (Law
Div. 2013) (citing Abbott Labs v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967)). A
"claim is not ripe for adjudication if the facts illustrate that the rights or status
of the parties are 'future, contingent, and uncertain.'" Id. at 189 (quoting
Indep. Realty Co. v. Twp. of N. Bergen, 376 N.J. Super. 295, 302 (App. Div.
2005)). A claim is only ripe "if 'there is a real and immediate' threat" to the
plaintiff. Ibid. (quoting K. Hovnanian Cos. of N. Cent. Jersey v. N.J. Dep't of
Env't Prot., 379 N.J. Super. 1, 10 (2005)).
In determining whether J.R. had standing, the judge examined both
Megan's Law and SVORA. He found J.R.'s conviction for endangering the
welfare of a child was not a "reasonable equivalent" to any of the sexual
offenses enumerated in SVORA at that time. 4 Thus, J.R. was required to
4
SVORA has since been amended to include endangering the welfare of a
child as a registrable offense. See Mont. Code Ann. 46-23-502(10)(a)(x)
(effective October 1, 2023). Although J.R. would now presumably be required
to register in Montana because endangering the welfare of a child under
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) is a "reasonable equivalent" to Mont. Code Ann. 45-5-
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register in Montana because he was convicted of an offense for which he was
required to register in New Jersey. Mont. Code Ann. § 46-23-502(10)(a)(xvii).
The judge also correctly determined J.R. had no New Jersey registration
requirement while he lived in Montana. He was not enrolled in school or work
here, nor did he intend to be. Therefore, he was not "a person required to
register" under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f).
As the judge found, J.R. had no stake in the outcome of the matter
because his registration obligation in Montana was dependent on his prior
conviction of an offense requiring registration, which would remain so
regardless of the outcome of his motion. He could not show that he would
suffer harm in the court's denying the motion, as it did not impact his Montana
registration obligation; conversely, he could not show he would benefit in the
court's granting the motion, as again, a favorable decision would not terminate
his registration obligation in Montana. Because J.R. was not facing or
suffering harm that a New Jersey court could address, he lacked standing to
have a New Jersey court decide his motion. For these reasons, J.R.'s motion
was also moot and not ripe for adjudication and was correctly dismissed for
failing to present a justiciable controversy.
___________________
622(2)(b)(ii), this additional ground for J.R.'s registration requirement in
Montana does not alter our analysis of standing.
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J.R. relies heavily on his assertion that, regardless of his residency in
another state, he nevertheless continues to have Megan's Law "status" in New
Jersey. We reject this argument because there is no legal "status" as a Megan's
Law offender—either there is a requirement to register in New Jersey or not.
The word "status" appears nowhere in the statute and to the extent the term has
appeared in published decisions, it refers to an offender's statutory requirement
to register in New Jersey, which is not present here. Cf. In re C.K., 233 N.J.
44, 54 (2018) (Registrant "expressed his feelings of isolation, anxiety, and
depression resulting from his Megan's Law status, . . . and his fear that his
registrant status will interfere with his ability to one day be a normal parent.");
In re L.E., 366 N.J. Super. 61, 63 (App. Div. 2003) ("Registrants argue that . . .
they are entitled to have their Megan's Law status terminated because they
were under the age of fourteen when their sex offenses were committed and
are now over eighteen."); In re Commitment of T.J., 401 N.J. Super. 111, 116
(App. Div. 2008) ("The judge commented on T.J.'s Megan's Law status.");
State ex rel. D.A., 385 N.J. Super. 411, 418 (App. Div. 2006) (Registrant's
"tier classification determines to whom notice will be given of the juvenile's
Megan's Law status."). Thus, we reject J.R.'s assertion that this impalpable
"status" gives him standing.
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J.R. also claims he suffers negative effects from his New Jersey "status"
because he is subject to the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification
Act (SORNA), 34 U.S.C. § 20911 to §20932, and International Megan's Law,
34 U.S.C. § 21501 to § 21510. We find this argument unavailing because it is
not based on a defensible reading of the statutes.
"Title I of the Adam Walsh Act—known as [SORNA]—establishes a
national baseline for sex offender registration and requires that states receiving
federal crime funds substantially comply with the guidelines it outlines."
C.K., 233 N.J. at 61 (citing 34 U.S.C. § 20927, § 10151). "In effect, SORNA
serves as model legislation that can be adopted in part or in whole by the
states." Ibid.
"SORNA classifies sex offenders into three risk tiers—Tiers I, II, and
III—for registration and notification purposes, depending solely on the nature
of the offense." Id. at 62 (citing 34 U.S.C. § 20911). "The offender's tier
assignment, in turn, determines the duration of his registration requirements."
Ibid. (citing 34 U.S.C. § 20915(a)).
Advanced Notification of Traveling Sex Offenders, also known as
International Megan's Law, requires certain sex offenders to report intended
international travel. See 34 U.S.C. § 21501 to § 21510, 18 U.S.C. § 2250. It
defines a "covered sex offender" as "an individual who is a sex offender by
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reason of having been convicted of a sex offense against a minor," 34 U.S.C. §
21502(3); and also includes a "sex offender under SORNA," 34 U.S.C. §
21502(9).
Thus, any federal registration or reporting requirements arise from J.R.'s
conviction, not an intangible "status" in New Jersey, and he has not otherwise
identified any case or statute in support of his contention. Because a New
Jersey court's decision on his motion to terminate would not impact any federal
obligation under SORNA or International Megan's Law, these requirements
also do not give rise to standing.
We note the current Megan's Law Bench Manual § 904, dated August
2020, contains the following statement: "At the Megan's Law meeting at
Judicial College on November 24, 2015, the Megan's Law [j]udges agreed that
registrants residing in another state should file for termination of the
registration obligation in the state where they are domiciled." This view
oversimplifies the issue of standing. We recognize that
[s]ex offender registration and notification laws are
widely used. The statutes, regulations, and laws
addressing sex offender registration and notification in
all fifty states, the District of Columbia, the five
principal United States territories, and over 125
federally recognized Indian Tribes are varied and
complex. Each local system makes its own
determinations about who is required to register,
which crimes are registerable offenses, what
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information offenders must provide, and what
consequences are inherent in the scheme.
[In re B.B., 461 N.J. Super. 303, 308-09 (App. Div.
2019).]
In deciding whether an out-of-state registrant has standing to bring a motion to
terminate in New Jersey, the Megan's Law judge must necessarily consider the
statutory scheme of the jurisdiction where the registrant resides. This ensures
a registrant has a forum to bring a motion consistent with the determinations of
both jurisdictions regarding what is in the best interests of protecting its
people.
While some jurisdictions have enacted registration schemes similar to
New Jersey and Montana, where an application to terminate must be decided
by the court where a registrant resides, other jurisdictions determine the
duration of registration based on the obligation in the state of conviction. For
example, some states may require a resident with an out-of-state conviction to
register for as long as the registration obligation in the state of conviction, or
the longer of the two states' registration obligations, or until the state of
conviction terminates the obligation. 5 In those instances, subject to the
5
Cf. Connecticut (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-253(a)), Kansas (Kan. Stat. Ann. §
22-4906(k)), Minnesota (Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(b)), New Mexico
(N.M. Stat. Ann. 29-11A-4(L)(3)), Pennsylvania (42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §
9799.15(a)(7)), and Utah (Utah Code Ann. § 77-41-105(3)(b)).
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Megan's Law judge's individual determination, we presume a registrant would
have standing to bring a motion to terminate in New Jersey. In those scenarios
the registrant has a stake in the outcome of the motion because it would affe ct
the obligation to register in the state where the registrant resides.
To the extent we have not expressly addressed any issues raised by J.R.,
it is because they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written
opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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