Angel Mendez v. Board of Trustees, Etc. ( 2024 )


Menu:
  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-2891-21
    ANGEL MENDEZ,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    v.
    BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
    POLICE AND FIREMEN'S
    RETIREMENT SYSTEM,
    Respondent-Respondent.
    ____________________________
    Argued January 22, 2024 – Decided February 2, 2024
    Before Judges Marczyk and Vinci.
    On appeal from the Board of Trustees of the Police and
    Firemen's Retirement System, Department of the
    Treasury, PFRS No. xx3001.
    Herbert J. Stayton, Jr. argued the cause for appellant
    (Stayton Law, LLC, attorneys; Herbert J. Stayton, Jr.,
    on the brief).
    Juliana C. DeAngelis, Legal Counsel, argued the cause
    for respondent (Nels J. Lauritzen, Deputy Director of
    Legal Affairs, attorney; Juliana C. DeAngelis, on the
    brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Petitioner Angel Mendez appeals from the April 13, 2022 final agency
    decision of the Board of Trustees of the Police and Firemen's Retirement System
    (the "Board") denying his claim for accidental disability retirement benefits
    under N.J.S.A. 43:16:A-7(1).       Based on our review of the record and the
    applicable principles of law, we affirm.
    Mendez was employed as a firefighter by the Camden City Fire
    Department beginning in April 2006. According to Mendez, on March 25, 2017,
    while responding to a fire, he injured his left shoulder while unloading or
    "stretching" a four-inch supply line from the fire truck "going towards the [fire]
    hydrant" to connect the supply line to the hydrant. Mendez testified "as [he]
    was stretching [the supply line he] got jerked back and as [he] got jerked back
    [his] left arm went back and [he] felt a sharp pain on [his] left arm . . . ."
    When asked what caused him to be jerked back, Mendez responded,
    "[a]pparently a lump sum of the four[-]inch supply line that was sitting on the
    hose bed came down on the section I was stretching causing it to get
    jammed . . . ."     Mendez "guess[ed] one of the couplings got caught or
    something."       He "believe[d] . . . [the supply line] must[have] been stored
    incorrectly." Mendez testified it was unusual for a hose to be stored incorrectly.
    A-2891-21
    2
    According to Mendez, when a hose is stored correctly it comes out one layer at
    a time, and it was unusual for "a large pile of hose to come down like that."
    After returning to the fire station on the day of the incident, Mendez
    completed and signed an injury report in which he stated, "[firefighter] hurt his
    left shoulder while repacking [four-inch] hose."        In the supervisor's report
    section of the injury report, the fire captain wrote, "[t]he firefighter stated that
    while repacking the [four-inch] hose he felt and heard something pop in his left
    shoulder."
    Mendez received three months of formal firefighter training before
    assuming his position and received additional training every work shift. He was
    trained on "[l]oading hose beds, unloading hose beds, hooking up hydrants," and
    "[s]tretching hose lines."    In his years as a firefighter, he responded to
    "hundreds" of fires.
    On May 30, 2018, Mendez filed an application for accidental disability
    retirement benefits. The disability comments section of the application states,
    "[a]s a result of attempting to remove a [four-]inch supply line that was
    improperly stored on the hose bed I suffered a severe shoulder injury." On
    October 19, 2018, Mendez underwent a medical disability examination. The
    "description of accident" section of the disability evaluation report prepared
    A-2891-21
    3
    following that examination states, "[m]ember was repacking a [four-inch] hose
    and felt a pop in his left shoulder."
    On December 11, 2018, the Board denied his application and awarded
    ordinary disability benefits because "the event that caused [his] disability [was ]
    not undesigned and unexpected." The Board also determined Mendez was
    totally and permanently disabled as a direct result of the March 25, 2017,
    incident.
    After Mendez contested the Board's denial, a hearing was conducted in
    the Office of Administrative Law. Mendez was the only witness who testified.
    Following the hearing, the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") affirmed the
    Board's decision in a written decision. The ALJ found "the facts are unclear as
    to what happened on March 25, 2017." The ALJ determined Mendez's testimony
    was not convincing and noted "he himself did not appear convinced" of what
    happened because "he could not articulate what occurred on that date." The ALJ
    specifically recounted Mendez testified "'apparently' the accident was caused by
    a 'lump sum of the . . . supply line,' he 'guess[ed]' one of the couplings got caught
    or something, and he 'believe[d]' there was a lump sum of hose." The ALJ also
    found Mendez's testimony was inconsistent with the injury report he signed on
    the day of the incident and the October 19, 2018, disability evaluation report,
    A-2891-21
    4
    both of which state Mendez was injured while "repacking" the hose, not
    "stretching" it from the truck.
    The ALJ found Mendez "was the only person who was unloading the hose,
    and he [was] uncertain what occurred." The ALJ determined there was "no
    evidence of" a traumatic event that was undesigned and unexpected. The ALJ
    concluded Mendez "did not particularize what occurred and [did] not [meet] his
    burden of presenting sufficient competent and credible evidence of facts
    essential to his claim[]" and "[did] not [meet] the burden of proving . . .
    eligibility for accidental disability retirement [benefits] by a fair preponderance
    of the evidence."
    Mendez filed exceptions to the ALJ's decision with the Board. After
    considering those exceptions, the Board adopted the ALJ's decision and affirmed
    the denial of Mendez's application. This appeal followed.
    On appeal, Mendez argues he proved by a preponderance of the evidence
    he is entitled to accidental disability retirement benefits because the event that
    caused his disability was undesigned and unexpected, and the Board's decision
    was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.       Mendez also argues pension
    statutes are remedial and should be liberally construed in favor of the employee.
    A-2891-21
    5
    "Our review of administrative agency action is limited." Russo v. Bd. of
    Trs., Police & Fireman's Ret. Sys., 
    206 N.J. 14
    , 27 (2011) (citing In re
    Herrmann, 
    192 N.J. 19
    , 27 (2007)). "An agency's determination on the merits
    'will be sustained unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious,
    or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record.'" Saccone v. Bd. of
    Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 
    219 N.J. 369
    , 380 (2014) (quoting Russo,
    
    206 N.J. at 27
    ).
    "Arbitrary and capricious action of administrative bodies means willful
    and   unreasoning    action,   without   consideration    and   in   disregard    of
    circumstances. Where there is room for two opinions, action is [valid] when
    exercised honestly and upon due consideration, even though it may be believed
    that an erroneous conclusion has been reached." Worthington v. Fauver, 
    88 N.J. 183
    , 204-05 (1982) (alteration in original) (quoting Bayshore Sewerage Co. v.
    Dep't Env't Prot., 
    122 N.J. Super. 184
    , 199 (Ch. Div. 1973)).
    In determining whether an agency's decision is arbitrary, capricious, or
    unreasonable, we examine: (1) whether the agency's decision conforms with
    relevant law; (2) whether the decision is supported by substantial credible
    evidence in the record; and (3) whether in applying the law to the facts, the
    A-2891-21
    6
    "agency clearly erred in reaching [its'] conclusion." In re Stallworth, 
    208 N.J. 182
    , 194 (2011) (quoting In re Carter, 
    191 N.J. 474
    , 482-83 (2007)).
    In Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 
    192 N.J. 189
    (2007), the Supreme Court clarified the meaning of the term "traumatic event"
    under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(1). A claimant for accidental disability benefits must
    establish:
    (1) that he is permanently and totally disabled;
    (2) as a direct result of a traumatic event that is
    a. identifiable as to time and place,
    b. undesigned and unexpected, and
    c. caused by a circumstance external to the
    member (not the result of pre-existing disease
    that is aggravated or accelerated by the work);
    (3) that the traumatic event occurred during and as a
    result of the member's regular or assigned duties;
    (4) that the disability was not the result of the member's
    willful negligence; and
    (5) that the member is mentally or physically
    incapacitated from performing his usual or any
    other duty.
    [Id. at 212-13.]
    Under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(1), a member applying for accidental disability
    must prove the event was "undesigned and unexpected." 
    Ibid.
     As the Court
    explained in Richardson, "[t]he polestar of the inquiry is whether, during the
    A-2891-21
    7
    regular performance of his job, an unexpected happening, not the result of pre-
    existing disease alone or in combination with the work, has occurred and directly
    resulted in the permanent and total disability of the member." Id. at 214.
    "Undesigned and unexpected" requires "an unanticipated consequence " that "is
    extraordinary or unusual in common experience." Id. at 201. The evaluation of
    the event is not based on results but instead on what the injured person was doing
    at the time. Russo, 
    206 N.J. at 18
    .
    Although pension statutes are "remedial in character" and "should be
    liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be
    benefited thereby," Geller v. Dep't of Treasury, 
    53 N.J. 591
    , 597-98 (1969),
    "eligibility is not to be liberally permitted," Smith v. State, Dep't of Treasury,
    
    390 N.J. Super. 209
    , 213 (App. Div. 2007).
    After considering all the evidence presented and the applicable legal
    standards, the ALJ determined Mendez failed to prove by a preponderance of
    the evidence his disability was caused by an undesigned and unexpected event.
    The ALJ specifically noted Mendez was not able to convincingly articulate how
    he was injured and "did not particularize what occurred." The ALJ also found
    his testimony was inconsistent with the contemporaneous injury report he
    completed on the day of the incident as well as the report of his disability
    A-2891-21
    8
    evaluation. The ALJ's decision was based on ample findings supported by
    substantial credible evidence in the record and was not arbitrary, capricious, or
    unreasonable. We discern no basis to disturb the Board's decision adopting the
    ALJ's findings and denying Mendez's application for accidental disability
    retirement benefits.
    To the extent we have not otherwise addressed appellant's arguments, they
    are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-
    3(e)(1)(D) and (E).
    Affirmed.
    A-2891-21
    9
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-2891-21

Filed Date: 2/2/2024

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 2/2/2024