Donald Trout v. Board of Trustees, Etc. ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2623-21
DONALD TROUT,
deceased,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES'
RETIREMENT SYSTEM,
Respondent-Respondent.
____________________________
Submitted January 29, 2024 – Decided February 6, 2024
Before Judges Mawla and Vinci.
On appeal from the Board of Trustees of the Public
Employees' Retirement System, Department of
Treasury, PERS No. xx3761.
Alterman & Associates, LLC, attorneys for appellant
(Stuart J. Alterman, on the brief).
Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Sookie Bae-Park, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel; Jeffrey David Padgett, Deputy
Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Appellant Donald Trout appeals from a March 17, 2022 final agency
decision by the Board of Trustees (Board), Public Employee's Retirement
System (PERS) denying his widow's request for accidental death benefits. We
affirm.
Trout was employed by the Middlesex County Hazardous Materials Unit
as a Hazmat Tech I when he passed away on August 27, 2021. That day, he was
responding to an emergency call and while gathering his equipment at his work
vehicle, he suffered a cardiac arrest and passed away. Trout's death certificate
listed the cause of death as "sudden cardiac death ventricular fibrillation arrest."
Trout's widow filed for accidental death benefits and the Board denied the
request on December 10, 2021. The Board noted the Division of Pensions and
Benefits requested Trout's medical records and the Division's Medical Review
Board (MRB) reviewed the records and found Trout had "a history of prior
cardiac surgery and treatment for hypertension and hyperlipidemia." Although
Trout's heart attack occurred on the job, "the MRB [did] not see a particular
incident that caused this event." The Board concluded the plain language of
N.J.S.A. 43:15A-49(a)(1) and "binding case law" required it to deny the
application.
A-2623-21
2
Appellant challenged the Board's decision and requested a hearing before
an administrative law judge. However, the Board denied the hearing request
because there was "no genuine issue of material fact in dispute." The Board
then issued its March 17, 2022 written decision, recounting the underlying
incident and the reasons it previously denied accidental disability benefits.
The Board explained N.J.S.A. 43:15A-49(a) requires that "the death of a
member in active service [be] . . . a result of: (1) an accident met in the actual
performance of duty at some definite time and place . . . ." It found Trout did
not die of an accident, but "[r]ather . . . had a long history of pre-existing
conditions[,] which ultimately resulted in his death."
The Board cited Russo v. Teachers' Pension & Annuity Fund, 62 N.J. 142(1973). It noted although the pension fund in Russo was different than PERS,
it "employ[ed] identical language to that of N.J.S.A. 43:15A-49." Russo was a
custodian who died of a heart attack while performing his job duties. Id. at 144.
The Board noted the Supreme Court denied the request for accidental death
benefits because Russo's heart attack was not the result of an accident. Ibid.The Board also cited Richardson v. Police & Fireman's Retirement
System, which denied accidental death benefits to a police officer who suffered
a heart attack while chasing a suspect. 192 N.J. 189, 214 (2007). There, the
A-2623-21
3
Court held the death was not the result of an accident because "the work effort,
alone or in combination with pre-existing disease, was the cause of the injury."
Id. at 213.
Based on these cases, the Board concluded Trout's death was not the result
of an accident. It further noted it considered appellant's "personal statements,
written submission[,] and all documentation in the record." However, because
the matter did "not entail any disputed questions of fact" the Board could decide
the matter without an administrative hearing.
On appeal, appellant reasserts the arguments previously made to the
Board. Appellant argues Trout qualified for accidental death benefits because a
heart attack is "undesigned and unexpected" and therefore qualifies as an
accident. Further, the Board could not decide whether Trout's death was due to
a pre-existing condition without a hearing. The Board's refusal to permit a
hearing was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable because it should have
allowed appellant to submit expert testimony regarding Trout's cause of death .
Our review of an administrative agency's final decision is limited. In re
Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482 (2007). We afford "a 'strong presumption of
reasonableness' to an administrative agency's exercise of its statutorily delegated
responsibilities." Lavezzi v. State, 219 N.J. 163, 171 (2014) (quoting City of
A-2623-21
4
Newark v. Nat. Res. Council, Dep't of Env't Prot., 82 N.J. 530, 539 (1980)).
Absent arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious action, or a lack of support in the
record, the agency's final decision will be sustained. In re Herrmann, 192 N.J.
19, 27-28 (2007).
We are not bound by an agency's interpretation of a statute, or its
determination of a strictly legal issue. Allstars Auto Grp., Inc. v. N.J. Motor
Vehicle Comm'n, 234 N.J. 150, 158 (2018). Although pension statutes are
"remedial in character" and "should be liberally construed and administered in
favor of the persons intended to be benefited thereby," Geller v. Dep't of
Treasury, 53 N.J. 591, 597-98 (1969), "eligibility is not to be liberally
permitted," Smith v. State, Dep't of Treasury, 390 N.J. Super. 209, 213 (App.
Div. 2007).
Pursuant to these principles, we affirm for the reasons expressed in the
Board's decision because it is supported by sufficient credible evidence on the
record as a whole. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D). We add the following comments.
Russo defined what an accident is for purposes of qualifying for accidental
death benefits. The Court stated:
In ordinary parlance, an accident may be found either
in an unintended external event or in an unanticipated
consequence of an intended external event if that
consequence is extraordinary or unusual in common
A-2623-21
5
experience. Injury by ordinary work effort or strain to
a diseased heart, although unexpected by the individual
afflicted, is not an extraordinary or unusual
consequence in common experience. We are satisfied
that disability or death in such circumstances is not
accidental within the meaning of a pension statute when
all that appears is that the employee was doing his usual
work in the usual way.
[62 N.J. at 154.]
The substantial, credible evidence in the record reveals Trout's heart
attack was suffered by "ordinary work effort or strain" to his heart, not "an
unintended external event or in an unanticipated consequence of an intended
external event . . . extraordinary or unusual in common experience." Ibid. For
these reasons, the Board was not required to hold a hearing and properly applied
N.J.S.A. 43:15A-49(a)(1) when it denied accidental death benefits.
Affirmed.
A-2623-21
6