State of New Jersey v. Sunny Patel ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0172-22
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
SUNNY PATEL,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
Argued January 30, 2024 – Decided February 7, 2024
Before Judges Haas and Gooden Brown.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Atlantic County, Municipal Appeal No. 1-22.
Luke C. Kurzawa argued the cause for appellant (Reisig
Criminal Defense & DWI Law, LLC, attorneys; Luke
C. Kurzawa, on the brief).
Kristen Nicole Pulkstenis, Assistant Prosecutor, argued
the cause for respondent (William E. Reynolds,
Atlantic County Prosecutor, attorney; Kristen Nicole
Pulkstenis, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Sunny Patel appeals from the Law Division's August 4, 2022
order denying his motion to vacate his March 30, 2015 guilty plea to driving
while intoxicated (DWI). We affirm.
On January 17, 2015, defendant was arrested and charged for driving
under the influence of alcohol in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. Represented by
counsel, on March 30, 2015, defendant appeared before the municipal court and
agreed to plead guilty to DWI. Defendant gave the court a factual basis for his
plea and confirmed the plea was voluntary.
Specifically, defendant admitted he was operating a motor vehicle on
January 17, 2015, and had been consuming alcoholic beverages on that date prior
to getting behind the wheel. The judge asked defendant if he was "satisfied now
as you reflect back on the events of that evening, considering the amoun t of
alcohol you consumed, the nature of your driving, and the other circumstances
that prevailed, that you were under the influence of the alcoholic beverages you
consumed?" Defendant replied, "Yes, Your Honor."
The judge accepted defendant's plea and found him guilty of driving while
intoxicated. The judge then asked defendant's attorney if there was a "Chun
worksheet."1 The worksheet showed that defendant's blood alcohol content
1
State v. Chun, 194 N.J. 54 (2008).
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(BAC) measured .14%. The judge sentenced defendant as a first offender and
suspended his driving privileges for seven months and imposed appropriate fines
and financial assessments.
Over six years later, on September 20, 2021, defendant filed a motion in
the municipal court seeking to vacate his guilty plea. Defendant argued that his
plea was not supported by an adequate factual basis because he did not
acknowledge that the results of his BAC test, which were not part of his plea
colloquy, were accurate.
On December 13, 2021, the municipal court judge 2 denied defendant's
motion as untimely under Rule 7:10-2(b)(2). The judge also found that
defendant provided an adequate factual basis by admitting to consuming alcohol
before he drove his vehicle on January 17, 2015, and that he was under the
influence of those alcoholic beverages. The judge also reminded the parties that
the BAC result, which was discussed after the judge accepted the plea and found
defendant guilty of DWI, "only corroborated the defendant's proofs. It was not
. . . the basis for the [c]ourt's conviction."
2
This judge was the same judge who had presided at the March 30, 2015 plea
hearing and sentencing.
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Defendant appealed to the Law Division, which, after argument, held that
defendant's application to withdraw his guilty plea was untimely under Rule
7:10-2(b)(2). It also noted that defendant failed to demonstrate that the denial
of his late application to withdraw his plea would result in a manifest injustice
as set forth in Rule 7:6-2(b). The court further found that defendant's guilty plea
was supported by a sufficient factual basis and, therefore, it fully complied with
the requirements of Rule 7:6-2(a)(1). On appeal, defendant raises the following
contention:
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO VACATE HIS
GUILTY PLEA SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED
ON DE NOVO REVIEW PREDICATED UPON THE
MUNICIPAL COURT'S FAILURE TO OBTAIN A
FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE ENTRY OF
DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA ON MARCH 30,
2015 IN ACCORDANCE WITH R. 7:6-2(a)(1).
We have considered this contention in light of the record, the applicable
law, and the arguments of counsel. We are satisfied that defendant's argumen t
lacks sufficient merit to warrant extended discussion in a written opinion. See
R. 2:11-(e)(2). We affirm substantially for the reasons set forth by the Law
Division in its August 4, 2022 written decision. We add the following brief
comments.
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Applications filed in the municipal court for post-conviction relief, such
as defendant's motion to vacate his guilty plea in this case, are governed by Rule
7:10-2. That rule plainly states that other than petitions to correct an illegal
sentence, "[a] petition . . . shall not be accepted for filing more than five years
after entry of the judgment of conviction or imposition of the sentence sought to
be attacked, unless it alleges facts showing that the delay in filing was due to
defendant's excusable neglect." R. 7:10-2(b)(2).
Here, the municipal court sentenced defendant on March 30, 2015. He
did not file his motion challenging that conviction until September 20, 2021,
well past the five-year limitation set by Rule 7:10-2. Defendant has never
provided any explanation for his untimely submission and, therefore, the Law
Division properly denied his late motion.
As the Law Division found, defendant's application was also untimely
under Rule 7:6-2(b). That rule states that "[a] motion to withdraw a plea of
guilty shall be made before sentencing, but the court may permit it to be made
thereafter to correct a manifest injustice." (emphasis added). Defendant waited
over six years after sentencing to file his motion. Just as importantly, defendant
made no showing whatsoever that the denial of his motion would result in "a
manifest injustice."
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Finally, even if defendant's untimely application could be considered, the
Law Division correctly found that defendant gave an adequate factual basis for
the plea as required by Rule 7:6-2(a)(1).3 Defendant admitted to drinking
alcoholic beverages before he drove and that he operated his vehicle while under
the influence of alcohol.4 Defendant's attorney submitted the BAC test results,
which amply corroborated defendant's factual admissions. Therefore, the court
properly denied defendant's motion to vacate the plea.
Affirmed.
3
Rule 7:6-2(a)(1) states that before accepting a guilty plea, a municipal court
judge must address the defendant personally, and make a determination "by
inquiry of the defendant and, in the court's discretion, of others, that the plea is
made voluntarily with the understanding of the nature of the charge and the
consequences of the plea and that there is a factual basis for the plea."
4
Defendant relies upon an unpublished, readily distinguishable decision of this
court to assert that the factual basis for his plea in this case was deficient because
he did not personally acknowledge the admissibility of the results of the BAC
test during the plea colloquy. Defendants' reliance on this unpublished case is
misplaced because pursuant to Rule 1:36-3, the case has no precedential value
and is not binding on any court. As we stated in Badiali v. New Jersey Mfrs.
Ins. Grp., 429 N.J. Super. 121, 126 n. 4 (App. Div. 2012), aff’d, 220 N.J. 544(2015), "as a general matter, unpublished opinions are not to be cited by any
court absent certain specified circumstances." None of those circumstances
apply to the unrelated, unpublished case on which defendant relies.
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