Lisa Hood v. Matt Blatt, Inc. ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0222-22
LISA HOOD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MATT BLATT, INC.,
a/k/a MATT BLATT KIA,
Defendant-Respondent.
Submitted November 14, 2023 – Decided February 7, 2024
Before Judges Natali and Puglisi.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Atlantic County, Docket No. L-3670-21.
Lisa Hood, appellant pro se.
Capehart & Scatchard, PA, attorneys for respondent
(Laura D. Ruccolo, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Lisa Hood appeals from the trial court's August 1, 2022 order
dismissing with prejudice her complaint against defendant Matt Blatt, Inc., also
known as Matt Blatt Kia, on statute of limitations grounds. Because we
conclude plaintiff was entitled to the benefit of the discovery rule, we reverse
the order on appeal and remand the case to the trial court.
We summarize the facts relevant to our disposition, as set forth in the
complaint and the hearing testimony. In September 2010, plaintiff purchased a
2007 Yukon Denali from defendant, a car dealership in Egg Harbor Township.
The vehicle had 78,000 miles on it and came with an engine and transmission
warranty for 100,000 miles or five years; she also purchased an additional
warranty, the details of which are unclear from the record.
Within two months of plaintiff's purchasing the vehicle, it had
transmission issues. In July 2012, plaintiff paid an $800 deductible to defendant
to replace the transmission, which was still under the warranty. At that time,
the vehicle had over 95,000 miles on it. When she received the vehicle back,
Donald Heritage, defendant's service writer, told her that a "new transmission"
had been installed.
Plaintiff drove the vehicle without any issues until 2021, when it again
experienced transmission problems. At that point, the vehicle had between
180,000 and 185,000 miles on it. Plaintiff brought the vehicle to two
independent mechanics, both of whom inspected the vehicle and advised her that
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the transmission was not new when it was installed in the vehicle. Plaintiff
received an estimate of $6,700 to replace the transmission.
Plaintiff's complaint, filed on October 29, 2021, alleged violations of the
New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. 56:8-2 (count one); negligent
misrepresentation (count two); constructive—equitable fraud (count three); civil
conspiracy to defraud (count four); breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing (count five); and intentional infliction of emotional distress
(count six). She sought compensatory, treble and punitive damages and other
unspecified equitable relief.
Defendant answered the complaint and subsequently filed a motion to
dismiss it pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e). On February 25, 2022, the court dismissed
counts four and six 1 and reserved decision on the remaining counts pending a
hearing pursuant to Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267 (1973).
At the hearing, defendant called two witnesses, both of whom the court
accepted as experts, presumably in vehicle repairs. Steven Espinal was an auto
mechanic employed by defendant, although not when the repair to plaintiff's
vehicle occurred in 2012. He testified as to the standard procedures taken by
defendant's repair department when a customer brought in a vehicle with a
1
Plaintiff did not appeal the dismissal of these counts.
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3
complaint. He testified that, given the passage of time, the company no longer
had any records pertaining to the sale of the vehicle, the 2012 repair or any of
the warranties because it purged documents every seven or eight years.
However, during the hearing he was able to access defendant's system and obtain
information about the vehicle's service.
As to the repairs on plaintiff's vehicle, Espinal explained that the terms of
a warranty determined whether a new or remanufactured transmission would
have been used, so without the records he could not confirm whether the
replaced transmission was new or remanufactured. He testified he had seen
transmissions that only lasted 5,000 or 10,000 miles, and some that were still
working at 200,000 miles.
Espinal further testified that it was possible to determine whether a
transmission was new or used by looking at it:
There's usually say if it was to be a used transmission,
you can usually see like a VIN identifier. It's usually
like a VIN plate sometimes they'll do on a transmission.
Sometimes a junkyard will put even they're called heat
tabs, they're usually for engines, but I've seen them on
transmissions as well.
I'm trying to think of other things. Sometimes
junkyards put like markings on it to like identify which
engine or which customer it's going to, like a [P.O.],
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4
like a purchase order number or something written on
the transmission.
And like with what her witness was saying, like you
could sometimes see like the mating where the
transmission and the engine mate. You could see like
a significant color difference. Like the aluminum tends
to have oxidation on it and it will have like that
white[-]like cloudy[-]like dust almost.
And sometimes you could differentiate the age of the
transmission to the engine if it's ever been replaced.
But past that it's really hard to say how long.
And sometimes also it's like a steel, it could be a steel
block with an aluminum head, aluminum belt housing
for the transmission, and you won't really be able to
compare in that sense. But nowadays everything has an
aluminum block, nowadays.
Plaintiff also offered the testimony of Frederick Barker, a friend of
plaintiff, who was previously employed as a service writer and technician at a
BMW dealership. Barker explained that in June 2022, he ran an electronic check
on plaintiff's vehicle, which indicated an issue with the transmission. He also
testified the transmission must have been replaced in 2012 because otherwise
the vehicle would have been inoperable; and that a new transmission should last
about ten years. He explained that a dealership could replace a transmission
with either a new or used one; a new one would have likely cost her around
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$3,400 and since she only paid an $800 deductible, it was his opinion that the
transmission had been replaced with a used one in 2012.
Plaintiff testified about the 2012 repairs consistent with the allegations in
her complaint. She stated she took the vehicle every 3,000 miles for routine
maintenance, including inspections and oil changes, and did not encounter any
issues with it until October 2021.2 She further testified that other than a work
order for the 2012 repair, she did not retain any documents from her purchase
of the vehicle, the repair or the warranties.
After considering the testimony, the court made the following findings:
I found [plaintiff's] testimony to be truthful. She
basically testified that she purchased the vehicle in
2010 from Matt Blatt Kia. It was a used vehicle and
had approximately 78,000 miles on it at the time that
she purchased it in 2010. It was a 2007 GM vehicle.
Approximately two years later in September 2012 when
there were about 89,000 miles on it she had an issue
with the transmission. She testified that she had also
obtained a ten-year, 100,000 mile warranty on the
vehicle in 2010 when she purchased it.
She brought it in 2012. She was given a new or
replacement transmission vehicle in 2012. She then
drove the vehicle for another nine years approximately
2
Plaintiff's complaint and appellate brief state the vehicle became inoperable
in January 2021; however, she testified numerous times during the hearing it
was October 2021. The discrepancy does not impact our analysis of the
discovery rule.
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until October 2021, a little over nine years. She put
around another 90,000 miles on the vehicle at that time
and then she began to experience problems with the
transmission.
She testified that she regularly serviced the vehicle
every 3,000 miles and that she really had no issues with
the vehicle until October 2021 when she said at that
time she was advised that she did not have a, quote, new
transmission placed in the vehicle back in 2012.
The court then noted neither plaintiff nor defendant had retained copies of any
documentation of the sale, repair or warranties regarding the vehicle. However,
it found "there must have been a change in the transmission, whether new or
used, in 2012," because otherwise "she would not have been able to drive the
vehicle for another nine years and another 90 to 100,000 miles."
The court then found the injury did not occur in 2012 because there was
no "competent evidence" that there was an additional warranty from 2012, so no
"claim that would have arisen in 2012."
Because she suffered the injury much later I don't see
that at that time Matt Blatt, based on the existence of a
2010 warranty, is responsible for an injury that
occurred in 2021.
I can't find that, right? Because everybody agrees that
it's ten years or 100,000 miles. So, by the time that we
get to 2021, we're clearly outside the ten[-]year
warranty that started in September 2010.
The court then addressed the factors under Lopez:
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The nature of the alleged injury is a transmission . . .
ceased to work approximately nine years after it was
worked on by [defendant].
So, that injury, again, I don't believe happened in 2012.
I don't think there's been any expert testimony to
indicate that something that was done wrong in 2012
caused an injury seven years later. All right. So, we
have to look at when the injury was. The injury was
not in 2012, it was in 2021.
The availability of witnesses and written evidence.
Both parties agree that there's an issue with written
evidence. It's just not available. Nobody has the
documentation that indicates that the warranty is there.
Witnesses. I don't, you know, nobody has produced Mr.
[Heritage]. We have from the defense an employee
who started working there in 2014. So it would seem
to me that perhaps the people who were around when
[plaintiff] originally brought her car in 2010, 2012,
might not be there any more. Which is reasonable
because it has been about ten years.
The length of time that has elapsed since the alleged
wrongdoing. Again, I'm going to go back to the 2010
warranty because I don't find any competent evidence
of a 2012 warranty.
I do find that there [were] repairs done under the 2010
warranty. I can't find, based on what's been presented
to me today, that there was any injury that arose from
that. Again because [plaintiff] testified truthfully that
she had no problems with the car and she was getting it
regularly serviced until 2021.
Whether the delay has been to any extent deliberate or
intentional. I don't find that it was deliberate or
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intentional on any party. I don't find that any party has
engaged in any improper conduct that would have
concealed this you know from the other party. It's just
you know from what I can see the nature of mechanical
things that over time they may or may not break. But
to the extent again that there was a 2012 warranty, I
can't find that.
And whether the delay may have been said to unusually
prejudice the defendant. Under these circumstances I
do find that there is some unusual prejudice just
because there you know the people who interacted with
[plaintiff] are no longer there, it's outside the
seven[-]year document retention policy.
....
Again I can't find that the injury happened back in 2012.
The injury happened now. But I don't find under the
circumstances that there is sufficient evidence before
me for me to determine that that injury was caused by
the defendants, frankly. It just doesn't seem based on
the expert testimony that it was something that they did
improperly.
The court entered an order dismissing the remaining counts of plaintiff's
complaint "because they were filed significantly beyond the six-year statute of
limitations."
Where, as here, "the court considers evidence beyond the pleadings in a
Rule 4:6-2(e) motion, that motion becomes a motion for summary judgment,"
Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman & Stahl, PC , 237
N.J. 91, 107 (2019) (citation reformatted), which we review de novo, employing
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the same standard as the trial court. See Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 59
(2015) (citing Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 405 (2014)).
We do, however, apply a deferential standard in reviewing factual findings
by a judge. Balducci v. Cige, 240 N.J. 574, 595 (2020). Deference is also given
to a trial court's credibility findings "because it has 'a better perspective than a
reviewing court in evaluating the veracity of a witness.'" C.R. v. M.T., 248 N.J.
428, 440 (2021) (quoting Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015)).
Plaintiff was required to bring her claims of Consumer Fraud Act
violations, negligent misrepresentation, equitable fraud and breach of implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing within six years of when they accrued.
N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1; Catena v. Raytheon Co., 447 N.J. Super. 43, 52 (App. Div.
2016).
The goal of the discovery rule is to "avoid [the] harsh results that
otherwise would flow from mechanical application of a statute of limitations."
Kendall v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 209 N.J. 173, 191 (2012) (alteration in
original) (quoting Caravaggio v. D'Agostini, 166 N.J. 237, 245 (2001)). "Under
the rule, a claim does not accrue until the plaintiff 'discovers, or by an exercise
of reasonable diligence and intelligence should have discovered that he may
have a basis for an actionable claim.'" Catena, 447 N.J. Super. at 52 (quoting
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Lopez, 62 N.J. at 272). In applying the rule, the court must also consider
"whether the delay may be said to have peculiarly or unusually prejudiced the
defendant." Lopez, 62 N.J. at 276.
Plaintiff raises the following arguments for our consideration:
A. The Trial Court Erred and Deprived Plaintiff of
Due Process and Equal Protection under the Equitable
Tolling Doctrine Given the Facts Presented Below.
B. The Trial Court Erred and Deprived Plaintiff of
Due Process and Equal Protection by Allowing
Defendant to Ignore Plaintiff's Discovery Demands.
C. The Trial Court Erred by Accepting Testimony
from Defendant's Witness who was not Credible and
Lacked Personal Knowledge.
D. The Trial Court's Dismissal Order is Detrimental
to Public Safety and Policy Given Defendant's Breach
of Implied Covenants of Good Faith and
Unconscionable Conduct that Extends Beyond an
Injury to Plaintiff.
While we disagree with plaintiff's assertions that this case presents issues
of constitutional dimension, we do agree the trial court erred in denying her the
benefit of the discovery rule.
Plaintiff's complaint alleges she purchased a used vehicle from defendant
in 2010. Two years later, the vehicle had transmission problems that were fixed
by defendant under the warranty. Upon paying a deductible, defendant made
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repairs to the vehicle. Plaintiff claims defendant's employee told her the
replacement transmission was "new," which she took to mean just that, a new
part. She drove the vehicle without issue for ten years, until the transmission
again failed. It was not until she brought the vehicle to two different mechanics
that she learned the replacement transmission was not a new part, but a used or
remanufactured one. 3
Based on those facts, we agree with the trial court's determination the
injury to plaintiff occurred when the transmission failed, whether that was in
January or October 2021. However, she did not know a third party may have
been responsible until after that event, when two different mechanics advised
her the replacement transmission was not new when it was installed in the
vehicle.
Although not squarely addressed by the trial court, we reject defendant's
contention that the condition of the transmission could have been readily
ascertained. Espinal's testimony, which the court found credible, was that a used
transmission could be identified through a VIN plate, heat tab, or purchase order
3
Although the court and the parties discussed the alleged warranties during the
hearing, plaintiff's complaint does not contend defendant breached the terms of
a warranty; rather, her claims sound in fraud based on the alleged misstatement
about the replacement transmission.
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on the transmission, or by examining its metal composition. Plaintiff testified
she took the vehicle in to defendant for routine maintenance; she never had any
issues with the vehicle and had no occasion to inspect it herself. Even if she had
lifted the hood, the identifiers or characteristics of a used transmission would
not be readily apparent to the untrained eye. Therefore, plaintiff did not know,
nor should she have known, sufficient facts to commence the statute of
limitations until she brought the vehicle to the other mechanics after the
transmission failed in 2021.
We also agree with plaintiff that there was no evidence that defendant
would be unduly prejudiced by application of the discovery rule. See ibid.Other than the work order for the repair, it appears neither party retained paper
records of the sale or repair. However, it appears that electronic records were
available, because Espinal was able to access some records during the hearing.
There also was no representation by defendant that Heritage or other witnesses
were not available.
At this juncture, we need not consider plaintiff's lack of proofs and issues
with establishing causation. For purposes of the Lopez hearing, the question
was not whether plaintiff had a meritorious case, or whether she was likely to
prevail at trial. The only issue was whether she should have her day in court or
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whether her complaint should be barred by the statute of limitations. We
conclude that plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of the discovery rule.
Accordingly, we reverse the order on appeal, reinstate counts one, two, three
and five of the complaint, and remand this case to the trial court. Because the
case has been reinstated, we decline to address plaintiff's arguments regarding
discovery.
To the extent we have not expressly addressed any issues raised by
defendant, it is because they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a
written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
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