State of New Jersey v. Rodney F. Bates ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3754-21
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
RODNEY F. BATES, a/k/a
RODNEY F. BATES, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Argued November 28, 2023 – Decided February 13, 2024
Before Judges Gooden Brown and Puglisi.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Camden County, Indictment No. 15-12-3508.
Kayla Elizabeth Rowe, Designated Counsel, argued the
cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public
Defender, attorney; Kayla Elizabeth Rowe, on the
brief).
Maura Murphy Sullivan, Assistant Prosecutor, argued
the cause for appellant (Grace C. MacAuley, Camden
County Prosecutor, attorney; Maura Murphy Sullivan,
of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Rodney F. Bates appeals from a July 8, 2022 order denying his
first petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without a hearing. Having
reviewed the record and defendant's arguments in light of the applicable law, we
affirm.
I.
We glean the following facts from our prior opinion on defendant's direct
appeal, State v. Bates, No. A-0373-17 (App. Div. June 10, 2019) (slip op. at 6-
12), and from our review of the record. Defendant's elderly mother lived in
Somerdale with her daughter, who was defendant's sister; and her
granddaughter, who was defendant's niece. Defendant's mother had deeded the
home to his sister in July 2004, and his sister and niece cared for his mother.
Defendant was not permitted to enter the home unless his sister was
present, and had to make an appointment to do so. He was allowed to use the
detached garage, where he stored some of his belongings. The niece described
him as, among other things, "a little bit of a bully to everybody in the family
including [his mother]." She also testified that defendant never came to the
home when she was alone with his mother, because the niece felt uncomfortable
around him. She explained she usually kept the doors locked to keep defendant
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out, because when he came in, he would refuse to leave or display a "bully kind
of mentality." She also said defendant had previously locked her out of the
house.
On the morning of September 10, 2015, defendant's sister was not home
and his niece was caring for his mother. As the niece ran out of the house to
take out the trash, defendant pulled up in his mother's Cadillac and began to
ridicule her. He got out of the car and started "gunning" for the door, which she
had left unlocked. She pleaded with him not to go in the house, because he was
not allowed in, but he did so anyway. She ran behind him and grabbed the
doorknob. Defendant reached for the slide lock but she "ripped" open the door
and stood in between him and the door so that he would not lock her out of the
house. Defendant pushed his body into hers, which propelled her against the
door, shattering the glass. He picked up a piece of triangular-shaped glass and
held it near her.
Defendant and his niece then struggled, during which he grabbed a fistful
of her hair at the top of her head, causing clumps of her hair to come out. The
niece fell to the ground, and he jumped on top of her and pinned her down with
his hands. She cried and screamed, and eventually stood up. She was able to
get into the house, retrieve her cell phone, and call 9-1-1.
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Defendant re-entered the house and went to his mother's room, where the
niece heard him attempting to blame her for the broken door. As the niece was
speaking to the 9-1-1 dispatcher, defendant returned and grabbed her by the
neck, pinned her against the wall, and punched her in the face twice. His mother
then came out of her room using her walker.
The niece called 9-1-1 again, having been disconnected from the first call,
and defendant left. Recordings of the two 9-1-1 telephone calls were played for
the jury. In the first call, the niece told the dispatcher: "My uncle just broke
into the house. We were just wrestling outside. He broke the glass. . . . He's
coming after me right now. . . . He just punched me." During the second call,
she said defendant had her "pinned under the chair pounding [her] in the face."
In the second call, in response to the dispatcher's question, "what's going on
there," the niece responded: "I have an abusive, crazy uncle who stops by from
time to time. Today he decided to break the glass [on] my grandmother's porch,
break in and then proceeded to punch me in the face and pull my hair."
At trial, the State presented the jury with photographs including the
shattered door, clumps of the niece's hair and her two black eyes.
Defendant testified to a different version of events. He said he was
unaware of any understanding among his mother, sister, and niece that he was
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not allowed to enter the house unless his sister was present. According to him,
the opposite was true; his mother wanted him there. He said he had no idea his
mother had deeded the home to his sister until he saw the deed a couple of days
before trial when he and his attorney were reviewing discovery.
Turning to the events of September 10, 2015, defendant said he drove to
his mother's home that morning to visit her. He drove into the driveway, passed
his niece, who was taking out the trash, and walked toward the door. He thought
he heard his niece say something but told her he did not have time and continued
to walk toward the door. Defendant said as he began to open the door to enter
the home to see his mother, his niece came from behind him, slipped under his
arm, and got between him and the door. According to defendant, her hair got
caught in the latch and lock and she thought he was pulling it. She stomped on
his foot three times and broke his toe. In pain, he lifted his foot, and she pushed
him to the ground. As he lay on the ground he watched his niece rip her hair out
from the lock, screaming "ouch" as she did so. She then tried to kick him again.
Defendant had to hop into the house to see his mother, because his foot
was severely injured. He told his mother his niece was starting something and
asked his mother to come out of her room and intercede, and his mother came
out.
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It appeared to him that his niece was getting a knife out of a kitchen
drawer, so he told his mother he was leaving and he left, wanting to get away
from his attacker. Defendant repeated that he had gone to the home for no other
reason than to visit his mother. He explained that he lives in Florida during the
winter, and when summer is over, he returns there. He knew his mother's health
was failing and wanted to visit her before returning to Florida for the winter.
During cross-examination defendant was confronted with photographs of
his niece's injuries, which he denied inflicting. He said the photographs of her
face looked "like all smeared makeup." As to her other injuries, he testified, "I
feel as though she inflicted them upon herself by attacking me from behind and
putting her head in a position where her hair was caught and the way she ripped
her hair out." Defendant claimed he never touched her, insisting he was "not
responsible for her actions. She was the aggressor, not [him]."
The jury rejected defendant's version of the events and convicted him of
second-degree burglary of his sister's home and third-degree aggravated assault
on his niece. At sentencing, the court merged the aggravated assault into the
burglary and sentenced defendant to a ten-year custodial term subject to the No
Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. We affirmed the conviction but
remanded to the trial court to correct the judgment of conviction to reflect the
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burglary as it was charged in the indictment, which was a third-degree offense,
and for resentencing on that count. On remand, the court resentenced defendant
to a five-year custodial term with a two-and-a-half-year parole ineligibility
period.
Defendant again appealed to the excessive sentence oral argument panel,
which remanded the matter again for resentencing to afford defendant the
opportunity to speak at sentencing. After a denied motion for release, which we
affirmed, defendant filed a pro se PCR petition in September 2019, but withdrew
it; counsel filed a certification and brief in March 2022.
In his petition, defendant argued his trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to do the following: properly investigate and ensure that
all Brady1 materials were received, object to or investigate the origin of a
photograph depicting the victim with two black eyes, verify the DNA found on
the niece's pants was defendant's, investigate and cross-examine defendant's
mother's caregiver, interview and question the ambulance driver prior to her
testimony, and object to the admission of the 9-1-1 calls.
The PCR judge issued an oral decision on the record, discussed more fully
below, denying defendant's petition without an evidentiary hearing because he
1
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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"failed to establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel for
any of the errors raised in [his] petition." The court did not find "counsel
committed such cumulative errors as to render the defendant's trial unfair or
deprive him of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel," and denied defendant's
request for an evidentiary hearing.
II.
Defendant raises the following points on appeal:
POINT I.
THERE WERE MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT WITH
RESPECT TO THE UNPRODUCED SMITH REPORT
THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN RESOLVED WITH
LIMITED PCR DISCOVERY AND AT AN
EVIDENTIARY HEARING.
POINT II.
THE PCR COURT SHOULD HAVE HELD AN
EVIDENTIARY HEARING TO ANSWER ITS
QUESTIONS ABOUT [DEFENDANT'S] PRO SE
CLAIM THAT COUNSEL FAILED TO HAVE THE
BLOOD TESTED.
POINT III.
THE PCR COURT FAILED TO ANALYZE
[DEFENDANT'S] ARGUMENT THAT HAD THE
JURY KNOWN HE WAS INJURED IN THE MELEE,
IT WOULD HAVE CHANGED THE OUTCOME OF
THE TRIAL.
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We are unpersuaded by defendant's contentions.
III.
We review the legal conclusions of a PCR court de novo. State v. Harris,
181 N.J. 391, 419 (2004) (quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of
Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)). The de novo standard also applies to
mixed questions of law and fact. Ibid. Where an evidentiary hearing has not
been held, we "conduct a de novo review of both the factual findings and legal
conclusions of the PCR court . . . ." Id. at 421.
To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant
must establish both prongs of the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687 (1984), and adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105
N.J. 42, 58 (1987), by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Gaitan, 209
N.J. 339, 350 (2012). First, a defendant must show that "counsel's performance
was deficient." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. This requires demonstrating that
"counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel'
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Ibid. The Constitution
requires "reasonably effective assistance," so an attorney's performance may not
be attacked unless they did not act "within the range of competence demanded
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of attorneys in criminal cases" and instead "fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness." Id. at 687-88.
When assessing the first Strickland prong, "[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's
performance must be highly deferential," and "every effort [must] be made to
eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight." Id. at 689. "Merely because a trial
strategy fails does not mean that counsel was ineffective." State v. Bey, 161
N.J. 233, 251 (1999) (citing State v. Davis, 116 N.J. 341, 357 (1989)). Thus, a
reviewing court "must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance[,]" and "the
defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the
challenged action [by counsel] 'might be considered sound trial strategy.'"
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101
(1955)). Further, the court must not focus on the defendant's dissatisfaction with
"counsel's exercise of judgment during the trial . . . while ignoring the totality
of counsel's performance in the context of the State's evidence of [the]
defendant's guilt." State v. Castagna, 187 N.J. 293, 314 (2006).
For the second prong of the Strickland test, "the defendant must show that
the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." 466 U.S. at 687. This means
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"counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial
whose result is reliable." Ibid."[I]n order to establish a prima facie claim, a petitioner must do more than
make bald assertions that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel."
State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (1999). "[R]ather, the defendant
'must allege facts sufficient to demonstrate counsel's alleged substandard
performance.'" State v. Jones, 219 N.J. 298, 312 (2014) (citations omitted)
(quoting State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 355 (2013)). Where a "court perceives
that holding an evidentiary hearing will not aid the court's analysis of whether
the defendant is entitled to [PCR] . . . or that the defendant's allegations are too
vague, conclusory, or speculative to warrant an evidentiary hearing . . . then an
evidentiary hearing need not be granted." State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158
(1997) (citations omitted); see R. 3:22-10(e)(1)-(2).
Guided by these standards, we find the PCR court did not err in denying
defendant's petition. We address defendant's arguments in turn.
First, defendant argued his counsel was ineffective because he failed to
properly investigate and ensure that all Brady materials were received.
Specifically, defendant claimed an Officer Smith wrote a report containing
exculpatory information, which defendant first learned about during his direct
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appeal. According to defendant, the report stated the glass from his mother's
door had broken outward instead of inward; thus, defendant believed this
information would exculpate him of the burglary charge.
The record reflects that the discovery request for the report was discussed
during a pretrial conference on October 11, 2016. Defendant's counsel asked
for any "statements" made by Officer Smith, because his investigators reached
out to the officer and he was "not providing any statement," nor was there "any
indication there [was] an original statement." The judge asked for clarification,
since in her experience, she had never seen a police officer provide a "statement"
in a criminal matter, rather, an officer may write a report. Defense counsel
agreed that he meant to ask for any police report authored by Officer Smith. The
assistant prosecutor responded that his detective had called the Somerdale
records clerk twice to determine whether there were any reports from Officer
Smith, and informed the court "[t]hey do not exist; there's nothing." The court
concluded that there was no report, to which defendant responded, "Yes, Your
Honor. Thank you for that information."
We agree with the PCR judge's finding there was no need to conduct
discovery because defendant did not produce any evidence of a report written
by Officer Smith. Defendant referenced the pretrial memorandum included in
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the State's appendix on direct appeal, which lists the report as "needed
discovery." Defendant interpreted this notation to mean that a report existed.
However, as the PCR judge found, the pretrial memorandum catalogued
discovery that had been requested, but did not confirm the existence of the
report.
Moreover, defendant did not demonstrate counsel failed to adequately
investigate the issue in his defense. During the pretrial conference, the State
confirmed on the record that it had investigated the request and determined there
was no report. The court accepted that representation, and defense counsel's
reliance on that representation did not fall below the standards of objective
reasonableness.
Defendant's claim that the report was exculpatory is also dubious. The
jurors were shown photographs of the door and were charged with making the
determination of which witnesses were credible. The niece testified that
defendant was already in the doorway of the house when she put herself in
between him and the door so he could not lock her out. She said defendant then
shoved her into the door, which ended up "smashing." She testified, "The glass
was everywhere including where my bare feet were. I remember looking down
and seeing shards of glass but [thought] I'm not giving up my ground, I'm not
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getting locked out of the house in this drizzle rain in my pajamas, that's not
going to happen." Because the testimony and evidence at trial were consistent
with there being glass on the outside of the house, a report confirming that fact
would not have been exculpatory.
Second, defendant argues the PCR judge erred by not conducting an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether defendant asked his counsel to test the
blood on the victim's clothing. As reflected in the record, defendant did not
provide any proof that he raised the issue with trial counsel nor any evidence in
the form of affidavits or certifications that any blood present on the niece's pants
would have been favorable to him. The PCR judge found:
Evidence and testimony were presented to the jury that
the defendant and the victim struggled with one another
during a physical altercation. Specifically, the
defendant testified that during the altercation [he]
sustained injuries.
The presence of the defendant's blood does not change
the fact that the parties physically struggled and the
defendant was injured, facts that the jury already knew.
Assuming that the defendant actually did request the
DNA testing, trial counsel's decision to forego
requesting DNA testing of the blood was not
unreasonable.
For the reasons articulated by the PCR judge, we agree that a hearing was
not warranted.
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Lastly, defendant argues the PCR judge did not address his contention that
his trial counsel failed to adequately present his injuries to the jury, whi ch may
have resulted in a different outcome. We disagree. In outlining the issues raised
by defendant, the PCR judge stated, "Additionally, the defendant asserts that if
the jury knew he was also injured the outcome of the trial would have been
different. The defendant does not offer any additional facts, assertions or law
to support this claim." In his discussion of the DNA, the PCR judge noted
defendant testified about his injuries, which the trial transcript reflects:
My niece came up behind me. When I opened the door
with my right hand she slipped under my arm and got
in between me and the door. Her hair got caught in the
latch and lock and she thought I was pulling her hair
and she stomped on my foot three times, broke my toe.
I picked my foot up in pain and I was pushed to the
ground. And I skinned my elbow on the way down, hurt
my hip, and I later found out that I broke my—or she
broke my toe, causing all the rest of the injuries
including the broken toe.
Defendant's petition did not point to any injury he sustained that was not
presented to the jury through his own testimony. While he claimed counsel
perhaps should have retained an expert to examine the extent of his nerve
damage, he did not demonstrate that counsel's performance in this regard was so
deficient that it prejudiced the outcome of the trial.
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Because defendant failed to meet either prong of Strickland on any of his
claims, the PCR judge did not err in denying a hearing.
To the extent we have not expressly addressed any issues raised by
defendant, it is because they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a
written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
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