State of New Jersey v. Nolan Walsh ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0987-23
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
NOLAN WALSH,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
Argued September 16, 2024 – Decided October 22, 2024
Before Judges Gummer and Berdote Byrne.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Morris County, Municipal Appeal No. 23-
101-A.
Kenneth Ralph argued the cause for appellant (Bruno &
Ferraro, attorneys; Kenneth Ralph, of counsel and on
the briefs).
Tiffany M. Russo, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the
cause for respondent (Robert J. Carroll, Morris County
Prosecutor, attorney; Erin Smith Wisloff, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant was seventeen years old in 2011 when a municipal court judge
accepted his guilty plea for driving under the influence of marijuana. Initially,
defendant faced charges of driving under the influence, driving in an incorrect
lane, driving while possessing narcotics, driving in violation of a provisional
driver's license, and reckless driving. In addition, defendant's passenger was
named as a co-defendant and charged with possession of marijuana. As a result
of defendant's guilty plea, his charges of driving in an incorrect lane, operating
a motor vehicle while possessing narcotics, and reckless driving were dismissed.
The co-defendant's possession charge was also dismissed because defendant
admitted the marijuana belonged to him.
In 2022, defendant moved to vacate the guilty plea, arguing the plea
hearing lacked a thorough inquiry of whether he understood the details of his
plea and his waiver of rights. The Municipal Court denied that motion.
Defendant appealed to the Law Division. After conducting a trial de novo based
on the Municipal Court record, the Law Division affirmed and entered an order
denying the appeal. Defendant then filed a motion for reconsideration, which
was also denied. We affirm the Law Division's orders for the reasons expressed
in the well-reasoned, oral opinions of the Honorable Ralph E. Amirata. We add
the following comments.
A-0987-23
2
Our review of a Law Division de novo hearing on the record of a
municipal-court hearing is "focuse[d] on whether there is 'sufficient credible
evidence . . . in the record' to support the trial court's findings." State v.
Robertson, 228 N.J. 138, 148 (2017) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162
(1964)); see also State v. Mellody, 479 N.J. Super. 90, 108 (App. Div. 2024)
(quoting State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 472 (1999)) ("[O]ur review of a Law
Division judge's decision is limited to determining whether the findings made
by the judge 'could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence
present in the record.'"). We do not engage in "independent fact-finding" but
instead are "governed by the substantial evidence rule." State v. Heine, 424 N.J.
Super. 48, 58 (App. Div. 2012).
We should especially defer when "two lower courts have entered
concurrent judgments on purely factual issues" and "ordinarily should not
undertake to alter concurrent findings of facts and credibility determinations
made by two lower courts absent a very obvious and exceptional showing of
error." Locurto, 157 N.J. at 474 (citing Midler v. Heinowitz, 10 N.J. 123, 128-
29 (1952)). However, we consider Law Division legal rulings de novo.
Robertson, 228 N.J. at 148; see also State v. Kuropchak, 221 N.J. 368, 383
A-0987-23
3
(2015) (citing State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 176 (2010)) ("[L]egal conclusions
are subject to de novo review.").
On appeal, defendant argues the plea was not voluntary and the factual
basis for it was not sufficient. As Judge Amirata correctly noted, defendant's
motion to vacate the plea was a petition for post-conviction relief, despite
defendant having not filed a direct appeal of the issue, and was time-barred by
Rule 3:22-12(a). Moreover, defendant failed to present any facts that would
support a finding of excusable neglect to enlarge the amount of time for post-
conviction relief.
Despite this procedural bar, Judge Amirata thoroughly addressed the
merits of defendant's motion and found defendant was represented by counsel at
the original plea hearing, he had already begun treatment for substance abuse,
and his parents were present in the courtroom when the plea was accepted.
Defendant's belated claim, brought eleven years later, that he did not understand
what "under the influence" meant when he pleaded guilty, despite having already
been enrolled in substance-abuse treatment, is belied by the record. The judge
also noted the court, in accepting the plea, was not dealing with an uneducated
defendant, as defendant's lawyer represented at sentencing that defendant was
performing well in school, which was considered favorably by the sentencing
A-0987-23
4
court. Further, defendant cites no legal support for his suggestion that the plea
hearing should have included additional procedures because of his youth.
We agree with Judge Amirata that defendant received the benefit of his
plea bargain and affirm his orders.
Affirmed.
A-0987-23
5