Jason Jani v. Andreia Jani ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4006-22
JASON JANI,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ANDREIA JANI,
Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________
Submitted October 1, 2024 – Decided October 23, 2024
Before Judges Bishop-Thompson and Augostini.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Monmouth County,
Docket No. FM-13-1309-19.
Villani & DeLuca, PC, attorneys for appellant (Michael
C. Ayres, on the briefs).
Keith, Winters, Wenning & Harris, LLC, attorneys for
respondent (Brian D. Winters, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
In this post-judgment matrimonial matter, defendant Andreia Jani appeals
from a July 20, 2023 order denying her motion to increase plaintiff's alimony
obligation and terminating alimony as of April 14, 2022. We reverse and
remand for a plenary hearing.
I.
The parties were married in June 2006 and have three children, ages
seventeen, fourteen, and eight. After two days of trial, on December 11, 2020,
they entered a marital settlement agreement (MSA) and were divorced by way
of a Dual Final Judgment of Divorce (DFJOD).
The parties were divorced during the COVID-19 pandemic. As a result,
a significant issue during their divorce was their incomes. Relevant to plaintiff's
alimony obligation, in paragraph ten of their DFJOD, the parties' agreed:
Paragraph 10. The parties agree that under the present
circumstances of the pandemic, there is an inability to
determine income imputation for [H]usband, however
[W]ife believes [H]usband's income should be
presently imputed at $115,000, and her income should
be imputed at $25,000. Husband asserts his income is
approximately $80,000.00 and Wife's should be
imputed at $35,000.00. Notwithstanding this
disagreement, Husband agrees to pay Wife alimony in
the sum of $1,000/month, paid weekly directly to
[W]ife via direct pay, which is an allocated amount
which conglomerates child support and alimony. This
negotiated amount takes into consideration [W]ife's
alimony demand less her obligation to pay child support
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to Husband. This amount is being paid without
prejudice to both parties' future rights/arguments. The
parties have agreed to an exchange of income
information in six months as neither party can predict
what the long-term effect of the pandemic will be on
their income. And neither party shall be required to
prove a Lepis change of circumstance to seek
modification of the overall support obligation, and the
parties acknowledge that the child support and alimony
will be modified depending upon future circumstances
at the six-month review.
Paragraph eleven of the DFJOD further addressed the term of alimony and
provided a buyout provision:
Paragraph 11. The payment of alimony shall be
limited to the duration of six (6) years in total,
regardless of the review in six months. In other words,
the six-month review shall not include a renegotiation
of the term of support, only the amount. Upon payment
by Husband to Wife in the amount equal to 72 months
of support, then the alimony obligation shall
irrevocably terminate. If during the period of alimony
Wife should cohabitate or remarry then and in either of
those events[,] alimony shall irrevocably terminate.
In preparation for the agreed-upon six-month review of alimony, the parties
were required to exchange financial information as detailed in paragraph twelve
of the DFJOD and thereafter attend mediation to "expedite a resolution of this
recalculation":
Paragraph 12. The parties shall have an
obligation to exchange their income information
in six months so the issue of alimony and child
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support can be recalculated. Proof of income for
[W]ife shall be determined through a review of
her pay stubs and a record of deposits into her
personal account, and for Husband through a
review of his Profit and Loss Statement for SCE
or his then current employment contract or
paystubs if no contract exists, and copies of bank
records whether held personally or through any
entity [H]usband owns or has an interest in. The
parties shall return to Joseph Gunteski, CPA, in
order to expedite a resolution of this recalculation
at that time. In the recalculation of child support
the parties shall utilize two sets of guidelines,
assuming there remains a split custody
arrangement, and net out of the two obligations.
The payment of Mr. Gunteski's fees for the
mediation shall be shared equally between the
parties. Mr. Gunteski shall not be required to
prepare a cash flow analysis and if Wife demands
the preparation of an analysis, regardless of its
depth, then she shall be obligated to satisfy that
fee.
Paragraph thirteen of the MSA set forth the parties' agreement regarding
child support:
Paragraph 13. The parties agree that they each
have a reciprocal child support obligation to each
other based upon the split parenting arrangement
as referenced above. However, for the purposes
of this agreement, the child support payment is
being subsumed into the $1000/month un-
allocated payment. The parties agree that the
proper child support amounts shall be calculated
at the six-month review, which shall include all
applicable health insurance credits, parenting
time credits, etc.
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The six-month review of alimony and child support was to occur in June
2021. However, the parties did not attend mediation with Mr. Gunteski until
August 2021. Mediation was unsuccessful. In March 2022, defendant filed a
notice of motion that was dismissed without prejudice as deficient.
On April 14, 2022, plaintiff tendered a check to defendant in the amount
of $55,000 to fulfill his alimony obligation pursuant to the buyout provision in
paragraph eleven of the DFJOD. Defendant did not immediately cash this check.
Rather, she filed a second notice of motion on June 17, 2022 seeking, in part, to
modify alimony and child support. Plaintiff filed a cross motion on July 28,
2022, seeking, in part, a credit of $55,000 as a prepayment of alimony should
the court set aside the parties' agreement.
In support of his cross motion, plaintiff certified that after the initial
mediation in 2021, the parties agreed to maintain the status quo of $1,000 per
month in alimony. This assertion, however, was uncorroborated. Plaintiff
further certified that given the passage of time, defendant was required to
demonstrate changed circumstances before alimony should be modified.
After conducting oral argument on August 12, 2022, the court noted
paragraph twelve of the DFJOD provided that the parties had an obligation to
exchange income information in six months from the date of their divorce "so
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the issue of alimony and child support can be recalculated." However, the court
found that "there [was] no evidence before this [c]ourt that the parties exchanged
their income" information before attending mediation in August 2021. The court
further found that even though there were conflicting certifications regarding
the issue of financial submissions, no hearing was necessary on this issue.
The court directed the parties to "exchange financial information as
specified in the [D]FJOD within [fourteen] days of [the] Order. . . . [and]
[t]hereafter, . . . attend mediation with Joseph Gunteski, CPA within [thirty]
days of [that]." The parties were to advise the court if mediation was
unsuccessful, and in turn, the court would schedule a case management
conference.
The parties attended mediation on October 6, 2022, presumably having
received the requisite financial information.1 On April 27, 2023, defendant
notified the court that mediation was unsuccessful and requested a case
management conference. In response, plaintiff asserted that circumstances had
not changed to justify a modification of alimony since the August 12, 2022
order, and furthermore, defendant had cashed the $55,000 check thereby
1
The record is unclear as to whether the parties provided the financial
information set forth in paragraph twelve of their MSA after the August 12, 2022
hearing.
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satisfying plaintiff's alimony obligation pursuant to the buyout provision in the
DFJOD.
At a case management conference on June 6, 2023, the court directed the
parties to brief the unresolved issues in the August 12, 2022 order. Without
further oral argument or a hearing, the court issued an order on July 20, 2023,
denying defendant's request to increase alimony and denying without prejudice
defendant's request to recalculate child support. The court terminated plaintiff's
alimony obligation as of April 14, 2023.2
In its statement of reasons attached to the July 20, 2023 order, the court
explained that the terms of the MSA were clear and unambiguous. Consistent
with the terms set forth in paragraph twelve of the DFJOD, the court previously
directed the parties to provide the agreed-upon financial information and return
to mediation. Having attended mediation again and without resolving the
alimony and child support obligation, the court reasoned that "the issue is now
before the [c]ourt as a matter of law[, and] [t]here is no factual dispute before
the [c]ourt." The court enforced the buyout provision in paragraph eleven and
found that "plaintiff's alimony obligation . . . terminated as of the tendering of
2
It appears that this provision in the order was intended to reflect a termination
of alimony on the date plaintiff tendered the check in the amount of $55,000,
which was April 14, 2022 and not April 14, 2023 as stated in the order.
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the $55,000 check on April 14, 2022." Additionally, since the child support
obligation was "subsumed into the alimony obligation for the duration of the six
(6) year term," the court concluded that recalculation of child support was not
ripe until December 2026, pursuant to paragraph thirteen of the DFJOD. This
appeal followed.
On appeal, the parties dispute whether a plenary hearing was necessary
regarding enforcement of the alimony provisions in their MSA. Defendant
asserts the court erred in terminating plaintiff's alimony obligation without a
plenary hearing, contravening the clear language and intent of the parties' MSA.
Plaintiff contends the court properly determined a plenary hearing was
unnecessary and correctly terminated plaintiff's alimony obligation after he
exercised the buyout option, thereby satisfying his alimony obligation.
II.
In reviewing a family court's decision on alimony, we generally defer to
the trial judge's findings and reverse only where there is an abuse of discretion.
See Overbay v. Overbay, 376 N.J. Super. 99, 106 (App. Div. 2005). However,
where the issue is a mistake of law, our review is de novo. S.D. v. M.J.R., 415
N.J. Super. 417, 430 (App. Div. 2010) (citing Manalapan Realty, LP v. Twp.
Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)). Likewise, "we review the
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interpretation of a matrimonial settlement agreement de novo." Amzler v.
Amzler, 463 N.J. Super. 187, 197 (App. Div. 2020).
"Settlement of disputes, including matrimonial disputes, is encouraged
and highly valued in our system." Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 44 (2016).
Moreover, it is well established that matrimonial agreements represent
enforceable contracts. Quinn, 225 N.J. at 45 (citing J.B. v. W.B., 215 N.J. 305,
326 (2013)); Pacifico v. Pacifico, 190 N.J. 258, 265-66 (2007). Because marital
settlement agreements are voluntary and consensual, they are presumed valid
and enforceable. See Massar v. Massar, 279 N.J. Super. 89, 93 (App. Div. 1995).
When interpreting a marital agreement, "[t]he court's role is to consider
what is written in the context of the circumstances at the time of drafting and to
apply a rational meaning in keeping with the 'expressed general purpose.'"
Pacifico, 190 N.J. at 266 (quoting Atl. N. Airlines, Inc. v. Schwimmer, 12 N.J.
293, 302 (1953)). Thus, "when the intent of the parties is plain and the language
is clear and unambiguous, a court must enforce the agreement as written, unless
doing so would lead to an absurd result." Quinn, 225 N.J. at 45 (citing Sachau
v. Sachau, 206 N.J. 1, 5-6 (2011)).
Applying these legal principles, we conclude that the court erred in
finding that the interpretation of the parties' MSA presented a question of law
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and that a plenary hearing was unnecessary to resolve the issues of alimony and
child support. Specifically, the court misinterpreted the terms of the MSA by
terminating alimony as of the date plaintiff tendered the lump sum payment and
prior to the recalculation hearing.
At the time of their divorce, the parties agreed to a six-month review of
alimony and child support because there was an "inability to determine income
imputation" for plaintiff due to the impact of the pandemic on plaintiff's
business. The failure of the parties to exchange income information delayed the
six-month review. A meaningful review of the support obligations was premised
on the parties' exchange of their income information as set forth in paragraph
twelve of the MSA. Without that information, neither party was able to make
an informed decision regarding income imputation and readjustment of alimony.
In construing the relevant provisions in the parties' MSA, the court needed
to look to the entire agreement to determine the parties' intent at the time of their
divorce. Specifically, paragraphs ten, eleven, and twelve of the MSA read
together, demonstrate the parties' objective in conducting this review; namely,
to expedite a resolution of the recalculation of alimony and child support once
updated income information was reviewed.
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After the court directed the exchange of financial information and
mediation was yet again unsuccessful, the parties' dispute regarding the correct
amount of alimony persisted. The issue was brought back to the court for
resolution in June 2023. The record, however, is void of any reference that the
court received and reviewed the parties' updated income information. Therefore,
the record does not support the court's conclusion that there was no factual
dispute as to the parties' respective incomes.
Moreover, the court erred in concluding that plaintiff's invocation of the
buyout provision in paragraph eleven of the MSA, prior to the recalculation of
alimony, terminated his alimony obligation. Paragraph eleven underscores the
purpose of the six-month review: a renegotiation of the amount of support and
not the term. This sentence precedes the buyout option, which states: "[u]pon
payment by Husband to Wife in the amount equal to 72 months of support, then
the alimony obligation shall irrevocably terminate." (emphasis added). The
plain meaning of this provision is that the review and resolution of the amount
of alimony would occur before plaintiff could exercise the buyout provision.
Moreover, as the August 12, 2022 order states, the prepayment of alimony would
not terminate plaintiff's alimony obligation; rather, it would be credited against
a future alimony obligation to be determined. Based upon the unambiguous
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language of the MSA and considering the circumstances at the time of the
parties' divorce, the court erred in permitting the tendering of the $55,000 check
on April 14, 2022 to satisfy plaintiff's alimony obligation, thereby terminating
it, prior to a recalculation of alimony.
In sum, we reverse and remand for a hearing to review and recalculate
alimony. In determining the amount of alimony, the court must consider the
parties' financial circumstances, and the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-
23(b) to enter an order that is "fit, reasonable, and just." N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.
To the extent we have not addressed any remaining arguments raised by
defendant, it is because they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a
written decision. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with our
opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
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