State of New Jersey v. Wallace Gaskins ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0289-23
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
WALLACE GASKINS, a/k/a
WALLACE N. GASKINS,
WALLACE MICHAEL,
WALLACE MILLER,
WALLACE N. MILLER,
and WALLACE N. MOORE,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________
Submitted September 30, 2024 – Decided October 25, 2024
Before Judges Sabatino and Berdote Byrne.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 08-08-2556.
Wallace Gaskins, appellant pro se.
Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Debra G. Simms, Deputy Attorney
General, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant appeals from the denial of a motion to correct an illegal
sentence, arguing the Supreme Court's decision in State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246(2021) applies retroactively and required the sentencing court to conduct an
overall fairness evaluation before imposing a consecutive sentence. Because we
have, on several prior occasions, held defendant's sentence is valid, and the
absence of a Torres statement does not render a sentence illegal, we affirm the
trial court's ruling.
On August 22, 2008, defendant was indicted with first-degree purposeful
or knowing murder, in contravention of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1)(2) (count one);
first-degree attempted murder, in contravention of N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and N.J.S.A.
2C:11-3 (count two); two counts of second-degree unlawful possession of a
handgun, in contravention of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) (counts three and eight,
respectively); and second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful
purpose, in contravention of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) (count four). A jury convicted
him of first-degree aggravated manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of
count one, and counts two through four.
Gaskins was sentenced on March 1, 2010. For count one, the sentencing
court imposed a sentence of thirty years, with an eighty-five percent period of
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parole ineligibility pursuant to the No Early Release Act 1 ("NERA"), which
included fifteen years required by the Graves Act, 2 and five years of supervision
upon release. The sentencing judge merged defendant's count two and count
four convictions and sentenced him to an aggregate extended term of life
imprisonment with an eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility pursuant
to NERA and the required fifteen years pursuant to the Graves Act. For count
three, the sentencing judge imposed a concurrent sentence of ten years, with a
five-year period of parole ineligibility pursuant to the Graves Act. Finally, for
count eight, although severed and not tried against defendant, the sentencing
judge imposed a concurrent ten-year sentence with a five-year period of parole
ineligibility pursuant to the Graves Act.
Defendant filed a direct appeal challenging both the convictions and his
sentence, specifically arguing the sentences were manifestly excessive and his
conviction for count eight was in error because it was never tried. We affirmed
the convictions, vacated the sentence as to count eight, and remanded for
resentencing on counts one and two, expressing concern that the trial court
sentenced defendant to the highest end of the statutory ranges and ran the
1
N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.
2
N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c).
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sentences consecutively. State v. Gaskins, No. A-4936-09 (App. Div. July 25,
2012). On resentencing, the trial court reduced the initial thirty-year sentence
for count one to twenty years, subject to an eighty-five percent NERA parole
disqualifier and the Graves Act, but, after consideration, allowed counts one and
two to remain consecutive. All other sentences remained the same except for
count eight, which was vacated.
Defendant subsequently filed a self-represented petition for post-
conviction relief ("PCR") alleging his trial attorney's concession on the gun
charges, failure to cross-examine the arresting officer, and failure to object to a
portion of the prosecutor's summation amounted to ineffective assistance of
counsel, which we rejected, see State v. Gaskins, No. A-1283-15 (App. Div.
Mar. 28, 2017), and the Supreme Court denied certification. See State v.
Gaskins, 231 N.J. 183 (2017). Defendant then filed a second self-represented
PCR petition alleging his trial attorney and PCR counsel failed to include
testimony, facts, and arguments to adequately support defendant's case and
amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel, which we also denied, see State
v. Gaskins, A-3877-17 (June 10, 2019), and the Supreme Court denied
certification. See State v. Gaskins, 240 N.J. 145 (2019).
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Defendant next filed a self-represented habeas corpus petition in the
United States Federal District Court, alleging: (1) the PCR court failed to
address the issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel when counsel failed
to fully inform him of the penal consequences of the State's plea agreement; (2)
the PCR court abused its discretion by refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing ;
and (3) the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive. The District Court
rejected these claims and found each of defendant's sentences within the
statutory limits. See Gaskins v. Johnson, No. 18-1440 (D.N.J. June 30, 2021).
Defendant then filed a motion before the Law Division for a change of
sentence pursuant to Rule 3:21-10(b)(3), alleging, in part, that the sentencing
court did not address every factor enumerated in State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J.
627 (1985), and it did not cite to any statutory basis for imposing consecutive
sentences. Even though the court found defendant failed to comply with the
rule's requirements because the prosecuting attorney had not joined in
defendant's motion, it nonetheless addressed defendant's arguments
substantively and found no merit.
Undeterred, defendant filed a motion to correct an alleged illegal sentence,
claiming his sentence violated the Code of Criminal Justice 3 because the
3
See R. 3:21-10(b)(5).
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sentencing court failed to conduct an "overall fairness" evaluation as required
by Torres before imposing consecutive terms, which the trial court denied. This
appeal followed. We agree with the trial court and affirm.
First, on direct appeal, we have previously concluded defendant's current
sentence is legal and was imposed in accordance with all applicable law. See
Gaskins, No. A-4936-09 (App. Div. July 25, 2012) (slip op. at 24) ("[W]e see
no error in the judge's decision to impose consecutive sentences under the
circumstances of this case . . . ."). Therefore, we need not address the
consecutive nature of the sentences again and decline to do so.
Secondly, we disagree with defendant's contention that Torres applies
retroactively. Torres did not create a new rule of law requiring retroactive
application to this matter, where defendant was sentenced over eleven years
before Torres was decided. In Torres, our Supreme Court explained its intention
"to underscore" and "promote" the "concepts of uniformity, predictability, and
proportionality" that underlie the factors laid out in Yarbough. Torres, 246 N.J.
at 252-53. The Supreme Court stated:
We reiterate the repeated instruction that a sentencing
court's decision whether to impose consecutive
sentences should retain focus on "the fairness of the
overall sentence." [State v.] Miller, 108 N.J. [112,] 122
[(1987)]; see also State v. Abdullah, 184 N.J. 497(2005). Toward that end, the sentencing court's
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explanation of its evaluation of the fairness of the
overall sentence is "a necessary feature in any
Yarbough analysis." [State v.] Cuff, 239 N.J. [321,]
352 [(2019)].
[Id. at 270.]
Torres did not announce a new rule. It reemphasized the long-established
requirement that a sentencing court must provide "an explanation of the overall
fairness of [a] consecutive sentence." Ibid. Regardless, the absence of a Torres
statement does not render a sentence illegal.
We have previously determined the trial court properly considered the
defendant's consecutive sentences when we considered defendant's direct
appeal. See Gaskins, No. A-4936-09 (slip op. at 21-24). Certainly, after our
remand, where we expressed concern defendant had been sentenced at the
highest end of each range and the sentences had been imposed consecutively,
the trial court carefully considered the re-imposition of consecutive sentences.
Affirmed.
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