State of New Jersey v. Robert J. Hartobey ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3498-22
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ROBERT J. HARTOBEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________
Argued October 1, 2024 – Decided October 25, 2024
Before Judges Gooden Brown and Vanek.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Somerset County, Indictment No. 21-04-
0268.
Rachel E. Leslie, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
argued the cause for appellant (Jennifer N. Sellitti,
Public Defender, attorney; Rachel E. Leslie, of counsel
and on the briefs).
Alyssa N. Biamonte, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the
cause for respondent (John P. McDonald, Somerset
County Prosecutor, attorney; Alyssa N. Biamonte, of
ounsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Following a jury trial, defendant Robert Hartobey was convicted of animal
cruelty stemming from him kicking and punching his dog, Nessa. The State's
proofs at trial included eyewitness testimony from a good Samaritan, two
responding police officers, an animal control officer, and a veterinarian, all of
whom saw the dog either during the attack or the day after. Defendant, who was
already serving a sentence of parole supervision for life (PSL), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-
6.4, for an unrelated conviction, received a county jail sentence with additional
conditions imposed on his PSL sentence.
On appeal, defendant raises the following points for our consideration:
POINT I
DEFENDANT'S ANIMAL CRUELTY CONVICTION
MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE JURY
INSTRUCTIONS FAILED TO DEFINE THE
CENTRAL ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE. (NOT
RAISED BELOW).
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL
BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT
EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT ACTED
UNNECESSARILY OR CRUELY.
A-3498-22
2
POINT III
THE NON-CUSTODIAL PORTION OF
DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE IS ILLEGAL AND
MUST BE VACATED BECAUSE THE COURT HAD
NO AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE CONDITIONS ON
DEFENDANT'S PAROLE SUPERVISION FOR LIFE,
AND BECAUSE ALL SENTENCES MUST BE
AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
1. Sentencing Courts Lack Jurisdiction To
Impose Conditions Of Parole.
2. Sentencing Courts May Only Impose
Sentences Authorized By Statute.
Based on our review of the record and the applicable legal principles, we affirm
the conviction but vacate the noncustodial portion of defendant's sentence.
I.
On April 14, 2021, defendant was charged in a Somerset County
indictment with fourth degree cruelty to animals, N.J.S.A. 4:22-17(c)(1). We
glean these facts from the three-day jury trial conducted from May 8 to 10, 2023.
At approximately 10:00 p.m. on May 8, 2020, Heather Dougherty was
"sitting down in [her] living room" with her dog when she heard "a loud thud
against [her] house," followed "about ten seconds later" by "another loud thud."
Dougherty went outside onto her porch and observed a man "kicking" what she
believed was "a book bag" until she "heard . . . whimpering and realized it was
A-3498-22
3
a dog." Dougherty did not see the man "slam [the] dog against" the foundation
of her house but testified that she "felt it from [her] living room" and that her
dog reacted to it. After yelling at the man "to get the hell off that dog," to which
the man responded that she should "get [her] . . . fat ass back in the house,"
Dougherty went back inside and called 9-1-1. According to Dougherty, as she
reported the incident to the 9-1-1 dispatcher, she observed defendant "kicking"
and "dragging" the dog. She testified the dog "wasn't walking" and "was
whimpering."
Manville Police Officers Michael Zangrillo and David Somonski
responded and observed a man, later identified as defendant, fitting the
description reported in the dispatch. When they arrived on the scene, the officers
saw defendant "striking" the dog "with a closed fist" on "[t]he top of [her] head,"
using "a downward motion." Defendant had "the dog leashed around the neck"
and was "pulling the leash . . . to force the dog to raise [her] head," which Officer
Zangrillo believed was "to make it easier to strike the dog." The officers
witnessed defendant strike the dog twice and then "made contact with
[defendant] as he was attempting his third [strike]."
The officers described defendant as "intoxicated" with "[s]lurred speech,
bloodshot watery eyes, unsteady[,] staggering walk" and emitting "the odor of
A-3498-22
4
an alcoholic beverage . . . on his breath and . . . person." The dog, later identified
as Nessa, "appeared frightened of . . . defendant" and "scared." She had her "tail
between her legs,"1 her ears tucked "behind [her] head," and she was
"whimpering," "shaking," and "cowering towards the ground." She had an "open
wound" and "fresh blood" on "the very top of [her] head" about "an inch . . .
from her eye." The officers arrested defendant and brought Nessa "[b]ack to the
police station." While at the police station, Nessa was still "[f]rightened,"
"shaking," and "scared." She ran "underneath a trailer" in the station's "sally
port" and "just laid down."
The police contacted the Somerset Regional Animal Shelter to pick up
Nessa, and animal control officer Christopher Moroney responded to the call.
When Moroney arrived at the police station, Nessa was in the "bay area" where
the police cars were located and "hunkered down under [a] car, . . . trying to
make herself as small as could be." According to Moroney, Nessa appeared
"very nervous" and "very frightened." Moroney used dog treats to "coax [Nessa]
out," "lifted her in[to the shelter's] truck," and "transported her to the shelter."
When Moroney picked Nessa up, "she yelped" as if she was in pain.
1
There was conflicting testimony as to whether Nessa had a tail. On cross-
examination, Officer Somonski testified that "[t]he tail looked like it was
between [the dog's] legs."
A-3498-22
5
The next day, Moroney took Nessa to Whitehouse Veterinary Hospital
where Dr. Brett Newton examined her. Newton "approximated Nessa's age to
be around six months old" and testified that she weighed "[a]bout [fifty]
pounds." Nessa underwent a "full physical examination," including
"radiographs," "a cursory ultrasound," and "blood tests." The radiographs were
"normal" and did not show "bruising to the lungs or broken ribs." Both the
cursory ultrasound and blood work also came back "normal." Newton observed
"some abnormalities in the physical examination," notably "ear mites" as well
as "scabbing and hair loss in a couple [of] different places." Newton believed
that "demodectic mange" was "one of the possible causes for the hair loss on
Nessa's body."
Defendant produced two witnesses, his mother, Catherine McCarthney,
whom Nessa lived with after leaving the shelter, and Dr. Beth Sulner, who was
qualified "as an expert in veterinary medicine" and who treated Nessa over three
months after the incident. McCarthney described Nessa as a "shy" "couch
potato" who "sleeps all the time." She agreed that Nessa was not "violent,"
"vicious," or "aggressive," and was a "very lovable" dog.
Sulner testified that Nessa was brought to her veterinary practice on
August 13, 2020, and treated by her associate, Dr. Jennifer Feeney. According
A-3498-22
6
to hospital notes reviewed by Sulner, Nessa "came in for a patch of hair loss on
the top of her head." Feeney's examination, which included a skin scrape,
revealed that Nessa had "demodex," "a type of mite that lives under the skin."
As a result, Nessa was diagnosed with "mange."
After the jury returned a guilty verdict, the judge sentenced defendant to
180 days in the county jail and imposed various conditions on his PSL sentence.
The judge memorialized the sentence in a conforming judgment of conviction
entered on June 27, 2023, and this appeal followed.
II.
In Point I, defendant argues he "was denied a fair trial because the critical
element of the animal cruelty charge was never defined for the jury."
Specifically, defendant argues that although the State proceeded "under the
theory that [defendant] 'unnecessarily or cruelly beat' or 'cruelly abuse[d]' the
dog," the jury instructions failed to define "'unnecessarily' and 'cruelly.'"
Defendant further asserts that although the judge "followed the language of the
model charge for animal cruelty," the charge "adds nothing to the statutory terms
of the offense" and fails to "define the acts that constitute" "cruel" or
"unnecessary." Defendant posits that although our courts have not "explored
the meaning of these terms in this context, . . . child cruelty cases provide a
A-3498-22
7
useful analog." At trial, defendant did not ask the judge to tailor the model jury
charge nor did defendant object to the charge that was delivered.
The governing legal principles that guide our analysis are well settled.
"Appropriate and proper charges to a jury are essential for a fair trial." State v.
Lora, 465 N.J. Super. 477, 501 (App. Div. 2020) (quoting State v. Green, 86
N.J. 281, 287 (1981)). "Jury charges must provide a 'comprehensible
explanation of the questions that the jury must determine, including the law of
the case applicable to the facts that the jury may find.'" State v. Singleton, 211
N.J. 157, 181-82 (2012) (quoting Green, 86 N.J. at 287-88).
If a defendant does not object when a charge is given, as here, "there is a
presumption that the charge was not error and was unlikely to prejudice the
defendant's case." State v. Montalvo, 229 N.J. 300, 320 (2017) (quoting
Singleton, 211 N.J. at 182). When there is no objection, we review for plain
error and "disregard any alleged error 'unless it is of such a nature as to have
been clearly capable of producing an unjust result.'" State v. Funderburg, 225
N.J. 66, 79 (2016) (quoting R. 2:10-2); see State v. Adams, 194 N.J. 186, 206-
07 (2008) ("Generally, a defendant waives the right to contest an instruction on
appeal if he does not object to the instructions as required by Rule 1:7-2.").
A-3498-22
8
Plain error in a jury charge is "[l]egal impropriety in the charge
prejudicially affecting the substantial rights of the defendant [and] sufficiently
grievous to justify notice by the reviewing court and to convince the court that
of itself the error possessed a clear capacity to bring about an unjust result."
State v. Camacho, 218 N.J. 533, 554 (2014) (first alteration in original) (quoting
Adams, 194 N.J. at 207). "Nevertheless, because clear and correct jury
instructions are fundamental to a fair trial, erroneous instructions in a criminal
case are 'poor candidates for rehabilitation under the plain error theory.'"
Adams, 194 N.J. at 207 (quoting State v. Jordan, 147 N.J. 409, 422-23 (1997)).
To determine whether there was error in a jury charge, "[t]he charge must
be read as a whole." State v. Torres, 183 N.J. 554, 564 (2005) (citing Jordan,
147 N.J. at 422). We "must not look at portions of the charge alleged to be
erroneous in isolation; rather, 'the charge should be examined as a whole to
determine its overall effect,' and 'whether the challenged language was
misleading or ambiguous.'" State v. McKinney, 223 N.J. 475, 494 (2015) (first
quoting Jordan, 147 N.J. at 422; and then quoting State v. Nelson, 173 N.J. 417,
447 (2002)). In addition, the error "must be evaluated in light 'of the overall
strength of the State's case.'" State v. Walker, 203 N.J. 73, 90 (2010) (quoting
State v. Chapland, 187 N.J. 275, 289 (2006)).
A-3498-22
9
Here, defendant was charged with animal cruelty under N.J.S.A. 4:22-
17(c)(1), which provides "[i]t shall be unlawful to purposely, knowingly, or
recklessly . . . [t]orment, torture, maim, hang, poison, unnecessarily or cruelly
beat, cruelly abuse, or needlessly mutilate a living animal or creature . . . ." In
the final charge, the judge instructed the jury:
[I]n order to find the defendant guilty of this
offense . . . , the State must prove each of the following
elements beyond a reasonable doubt. There are three
elements. Number one, that the defendant acted
purposely, knowingly, or recklessly; number two, that
the defendant committed one or more of the following
acts, tormented, tortured, maimed, hung, poisoned,
unnecessarily or cruelly beat, cruelly abused or
needlessly mutilated; and, number three, that the
defendant committed this conduct against a living
animal or creature.
In explaining the second element to the jury, the judge stated:
[T]he second element that the State must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt is that the defendant committed one
or more of the following acts, tormented the animal,
tortured the animal, maimed the animal, hung the
animal, poisoned the animal, unnecessarily or cruelly
beat the animal, cruelly abused the animal or needlessly
mutilated the animal. Specifically, the State alleges
here that [defendant] unnecessarily or cruelly beat or
cruelly abused Nessa, the six-month-old puppy.
In instructing the jury, the judge read the model jury charge in its entirety
almost verbatim. See Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Animal Cruelty –
A-3498-22
10
Torment/Torture (N.J.S.A. 4:22-17(c)(1))" (approved June 7, 2021). Although
model jury charges "are not binding authority," State v. Bryant, 419 N.J. Super.
15, 28 (App. Div. 2011), "a jury charge is presumed to be proper when it tracks
the model jury charge because the process to adopt model jury charges is
'comprehensive and thorough.'" State v. Cotto, 471 N.J. Super. 489, 543 (App.
Div. 2022) (quoting State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308, 325 (2005)); see Mogull v. C.B.
Com. Real Est. Grp., Inc., 162 N.J. 449, 466 (2000) (noting that "[i]t is difficult
to find that a charge that follows the Model Charge so closely constitutes plain
error"); see also R.B., 183 N.J. at 325 (instructing trial courts to follow the model
jury charges and read them "in their entirety to the jury").
Defendant invites us to look to "child cruelty cases" as "a useful analog"
because, he asserts, the model jury charge for child abuse defines the term
"cruelty." We decline the invitation. The model jury charge for child abuse
does not define the term "cruelty" generally; instead, it provides "that the State
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt . . . that defendant knowingly committed
an act of cruelty against" a child and then provides five possible "act[s] of
cruelty," one or more of which the defendant must have committed to be found
guilty of the charge. See Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Abuse/Cruelty to
Child (Non-Parent/Guardian/Person Having Control) (N.J.S.A. 9:6-1; N.J.S.A.
A-3498-22
11
9:6-3)" (approved April 16, 2012). Similarly, the model jury charge for animal
cruelty provides that "the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt . . . that
the defendant committed one or more of the following acts" and then defines
those acts as "tormented the animal; tortured the animal; maimed the animal;
hung the animal; poisoned the animal; unnecessarily or cruelly beat the animal;
cruelly abused the animal; or needlessly mutilated the animal." Model Jury
Charges (Criminal), "Animal Cruelty – Torment/Torture (N.J.S.A. 4:22-
17(c)(1))" (approved June 7, 2021).
We have previously acknowledged that "[a] court's obligation properly to
instruct and to guide a jury includes the duty to clarify statutory language that
prescribes the elements of a crime when clarification is essential to ensure that
the jury will fully understand and actually find those elements in determining
the defendant's guilt." State v. N.I., 349 N.J. Super. 299, 308 (App. Div. 2002)
(quoting State v. Alexander, 136 N.J. 563, 571 (1994)). However, "[t]his is not
to say that every word used in a charge must be further defined even when it has
a readily and commonly understood meaning." Id. at 308 (citing State v. Rovito,
99 N.J. 581, 584-85 (1985)). Indeed, "[c]ertain words can be understood by 'a
person of average intelligence' and 'would not send the average citizen
scrambling for a dictionary.'" Id. at 308-09 (quoting State v. Afanador, 134 N.J.
A-3498-22
12
162, 171 (1993)). As such, "[w]ords 'used by ordinary citizens in everyday
conversation' need not be defined." Id. at 309 (quoting Afanador, 134 N.J. at
175). Here, we are satisfied that "cruelly" and "unnecessarily" required no
further definition or clarification for the jury.
In Point II, defendant argues that because "the State did not present
sufficient evidence that [defendant] acted unnecessarily or cruelly," the trial
court erroneously denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal and "the [animal
cruelty] offense should not have been submitted for the jury's consideration."
"Motions for a judgment of acquittal are governed by Rule 3:18-1," State
v. Tindell, 417 N.J. Super. 530, 548 (App. Div. 2011), which provides in part,
"[a]t the close of the State's case . . . , the court shall, on defendant's motion or
its own initiative, order the entry of a judgment of acquittal of one or more
offenses charged in the indictment . . . if the evidence is insufficient to warrant
a conviction."
But
a trial court must deny the defendant's motion if
"viewing the State's evidence in its entirety . . . and
giving the State the benefit of all its favorable
testimony as well as all of the favorable inferences
which reasonably could be drawn therefrom, a
reasonable jury could find guilt . . . beyond a reasonable
doubt." State v. Wilder, 193 N.J. 398, 406 (2008)
(quoting State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454, 458-59 (1967)).
A-3498-22
13
[State v. Ellis, 424 N.J. Super. 267, 273 (App. Div.
2012) (omissions in original).]
"On appeal, we utilize the same standard as the trial court in determining
whether a judgment of acquittal was warranted," ibid., but we apply "a de novo
standard of review," State v. Williams, 218 N.J. 576, 593-94 (2014), and "owe
no deference to the findings of . . . the trial court," State v. Lodzinski, 249 N.J.
116, 145 (2021).
At the close of the State's case, defendant moved for a judgment of
acquittal, arguing the evidence was insufficient to warrant a conviction for
animal cruelty. Relying on the testimony of Dougherty and the two responding
police officers, all of whom actually observed defendant repeatedly strike Nessa,
the judge denied the motion. We agree that viewing the State's evidence in its
entirety in the light most favorable to the State, a reasonable jury could have
found defendant guilty of animal cruelty. Three witnesses testified that they
saw defendant physically assault Nessa. Dougherty saw defendant kick Nessa
and the responding officers both saw defendant punch Nessa twice and attempt
a third strike before they interceded. Further, Zangrillo and Somonski observed
an "open wound" and "fresh blood" on "the very top of [Nessa's] head."
Additionally, both officers as well as Moroney described Nessa as scared and
frightened. Moroney also testified that Nessa "yelped" as if she was in pain
A-3498-22
14
when he picked her up to load her into the truck.
Defendant asserts "the State was required to prove that [he] inflicted
unnecessary pain or suffering, or prolonged torment, upon the animal" and "[t]he
State failed to carry that burden" because "the dog had no signs of bruising, no
signs of trauma, and no fractures" the day after defendant's arrest, and none of
the State's witnesses "testified about events preceding the alleged punching or
kicking." However, contrary to defendant's assertions, the State was only
required to present evidence that defendant unnecessarily or cruelly beat Nessa,
which it did. Indeed, a violation of the statute will be upgraded from fourth
degree to third degree if "the animal or creature suffers serious bodily injury as
a result of the violation." N.J.S.A. 4:22-17(d)(1)(b).
In Point III, defendant argues that because the judge had "no authority" to
impose conditions on his existing PSL sentence, the non-custodial portion of his
sentence was not "authorized by law" and "must be vacated." The challenged
conditions of parole are that defendant shall: (1) have no contact with Nessa;
(2) never own or care for any other animals; and (3) attend anger management
counseling. Defendant does not contest the 180-day county jail sentence or
financial penalties imposed.
The legality of a sentence is reviewed "de novo, 'affording no special
A-3498-22
15
deference to the court['s] interpretation of the relevant statutes.'" State v.
Steingraber, 465 N.J. Super. 322, 327-28 (App. Div. 2020) (alteration in
original) (quoting State v. Nance, 228 N.J. 378, 393 (2017)). We "may correct
an illegal sentence 'at any time before it is completed.'" Id. at 328 (quoting State
v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 247 (2000)); see R. 3:21-10(b)(5) ("A motion may be
filed and an order may be entered at any time . . . correcting a sentence not
authorized by law including the Code of Criminal Justice . . . ."). "If a
defendant's sentence is illegal, a reviewing court must remand for resentencing."
Steingraber, 465 N.J. Super. at 328.
"There are two categories of illegal sentences: those that exceed the
penalties authorized for a particular offense, and those that are not authorized
by law." State v. Hyland, 238 N.J. 135, 145 (2019).
Those two categories of illegal sentences have been
"defined narrowly." [Murray, 162 N.J. at 246]. For
example, . . . [a sentence] is not illegal if the sentencing
judge fails to state the reasons for imposition of a
sentence on the record as is required by case law, but
otherwise imposes an authorized sentence[.] [State v.]
Acevedo, 205 N.J. [40,] 47 [(2011)]. In other words,
even sentences that disregard controlling case law or
rest on an abuse of discretion by the sentencing court
are legal so long as they impose penalties authorized by
statute for a particular offense and include a disposition
that is authorized by law.
[Id. at 145-46.]
A-3498-22
16
In State v. Beauchamp, pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant
pleaded guilty to burglary and contempt and was sentenced to an aggregate
prison term of five years. 262 N.J. Super. 532, 534 (App. Div. 1993). At his
plea hearing, the "defendant admitted to a January 1990 burglary at the home of
his estranged wife and a May 1990 violation of a temporary restraint issued
pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act [of 1991], [N.J.S.A.
2C:25-17 to -35], under which defendant had been ordered to stay away from
his wife." Ibid. Three sentencing proceedings were conducted, resulting in the
entry of an amended judgment of conviction that prohibited the defendant from
entering the Township of Fairfield or contacting the victim at her place of
employment in Fairfield as a "condition for release from custody." Id. at 534-
35. In support, the judge explained that the defendant "ha[d] continued to
threaten to kill his wife while incarcerated" and "repeated these threats to family
members." Id. at 535.
On appeal, the defendant challenged the trial court's authority to impose
conditions of parole as part of the sentence imposed. Ibid. We reversed, holding
that "the trial court had no authority to impose conditions of parole." Id. at 536.
We reasoned:
We can understand the considerations that
motivated the sentencing judge, in the circumstances he
A-3498-22
17
faced, to establish the conditions of parole. We share
his concerns for the safety of the victim and her family
in the light of defendant's past conduct. We are,
nevertheless, constrained to conclude that, under clear,
prevailing rules of law, a sentencing judge is without
the power to establish conditions of parole, even those
that are case- or party-related and may be warranted by
the nature of the circumstances or the quality of the
relationships.
[Ibid.]
Because the defendant was not yet on parole, we expressed "concern[]
with the wisdom of judicially established conditions for parole which are crafted
on sentencing day to govern a defendant some time in the future when he
becomes eligible for parole." Ibid. We also relied on separation of powers
principles to support our decision, stating:
Under our constitutional and statutory scheme,
once a trial court has pronounced sentence and entered
a judgment of conviction, it relinquishes jurisdiction
over the matter to the executive branch, except for the
appellate process and to the extent that regular
procedures permit the matter to be reopened in a
judicial forum for limited purposes which can be
achieved only in a court. See, e.g., R. 3:21-10; 3:22.
Just as the executive branch of government may
not intrude unduly on the judiciary's discharge of its
responsibilities in the sentencing process, State v.
Lagares, 127 N.J. 20, [27-28] (1992), so is the judicial
branch limited in its role thereafter as the sentence is
executed. Creation of the substantive standards
governing both branches is the province of the third, the
A-3498-22
18
legislative, State v. Des Marets, 92 N.J. 62, 80-81
(1983); and the respective prerogatives of the judiciary
and the executive are each immune from undue
intrusion by the other branch. N.J. Const. art. III, [¶] 1.
[Id. at 537.]
We noted that whereas the sentencing judge's "emphatic
recommendations" had "meaning and viability as background for the Parole
Board," the conditions "articulated by the sentencing judge" were "a nullity
insofar as they were designed to govern and control the decisions whether, when,
and under what conditions parole would be granted to defendant" and therefore
had to "be modified to reflect their correct character as recommendations and
not as mandates." Id. at 538. Indeed, "[t]he symmetry of the constitutional
scheme permits the judicial and executive branches to participate in the other's
province by way of recommendation but not by way of directing the outcome. "
Id. at 537.
Applying these principles, we agree with defendant that the judge did not
have the authority to impose conditions on his existing PSL sentence .
Considering the separation of powers concerns expressed in Beauchamp, the fact
that defendant was already on parole does not justify a different outcome. We
are equally unpersuaded by the State's invited error argument based on defense
counsel inviting the judge to impose anger management counseling as a
A-3498-22
19
condition of defendant's PSL sentence. See State v. Manzie, 335 N.J. Super.
267, 278 (App. Div. 2000) ("[A] defendant may not acquiesce in the imposition
of an illegal sentence."). Accordingly, we affirm the conviction and the
custodial portion of the sentence but vacate the conditions imposed on
defendant's PSL sentence and remand for modification of the judgment of
conviction to conform with this opinion.2
The conviction is affirmed; the sentence is affirmed in part, reversed in
part, and remanded for modification of the judgment of conviction consistent
with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
2
Although N.J.S.A. 4:22-26.2 allows a sentencing court to ban a person
convicted of an animal cruelty violation from owning, harboring, residing with,
or having custody or control of any other animals, the statute became effective
in July 2023, more than three years after defendant's offense and over one month
after defendant's sentence, and is not implicated in this appeal.
A-3498-22
20