Alexander Schachtel v. Ping Zhang Hughes ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NOS. A-3510-21
A-3728-21
ALEXANDER SCHACHTEL,
LAW OFFICE OF
ALEXANDER SCHACHTEL,
LLC,
Plaintiffs,
and
MAGGI KHALIL MAKSOUD
and LAW OFFICE OF MAGGI
KHALIL MAKSOUD, LLC,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
PING ZHANG HUGHES 1 a/k/a
JOANNA ZHANG, PING
ZHANG, A.J. PARK, PING
LIANG, and PING ZING
LIANG,
1
We note the caption attached to defendant's notices of appeal reflect her name
as "Ping Zhang Hughs," however, the caption on the final judgment order and
on her brief states "Ping Zhang Hughes." Therefore, we refer to defendant as
"Hughes" in our opinion.
Defendant-Appellant.
______________________________
Argued October 8, 2024 – Decided October 25, 2024
Before Judges Firko and Bishop-Thompson.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Hudson County, Docket No. L-3590-18.
Joel N. Kreizman argued the cause for appellant
(Scarinci & Hollenbeck, LLC, attorneys; Joel N.
Kreizman, of counsel and on the brief; James A.
Plaisted, on the brief).
Michael Confusione argued the cause for respondents
(Hegge & Confusione, LLC, attorneys; Michael
Confusione, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
We calendared these appeals back-to-back and consolidated them for
purposes of this opinion because they arise from the same facts. In September
2015, Hughes retained plaintiff Maggi Khalil Maksoud (Maksoud) to represent
her in a divorce proceeding. Shortly thereafter, Maksoud terminated the
attorney-client relationship due to Hughes's refusal to take her advice. Maksoud
refunded Hughes the unused portion of her retainer.
Hughes wrote a negative online review of Maksoud and her firm, the Law
Office of Maggi Khalil Maksoud, LLC (the firm). Hughes also filed a lawsuit
seeking return of her entire retainer in addition to other damages. Following a
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jury trial, the jury determined Maksoud had over-refunded Hughes. Thereafter,
Hughes filed two motions for a new trial, which were both denied. She also
filed an ethics complaint against Maksoud's trial attorney, which was ultimately
dismissed.
Hughes then published more negative online reviews of Maksoud and the
firm, claiming Maksoud stole her retainer for personal use, never performed
work on her case, and was under ethics review. All of those statements were
false.
Around the same time as making those false reviews of Maksoud, Hughes
consulted co-plaintiff Alexander Schachtel. Following the consultation, Hughes
posted negative online reviews of him and his firm that similarly contained false
statements.
Maksoud and Schachtel jointly filed the complaint under review against
Hughes alleging defamation, malicious use of process, and intentional infliction
of emotional distress (IIED). Because Hughes failed to respond to discovery
requests, her answer to the complaint was stricken with prejudice and default
was entered against her. 2 Schachtel then settled his claims with Hughes.
2
Hughes moved to reinstate her answer. The court denied the motion.
A-3510-21
3
Following a proof hearing, the trial court found Maksoud: (1) had proven
a cause of action of defamation, for which it awarded $500.00 in nominal
damages; (2) had not proven malicious use of process; and (3) had established
IIED, and ordered a separate damages hearing to be conducted to determine the
amount of the award. The court also ordered Hughes to take down all online
reviews of Maksoud and the firm.
On March 22, 2022, the court conducted the proof hearing on the amount
of damages to award for IIED. The court rendered an oral decision that day, and
entered judgment in favor of Maksoud and against Hughes, awarding
compensatory damages for IIED in the amount of $522,700.00. The court also
awarded $42,393.00 in counsel fees to Maksoud. The court entered an order of
disposition on March 22, 2022, and permitted Maksoud's attorney to submit a
certification of services for his fees incurred subsequent to the March 1, 2021
certification of Maksoud, which addressed her damages and an itemization of
her time and monies expended by her relative to this matter. Hughes filed a
motion for reconsideration, which was denied.
On June 7, 2022, the civil presiding judge—who was not the court
presiding over the proof hearings—entered an order for judgment, which
included a calculation of pre- and post-judgment interest in accordance with
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4
Rule 4:42-11, and entered a total judgment against Hughes in the amount of
$664,947.75, plus accruing daily interest. 3 In A-3510-21, Hughes appeals from
the March 22, 2022 order of disposition entering default judgment in favor of
Maksoud.
On appeal, Hughes argues: (1) the court erred in finding Maksoud had
proven a case of IIED and awarding damages; (2) Maksoud's causes of action
were barred by res judicata, collateral estoppel, and the entire controversy
doctrine; (3) Maksoud's claims for IIED and defamation were barred by the First
Amendment; and (4) the court erred in awarding damages based on stress
Maksoud claimed to have experienced as a result of litigation. Based upon our
review of the record, we conclude the March 22, 2022 order of disposition
entering default judgment as to the IIED claim and awarding counsel fees was
based on adequate, substantial, and credible evidence, and we affirm.
As to A-3728-21, the appeal is dismissed because Hughes and Schachtel
settled their claims and did not file merits briefs.
3
The June 7, 2022 order for judgment also states: "upon completion of punitive
damages discovery, [Maksoud] may request a [p]roof [h]earing on the issue of
whether to award punitive damages to [Maksoud] and against [Hughes]." The
record does not reflect whether a punitive damages hearing occurred.
A-3510-21
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I.
A.
Factual Background
The record reveals the following relevant facts, allegations, and
procedural history. On September 4, 2015, Maksoud met with Hughes regarding
a potential divorce case against her husband. Maksoud and Hughes spoke on
the phone a few times thereafter. On September 17, 2015, Hughes formally
retained Maksoud, signed a retainer agreement, and paid a $4,000.00 retainer
fee. Maksoud started to perform work for Hughes.
Shortly after representation began and prior to Maksoud's filing anything
on behalf of Hughes, on September 28, 2015, Maksoud terminated the attorney-
client relationship due to Hughes's refusal to take her legal advice. Maksoud
refunded Hughes the unused portion of her retainer in the amount of $3,015.00,
and sent Hughes an invoice, which reflected summarized, reduced charges.
Hughes did not agree with the amount she was refunded; instead, she
demanded repayment of the entire retainer. Maksoud explained to Hughes that
she earned her fees and would not be providing any more of a refund. Hughes
then requested an itemized bill, and Maksoud obliged.
A-3510-21
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On October 26, 2015, Maksoud appeared in person at Maksoud's office,
refusing to leave until she received a full refund. Ultimately, the police were
called, and Hughes was removed from the office. Shortly after this incident,
Hughes published a lengthy negative review of Maksoud and the firm on
Avvo.com:4
I went back home after 10:30 pm. I wrote her email:
not do anything and I will let her know… However,
she kept calling me and threaten she will file court
appearance her own… She took $1000 from my
retainer only with "courtesy" after 30 days no bill. She
holds another remaining $3000 no refund, unless I
accept her "5 hrs 30 minutes service". She called Police
I harassing her? Stay away from this harassing
Prosecutor!
B.
The Litigation
On July 12, 2017, Hughes filed a complaint 5 in the Law Division against
Maksoud, and demanded damages of $4,000.00, in addition to court costs. On
4
"Avvo is a comprehensive online legal marketplace connecting consumers and
attorneys through its online directory, attorney profiles, question and answer
forum, reviews, and other features. More than eight million consumers visit
monthly to research their legal issue and find the right lawyers, which helps
attorneys grow their practice." About Us, Martindale-Avvo,
https://www.martindale-avvo.com/about/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2024).
5
Docket No. HUD-DC-9433-17.
A-3510-21
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October 23, 2017, Hughes voluntarily dismissed that action by way of
stipulation.
On October 30, 2017, Hughes filed another complaint6 in the Law
Division against Maksoud and demanded damages in the amount of $15,000.00.
In her complaint, Hughes alleged: "Count I. Dishonest, Bully and Insult,
Wanton Disregard of [Hughes's] Right"; "Count II. Improper Withdrew, Gross
Retaliation on Fraudulent Excessive Fees"; "Count III. Reckless Threat with
Further Damages on Dispute, Maksoud's Attack and LIES"; "Count IV. Gross
Retaliation on A Fraudulent and Abusive Written Accounting, Excessive Fees";
and "Count V. Egregious Actual Malice – Multi-Intentional [Wanton] Personal
Attack."
On December 11, 2017, Maksoud moved to dismiss Hughes's complaint
for failure to state a claim. On December 20, 2017, Hughes cross-moved for
"sanctions" relative to Maksoud's "frivolous motion." On January 5, 2018, the
court denied Maksoud's motion, noting that "a motion to dismiss cannot be
granted if a cause of action can be gleaned even from an obscure statement ."
The court also denied Hughes's cross-motion.
6
Docket No. HUD-DC-14482-17.
A-3510-21
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In March 2018, Hughes's complaint against Maksoud proceeded to a jury
trial. During trial, Hughes, who was self-represented, admitted to signing a
retainer agreement and receiving a refund check from Maksoud, which was
never deposited or cashed.
On March 19, 2018, the jury determined that Maksoud had over-refunded
Hughes, and that Hughes was entitled to a refund of only $2,609.00. As
previously stated, after the jury's verdict, Hughes filed two motions seeking a
new trial, which were both denied.
On April 12, 2018, Maksoud filed a motion for sanctions against Hughes.
On April 27, 2018, the court denied Maksoud's motion, finding that the Hughes
"lawsuit was not frivolous, rather it was litigated properly to conclusion ."
Also in April 2018, Hughes filed an ethics complaint against Maksoud's
trial attorney, claiming that he had falsified documents, and specifically,
documents maintained in Hughes's client file. Ultimately, the allegations
against Maksoud's attorney were found to be unsubstantiated and were
dismissed.
In May 2018, Hughes published another negative online review about
Maksoud and her law firm on Google under the pseudonym "A.J. Park":
A solo business – "JEKYLL AND HYDE!!"
A-3510-21
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Advertise low fees on bait and switch. Pretend
nice to take your money. Aggressive and Offensive on
you and cheat you! Outrageously Dishonest on
unearned legal fees for the days and hours she NEVER
worked!!
When someone is showing tons of great reviews
around same date, that's alert! More than one 1 start is
the warning sign. [Maksoud] is RUDE and
DISHONEST. She steals your retainer for her personal
business use.
She never work on your case but
FRAUDULENTLY "bill" you with "Summarized"
"bill" on your waiting in her office lobby, on her
missing appointment…. BACK "bill" you after she
grabbed your money. She asks for multiple advertising
"reviews" to cover up her bad reviews.
[Maksoud] attempted to remove her 1star AVVO
review. She wasn't successful to remove the truth.
UPDATE: I had paid CONSULTATION! She
LIED that SHE was "pushed" and she LIED she was
VERBALLY "retained" to justify she charged on
hourly rate for her AND her assistant, on the same very
first day I met her!! She threatened NOT to cash her
"refund" check if no commitment to NOT dispute!! She
also LIED she called police more than 2 times to her
office, because she was asked to provide itemized bill
which is written on the contract!! Her issue is
submitted to ethic review in 2015 and 2018. HER
LAWYER is under ethic review.
Around this time, Hughes met with Schachtel, who is also an attorney, for
a consultation. While the initial consultation was "free," subsequent
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consultations were not. At the end of Hughes's second consultation with
Schachtel, which took place on May 14, 2018, she paid him $200.00 in cash.
On June 5, 2018, Hughes sent Schachtel an email demanding a refund of
her $200.00 payment. Schachtel explained that he had earned his fees and would
not be refunding her. Hughes, once again using the pseudonym "A.J. Park,"
then published a lengthy negative review about Schachtel and his law firm on
Google. In a subsequent email, Hughes admitted to authoring the review and
demanded that Schachtel pay her $200.00 to remove her posting.
Thereafter, on August 1, 2018, Maksoud and Schachtel instituted this
action against Hughes. While the matter was initially filed in the Chancery
Division, it was later transferred to the Law Division. Meanwhile, on October
18, 2018, Hughes filed another complaint in the Law Division against Maksoud
and Schachtel, alleging "breach duty of confidentiality by releasing personal
information for the purpose of retaliation and [a] pattern of harassment." Almost
two years later, on August 28, 2020, summary judgment was granted against
Hughes in that matter.
C.
The Proof Hearing
A-3510-21
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As to Maksoud's pending litigation, because Hughes failed to respond to
discovery requests, her answer was stricken with prejudice and default was
entered against her. On January 6, 2021, a one-day proof hearing was held.
Schachtel did not take part in the proof hearing because sometime prior to that
date he and Hughes settled.
At the proof hearing, Maksoud testified about the false allegations Hughes
made in her lawsuits and how that impacted her reputation in the legal
community. In particular, Maksoud testified about the time she spent on reading
and answering Hughes's filings, and other work time and family events she
missed as a result. Maksoud also testified about the negative online reviews
Hughes posted, the false information included in those reviews, and how those
reviews impacted her professionally and personally.
Following the proof hearing, at which only Maksoud testified, the court
found she established a prima facie case of "defamation, libel." The court did
not find a compensable loss to Maksoud but awarded nominal damages in the
amount of $500.00. The court also found that Maksoud established a prima facie
case of IIED. The court noted that it
heard [Maksoud] recount her suffering; the never-
ending onslaught and daily reminder of [Hughes], the
countless hours of loss, the embarrassment of knowing
the Hudson County [j]udiciary had read these
A-3510-21
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comments and statements about [Maksoud], potential
clients asking her about the negative reviews, anxiety
and fears of losing additional business. Her
incomprehensible impact here, and incomprehensible
impact as a business owner and person whose personal
life has suffered as well.
The court did not award damages on the IIED count at that time, but
explained they would be addressed at a future proof hearing. As to malicious
use of process, the court found that Maksoud had not established a prima facie
case because no "special grievance ha[d] been established," and dismissed that
count with prejudice. Finally, the court ordered all Hughes's online reviews to
be removed, including libelous false internet, social media, and electronic posts
or publications, either in her name, or through a pseudonym, or anonymous
posts, within thirty days and provide a certification to Maksoud's counsel
describing what posts were removed.
D.
The IIED Damages Proof Hearing
Beginning on February 23, 2022, a damages hearing spanning five days
was held on the issue of IIED. At this hearing, Maksoud again testified, along
with her psychologist, Dr. Mark Seglin. In light of her default status, Hughes
was only permitted to conduct cross-examination and not present affirmative
A-3510-21
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proofs or evidence. As to how Hughes's allegations affected Maksoud
professionally, she testified:
Professionally, I can't work. My kids are not around,
and I'm not working.
I don't feel like the strong and happy and
confident woman that I used to be. I can't help people.
I've been too busy reading everything she's filing. And
with each filing it's broken me down just a little more.
It's made me question who I am, what I did. You know,
when—when she gave me a $4,000[.00] retainer and
terminated me and she started bullying me, maybe I'm
wrong. Maybe I should have given her $5,000[.00] or
$6,000[.00] and just given into her demands because of
how much she did to me.
It's made me unable to help others. It's made me
wonder what I could have done differently every day
and what the next client might do to me because of what
she was able to do to me for so long, endlessly, even
until this day.
All the letters against my attorneys. An attorney
friend of mine that we no longer speak because of what
she did to him. Professionally, he was a colleague and
a friend, and he was very much in my life, often
communicating with [him], often enjoying lunches and
meeting up at work events.
We don't do any of that anymore. He was
traumatized by her. And you know, I don't want to
speak for him, but I'm certainly traumatized, and I can
say we don't talk anymore, and it's because of this.
A-3510-21
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Maksoud also testified as to how her involvement with Hughes adversely
affected her health:
I wake up from my sleep thinking about all the things
that have happened, thinking about what I could have
done differently, like when she came to my office and
there were a lot of clients in the waiting room, and some
had to be squeezed in for emergencies, and she came in
and made a scene and demanded to see me, and I just—
I have nightmares about the things she did that
impacted my reputation like that.
And when she called me a thief online and what
people must think of me because an allegation can be
believed by others without even the end result. Just the
mere allegation of being called a thief had me sleepless,
had me nauseous, had me—had me sick to my stomach.
I have stomach issues. I had stomach issues all
morning today, which is another reason I won't really
work because how many times can I get up in the
middle of a meeting with someone with my stomach
issues, and that's something that really has been going
on for years.
And I feel stressed all the time, and I'm always
reading what she sends, what she files. I'm always
wondering what she's going to do next. And I can't
believe how many times she's had this hearing alone
adjourned and how many times she just keeps coming
after me and targeting me and coming up with—with
new reasons and ways to have me answer her
allegations of sham-this and fraudulent-this and
misappropriated-this when I over-refunded the retainer
and even offered her the whole thing back.
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I don't know what else I could have done to avoid
all these years with my husband, my family. I'm often
depressed. I'm with them, and I'm not with them.
And my husband's like, please get her out of your
head please. And I'm like easy for you to say. I wish I
could. But you know what, she just did this, she just
said this, and it's been relentless, and her actions show
....
Maksoud then testified about her decision to seek therapy and her sessions with
Seglin.
Finally, Maksoud detailed how her personal life had been affected:
I recall several—several dates where my family was
doing things that I would have normally loved to
participate in, like a neighbor who had a birthday party.
It was, I believe a three-hour event, and I couldn't go.
Typically[,] the mothers take the child to those
events, and I asked my husband to do it instead of me
because I just emotionally could not have normal
conversations with other mothers, other people, and I
missed that birthday party for our neighbor, my son's
friend, who was his same age and the same school, and
I missed so much more.
My husband has countless days where he took
our child or children, depending on the year—right, it
depends on what year it was, and he would go without
me to the zoo because the day before maybe I was
served with something new, and I was just a mess from
all the things she was saying about me, and how she
was still spinning and growing all of this, and how it
was still going on.
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And I just needed time alone to just—to just
breathe from it and, quite frankly, to cry that this has
become my life and it's continuing in this way.
I missed apple pickings with my family.
And it impacted my pregnancies. I miscarried on
more than one occasion, and I remember during those
pregnancies—and even the pregnancies that went to
term, not feeling happy the way that a pregnant person
should feel, excited about the future and her family.
Instead[,] I would just run to my computer, drop
everything, and read what she is saying and what she is
doing and just continue to focus on it because I had to.
I didn't want to default. I had to always make
sure I had an attorney. I had to go to my husband and
explain to him what we were paying and why. I had to
go to my colleagues and ask for help, and I'm not—I'm
not proud of that. It's embarrassing.
And I owe them money that I want to pay them
because they deserve to be paid for their help, and I just
feel like my name was dragged through the mud, not
just before the [c]ourt—and I feel humiliated and my
reputation, but not only do I feel completely destroyed
professionally but also personally.
I can't interact with people or even my own
family, my own kids. I go into a daze, and my
husband—from my understanding from what he says to
me, he's—I'm trying really hard to be present because
I'm not present, and he's—he's clearly, from my
observations, very upset about that.
....
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All the dinners I had with girlfriends and
colleagues where I wasn't there, and when I finally
talked, it was about her. It was about this, and I turned
everyone into a personal therapist. I turned everyone's
moment with me, where we were supposed to catch up
and have a good time and colleagues, into talking about
what she filed.
....
I became a different person, from sad to angry to
edgy to just not being able to just be normal and go out
for lunch, or dinner, or drinks, or just get together.
....
I stopped going to bar functions. I stopped
everything. I was part of the Family Law Executive
Committee, which is a very prestigious committee and
I—I'm just not myself. There's so much loss upon loss.
As for Seglin, he testified that he met with Maksoud "periodically" to
discuss her situation with Hughes. Seglin opined, "it was like treating post-
traumatic stress while the attack is ongoing"; thus, "it was kind of hard to be
helpful." Seglin testified that as a result of her interactions with Hughes,
Maksoud suffered with "anxiety," "helplessness," and "major depression." He
defined "major depression" to mean that Maksoud suffered with "dysphoria, a
passivity, ruminating thoughts, guilt, helplessness, a loss of interests, and a loss
of engagement with one's interests, social withdrawal."
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At the conclusion of the hearing on March 22, 2022, the court rendered an
oral decision. At the outset, the court found damages were proven by "well more
than a preponderance of the evidence." The court specified that Hughes's
conduct was "directed" at Maksoud and that "her conduct was purposeful,
intentional, and outrageous." The court took "judicial notice of the entire
record," which included Maksoud's "certification as to damages" and "an
itemization of those damages." The court found Maksoud credible and that her
answers "were absolute and serious." The court agreed with Maksoud that
Hughes "started, continued, and perpetuated" the litigation. The court also gave
great weight to Seglin's testimony, and in particular, his testimony that "[h]e had
not seen anyone so vulnerable and subject to such a persistent and relentless
campaign."
The court concluded:
Words do mean something, and they do have
consequences; consequences that are palpable, actual,
and in this case, debilitating.
The court finds that the harm here was real, that
[Hughes's] conduct was real, and that it was reckless
and intentional and she caused harm to [Maksoud].
The court finds that [Hughes's] actions are
intentional and deliberate without any regard for any
emotional distress that would follow, and the [c]ourt
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finds that that—the [c]ourt finds that great distress did
follow.
The [court] finds that $522,700[.00] would be
fair, reasonable, and adequate compensation for the
harm that [Maksoud] has experienced at the hands of
[Hughes].
The court's judgment shall also include
$42,392[.00] in legal fees and that [Maksoud's counsel]
be permitted to submit a certification of legal services
to the court for his fee, for his time since the March 1st,
2021 certification of [Maksoud] addressing her
damages[,] which included an itemized breakdown of
the time and money expended by her.
This appeal followed.
II.
A.
Hughes first contends the judgment in favor of Maksoud on the IIED claim
should be vacated and dismissed by this court. Hughes asserts the IIED claim
is not valid because the alleged conduct is: (1) covered by the defamation and
abuse of process claims; (2) the IIED cause of action was erroneously found by
the court without reliable expert medical testimony; and (3) the IIED and
defamation claims were based on "court filings" and are barred by New Jersey's
immunity case law.
A-3510-21
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A judgment entered after a proof hearing is subject to limited review.
Seidman v. Clifton Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 205 N.J. 150, 169 (2011). On appeal, the
issue is whether there was substantial credible evidence to support the judgment.
Ibid. In a proof hearing, "the question of what proofs are necessary is inherently
within the judge's discretion." Chakravarti v. Pegasus Consulting Grp., Inc.,
393 N.J. Super. 203, 210 (App. Div. 2007).
To allege a viable claim for IIED, a plaintiff must assert facts supporting
the four requisite elements of the cause of action. Delvalle v. Trino, 474 N.J.
Super. 124, 142-43 (App. Div. 2022); Juzwiak v. Doe, 415 N.J. Super. 442, 451
(App. Div. 2010).
First, "the plaintiff must [allege] that the defendant acted intentionally or
recklessly. For an intentional act to result in liability, the defendant must intend
both to do the act and to produce emotional distress." Buckley v. Trenton Sav.
Fund Soc'y, 111 N.J. 355, 366 (1988) (citations omitted). Second, "[t]he
conduct must be 'so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go
beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and
utterly intolerable in a civilized community.'" Ibid. (citation omitted). "Third,
the defendant's actions must have been the proximate cause of the plaintiff's
emotional distress." Ibid. (citation omitted). Finally, "the emotional distress
A-3510-21
21
suffered by the plaintiff must be 'so severe that no reasonable man could be
expected to endure it.'" Ibid. (citation omitted).
We have found conduct was sufficiently outrageous to support an IIED
claim where a landlord "failed to provide central heating, running water and
reasonable security in a rent[-]controlled building in an effort to induce the
tenants to vacate," Griffin v. Tops Appliance City, Inc., 337 N.J. Super. 15, 23
(App. Div. 2001) (citing 49 Prospect St. Tenants Ass'n v. Sheva Gardens, Inc.,
227 N.J. Super. 449, 455-57, 466, 471- 75 (App. Div. 1988)), where a doctor
intentionally told a child's parents the child was "suffering from a rare disease
which may be cancerous knowing that the child has nothing more than a mildly
infected appendix," ibid. (citing Hume v. Bayer, 178 N.J. Super. 310, 319 (Law
Div. 1981)), and where an employer used a vile, racial slur against an African
American employee, ibid. (citing Taylor v. Metzger, 152 N.J. 490, 508-21
(1998)). In contrast, we have determined the alleged conduct was not
sufficiently outrageous to support an IIED claim where an employee was denied
promotions and terminated due to age. Ibid. (citing McDonnell v. Illinois, 319
N.J. Super. 324, 332, 342 (App. Div. 1999)).
Here, there was substantial credible evidence to support the court's finding
that Maksoud presented a claim of IIED. Not only did Maksoud testify
A-3510-21
22
regarding her history with Hughes and how their interaction negatively impacted
her professional and personal life, but there was also physical evidence to
buttress Maksoud's claim. In particular, the record contained the multitude of
filings Hughes lodged against Maksoud, along with several negative online
reviews of Maksoud's regarding her and the firm, all of which were defamatory
in nature.
In her merits brief, Hughes asserts "the IIED claim is not valid because
the alleged conduct[] is covered by the defamation and abuse of process claims."
In support of her claim, Hughes cites to two cases: Decker v. Princeton Packet,
Inc., 116 N.J. 418, 432 (1989), and Griffin, 337 N.J. Super. at 24. Those cases,
however, do not stand for the proposition Hughes suggests.
In Decker, the plaintiff, whose death was falsely reported in an obituary,
brought a tort action against the defendant, the publishing newspaper, seeking
damages for defamation and emotional distress. 116 N.J. at 420. Because the
plaintiff could not prove intention, only a claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress was considered. Id. at 424.
Ultimately, the Court held publication of the obituary was not defamatory
per se "because the reported death of an individual when viewed from the
perspective of a reasonable person of ordinary intelligence and experience does
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23
not impugn reputation." Id. at 427-28. As for the negligent infliction of
emotional distress claim, that too was dismissed because "the injury [was] not
sufficiently palpable, severe, or enduring to justify the imposition of liability
and the award of compensatory damages." Id. at 431. Rather,
the alleged emotional distress approximates the
subjective reactions of ordinary persons who feel
victimized by the false report of death, namely,
annoyance, embarrassment, and irritation. Further, the
distress experienced by [the plaintiff] was not
occasioned by conduct that itself was egregious or
purposeful. Rather it appears to have been caused only
by inadvertent conduct, with respect to which there is
no suggestion in the record that any serious and
substantial distress on the part of [the plaintiff] and her
family would be particularly foreseeable.
[Ibid.]
Because defendant was a newspaper, the Court further added:
Several federal courts have addressed the standard of
conduct necessary to trigger liability for negligent
infliction of emotional harm by a defendant also being
sued for defamation. They have found that the [F]irst
[A]mendment requires that plaintiff establish at least
the same level of intent to recover for the infliction of
emotional harm as is necessary to find defamation. If
the levels of culpability were not at least as stringent,
plaintiffs would be able to use the tort of negligent
infliction of emotional distress to overcome defenses to
defamation actions, to avoid short statutes of
limitations for defamation, and to circumvent judicial
barriers to punitive damages. There is, in other words,
a certain symmetry or parallel between claims of
A-3510-21
24
emotional distress and defamation that calls for
consistent results. Thus, it comports with first
amendment protections to deny an emotional-distress
claim based on a false publication that engenders no
defamation per se. In this case, by determining that as
a matter of law a false obituary does not injure
reputation or cause compensable emotional distress, the
Court preserves the libel law's [F]irst [A]mendment
protections for the media.
[Id. at 432 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).]
Here, in contrast to Decker, Maksoud's claim of IIED was not limited to
the emotional distress she suffered as a result of the publication of Hughes's
online reviews; rather, Maksoud's claim included distress she suffered as a result
of the totality of Hughes's conduct directed at her over the years the two were
acquainted.
Moreover, Maksoud presented proof, which the court found credible, that
Hughes's conduct was both egregious and purposeful, that is, intentional. And,
Maksoud had presented a prima facie case of defamation, and thus, there were
no concerns regarding whether Hughes's speech was protected by the First
Amendment. Consequently, Decker is not instructive in this instance.
In Griffin, also cited by Hughes, the plaintiff brought suit against his
former employer for, among other things, defamation based on statements made
to other employees concerning the reason for plaintiff's discharge, and IIED
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25
brought on by the employer's behavior. 337 N.J. Super. at 19. At the conclusion
of trial, the jury returned a verdict in the employer's favor on the plaintiff's
defamation claim. Id. at 21. However, the jury returned a verdict in plaintiff's
favor on his claim for IIED. Ibid.In finding that the plaintiff presented insufficient evidence to support a
verdict for IIED, the court first noted that IIED is only found in "extreme cases ."
Id. at 23 (citing 49 Prospect St., 227 N.J. Super. at 455-57, 466, 471-75). The
court concluded that the employer's actions were not so outrageous, and
plaintiff's proofs concerning his emotional distress were weak. Id. at 24-27.
Further, we emphasized:
a plaintiff may not pursue a claim for [IIED] to
circumvent the required elements of or defenses
applicable to another cause of action that directly
governs a particular form of conduct. The jury in this
case rejected plaintiff's defamation claim because
defendants established a legitimate business purpose
for the alleged defamatory statements made to other []
employees. Plaintiff cannot avoid the qualified
privilege extended to such statements by relying upon
them as a basis for an [IIED] claim.
Similarly, plaintiff could not rely upon the fact
that the defendants had filed a criminal complaint
against him as a basis for a finding of [IIED], because
such conduct is the specific subject of the tort of
malicious prosecution. To establish a malicious
prosecution claim, a plaintiff must show, among other
things, that the criminal complaint "terminated
A-3510-21
26
favorably" to him. Since the criminal complaint against
plaintiff was still pending when this case was tried,
plaintiff could not show that it had been "terminated
favorably" to him and thus he did not yet have a viable
cause of action for malicious prosecution.
Consequently, plaintiff could not rely upon the criminal
prosecution to support an [IIED] claim.
[Id. at 24-25 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).]
Here, in contrast to Griffin, there was proof that Hughes's behavior toward
Maksoud was extreme and outrageous, and that the emotional distress Maksoud
suffered as a result of Hughes's behavior was severe. That proof included not
only the online reviews posted by Hughes, but also Maksoud's testimony
regarding her relationship with Hughes as well as the multiple court filings
submitted by Hughes.
Further, in contrast to the circumstances presented in Griffin, Maksoud
presented a prima facie case of defamation, for which she was awarded nominal
damages in the amount of $500.00, and thus, her IIED claim was not being used
to circumvent the elements of or defenses applicable to defamation. Cf.
LoBiondo v. Schwartz, 323 N.J. Super. 391, 417 (App. Div. 1999) ("It would
obviously be intolerably anomalous and illogical for conduct that is held not to
constitute actionable defamation nevertheless to be relied on to sustain a
different cause of action based solely on the consequences of that alleged
A-3510-21
27
defamation."). While the court did not find Maksoud presented a prima facie
case of malicious use of process, it concluded her defamation claim was viable.
B.
Hughes next argues the court's legal basis for finding liability on the IIED
claim was "wrong" and a "misunderst[anding] [of] the law," and therefore, the
judgment should be vacated. Specifically, Hughes cites to the part of the court's
decision where it discusses elements three and four of an IIED claim. Hughes
argues that the court incorrectly relied upon Clark v. Nenna, 465 N.J. Super. 505(App. Div. 2020), and Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J. Super. 282 (App. Div. 2001).
First, as to Clark, the court discussed how we "reaffirmed . . . expert
testimony is not required to establish the mere emotional distress under certain
circumstances in which the nature of the particular harm mitigates against a
reason for an enhanced standard of proof." The court's observation was correct.
In Clark, we recognized that, while "[o]rdinarily, medical or expert proof
is required to establish emotional distress damages," there are two exceptions.
Clark, 465 N.J. Super. at 513 (citing Tarr v. Diasulli, 181 N.J. 70, 77-78 (2004)).
The first "applies in cases involving intentional torts." Ibid. (citing Tarr, 181
N.J. at 77-78). The second applies "to cases in which '[t]he nature of [the]
particular harm mitigates against the reason for an enhanced standard of proof
A-3510-21
28
in the first instance—the elimination of spurious claims.'" Ibid. (quoting Innes
v. Marzano-Lesnevich, 435 N.J. Super. 198, 239 (App. Div. 2014)).
In the matter under review, the court properly applied both exceptions.
The court found that Maksoud presented a claim of defamation, an intentional
tort, and thus, the court correctly reasoned that medical or expert proof was not
necessary to establish the IIED claim. Further, while the court ultimately did
not find that Maksoud presented a claim of malicious use of process because she
could not prove a special grievance, the court did find that Hughes acted with a
malicious motive in instituting the civil suits against Maksoud and proceeded
intentionally. Lastly, the court did not award damages on Maksoud's IIED claim
following the proof hearing. Rather, the court reserved its decision on that issue
following a separate hearing where Maksoud presented expert testimony by
Seglin.
Next, as to Baglini, the court referenced one of our holdings in that case,
stating: "In Baglini, the court held in a malicious use of process case, the
plaintiff may recover for harm to his reputation by any defamatory matter
alleged as the basis of the proceeding, and any emotional distress that is caused
by the proceedings." Hughes maintains "Baglini does not stand for the
proposition the trial [court] cited it for but is instead an illustration of the legal
A-3510-21
29
principle argued above, that when there is a meritorious defamation or abuse of
process claim, the IIED cause of action should be dismissed."
Contrary to Hughes's argument, however, the court's citation to Baglini
was correct. 338 N.J. Super. at 306-07. In Baglini, we emphasized, "[e]motional
distress may be recovered" if it "'is of a kind normally to be expected as a result
of the proceedings.'" Id. at 307 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 681
cmt. f (Am. L. Inst. 1976)). "Intangible, non-pecuniary damages, such as
damages to reputation where it can be proven, humiliation or anxiety, emotional
distress and the like, can be recovered in addition to the pecuniary losses." Ibid.
(quoting Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 120, at 896 (5th ed. 1984) (hereinafter
Prosser & Keeton)). In this instance—as duly noted by the court—because
Maksoud had proven a case of defamation, an intentional tort, emotional distress
could be expected, and separately awarded. The court was correct in its analysis.
Moreover, Baglini does not stand for the proposition Hughes suggests,
which is that when there is a meritorious defamation or abuse of process claim,
the IIED cause of action should be dismissed. While in Baglini the negligent
and IIED claims were eventually dismissed, either by consent order or by order
of the court, there is nothing in that case to suggest those claims were dismissed
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30
because there were meritorious defamation or abuse of process claims
precluding recovery. Baglini, 338 N.J. Super. at 293.
C.
Hughes next argues that "[i]n addition to misunderstanding the law, [the
court] also made demonstrably erroneous factual findings when ruling that
[Hughes] was liable for IIED." Hughes maintains that "instead of actually
reviewing and relying on the prior court decisions, [the court] relied on
testimony of [Maksoud] in reaching her decision." Hughes's contention is belied
by the record, which reveals the court did not make such findings.
By way of example, the court correctly identified the three lawsuits
Hughes filed against Maksoud: the first, which was voluntarily withdrawn by
Hughes on October 23, 2017; the second, which proceeded to trial and resulted
in a jury determining that Maksoud had over-refunded Hughes; and the third, in
which summary judgment was granted against Hughes on all counts. Hughes
claims that the court incorrectly found Maksoud prevailed at the jury trial.
However, the record clearly shows that the jury determined Maksoud over-
refunded Hughes, and therefore, the court was not incorrect in its recitation of
the procedural history.
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31
As for the amount of damages awarded, Hughes asserts that because no
compensable damages were awarded for Maksoud's defamation claim, the court
erred in its decision to award damages for IIED. But defamation and IIED were
separate claims brought by Maksoud, and the court was not required to preclude
a damage award for Maksoud's IIED claim just because it found a compensable
award inappropriate for her defamation claim.
"Ultimately, a damages award cannot stand if it is so grossly
disproportionate to the injury suffered that it shocks the judicial conscience."
Cuevas v. Wentworth Grp., 226 N.J. 480, 510 (2016). Judicial review of the
correctness of a damages reward requires the record to be viewed in light most
favorable to the prevailing party, with deference given to the trial court's feel of
the case. Id. at 488, 501.
Here, the court's damages award for plaintiff's IIED claim was based on
credible testimony provided by Maksoud and her psychologist, Seglin.
Moreover, Maksoud provided a detailed list to the court identifying the amount
of professional time spent on her litigation with Hughes and personal time lost.
Maksoud also provided an estimate for revenue lost from her business. Thus,
we are satisfied the damages award was not so grossly disproportionate to the
injury suffered that it shocks the judicial conscience.
A-3510-21
32
D.
Hughes stresses that it was error for the court to "rel[y] on statements
contained in pleadings to find liability." Hughes argues that those statements
were "absolutely protected by the litigation privilege."
The court found that the litigation privilege did not apply to the statements
contained in Hughes's pleadings because Hughes had shared the contents of her
pleadings—along with the docket numbers—online. Regardless, the court
further noted that even if the litigation privilege did apply to the statements
contained in Hughes's pleadings, the reviews she posted online were sufficient
to support a prima facie case of defamation and IIED.
While Hughes is correct that there is an absolute privilege, known as the
litigation privilege, afforded to statements made in the course of judicial and
quasi-judicial proceedings, Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 117 N.J. 539,
563 (1990), that privilege logically does not extend to statements made outside
of judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. Here, the record amply supports the
court's finding that Hughes shared the contents of her pleadings, including
docket numbers, online, bringing "the populace of the internet into her personal
web of defamation." We conclude the court correctly entered judgment on
A-3510-21
33
Maksoud's IIED claim, which was based upon substantial credible evidence in
the record.
III.
Next, Hughes contends for the first time on appeal that all of Maksoud's
causes of action are barred by res judicata, collateral estoppel, and the entire
controversy doctrine. Hughes argues that Maksoud's malicious use of process
claim was barred by res judicata. Hughes also maintains that Maksoud's IIED
claim was also barred by res judicata and "the award of attorney's fees as
damages" was barred.
A.
Res Judicata
"The application of res judicata is a question of law[]" that is reviewed
"de novo." Walker v. Choudhary, 425 N.J. Super. 135, 151 (App. Div. 2012)
(first quoting Selective Ins. Co. v. McAllister, 327 N.J. Super. 168, 173 (App.
Div. 2000); and then citing Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of
Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).
Under the doctrine, a "cause of action between parties that has been finally
determined on the merits by a tribunal having jurisdiction cannot be relitigated
by those parties or their privies in a new proceeding." Velasquez v. Franz, 123
A-3510-21
34
N.J. 498, 505 (1991). For res judicata to apply, there must be "'substantially
similar or identical causes of action and issues, parties, and relief sought,' as
well as a final judgment." Wadeer v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 220 N.J. 591, 606
(2015) (quoting Culver v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 115 N.J. 451, 460 (1989)).
Here, contrary to Hughes's argument, res judicata is inapplicable to the
malicious use of process claim because a special grievance had not been
established. And, res judicata did not bar Maksoud's IIED claim because her
IIED claim was not raised in earlier proceedings, nor was a "substantially
similar" cause of action raised in earlier proceedings. Ibid. (quoting Culver, 115
N.J. at 460). Moreover, res judicata did not preclude the court's award of
attorney's fees, because the fees were awarded based on the court's finding that
Maksoud had proven IIED and defamation, which were both claims not raised
in earlier proceedings.
B.
Collateral Estoppel
Hughes next asserts Maksoud is "collaterally estopped from asserting that
the litigation was frivolous and warranted sanctions, attorney's fees, or damages
because of the rulings to the contrary." Hughes further argues Maksoud "is also
collaterally estopped because the prima facie IIED claim was based on
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35
Maksoud's testimony that the prior lawsuits were frivolous and without
consideration of the actual rulings in those cases."
The doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, "is a branch of the
broader law of res judicata." Selective Ins., 327 N.J. Super. at 173 (emphasis
removed) (quoting Figueroa v. Hartford Ins. Co., 241 N.J. Super. 578, 584 (App.
Div. 1990)). For collateral estoppel to apply, the party invoking the doctrine
must show:
(1) the issue to be precluded is identical to the issue
decided in the prior proceeding; (2) the issue was
actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (3) the court
in the prior proceeding issued a final judgment on the
merits; (4) the determination of the issue was essential
to the prior judgment; and (5) the party against whom
the doctrine is asserted was a party to or in privity with
a party to the earlier proceeding.
[Id. at 173-74 (quoting In re Est. of Dawson, 136 N.J.
1, 20 (1994)).]
Thus, under collateral estoppel "[w]hen an issue of fact or law is actually
litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is
essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action
between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim." Restatement
(Second) of Judgments § 27 (Am. L. Inst. 1982). The doctrine "is not subject to
rigid application but may be applied after a careful assessment and consideration
A-3510-21
36
of all relevant factors both in support of and against its application." Selective
Ins., 327 N.J. Super. at 174.
Here, the issues encompassing Maksoud's claims for defamation and IIED
were raised for the first time in the August 1, 2018 complaint Maksoud brought
against Hughes. Therefore, because these issues were not previously litigated
and decided, they were not barred by collateral estoppel.
C.
Entire Controversy Doctrine
"The entire controversy doctrine 'embodies the principle that the
adjudication of a legal controversy should occur in one litigation in only one
court.'" Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman & Stahl,
PC, 237 N.J. 91, 108 (2019) (quoting Cogdell ex rel. Cogdell v. Hosp. Ctr. at
Orange, 116 N.J. 7, 15 (1989)). "The doctrine 'seeks to impel litigants to
consolidate their claims arising from a "single controversy" whenever possible.'"
Ibid. (quoting Thornton v. Potamkin Chevrolet, 94 N.J. 1, 5 (1983)).
Three significant concerns in the administration
of justice support claim preclusion under the entire
controversy doctrine: "(1) the need for complete and
final disposition through the avoidance of piecemeal
decisions; (2) fairness to parties to the action and those
with a material interest in the action; and (3) efficiency
and the avoidance of waste and the reduction of delay."
A-3510-21
37
[Ibid. (quoting Wadeer, 220 N.J. at 605).]
"The purpose of the doctrine is not to bar meritorious claims." Olds v.
Donnelly, 150 N.J. 424, 447 (1997). The Supreme Court has "always
emphasized that preclusion is a remedy of last resort." Id. at 446.
"When a court decides whether multiple claims must be asserted in the
same action, its initial inquiry is whether they 'arise from related facts or the
same transaction or series of transactions.'" Dimitrakopoulos, 237 N.J. at 109(quoting DiTrolio v. Antiles, 142 N.J. 253, 267 (1995)).
"The doctrine does not mandate that successive claims share common
legal issues in order for the doctrine to bar a subsequent action." Ibid. (citations
omitted) "Instead, 'the determinative consideration is whether distinct claims
are aspects of a single larger controversy because they arise from interrelated
facts.'" Ibid. (quoting DiTrolio, 142 N.J. at 272). "It is the core set of facts that
provides the link between distinct claims against the same parties . . . and
triggers the requirement that they be determined in one proceeding." Wadeer,
220 N.J. at 605 (omission in original) (quoting DiTrolio, 142 N.J. at 268-69).
The entire controversy doctrine is "an equitable doctrine whose
application is left to judicial discretion based on the factual circumstances of
individual cases." Dimitrakopoulos, 237 N.J. at 114 (quoting Highland Lakes
A-3510-21
38
Country Club & Cmty. Ass'n v. Nicastro, 201 N.J. 123, 125 (2009)). "The
polestar of the application of the [doctrine] is judicial 'fairness.'" Wadeer, 220
N.J. at 605 (quoting DiTrolio, 142 N.J. at 271). "The doctrine's equitable nature
'bar[s] its application where to do so would be unfair in the totality of the
circumstances and would not promote any of its objectives, namely, the
promotion of conclusive determinations, party fairness, and judicial economy
and efficiency.'" Dimitrakopoulos, 237 N.J. at 114 (alteration in original)
(quoting K-Land Corp. No. 28 v. Landis Sewerage Auth., 173 N.J. 59, 70
(2002)).
We reject Hughes's argument that the entire controversy doctrine
precludes Maksoud's action. Maksoud's claims for defamation and IIED were
based on events that occurred not just before and during the litigation of the two
lawsuits that Hughes filed against her, but also on the subsequent events that led
to this action. Additionally, those lawsuits did not include the same parties, as
Maksoud's complaint originally included Schachtel. Simply put, Maksoud's
claims against Hughes had not yet accrued during the pendency of the other
lawsuits, and thus, the entire controversy doctrine has no applicability here.
Importantly, we note that Hughes did not raise these issues below. These
preclusive doctrines Hughes now references are affirmative defenses that may
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39
be deemed waived if not asserted. See Rule 4:5-4 ("A responsive pleading shall
set forth specifically and separately a statement of facts constituting an
avoidance or affirmative defense[.]"). "It is a well-settled principle that our
appellate courts will decline to consider questions or issues not properly
presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is
available." Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973).
Notwithstanding the tenants of Rule 4:5-4, we have considered Hughes's res
judicata, collateral estoppel, and entire controversy doctrine arguments and
conclude they lack merit.
IV.
Hughes next argues "the IIED and defamation claims were defective and
are barred by the [F]irst [A]mendment and should be dismissed with prejudice."
Hughes maintains that her online reviews were merely "opinions," and thus,
were "not actionable." Hughes relies in part on decision rendered by the
Chancery Judge, who stated that Hughes's comments constituted "opinions" and
"could not [be] restrain[ed]."
Generally, "[a] statement is defamatory if it is false, communicated to a
third person, and tends to lower the subject's reputation in the estimation of the
community or to deter third persons from associating with him." W.J.A. v. D.A.,
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40
210 N.J. 229, 238 (2012) (citing Lynch v. N.J. Educ. Ass'n, 161 N.J. 152, 164-
65 (1999)). To determine whether a statement is defamatory, "the publication
as a whole" is examined and consideration is particularly given to "the context
in which the statement appears." Romaine v. Kallinger, 109 N.J. 282, 290
(1988). Further, consideration is given to the "content, verifiability, and context
of the challenged statements." Ward v. Zelikovsky, 136 N.J. 516, 529 (1994).
In this regard, first the
statement's content is judged by its objective meaning
to a reasonable person of ordinary intelligence.
Second[], only verifiable statements can be defamatory.
Finally, a statement's meaning can be affected by its
context. The focus is on the effect of the alleged
defamatory statement on third persons, that is, whether
they viewed the plaintiff in a lesser light as a result of
hearing or reading the offending statement.
[Dello Russo v. Nagel, 358 N.J. Super. 254, 263-64
(App. Div. 2003) (citations omitted).]
"[T]he law of defamation exists to achieve the proper balance between
protecting reputation and protecting free speech." DeAngelis v. Hill, 180 N.J.
1, 12 (2004) (quoting Ward, 136 N.J. at 528). Therefore, a claim cannot lie for
one's expression of "'pure' opinion," particularly on a matter of public concern.
Kotlikoff v. Cmty. News, 89 N.J. 62, 69 (1982).
A-3510-21
41
An opinion is "pure" when "the maker of the comment states the facts on
which he bases his opinion . . . and then states a view as to the plaintiff's conduct,
qualifications or character." Id. at 68-69. Alternatively, a "mixed" opinion, that
is, one "apparently based on facts about the plaintiff or his conduct that have
neither been stated by defendant nor assumed to exist by the parties to the
communication[,]" may be defamatory if it implies underlying objective facts
which are false. Id. at 69. Finally, a statement that "could be construed as either
fact or opinion" cannot result in liability, because "[a]n interpretation favoring
a finding of fact would tend to impose a chilling effect on speech." Lynch, 161
N.J. at 168 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, a review of the online reviews posted by Hughes clearly shows they
are not "pure opinion" as she suggests. Instead, the online reviews are based on
false facts, such as the statement that Maksoud "stole" Hughes's retainer for
personal use, and thus, were properly found by the court to be defamatory.
Hughes misconstrues the decision rendered by the Chancery Judge.
Indeed, the record demonstrates the Chancery Judge did not make a decision one
way or the other, but instead instructed the parties to pursue their claims in the
Law Division. Specifically, the Chancery Judge said:
. . . [P]laintiffs [Maksoud and Schachtel] completely
and do fail to cite to any law that supports its assertion
A-3510-21
42
that [they are] entitled to the drastic remedy of
enjoining [libel] or, more drastically, enjoining the
defense in its future speak.
Instead the [c]ourt does find that . . . plaintiffs do
have an adequate remedy at law in the Law Division for
damages, as the only claims left in the complaint are for
damages because of the alleged defamation committed
by [Hughes] against the [Maksoud and Schachtel] and
their business.
These issues are triable at law before a [j]ury and
not before the Chancery Division, under Rule 4:3-
1[(a)(1)], . . . therefore, this complaint will be
transferred [on] the [c]ourt's own motion to the Law
Division under Rule 4:3-1(b).
....
As irksome as this—these—that these comments
have been made both on Avvo and on Google, they are,
nevertheless, constitutionally protected speech that this
[c]ourt cannot enjoin.
Every individual before this [c]ourt has an
absolute right to state what his or her opinions are.
However, if those opinions are determined to be
libelous or slanderous, and therefore impact on the
business activities of [Maksoud and Schachtel], then
there is an adequate redressing for that if [Maksoud and
Schachtel] are able to prove their entitlement to
compensatory damages as a result of them, if they are
able to show that it is proximally caused by the
intentional acts of [Hughes].
Additionally, [Maksoud and Schachtel] would be
more than entitled to seek punitive damages if they
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43
believe and they are able to prove clearly and
convincingly that these were made with a malicious
intent, and that [Hughes] needs to be punished as a
result of that.
However, that is a decision that this [c]ourt
cannot make summarily, it would have to be made only
in the compensatory aspects and in the compensatory
atmosphere that is provided by the Law Division.
[(emphasis added).]
In an effort to further support her argument that Maksoud's defamation
claim was "defective," Hughes cites to Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3, 342
N.J. Super. 134 (App. Div. 2001). In Dendrite, we delineated a four-part test
applicable whenever "trial courts [are] faced with an application by a plaintiff
for . . . an order compelling an [Internet Service Provider (ISP)] to honor a
subpoena and disclose the identity of anonymous [i]nternet posters who are sued
for allegedly violating the rights of individuals, corporations or businesses." Id.
at 141. The trial court must "first require the plaintiff to undertake efforts to
notify the anonymous posters that they are the subject of a subpoena or
application for an order of disclosure." Ibid.Thereafter,
Dendrite requires that a plaintiff . . . must: (1) identify
the fictitious defendant with "sufficient specificity" to
allow for a determination as to whether the defendant
"is a real person or entity" who may be sued; (2)
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44
demonstrate a "good-faith effort to comply with the
requirements of service of process"; (3) present
sufficient facts from which it may be concluded that the
suit can withstand a motion to dismiss; and (4) provide
"a request for discovery with the [c]ourt, along with a
statement of reasons justifying the specific discovery
requested as well as identification of a limited number
of persons or entities on whom discovery process might
be served and for which there is a reasonable likelihood
that the discovery process will lead to identifying
information about defendant that would make service
of process possible."
[Warren Hosp. v. Does 1-10, 430 N.J. Super. 225, 231
(App. Div. 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting
Dendrite, 342 N.J. Super. at 151-52).]
If the court determines that a plaintiff has "presented a prima facie cause
of action, [it] must balance the defendant's First Amendment right of anonymous
speech against the strength of the prima facie case presented and the necessity
for the disclosure of the anonymous defendant's identity to allow the plaintiff to
properly proceed." Dendrite, 342 N.J. Super. at 142.
Hughes claims Maksoud "did not meet . . . the second or third element of
the tests required by Dendrite." However, the circumstances here are wholly
different from the circumstances presented in Dendrite. Unlike Dendrite, there
is no anonymous posting, and thus, this case does not involve an individual's
right to speak anonymously. And, saliently, there is no question that the online
reviews were authored by Hughes.
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In her correspondence with Schachtel, Hughes admitted to using the
pseudonym "A.J. Park." Moreover, compelling facts were produced by
Maksoud to withstand dismissal, namely, copies of the online reviews Hughes
published, prior court filings, and Maksoud's own testimony. Therefore, we
conclude that Hughes's reliance on Dendrite is misplaced.
Next, Hughes claims that it was error to find that she knowingly posted a
false statement because her posts were truthful based on her experience with
Maksoud. As we previously noted however, while it is true that a statement of
"pure opinion" cannot constitute defamation, Kotlikoff, 89 N.J. at 68-69, our
review of the record reveals that Hughes's online postings included considerably
more than her opinion.
The court highlighted the following comments Hughes made in its
findings following the proof hearing:
From AVVO:
I went back home after 10:30 pm. I wrote her email:
not do anything and I will let her know… However,
she kept calling me and threaten she will file court
appearance her own… She took $1000 from my
retainer only with "courtesy" after 30 days no bill. She
holds another remaining $3000 no refund, unless I
accept her "5 hrs 30 minutes service". She called Police
I harassing her? Stay away from this harassing
Prosecutor!
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From Google:
A solo business – "JEKYLL AND HYDE!" Advertise
low fees on bait and switch. Pretend nice to take your
money. Aggressive and Offensive on you and cheat
you! Outrageously Dishonest on unearned legal fees
for the days and hours she NEVER worked!! She asked
$4000 CASH.
[Plaintiff] is RUDE and DISHONEST. She steals your
retainer for her personal business use. She never work
on your case but FRAUDULENTLY "bill" you with
"Summarized" "bill" on your waiting in her office
lobby, on her missing appointment… BACK "bill" you
after she grabbed your money. She asks for multiple
advertising "reviews" to cover up her bad reviews.
....
Her issue is submitted to ethic review in 2015 and 2018.
HER LAWYER is under ethic review.
From Google:
She Fraudulently "billed" $375 for her NO-SHOW
appointment when she was NOT retained. She "billed"
14 "Collective" email for 4 email. She used her
assistant doing Bait-and-Switch for her low rate!
[Plaintiff] Stole our Confidential Personal Financial
Information!! Seven (7) documents!! She Deliberately
gave our Personal documents to her lawyer!!
Deliberately showed our Confidential documents to
Jury!! Posted our SSN, DOB online to public view!!
She Lied she was "required" to keep our Personal
documents In Her Hand for Seven (7) years!!
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Police advised to take her to Court! However, a once 7
year prosecutor Fabricated numerous nasty Police
stories went on Personal Attack!
The court also highlighted that in more than one review, Hughes identified
the docket numbers given to her filings against Maksoud and encouraged readers
to look up those docket numbers. Because of these public postings, the court
concluded that the litigation privilege did not apply, and thus, several of the
statements made by Hughes in her pleadings were defamatory as well. The court
read them into the record, relying on the following from Hughes's verified
complaint:
13. However, Maksoud unlawfully stole all
copies of [Hughes's] documents, stated all above, for
herself, prepared to harass [Hughes] if [Hughes]
disputed her charge.
....
15. In Aug 2017, Defendant Christopher
DeSocio started to represent Maksoud. Without
[Hughes's] consent, Maksoud knowingly, willfully and
illegally handed over all [Hughes's] documents to
DeSocio who was not involved in any part of
[Hughes's] divorce case.
....
17. Maksoud and DeSocio knowingly,
intentionally and maliciously prepared and misused
"Confidential Client Questionnaire" of [Hughes] dated
on Sept 4, 2015 to show to the Jury and lied that
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Maksoud was hired on Sept 4, 2015, instead of Sept 17,
2015 when the retainer was signed.
18. Also, Maksoud and DeSocio knowingly,
deliberately and maliciously prepared and misused all
Confidential Personal documents containing a large
amount of [Hughes's] personal identifiers for divorce
that Maksoud obtained and demanded on Sept 17, 2015,
and stole all copies from [Hughes] on Sept 28, 2015,
stated all above, as Maksoud's work and her exhibits to
show to the Jury.
....
22. Maksoud intentionally, maliciously, and
deceptively allowed all Confidential Personal
documents from [Hughes] that they prepared to show to
the Jury.
....
30. All Confidential Personal Identifier and
information of [Hughes] ha[s] been in Irreparable
Damages on internet to public since June 4, 2018.
....
35. Clearly, it is inevitable that "Confidential
Client Questionnaire" of [Hughes] has to be spread out
further among administrative staffs, lawyer and judge
in Hudson County Court and Superior Court Cler[k]
office during Court process . . . .
....
41. Maksoud deliberately stole [Hughes's]
divorce documents containing a great amount of
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personal, family and financial information for
harassment against her former client, [Hughes].
....
43. [Maksoud and DeSocio] have knowingly,
willfully and maliciously prepared and misused
[Hughes's] documents to release personal information
and create irreparable harm to Maksoud's former client.
44. [Maksoud and DeSocio's] repeated actions of
releasing personal information of former client is
Intentional, Spiteful, Willful, Unlawful and Immoral.
As evidenced above, Hughes's comments were not limited to simply
"criticism" of Maksoud's performance. Not only did Hughes label Maksoud a
liar and a thief, but she also supported her characterizations with false facts. In
addition, Hughes claimed defendant stole her money and personal information,
which was not true, and Hughes knew it was not true. By publicly making those
assertions, Hughes ultimately sought to harm Maksoud's business reputation.
Thus, we are satisfied the court properly found Hughes's online reviews were
defamatory.
Hughes further argues that "[t]o prove defamation, a plaintiff needs more
than their own testimony," and because Maksoud's "evidence was her own self-
serving testimony," it was error for the court to find Maksoud had proven a claim
of defamation. To support her argument, Hughes cites to Sisler v. Gannett Co.,
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104 N.J. 256, 281 (1986), and highlights the following language from that case:
"Awards based on a plaintiff's testimony alone or on 'inferred' damages are
unacceptable."
"Damages which may be recovered in an action for defamation are: (1)
compensatory or actual, which may be either (a) general or (b) special; (2)
punitive or exemplary; and (3) nominal." W.J.A., 210 N.J. at 239 (quoting
Prosser & Keeton § 116A, at 842). Actual damages are those "real losses
flowing from the defamatory statement[,]" which are "'not limited to out -of-
pocket loss,' but include[] 'impairment to reputation and standing in the
community,' along with personal humiliation, mental anguish, and suffering to
the extent that they flow from the reputational injury." Ibid. (first quoting
Prosser & Keeton § 116A, at 843; and then quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974)).
"All compensatory damages . . . depend on showings of actual harm,
demonstrated through competent evidence, and may not include a damage award
presumed by the jury." Nuwave Inv. Corp. v. Hyman Beck & Co., 221 N.J. 495,
499 (2015); see also Sisler, 104 N.J. at 281 ("[A] plaintiff should offer some
concrete proof that his reputation has been injured."). Although "[t]estimony of
third parties as to a diminished reputation will also suffice to prove 'actual
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injury[,]'" an "[a]ward[] based on a plaintiff's testimony alone or on 'inferred'
damages [is] unacceptable." Ibid.
Nominal damages may be awarded in cases where damages are presumed
but the plaintiff "has not proved a compensable loss." W.J.A., 210 N.J. at 240.
"Nominal damages are 'awarded for the infraction of a legal right, where the
extent of the loss is not shown, or where the right is one not dependent upon loss
or damage.'" Id. at 240-41 (quoting Charles T. McCormick, Damages 85
(1935)).
An award of nominal damages is a "judicial declaration that the plaintiff's
right has been violated." Id. at 241 (quoting McCormick at 85). They serve "the
purpose of vindicating the plaintiff's character by a verdict of a jury that
establishes the falsity of the defamatory statement." Ibid. The Punitive
Damages Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.9 to -5.17, defines nominal damages as
"damages that are not designed to compensate a plaintiff and are less than
$500.[00]" N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.10. "An award of nominal damages cannot
support an award of punitive damages"; punitive damages are only available "if
compensatory damages have been awarded in the first stage of the trial."
N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.13(c).
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Here, Maksoud was not awarded compensatory, actual, or punitive
damages for her defamation claims. She was awarded nominal damages in the
amount of $500.00, which was appropriate based on the evidence presented.
Contrary to Hughes's argument, Maksoud's defamation claim does not fail
because she did not prove a compensatory or actual loss.
Finally, Hughes cites to two out-of-state cases for the proposition that
"internet reviews of public professional practices like lawyers and doctors have
been treated more protectively than if it was just a matter of private concern,"
and therefore, the court's "finding a prima facie case of defamation should be
vacated." The two cases cited by Hughes are distinguishable from the present
matter.
The first case cited by Hughes is Creekside Endodontics, LLC v. Sullivan,
527 P.3d 424 (Colo. App. 2022). In that case, the plaintiff, a licensed dentist,
performed root canal therapy on his patient, the defendant. Id. at 426-27. The
defendant was dissatisfied with the procedures as well as the plaintiff's
responses to her concerns and publicly expressed her dissatisfaction by posting
online reviews. Id. at 426-28. The plaintiff then sued the defendant "for libel
per se and trade and product disparagement based on the allegedly defamatory
posts." Id. at 428.
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As for the statements defendant made about the plaintiff's dental work, the
court ultimately concluded that because the defendant's online reviews were
posted following a "lengthy investigation" into the work that was performed on
her teeth and after she "received conflicting viewpoints" from other dentists, the
plaintiff could not prove actual malice, which requires proof that the author
"entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the statement or acted with a high
degree of awareness of its probable falsity." Id. at 431-32 (quoting Fry v. Lee,
408 P.3d 843, 848 (Colo. App. 2013)). Next, as for the statements the defendant
made regarding the plaintiff's response to her complaints, the court found that
those statements were "pure opinion" based on facts that were not false. Id. at
432. Therefore, because the defendant "provided the factual reasons for her
opinion, her statements are protected by the First Amendment." Id. at 433.
Here, in contrast, Maksoud was able to prove actual malice, that is,
Maksoud was able to show that the online reviews posted by Hughes were
published with Hughes's actual knowledge that the information she was sharing
was false. Additionally, we reiterate, that Hughes's comments were not "pure
opinion" protected by the First Amendment because they were based on false
facts.
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Hughes relies on DeRicco v. Maidman, 209 A.D.3d 560 (N.Y. App. Div.
2022). In that case, the plaintiffs, an orthodontist and his professional
corporation, alleged that the defendants, a former minor patient and the patient's
parents, defamed them in an unfavorable review posted on Google. Ibid.In dismissing the complaint, the court held that the "overall context in
which the communication was made, an anonymous online review of plaintiff's
services," was an important consideration. Id. at 561. Based on that finding,
the court concluded that "a reasonable reader of [the] review would understand
it to be pure opinion," and therefore, not actionable. Ibid.
In this instance, however, Hughes's online postings were not simply
limited to commentary on Maksoud's services as an attorney. Rather, Hughes's
reviews contained false allegations against Maksoud, which, to a reasonable
reader, would not be understood or construed as pure opinion. Thus, Hughes's
arguments are unavailing, and the court did not err in finding Maksoud proved
a case of defamation.
V.
Hughes next argues that "all damages awarded for the stress [Maksoud]
allegedly suffered in connection with litigation are not compensable," and
therefore, the court erred in entering an award for IIED. Again, we disagree.
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In Picogna v. Board of Education of Township of Cherry Hill, 143 N.J.
391, 399 (1996), the Court held that a plaintiff may not recover for the stress of
conducting the litigation that the plaintiff instituted against the defendant
tortfeasor. However, the Court also noted that severe emotional distress
proximately caused by defendant's conduct, exclusive of the litigation, is
recoverable. Ibid.Here, Maksoud was not seeking recovery for severe emotional distress
caused by this action—the lawsuit she filed against Hughes. Instead, Maksoud
was seeking recovery for the severe emotional distress she suffered as a result
of Hughes's intentional and outrageous conduct against her—conduct which
included bringing two actions and filing multiple court documents premised on
false facts, and forcing Maksoud to defend herself against them. The evidence
adduced during the proof hearing and the damages hearing showed there were
multiple stress sources, and nothing in our jurisprudence indicates that a precise
quantification is required when that occurs. See, e.g., id. at 399; Hill v. N.J.
Dep't of Corr., 342 N.J. Super. 273 (App. Div. 2001). Consequently, we are
satisfied the court did not err in taking into consideration the prior litigation
history between the parties when determining the award for IIED damages.
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Hughes further argues "the finding, that there was no 'special grievance'
for the malicious abuse of process [] and the findings of 'no compensable
damages' for Hughes's defamation claim [] conflicts with the finding of liability
under the IIED claim." However, malicious abuse of process, defamation, and
IIED are separate causes of action. The court's disinclination to find "a special
grievance" to support a claim of malicious abuse of process, and its
disinclination to find compensable damages as a result of the defamation, did
not preclude the court from finding that Maksoud had separately established a
claim of IIED.
Lastly, Hughes argues that it was error for the court to "rel[y] upon and
specifically incorporate" Maksoud's computation of damages. "[T]o arrive at a
fair and reasonable award of compensation requires a high order of human
judgment." Model Jury Charges (Civil), 8.11E, "Disability, Impairment and
Loss of the Enjoyment of Life, Pain and Suffering" (rev. May 2017).
"Determining just compensation[,] . . . particularly when the damages are not
susceptible to scientific precision, as in the case of pain and suffering damages,
necessarily requires a high degree of discretion." Johnson v. Scaccetti, 192 N.J.
256, 279 (2007).
The Model Jury Charge on damages provides in pertinent part:
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The law on compensation recognizes that a plaintiff
may recover for any disability or impairment that he or
she suffers as a result of his or her injuries. . . . The law
also permits a plaintiff to recover for the loss of
enjoyment of life, which means the inability to pursue
one's normal pleasure and enjoyment. You must
determine how the injury has deprived [p]laintiff of [his
or her] customary activities as a whole person. This
measure of compensation is what a reasonable person
would consider to be adequate and just under all the
circumstances of the case to make [p]laintiff whole for
[his or her] injury and [his or her] consequent disability,
impairment, and the loss of the enjoyment of life. The
law also recognizes as proper items for recovery, the
pain, physical and mental suffering, discomfort, and
distress that a person may endure as a natural
consequence of the injury. . . .
Here are some factors you may want to take into
account when fixing the amount of the verdict . . . . You
may consider [p]laintiff's age, usual activities,
occupation, family responsibilities and similar relevant
facts in evaluating the probable consequences of any
injuries you find [he or she] has suffered. You are to
consider the nature, character and seriousness of any
injury, discomfort or disfigurement. You must also
consider their duration . . . .
The law does not provide you with any table,
schedule or formula by which a person's pain and
suffering, disability, impairment, and loss of enjoyment
of life may be measured in terms of money. The
amount is left to your sound discretion. . . . [T]he law
can provide no better yardstick for your guidance than
your own impartial judgment and experience.
You are to exercise sound judgment as to what is
fair, just and reasonable under all the circumstances.
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You should, of course, consider the testimony of
[p]laintiff on the subject of [his or her] discomforts.
You should also scrutinize all the other evidence
presented by both parties on the subject, including the
testimony of the doctors. After considering the
evidence you shall award a lump sum of money that will
fairly and reasonably compensate [p]laintiff for [his or
her] pain, suffering, disability, impairment, and loss of
enjoyment of life proximately caused by defendant's
negligence (or other fault).
[Model Jury Charges (Civil), 8.11E, (emphasis added)
(italicization removed).]
As the factfinder, the court here relied on Maksoud's testimony, which it
found to be credible and persuasive, as well as Maksoud's certification, which
supplemented her testimony and detailed the loss of her personal and
professional time proximately caused by Hughes's conduct. The court also
relied on Seglin's testimony, which it further found to be credible and was not
rebutted. Even though the court did not award compensatory damages for
defamation, that did not preclude the court from awarding damages for IIED.
And thus, it was entirely appropriate, and consistent with the Model Jury
Charges, for the court to consider Maksoud's testimony, certification, and
Seglin's7 testimony in arriving at its determination.
7
In her reply brief, Hughes contends that Seglin was not a "competent" witness
because he "was sufficiently impeached by his own misconduct for over-billing
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VI.
Finally, Hughes argues the verdict should be vacated for several other
reasons, which we address in turn.
A.
Default
Hughes maintains that "rigid enforcement of a default against a pro se
defendant for minor discovery violations denied the right to a jury trial ."
Hughes, however, never appealed from the court's entry of default judgment.
In civil actions, Rule 2:5-1(f)(2)(ii) requires an appellant to designate, in
the notice of appeal, the judgment, decision, action or rule appealed from. See
Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 5.1 on R. 2:5-1 (2025). If
a matter is not designated in a party's notice of appeal, it is not subject to the
appellate process and review. See Kornbleuth v. Westover, 241 N.J. 289, 299
(2020); Campagna ex rel. Greco v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 337 N.J. Super. 530, 550
Medicaid patients." In the record, it was explained that there was an
"administrative proceeding" with the "State fraud division" that "terminated at
the end of 2016 regarding some billing issues that involved an assistant in the
doctor's office and that as a condition of that resolution, with no civil penalties,
[Seglin] has long since hired a company to take care of his billing and has
received an administrative error." Thus, contrary to Hughes's argument, we
conclude this history did not render Seglin incompetent, and the court took that
information into consideration when rendering its final opinion.
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(App. Div. 2001); Sikes v. Twp. of Rockaway, 269 N.J. Super. 463, 465-66
(App. Div. 1994).
Since Hughes did not appeal from the court's default judgment, the issue
as to whether default was properly entered is not before this court. Nonetheless,
we address the merits of Hughes's argument.
Rule 4:43-1 states, in pertinent part:
If a party against whom a judgment for affirmative
relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend
as provided by these rules or court order, or if the
answer has been stricken with prejudice, the clerk shall
enter a default on the docket as to such party.
"As a general matter, there are various ways in which a party's failure to
adequately fulfill conditions imposed by a court order in discovery or in
preparation for trial may ultimately permit the dismissal of a claim or the entry
of default." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. P.W.R., 410 N.J. Super. 501,
506 (App. Div. 2009). More typical examples of such failures include "[f]ailures
to file responsive pleadings or to appear when required to litigate the matter."
N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. M.G., 427 N.J. Super. 154, 168 (App. Div.
2012).
Here, although Hughes was proceeding pro se, the record shows she was
familiar with the court system. Indeed, Hughes was given multiple opportunities
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to respond to Maksoud's discovery requests, but repeatedly failed to comply.
Hughes's failure to appear and participate clearly constituted a failure to defend,
squarely falling within the grounds for a default under Rule 4:43-1. Moreover,
in light of Hughes's conduct, there was no basis for the court to try the case by
jury.
B.
Damages Awarded Were Arbitrary and Capricious
Hughes avers that the court's evaluation of damages for "emotional trauma
was arbitrary and capricious and should be vacated." Hughes maintains that
having found no compensable damages for defamation and no special damages
for abuse of process, Maksoud cannot be entitled to estimated compensatory
damages under the guise of damages for extraordinary emotional distress
resulting from conduct so horrendous that it is beyond the capacity of a person
to bear.
As we previously stated, however, the court was not precluded from
finding Maksoud proved IIED and was entitled to damages simply because it
did not award compensatory damages for defamation and did not find proof of
a claim of malicious use of process. Each claim was separate. Moreover, the
court was permitted to consider all the evidence presented when awarding
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damages. Ultimately, the amount the court ordered, $522,700.00, does not
shock the judicial conscience based on the proven facts of this case.
C.
Mitigating Factors
Finally, Hughes argues that she should have been allowed to present
evidence in mitigation of the damages alleged by Maksoud. "It [is] strictly a
discretionary matter for [the] court to determine and delineate the extent of
defendant's participation" in the default proceeding. Scott v. Scott, 190 N.J.
Super. 189, 196 (Ch. Div. 1983).
Here, Hughes was permitted to challenge Maksoud's evidence by way of
cross-examination. Additionally, Hughes was provided the opportunity to give
a closing statement, although she was ultimately barred from doing so based on
her representations to the court. Hughes was not permitted to present affirmative
proofs, but that limitation was rightly imposed by the court because of her
default status. See Chakravarti, 393 N.J. Super. at 210-11 ("Even though a
defendant who has defaulted has relinquished the right to present affirmative
proofs in the matter, the right to challenge a plaintiff's showings in a proof
hearing by way of cross-examination and argument should not ordinarily be
precluded."); Innes v. Carrascosa, 391 N.J. Super. 453, 496 (App. Div. 2007)
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(finding that when faced with a defaulting defendant, trial judge acted
reasonably and within his authority to restrict that party's participation in a
proceeding including limiting introduction of evidence).
Thus, contrary to Hughes's arguments, in light of her default status,
Hughes had no right to present evidence on her behalf at the hearings. We
conclude the court acted well within its discretion in limiting Hughes's
involvement to cross-examination and closing statements.
To the extent we have not addressed them, all other points raised by
Hughes lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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