State of New Jersey v. Daniel P. Nicini ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2921-21
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DANIEL P. NICINI,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
Argued November 9, 2023 – Decided October 28, 2024
Before Judges Gummer and Walcott-Henderson.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Cumberland County, Indictment Nos. 92-09-
0809 and 92-12-1082.
Peter T. Blum, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora,
Public Defender, attorney; Peter T. Blum, of counsel
and on the briefs).
Jennifer E. Kmieciak, Deputy Attorney General, argued
the cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney
General, attorney; Jennifer E. Kmieciak, of counsel and
on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
GUMMER, J.A.D.
Defendant Daniel P. Nicini appeals from an order denying his motion for
reconsideration of his sentence for crimes he committed in 1992 when he was
nineteen years old. He argues we should extend our Supreme Court's decision
in State v. Comer, 249 N.J. 359 (2022), to youthful offenders who were between
the ages of eighteen and twenty when they committed their offenses. We
disagree and affirm.
In 1992, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, defendant pleaded guilty
to first-degree felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3), and third-degree
burglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2, for his involvement in the brutal slaying of a man
he had lured to a remote location to rob. See State v. Timmendequas, 168 N.J.
20, 74-75 (2001). The trial court sentenced him to a term of life imprisonment
with a thirty-year period of parole ineligibility on the felony-murder conviction
and a consecutive five-year term of imprisonment with a three-year period of
parole ineligibility on the burglary conviction. Defendant subsequently moved
to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court denied that motion. In his direct
appeal, defendant challenged his sentence and the denial of his plea-withdrawal
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motion. We affirmed, and the Supreme Court denied his petition for
certification. State v. Nicini, 139 N.J. 186 (1994).
In 2021, defendant moved pro se for reconsideration of his sentence,
asking the court to amend the burglary-conviction sentence from running
consecutively to running concurrently with the sentence for the felony-murder
conviction. In a counseled brief, he asked the court to reconsider his sentence
based on Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and State v. Zuber, 227 N.J.
422 (2017). After hearing argument, the trial court placed a decision on the
record and entered an order on March 30, 2022, denying the motion. On May
2, 2022, the court entered a comprehensive written opinion explaining its denial
of the motion.
On appeal, defendant presents this single argument for our consideration:
POINT I
A RESENTENCING SHOULD OCCUR BECAUSE
THE LANDMARK COMER DECISION – WHICH
ENTITLES JUVENILE OFFENDERS TO A
RESENTENCING AFTER TWENTY YEARS –
SHOULD EXTEND TO NINETEEN-YEAR-OLD
OFFENDERS LIKE DEFENDANT NICINI, WHO
SHARE THE SAME CHARACTERISTICS AS
JUVENILES. U.S. CONST. AMEND. VIII, XIV; N.J.
CONST. ART. I, ¶ 12.
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In Comer, recognizing that "children are constitutionally different from
adults for purposes of sentencing," 249 N.J. at 384 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at
471), our Supreme Court held "[j]uvenile offenders sentenced under the
[homicide] statute may petition for a review of their sentence after having spent
[twenty] years in jail," id. at 403. The defendants in Comer were fourteen and
seventeen years old when they committed their crimes. Id. at 371, 374.
This court addressed the issue defendant raises in this appeal squarely in
State v. Jones, 478 N.J. 532 (App. Div. 2024), petition for certif. filed, No.
089524 (June 6, 2024), an opinion issued after defendant had filed this appeal.
The defendants in Jones were eighteen and twenty years old when they
committed their crimes. Id. at 541, 544, 547. Like defendant, they sought
resentencing based on Comer, arguing the Comer sentence-review procedure
"should extend to youthful offenders [who were] between the ages of eighteen
and twenty when they committed their offenses" because "developmental
science recognizes no meaningful cognitive differences between juveniles and
young adults." Id. at 534-35, 542.
After an extensive review of the "guiding legal principles" applicable to
the sentencing of juvenile offenders, id. at 535-36, we declined to extend the
holding in Comer to youthful offenders, id. at 549. We found "the Court's
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decision [in Comer] was limited to juvenile offenders tried and convicted of
murder in adult court." Ibid. In reaching that conclusion, we relied in part on
State v. Ryan, 249 N.J. 581 (2022), an opinion the Court issued one month after
it had decided Comer. Jones, 478 N.J. Super. at 549-50. In Ryan, the Court
acknowledged that "[t]he Legislature has chosen eighteen as the threshold age
for adulthood in criminal sentencing. Although this choice may seem arbitrary,
'a line must be drawn,' and '[t]he age of [eighteen] is the point where society
draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood.'" Ryan,
249 N.J. at 600 n.10 (alterations in original) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 574 (2006)); see also Jones, 478 N.J. Super. at 551 (citing N.J.S.A.
2A:4A-22(a) (defining a juvenile as an individual "under the age of [eighteen]
years"); N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-22(b) (defining an adult as "an individual [eighteen]
years of age or older")).
Noting that "our institutional role as an intermediate appellate court is a
limited one" and that "[w]e are bound to follow the precedents of the United
States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of New Jersey," this court in Jones
"discern[ed] no reason to disturb the motion judges' decisions, which
emphasized the Supreme Court in Comer limited its decision to juveniles." 478
N.J. Super. at 551. We reach the same conclusion in this case. Perceiving no
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basis to deviate from our opinion in Jones, we affirm the March 30, 2022 order
denying defendant's motion for reconsideration of his sentence.
Affirmed.
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