Rebecca J. Reed v. Elizabeth M. Muoio ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2319-22
REBECCA J. REED and AMANDA
M. CURRY, on behalf of themselves
and all other class members similarly
situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
ELIZABETH M. MUOIO,
Treasurer of the State of New
Jersey, CAROLINE BENSON,
Acting Chief Financial Officer/
Treasurer of the Borough of
Middlesex, COLLEEN LAPP,
Director/Chief Financial Officer
of Middletown Township, on
behalf of themselves, and all
other defendant class members
similarly situated, GLENN A.
GRANT, J.A.D., Administrative
Director of the Courts, N.J.,
Administrative Office of the
Courts, B. SUE FULTON,
Chief Administrator, New Jersey
Motor Vehicle Commission, a body
corporate and politic and an
instrumentality of the State of New
Jersey, MERARI GAUD, Court
Administrator, Borough of Middlesex
and KATE CHIEFFO, Court Administrator,
Middletown Township, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated,
Defendants-Respondents.
______________________________________
Argued January 8, 2024 – Decided October 29, 2024
Before Judges DeAlmeida, Berdote Byrne, and Bishop-
Thompson.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Mercer County, Docket Nos. L-0857-21 and
L-0993-21.
Richard Galex and Joseph M. Pinto argued the cause
for appellants (Lomurro, Munson, Comer, Brown &
Schottland, LLC, and Polino and Pinto, PC, attorneys;
Richard Galex, Matthew A. Schiappa, Christina
Vassiliou Harvey and Joseph M. Pinto, on the briefs).
Phoenix N. Meyers, Deputy Attorney General, argued
the cause for respondents Elizabeth M. Muoio, Glenn
A. Grant, and B. Sue Fulton (Matthew J. Platkin,
Attorney General, attorney; Sara M. Gregory, Assistant
Attorney General, of counsel; Phoenix N. Meyers, on
the brief).
Matthew R. Flynn argued the cause for respondents
Caroline Benson, Merari Gaud, and the Borough of
Middlesex (Savo Schalk, attorneys, join in the brief of
respondents Elizabeth M. Muoio, Glenn A. Grant, and
B. Sue Fulton).
Dana Citron argued the cause for respondents Colleen
Lapp, and Kate Chieffo (Spiro Harrison & Nelson,
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attorneys, join in the brief of respondents Elizabeth M.
Muoio, Glenn A. Grant, and B. Sue Fulton).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
DeALMEIDA, J.A.D.
Plaintiffs Rebecca J. Reed and Amanda M. Curry appeal from five orders
of the Law Division dismissing their original and amended complaints for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The complaints alleged
a class action seeking the refund of a $25 surcharge assessed against plaintiffs
and similarly situated class members as a penalty for their convictions of driving
while intoxicated (DWI), N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a). The Legislature authorized the
surcharge at the same time it enacted a statute mandating municipalities install
mobile video recording systems (MVRS) in new police vehicles. The statute
authorizing the surcharge directs that it be collected by municipalities and used
for the purpose of fulfilling the MVRS installation mandate.
The New Jersey Council on Local Mandates (Council) invalidated the
MVRS installation mandate, finding that the surcharge was wholly insufficient
to cover the cost of installing MVRS in new municipal police vehicles. The
Council also purported to "render nugatory" the DWI surcharge. Plaintiffs
allege they and other class members are entitled to a refund of surcharges
imposed on them in light of the Council's decision.
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While the Council had the constitutional authority to invalidate the MVRS
installation mandate, we conclude it exceeded its authority when it purported to
invalidate the legislatively-designated funding source for the mandate. In
addition, we conclude the Council does not have the authority to invalidate a
legislatively-approved sanction for a quasi-criminal conviction. We therefore
hold that the surcharge remains a sanction for DWI and a source of funding in
those instances where municipalities elect to install MVRS in new police
vehicles. Because plaintiffs are not entitled to a refund of the surcharges they
paid, we affirm the trial court orders on appeal.
I.
In 2014, the Legislature enacted N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.1, which provides
that "[e]very new or used municipal police vehicle purchased, leased, or
otherwise acquired on or after [March 1, 2015] which is primarily used for traffic
stops shall be equipped with [MVRS]." At the time of the enactment of N.J.S.A.
40A:14-118.1, the Legislature also amended N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(i), the DWI
statute. The amendment increased an existing $100 surcharge for persons
convicted of DWI to $125 and provided $25 of the surcharge
shall be payable as follows: in a matter where the
summons was issued by a municipality's law
enforcement agency, to that municipality to be used for
the cost of equipping police vehicles with [MVRS]
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pursuant to the provisions of [N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.1];
in a matter where the summons was issued by a county's
law enforcement agency, to that county; and in a matter
where the summons was issued by a State law
enforcement agency, to the General Fund.
[L. 2014, c. 54, § 2.]
On or about May 4, 2015, Deptford Township filed a complaint with the
Council, alleging the MVRS installation mandate was unfunded in violation of
N.J. Const. Art. VIII, § 2, ¶ 5(a) and N.J.S.A. 52:13H-2. Deptford argued that
even with the surcharge, the Legislature has failed to "authorize sufficient
resources, other than the property tax, to offset the direct expenditures" required
to fulfill the MVRS installation mandate. Deptford produced estimates ranging
from $10,827.99 to $29,548.16 for equipping six new police vehicles with
MVRS, not including future costs such as service and upgrades for hardware
and software. In addition, the township established DWI convictions in its
municipal court averaged 7.5 a month, which would yield $2,250 in allocated
surcharges in a year, less than six percent of the estimated cost of MVRS
installation for six police vehicles.
On April 20, 2016, the Council issued an opinion invalidating the MVRS
installation mandate. The Council determined that "the enormous gap between
the municipality's projected costs and its surcharge revenues . . . compels the
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conclusion that the authorized funding is, on its face, constitutionally
inadequate." The Council continued: "Accordingly, the Council declares
N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.1 to be unconstitutional. That determination renders
nugatory the $25 surcharge described in N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(i) . . . ." The Council's
decision invalidating the surcharge is not limited to convictions in which the
summons was issued by a municipal law enforcement agency, even though the
surcharge is to be allocated to county or State law enforcement agencies that are
not subject to the MVRS installation mandate when those agencies issue the
summons resulting in a DWI conviction.
On July 15, 2017, an officer with the Middlesex Borough Police
Department issued plaintiff Rebecca J. Reed a summons for DWI. On January
27, 2020, Reed pleaded guilty to DWI in the Middlesex Borough Municipal
Court. The sentence imposed on Reed included the surcharge authorized by the
2014 amendment to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(i).
On March 8, 2021, Reed filed a class action complaint in the Law Division
against defendants Elizabeth M. Muoio, the State Treasurer, and Caroline
Benson, the Acting Financial Officer/Treasurer of the Borough of Middlesex.
Reed alleged that since March 1, 2015, those defendants have been collecting
the surcharge the Council declared unconstitutional from persons convicted of
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DWI, including from Reed and other similarly situated people. She demanded
an order: (1) certifying the class; (2) declaring N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.1
unconstitutional; (3) negating the surcharge added by the 2014 amendment; (4)
enjoining further collection of the surcharge; (5) directing defendants provide
an accounting of their collection of the surcharge since March 1, 2015; (6)
refunding the surcharge to Reed and the members of the purported class; and (7)
awarding attorney's fees, costs, and interest.
On July 24, 2020, an officer with the Middletown Township Police
Department issued plaintiff Amanda M. Curry a summons for DWI. On January
27, 2020, Curry pled guilty to DWI in the Middletown Township Municipal
Court. The sentence imposed on Curry included the surcharge authorized by the
2014 amendment to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(i).
On May 11, 2021, Curry filed a class action complaint in the Law Division
against Muoio and Colleen Lapp, the Director and Chief Financial Officer of
Middletown Township. Curry's allegations and demands for relief mirror those
alleged by Reed. On June 21, 2021, the court granted a motion to consolidate
the two complaints.
Muoio moved to dismiss the complaints pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e) for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. She argued she played
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no role in the collection of the surcharge by municipalities or in the subsequent
expenditure of those funds. Muoio also argued plaintiffs are unable to obtain
the relief they seek because N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(i), which imposes the surcharge,
is distinct from N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.1, which imposes the MVRS installation
mandate. According to Muoio, to the extent the two provisions are related, they
are severable and the unconstitutionality of N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.1 does not
affect the validity of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(i). Muoio argued the surcharge was
intended to raise revenue for municipalities to purchase MVRS for police
vehicles and, even if the MVRS installation mandate is invalid, the purpose of
N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(i) is fulfilled by collection of the surcharge, which is available
to municipalities that voluntarily purchase MVRS for their police vehicles. As
a funding source, Muoio argued, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(i) cannot be an unfunded
mandate and is not subject to review by the Council.
Finally, Muoio argued if the Council's decision is applied only to
defendants convicted on summonses issued by municipal law enforcement
agencies, then only defendants who are convicted on summonses issued by
county and State law enforcement officers would pay the surcharge, while the
plaintiff class would not. According to Muoio, such disparate treatment of DWI
defendants would violate equal protection principles.
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Benson also moved to dismiss the complaint against her for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. She joined Muoio's arguments
regarding severance and equal protection. Lapp had not yet been served with
the complaint.
Plaintiffs opposed the motions and cross-moved to file an amended
complaint. They argued once the Council declared the MVRS installation
mandate to be unfunded, and therefore unconstitutional, both the mandate in
N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.1 and the statute providing its inadequate funding source,
N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(i), were rendered invalid. They argued the two statutes must
be read in pari materia and the constitutional infirmity of one applies equally to
the other. Plaintiffs also argued decisions of the Council are political
determinations not subject to judicial review and must be respected by the
courts. Finally, plaintiffs argued further discovery might reveal Muoio's role in
collecting and dispersing the surcharge and equal protection principles are not
offended by varying punishments for the same offense, provided the State has a
rational basis for the disparate treatment, which is present here.
On August 18, 2022, the court granted defendants' motions and dismissed
the complaints without prejudice. In a written decision, the court held:
The Council['s] . . . authority is limited to deeming
unfunded mandates to be unconstitutional. The
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Council's decision to strike [N.J.S.A.] 40A:14-118.1 as
unconstitutional did not also deem [N.J.S.A.] 39:4-
50(i) to be unconstitutional. The Council's decision
held the $25 DWI surcharge to be nugatory only in
relation to the unfunded mandate. Plaintiffs' argument
that the disbursement of the collected funds has not
been disclosed is insufficient to save their [c]omplaint.
Even if [p]laintiffs were able to track the collection and
disbursement of the surcharges, this does not change
the fact that [N.J.S.A.] 39:4-50(i) is valid. Plaintiffs
should not be permitted to use discovery as a fishing
expedition in the hopes of finding a viable claim.
An August 18, 2022 order memorialized the court's decision.
On September 16, 2022, the court granted plaintiffs' cross-motion to file
an amended complaint.
On September 21, 2022, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. They
named additional defendants: Hon. Glenn A. Grant, J.A.D., the Acting Director
of the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC), B. Sue Fulton, Chief
Administrator of the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission (MVC), Merari
Gaud, Court Administrator for the Borough of Middlesex, and Kate Chieffo,
Court Administrator for the Township of Middletown. In addition to repeating
the allegations in the original complaints, the amended complaint alleges the
surcharge is collected by municipal court administrators and distributed by
municipal chief financial officers or treasurers, the MVC, or the AOC. Plaintiffs
also allege the surcharge is being collected with no guidance as to where the
A-2319-22
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money will go and may be being used for purposes contrary to law. Plaintiffs
seek the same relief demanded in the original complaints.
Muoio, Grant, Fulton, and Benson moved to dismiss the amended
complaint pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e) for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted. They argued the amended complaint is substantively
indistinguishable from the original complaints and, as a result, must be
dismissed under the law of the case doctrine. In addition, the defendants argued
that if the court addresses the substantive provisions of the amended complaint,
their motion must be granted for the same reasons the court expressed when
dismissing the original complaints.
Plaintiffs opposed the motion and cross-moved for reconsideration of the
August 18, 2022 order. They argued the law of the case doctrine does not apply
in the context of a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order and, on
the merits, the surcharge violates due process and upholding it would usurp the
Legislature's power to raise revenue and appropriate funds for a specified
purpose.
On February 16, 2023, the court granted defendants' motion and denied
the cross-motion. In a written decision, the court concluded the law of the case
doctrine did not apply in light of plaintiffs' cross-motion for reconsideration.
A-2319-22
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Applying the standards for reconsideration of an interlocutory order, the court
concluded plaintiffs had "not put forth any argument at this time that causes the
[c]ourt to feel that a revision of its prior opinion would be in the 'interest of
justice.'" With respect to the sufficiency of the allegations in the amended
complaint, the court concluded:
The [c]ourt finds that plaintiff[s'] [o]riginal [c]omplaint
and [f]irst [a]mended [c]omplaint, although formatted
differently, request the same relief, and differ only in
the defendants named.
The [c]ourt also notes that it previously rejected
plaintiff[s'] same arguments. Thus, because
[p]laintiff[s'] [m]otion for [r]econsideration is denied,
the [c]ourt concludes the doctrine of res judicata bars
[p]laintiff[s'] claims in this complaint and [d]efendants'
motion to dismiss must be granted with prejudice.
Two February 16, 2023 orders memorialized the court's decision.
On March 9, 2023, the court entered an order dismissing the amended
complaint against Lapp and Chieffo with prejudice for the reasons stated in its
February 16, 2023 decision. On May 18, 2023, the court entered an order
dismissing the amended complaint against Gaud with prejudice for the reasons
stated in its February 16, 2023 decision.
This appeal followed. Plaintiffs argue the orders dismissing their
complaints should be reversed because: (1) the Council's decision to invalidate
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the surcharge is a political decision not subject to judicial review and must be
respected by the courts; and (2) the trial court erred when it concluded the
Council invalidated the surcharge only in relation to the unfunded MVRS
installation mandate.
II.
We apply a de novo standard of review to a trial court's order dismissing
a complaint under Rule 4:6-2(e). See Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., LLC v.
Cnty. of Bergen, 450 N.J. Super. 286, 290 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting Teamsters
Loc. 97 v. State, 434 N.J. Super. 393, 413 (App. Div. 2014)). Under the rule,
we owe no deference to the motion judge's conclusions. Rezem Fam. Assocs.,
LP v. Borough of Millstone, 423 N.J. Super. 103, 114 (App. Div. 2011). Our
"inquiry is limited to examining the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the
face of the complaint." Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116
N.J. 739, 746 (1989) (citing Rieder v. Dep't of Transp., 221 N.J. Super. 547, 552
(App. Div. 1987)). "A pleading should be dismissed if it states no basis for
relief and discovery would not provide one." Rezem Fam. Assocs., LP, 423 N.J.
Super. at 113 (citing Camden Cnty. Energy Recovery Assoc., L.P. v. N.J. Dep't
of Env't Prot., 320 N.J. Super. 59, 64 (App. Div. 1999), aff'd, 170 N.J. 246(2001)).
A-2319-22
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In 1995, the electorate adopted Article VIII, Section 2, Paragraph 5 of the
State Constitution. The provision states, in relevant part:
(a) With respect to any provision of a law enacted on
and after January 17, 1996 . . . any provision of such
law . . . which is determined in accordance with this
paragraph to be an unfunded mandate upon . . .
municipalities because it does not authorize resources,
other than the property tax, to offset the additional
direct expenditures required for the implementation of
the law . . . shall, upon such determination cease to be
mandatory in its effect and expire. . . .
(b) The Legislature shall create by law a Council on
Local Mandates. The Council shall resolve any dispute
regarding whether a law . . . constitutes an unfunded
mandate. . . . The decisions of the Council shall be
political and not judicial determinations.
[N.J. Const. Art. VIII, § 2, ¶ 5 (a) and (b).]
The Legislature enacted N.J.S.A. 52:13H-1 to -22 to implement Article
VIII, Section 2, Paragraph 5. N.J.S.A. 52:13H-4 creates the Council.
It shall be the duty of the [C]ouncil to review, and issue
rulings upon, complaints filed with the [C]ouncil by
. . . a . . . municipality . . . that any provision of a statute
enacted on or after January 17, 1996 . . . constitutes an
unfunded mandate upon the . . . municipality . . .
because it does not authorize resources to offset the
additional direct expenditures required for the
implementation of the statute . . . .
[N.J.S.A. 52:13H-12(a).]
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"If the [C]ouncil determines that any provision of a statute . . . constitutes an
unfunded State mandate . . . that provision of the law . . . shall cease to be
mandatory in its effect and shall expire." Ibid. "A ruling of the [C]ouncil shall
be restricted to the specific provision of a law . . . which constitutes an unfunded
mandate and shall, as far as possible, leave intact the remainder of a statute
. . . ." Ibid.
"A provision of a law . . . determined to be an unfunded mandate shall
resume its mandatory effect if, after enactment of the law[,] . . . resources are
authorized to offset the additional direct expenditures required for the
implementation thereof." N.J.S.A. 52:13H-2. "[R]ulings of the [C]ouncil shall
be political determinations and shall not be subject to judicial review." N.J.S.A.
52:13H-18.
We do not agree with plaintiffs' argument that any decision of the Council,
even a decision plainly exceeding its constitutional and statutory authority, is
political and not subject to judicial review. It is well settled that the primary
purpose of "statutory interpretation is to determine and 'effectuate the
Legislature's intent.'" State v. Rivastineo, 447 N.J. Super. 526, 529 (App. Div.
2016) (quoting State v. Shelley, 205 N.J. 320, 323 (2011)). We start by
considering "the plain 'language of the statute, giving the terms used therein
A-2319-22
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their ordinary and accepted meaning.'" Ibid. (quoting Shelley, 205 N.J. at 323).
Where "the Legislature's chosen words lead to one clear and unambiguous result,
the interpretive process comes to a close, without the need to consider extrinsic
aids." Ibid. (quoting Shelley, 205 N.J. at 323). We do "not 'rewrite a plainly-
written enactment of the Legislature [or] presume that the Legislature intended
something other than that expressed by way of the plain language.'" Id. at 529-
30 (alteration in original) (quoting Marino v. Marino, 200 N.J. 315, 329 (2009)).
However, "[a]n enactment that is part of a larger statutory framework should not
be read in isolation, but in relation to other constituent parts so that a sensible
meaning may be given to the whole of the legislative scheme." Vitale v.
Schering-Plough Corp., 447 N.J. Super. 98, 115 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting
Wilson ex rel. Manzano v. City of Jersey City, 209 N.J. 558, 572 (2012)).
Taken literally, N.J.S.A. 52:13H-18 and the constitutional provision from
which it derives insulate all decisions of the Council from judicial review.
Plaintiffs urge this literal interpretation, arguing the voters who adopted Article
VIII, Section 2, Paragraph 5 intended the Council to operate free from judicial
oversight, even when the Council exceeds it constitutional authority. Under
plaintiffs' interpretation of Article VIII, Section 2, Paragraph 5 and N.J.S.A.
52:13H-18, if instead of declaring the surcharge "nugatory" the Council had
A-2319-22
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invalidated N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 in its entirety, including the offense of DWI, the
Council's decision would not be subject to judicial review. The same would be
true, according to plaintiffs, if the Council issued a decision invalidating a
statute entirely unrelated to the MVRS installation mandate and the surcharge
when it issued its decision. We do not agree the relevant provisions of the
constitution and statute are intended to be applied in so broad a fashion.
Generally, "[t]he nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a
function of the separation of powers." Gilbert v. Gladden, 87 N.J. 275, 281
(1981) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962)). A political question
exists when there is "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of [an]
issue to a coordinate political department." Id. at 282 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S.
at 217). Here, the textually demonstrable constitutional commitment is to the
Council to determine whether a statute imposes an unfunded mandate on
municipalities. The Council fulfilled its constitutional responsibility when it
reviewed Deptford's complaint and declared the MVRS installation mandate to
be unfunded. That decision is political and not subject to judicial review.
Neither plaintiffs nor defendants challenge the Council's decision that the
MVRS installation mandate is unfunded and, therefore, unconstitutional.
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The Council, however, also acted beyond its constitutional responsibility
when it purported to invalidate the surcharge. The surcharge is not a mandate
on municipalities. It is a source of funding for a mandate, assessed against
defendants convicted of DWI, not municipalities. There is no textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment to the Council to review the validity
of a source of funding identified by the Legislature for a specified purpose. The
purpose of Article VIII, Section 2, Paragraph 5 is "to prevent the State
government from requiring units of local government to implement additional
or expanded activities without providing funding for those activities . . . ."
N.J.S.A. 52:13H-1(b). Judicial review is a constitutionally appropriate avenue
through which to challenge a decision of the Council alleged to have been made
outside of its constitutional authority.
We have reviewed the Council's invalidation of the surcharge and
conclude its decision is not supported by law. As noted above, the surcharge
poses no burden on municipal coffers. It instead generates revenue for
municipalities. The Council, therefore, lacked the authority to invalidate it.
In addition, the Council is required to "restrict[]" its decisions "to the
specific provision of a law . . . which constitutes an unfunded mandate and shall,
as far as possible, leave intact the remainder of a statute . . . ." N.J.S.A. 52:13H-
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12(a). The Council must, therefore, sever the unconstitutional mandate from the
remaining elements of the statute, if possible. Severability is a question of
legislative intent. Affiliated Distillers Brands Corp. v. Sills, 60 N.J. 342, 345
(1972). "That intent must be determined on the basis of whether the
objectionable feature of the statute can be excised without substantial
impairment of the principal object of the statute." Ibid. "Courts will enforce
severability where the invalid portion is independent and the remaining portion
forms a complete act within itself." Inganamort v. Borough of Fort Lee, 72 N.J.
412, 423 (1977).
The surcharge provision in N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(i) is amenable to severance
from the MVRS installation mandate in N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.1. The legislative
intent of the surcharge is to punish those convicted of DWI, raise funds for the
installation of MVRS in municipal police vehicles, and provide revenue for
county and State law enforcement agencies. Those objectives can be
accomplished independent of the MVRS installation mandate in N.J.S.A.
40A:14-118.1. The punishment of those convicted of DWI through imposition
of the surcharge is independent of MVRS installation. The punishment derives
from the obligation to pay the surcharge, regardless of how that surcharge may
be spent. The same is true for the allocation of the surcharge to county and State
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law enforcement agencies, which are not subject to the MVRS installation
mandate. Finally, while the legislative mandate to install MVRS in municipal
police vehicles has been invalidated, municipalities remain free to elect to install
MVRS in police vehicles, and preservation of the surcharge as a funding source
for such installations best fulfills the legislative intent. We see nothing in the
legislative history or the Legislature's inaction in the many years during which
the surcharge has been imposed and collected after the Council's decision
indicating a legislative intent for the surcharge to expire in the event the MVRS
installation mandate is invalidated.
We therefore conclude the Council's purported invalidation of the
surcharge exceeded its constitutional authority and the Council failed to comply
with its statutory obligation to preserve as far as possible the provisions of a
statute under its review that do not contain an unfunded mandate.
Because the Council's purported invalidation of the surcharge is itself
invalid, plaintiffs do not have a right to return of the surcharges assessed against
them for their DWI convictions. Given that plaintiffs' original and amended
complaints were predicated on their purported right to the return of the
surcharges, we see no error in the trial court's orders dismissing those
complaints.
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To the extent we have not specifically addressed any of plaintiffs'
remaining arguments, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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