State of New Jersey v. P.T. ( 2024 )

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1207-23
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
P.T.,1
Defendant-Respondent.
_________________________
Submitted October 2, 2024 – Decided October 28, 2024
Before Judges Currier, Paganelli and Torregrossa-
O'Connor.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Passaic County, Indictment No. 18-05-0469.
Camelia M. Valdes, Passaic County Prosecutor,
attorney for appellant (Lauren P. Haberstroh, Assistant
Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for
respondent (Alexandra K. Roche, Assistant Deputy
Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
1
We use initials to protect defendant's privacy. Rule 1:38-3(a)(2).
PER CURIAM
The State appeals from the December 19, 2023 order dismissing the
indictment against defendant, P.T., after finding he lacked competency. We
affirm.
I.
A. The Indictments
When arrested on February 28, 2018, defendant was on pretrial release for
2017 offenses charged under a separate indictment (Indictment I).2 From the
time of his February 2018 arrest, defendant has remained detained. In March
2018, defendant was charged in the indictment underpinning this appeal
(Indictment II) with two counts of third-degree possession of CDS, N.J.S.A.
2C:35-10(a)(1), one count of third-degree possession of CDS (heroin) with
intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1), (b)(3), one count of second-degree
possession of CDS (cocaine) with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1),
2
Indictment I charged three counts of third-degree possession of a controlled
dangerous substance (CDS), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1), three counts of third-
degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1),
(b)(3), three counts of third-degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute
within 1000 feet of school property, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1), -7(a); three counts
of second-degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute within 500 feet of
a public housing facility, park, or building, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1), -7.1(a), and
one count of fourth-degree resisting arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(2).
A-1207-23
2
(b)(2), and two counts of third-degree possession of CDS with intent to
distribute within 1,000 feet of school property, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a), -7(a).
B. The Competency Determinations
Competency questions concerning defendant's fitness to stand trial
originated during the January 2019 jury selection for trial on Indictment I when
it appeared defendant had difficulty understanding and communicating with
counsel. The trial court ordered a competency evaluation, which was conducted
on February 4, 2019, by Paul Dasher, Ph.D. Dr. Dasher recommended the case
be adjourned to gather more information and rule out malingering and conducted
another evaluation on February 14, 2019. His report opined that "defendant
[was] not competent[] as there [was] an underlying psychiatric disorder that
significantly impair[ed] his ability to consult with counsel and assist in his own
defense." Dr. Dasher stated that with "proper medication and treatment," there
was a "reasonable expectation" that defendant could regain competence.
Defendant refused to take any medication.
The trial court thereafter ordered another competency evaluation to further
"determine defendant's capacity to understand the proceedings against him and
to assist in his own defense."
A-1207-23
3
Tarmeen Sahni, Ph.D., conducted the next evaluation in April 2019 and
issued a report in May 2019. Dr. Sahni noted defendant, without medication,
was able to engage in "coherent discussion" and express a "rational
understanding . . . [of] the legal system." The doctor diagnosed defendant with
delusional disorder, but found him competent to stand trial and "oriented to
person, place, time, and situation," understanding the roles of the judge,
prosecutor, defense attorney, and jury. Finding defendant also understood his
right to testify and the concept of plea bargaining, Dr. Sahni opined that any
confusion regarding the trial process was from lack of experience. Dr. Sahni
found defendant presented "low risk of dangerousness to [him]self [and] others,"
but explained that return to the community and his "homeless status" might
cause defendant to deteriorate without supervision. After a hearing in July 2019,
the trial court found defendant fit to stand trial.
Trial on Indictment I commenced soon after, and a jury found defendant
guilty on nine of thirteen counts on September 5, 2019. See State v. P.T., No.
A-1602-19 (App. Div. Mar. 8, 2023) (slip op. 1-4). The court ordered another
competency evaluation prior to sentencing, which was again conducted by Dr.
Dasher in October 2019, who determined defendant was competent to proceed
having demonstrated his "understand[ing of] basic legal concepts." Although
A-1207-23
4
defendant was "not accessing any mental health treatment . . . [and was] not on
any psychotropic medication," he "still ha[d] the requisite adjudicative
competence."
Thereafter, on Indictment I, the court, after merger, imposed an aggregate
sentence of ten years' imprisonment with five years' parole ineligibility. We
affirmed the conviction but remanded for resentencing on a merger error. See
P.T., slip op. at 1-4.
As Indictment II proceeded before a new trial judge, competency
questions again emerged, and the judge ordered a new evaluation. Heidi
Camerlengo, Ed.D., evaluated defendant on two occasions—once in March 2020
and a second time in August 2021—and rendered a report in October 2021
finding he lacked competency to stand trial.3 Dr. Camerlengo found defendant
did not understand his present legal situation, specifically that he was in a
criminal court charged with criminal offenses, was unable to orient himself to
the facts of the offense due to his delusional thought process, and was unable to
participate in presenting his defense.
3
The COVID-19 pandemic and the applicable health restrictions in place at
Ann Klein Forensic Center (AKFC) and in state prison caused a delay in
competency evaluations and proceedings and a large interval of time elapsed
between Dr. Camerlengo's evaluations and her report.
A-1207-23
5
Dr. Camerlengo further opined defendant "[did] not appear capable of
communicating relevant information to his attorney" or capable of "utilizing
appropriate decision-making skills related to his legal issues due to his
delusional thought process." Although defendant "might benefit from a trial of
antipsychotic medication to address his delusional thought process ," Dr.
Camerlengo noted he "ha[d] consistently refused to accept psychotropic
medication, and some practitioners question[ed] whether it would be effective
in addressing his delusions."
On November 4, 2021, defendant's prison physician approved the
involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication to defendant which
continued until March 2023. In May 2022, Dr. Camerlengo again evaluated
defendant for competency, observing defendant's "presentation during this
evaluation appear[ed] to be related to his mental illness that seem[ed] to have
only partially responded to treatment." The corresponding report detailed
defendant's "fixed delusions" despite his "psychotropic medication," noting the
medication was changed at one time when defendant had negative physical side
effects. Dr. Camerlengo could not determine defendant's fitness to stand trial
because of "his unwillingness to cooperate . . . which [was] likely due to mental
incompetence" and recommended "inpatient psychiatric hospitalization . . . to
A-1207-23
6
facilitate stabilization" and ultimately determine whether defendant could be
restored to competence.
Defendant was transferred to AKFC in April 2023 for treatment and
further evaluation. Douglas Smith, M.D., evaluated defendant and issued a
report in May 2023, finding defendant incompetent to stand trial but also
deeming it "substantially probable" that treatment with antipsychotic medication
would restore him to competence "in the foreseeable future." As to
dangerousness, the report noted that there were no "behavioral issues" since
defendant's arrival at AKFC.
Pursuant to the court's May 2023 order, Dr. Smith re-evaluated defendant
and issued a report in September 2023 again concluding defendant was not fit
to proceed to trial. Finding defendant still exhibited delusions interfering with
his ability to participate in his defense, Dr. Smith again opined that defendant
presented no behavioral issues and concluded "[i]t is substantially probable that,
with treatment with antipsychotic medication, [defendant] would attain fitness
in the foreseeable future."
The court then conducted a competency hearing in September 2023, with
Dr. Smith testifying as to his findings. Dr. Smith recommended medication as
a significant component for restoration, but explained that defendant refused to
A-1207-23
7
cooperate. AKFC did not administer involuntary medication because defendant
did not meet the facility's criteria in that defendant did not pose a foreseeable
risk of danger to himself or others. Consistent with his September 2023 report,
Dr. Smith explained defendant did not appreciate the nature or gravity of his
legal situation due to his delusional condition.
Dr. Smith agreed that it is generally accepted that those with delusional
disorders can be responsive to antipsychotic medication, but acknowledged
potential side effects ranging in severity can result from antipsychotic
medication, including sedation that might interfere with the ability to
communicate and cause difficulty remaining alert. The doctor opined that
medication does not typically interfere with memory absent a high dosage and
the process at AKFC is to monitor the dosage of medication, with dosage
adjusted or changed altogether upon negative side effects. Nonetheless, Dr.
Smith indicated that there's always a risk of side effects, and it was not possible
to eliminate them entirely.
At the conclusion of the competency hearing, the judge inquired about the
criteria for ordering involuntary medication, and defense counsel identified the
four considerations set forth in Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180-82
(2003), for court-ordered forcible medication. Defense counsel then indicated
A-1207-23
8
she would be filing a motion to dismiss Indictment II and signaled that defendant
was eligible for parole on his sentence on Indictment I. Both counsel and the
court concurred that should the court dismiss Indictment II, AKFC could initiate
involuntary commitment if justified. No order was issued for a new evaluation.
C. Motion to Dismiss Indictment II
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Indictment II under N.J.S.A. 2C:4-
6(c), which was argued in December 2023. The court asked that counsel address
the issue of involuntary medication under the factors set forth in Sell, 539 U.S.
at 180-82, further clarified in State v. R.G., 460 N.J. Super. 416, 428-31 (App.
Div. 2019).
Defense counsel asserted that the State had not moved for involuntary
medication of defendant and defendant did not meet the involuntary medication
standard. Counsel argued: the governmental interest in prosecuting defendant
was substantially diminished by the length of time he had been incarcerated
pretrial; involuntary medication could have a negative impact on defendant's
functioning at trial; involuntary medication is not necessary or medically
appropriate; and AKFC had determined defendant did not meet the medical
criteria to be medicated against his will.
A-1207-23
9
In addressing dismissal under the N.J.S.A. 2C:4-6(c) factors, defense
counsel claimed: it was unlikely that defendant, incompetent since October
2019, would regain competence in the near future; defendant did not regain
competency during the time he was involuntarily medicated starting in 2021 and
until March 2023; defendant had been institutionalized for a lengthy period of
time (almost six years); the charges, although serious, were non-violent, and the
most serious second-degree charges related to the alleged cocaine found on
defendant would likely be dismissed as the lab results were negative for that
substance; the prejudice to the State resulting from further delay in a drug case
would be lessened by the ability to refresh the memories of largely police
witnesses with reports; defendant had been, by contrast, greatly prejudiced by
his years of pretrial detention impacting his constitutional right to a speedy trial;
and the public interest in prosecuting the case is lessened as the lengthy pretrial
incarceration has accomplished any necessary deterrent effect.
The State contended the statutory presumption against dismissal and the
circumstances of the case favored holding the charges in abeyance. Specifically,
the State claimed: involuntary medication could help to restore competency; the
offense of distributing CDS is very serious and offenders must be held
accountable; the State's plea offer was irrelevant as the charges could be held in
A-1207-23
10
abeyance as long as that delay did not exceed the maximum sentencing term;
there would be no prejudice to the State by holding the charges in abeyance; and
any prejudice to defendant was and would be lessened by his simultaneously
serving another sentence.
The State conceded it had not moved for involuntary medication of
defendant, but argued in favor of such an order, contending there is a strong
governmental interest in prosecuting and deterring drug offenders; any side
effects from involuntary medication such as sedation could be monitored and
managed; and restoring defendant to competency would be in his best interest .
The court then questioned defendant directly, inquiring generally about
the proceedings and his condition. Defendant's responses reflected his lack of
understanding of his situation including his belief that he was a "high court
judge" who "went to school to be a judge" at Seton Hall University and "these
cases were resolved already."
Assessing dismissal versus abeyance, the court first acknowledged the
statutory presumption that it could hold charges in abeyance unless it finds
"continuation . . . would constitute a constitutionally significant injury
to . . . defendant attributable to undue delay in being brought to trial." N.J.S.A.
2C:4-6(c). The court found the first four factors under N.J.S.A. 2C:4-6(c)
A-1207-23
11
favored dismissal. First, the court found it could not "determine with any
definitiveness that [defendant] will return to competency" and noted defendant
was "found incompetent more than he has been found competent" and defendant
now appeared incompetent. The court next acknowledged defendant has been
"sitting in jail . . . since 2018" and "[t]hat's a long time to be incarcerated."
Further, the court recognized the seriousness of the offenses, but noted if
defendant had accepted the State's plea offer of a concurrent sentence to that
which he is serving on Indictment I, he would be eligible for parole. Considering
the next factors, the court accepted there would be no adverse impact on the
prosecution if there were further delay, but found there might be an adverse
effect on defendant if witnesses were to be called by defendant. The court
explained that defendant may not have "witnesses . . . that would testify for him"
and "if there are witnesses . . . they don't have . . . reports to rely upon."
The court declined to order involuntary medication, finding "even if
[defendant] were to receive involuntary medication, there's no guarantee [it
would] bring [defendant] up to speed." Recognizing that AKFC found defendant
did not meet the internal criteria for involuntary medication because he did not
pose a danger to himself or others, the court was concerned about imposing
involuntary medication. Although clearly identifying the public interest in
A-1207-23
12
prosecuting "selling drugs," the court questioned whether society has that same
interest in "punishing someone" who is incompetent. Further, the court found
defendant had already been "reasonably punished for the crime," observing
again that the case might have been resolved by plea agreement favorably to
defendant if he had been competent enough to consider the State's plea offer.
The court found defendant incompetent and dismissed the indictment,
issuing an order of dismissal on December 19, 2023. The court further ordered
defendant remain at AKFC until his next appearance in January 2024 and
ordered that AKFC provide the court with a treatment plan for defendant prior
to that appearance. The State appealed.
II.
The State raises the following arguments on appeal:
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
DISMISSING INDICTMENT 18-05-0469-I
BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT OVERCOME
THE PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF HOLDING
PROCEEDINGS IN ABEYANCE.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED CLEAR ERROR
BY REFUSING TO INVOLUNTARILY MEDICATE
DEFENDANT WHERE THE STATE SATISFIED
ALL FACTORS UNDER SELL V. UNITED STATES
A-1207-23
13
BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE (539
U.S. 166 (2003)).
As to Point I, the State asserts the court abused its discretion by finding
defendant was unlikely to regain competency because defendant was deemed
competent in 2019, and over the next four years consistently displayed at least
some understanding of the court process. The State further contends the court
did not consider defendant was serving a ten-year sentence under Indictment I
and gave improper weight to factor four in favor of dismissal by improperly
focusing on the plea offer of a concurrent sentence. In addition, the State
asserted its strong public interest in prosecuting CDS distribution offenses and
the court erred in finding defendant had been "reasonably punished" in light of
his history of CDS-related offenses.
As to Point II, the State contends the court erred in refusing to order
involuntary medication as the State established all of the Sell factors by clear
and convincing evidence.
Defendant counters that the court appropriately considered the arguments
under each N.J.S.A. 2C:4-6(c) factor and reasonably exercised its discretion in
dismissing the indictment, appropriately finding a constitutionally significant
injury to defendant by the continued prosecution despite defendant's
incompetence. That defendant was serving a sentence on Indictment I, and
A-1207-23
14
COVID-19 concerns delayed defendant's evaluations does not minimize the
constitutional and speedy trial concerns in defendant's case.
Defendant further argues that although the State did not move for
involuntary medication, the court properly analyzed and rejected forcibly
medicating defendant under the applicable legal standard.
III.
We review "[a] trial court's decision denying defendant's motion to
dismiss [an] indictment . . . for abuse of discretion." State v. Saavedra, 222 N.J.
39, 55 (2015). Such "discretionary power will not be disturbed on appeal 'unless
it has been clearly abused.'" Id. at 55-56 (quoting State v. Warmbrun, 277 N.J.
Super. 51, 60 (App. Div. 1994)). We will intervene to correct an abuse of
discretion only when the "decision is 'made without a rational explanation,
inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible
basis.'" State v. Chavies, 247 N.J. 245, 257 (2021) (quoting State v. R.Y., 242
N.J. 48, 65 (2020)).
A defendant who "lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against
him or to assist in his own defense" cannot be convicted of an offense "so long
as such incapacity endures." N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4(a). Competency determinations
are the sole province of the court, and upon a finding of a defendant's
A-1207-23
15
incompetence, when a defendant "has not regained fitness to proceed within
three months" following the court's initial determination of incompetency, the
court must consider whether to dismiss the charges with prejudice or hold further
proceedings in abeyance. N.J.S.A. 2C:4-6(c).
N.J.S.A. 2C: 4-6(c) further provides a presumption that charges be held
in abeyance upon a finding of continued incompetency, which "can be
overcome" if the court, utilizing statutorily enumerated factors, finds further
delay "would constitute a constitutionally significant injury to the defendant
attributable to undue delay in being brought to trial." The factors to be weighed
include:
[1] the defendant's prospects for regaining competency;
[2] the period of time during which the defendant has
remained incompetent; [3] the nature and extent of the
defendant's institutionalization; [4] the nature and
gravity of the crimes charged; [5] the effects of delay
on the prosecution; [6] the effects of delay on the
defendant, including any likelihood of prejudice to the
defendant in the trial arising out of the delay; and [7]
the public interest in prosecuting the charges.
[N.J.S.A. 2C:4-6(c).]
Dismissal is appropriate "when it is determined that an adequate period of
time has elapsed during which the defendant has been institutionalized and has
remained unfit to be tried." State v. Gaffey, 92 N.J. 374, 389 (1983). "[T]he
A-1207-23
16
real or likely prejudice to the rights of the defendant that can actually be shown
or reasonably be inferred from the delay in bringing the matter to trial " aids
courts in determining the adequacy of time. Ibid. This court has further
recognized that
[w]hile elemental fairness and due process
considerations are applicable to avoid constitutionally
significant injury attributable to undue delay, the
validity of claims relating to speedy trial should be
made on a case-by-case basis in terms of the prejudice
to defendant's rights that can actually be shown or
reasonably be inferred from the delay.
[State v. Moya, 329 N.J. Super. 499, 514 (App. Div.
2000).]
A court's consideration "requires more than mere reliance upon the length of
time elapsed." Ibid.Here we discern no basis for disturbing the court's order dismissing the
indictment. Recognizing the presumption against dismissal, the court properly
considered the N.J.S.A. 2C:4-6(c) factors and found that it could not determine
that defendant was likely to regain competence, and further delay would exact
enduring constitutionally significant injury to defendant. That conclusion was
grounded in the record.
A-1207-23
17
The court observed that, despite being found competent early in the
proceedings, defendant currently appeared to be incompetent, had been found
incompetent more times than competent, and remained incompetent since 2019.
It found that the nearly six years defendant was incarcerated pretrial and the
nature and extent of his institutionalization, during which defendant was both
unmedicated and medicated in both prison and hospital settings, supported
dismissal.
The court analyzed the nature and gravity of the crimes charged,
recognizing the seriousness of drug distribution. We find no error in the court's
noting the State's plea offer to recommend a sentence concurrent to his sentence
on Indictment I would likely have already rendered defendant parole eligible.
The court also considered the diminished prejudice to the State by further
delay noting memories could be refreshed by police reports created at the time
of the drug offenses, but found defendant faced greater potential prejudice with
the passage of time because any witnesses he may have decided to call to testify
would likely be unable to rely on similar reports.
Finally, the court recognized there is "absolutely" a public interest in
prosecuting drug distribution charges, but reasonably considered the
circumstances of defendant's situation, specifically his lengthy incarceration and
A-1207-23
18
consistent incompetence. Thus, we will not disturb the court's determination as
the court recognized each statutory factor and anchored its decision in the
record.
IV.
We turn to the State's contention that the court erred in not entering an
order for involuntary medication. We recognize the State made no formal
application for forced medication, and the trial court raised the issue. We
nevertheless determine that the State received ample notice of the issue at the
competency hearing and argued in support of an involuntary medication order,
after which the court properly addressed the applicable legal standards and
rooted its factual determinations in the record.
"In light of the constitutional rights at stake on a motion to involuntarily
medicate a defendant to restore competency," the court's "legal determinations
on a Sell application are reviewed de novo while its factual findings are
reviewed for clear error" under Rule 2:10-2. State v. J.H.P., 478 N.J. Super.
262, 278 (App. Div. 2024). In assessing clear error, we may "not reverse the
findings of the [motion] court simply because [we] would have weighed the
evidence differently." Id. at 276 (alteration in original) (quoting United States
v. Coy, 991 F.3d 924, 929 (8th Cir. 2021)).
A-1207-23
19
In Sell, the Supreme Court set forth a four-part test in evaluating for
involuntary medication of a defendant who has not yet been convicted of a
crime, holding:
[T]he Constitution permits the Government
involuntarily to administer antipsychotic drugs to a
mentally ill defendant facing serious criminal charges
in order to render that defendant competent to stand
trial, but only if the treatment is medically appropriate,
is substantially unlikely to have side effects that may
undermine the fairness of the trial, and, taking account
of less intrusive alternatives, is necessary significantly
to further important government trial-related interests.
[539 U.S. at 179.]
Specifically, to satisfy the standard in Sell, a court must find by clear and
convincing evidence that 1) important governmental interests are at stake; 2)
involuntary medication will significantly further those interests; 3) involuntary
medication is necessary to further those interests; and 4) administration of the
drugs is medically appropriate, or in the patient's best interest in light of his
medical condition. Id. at 180-82; see also State v. R.G., 460 N.J. Super. at 429
n.5.
The governmental interest is strong when the prosecution involves "a
serious crime against the person or a serious crime against property," and courts
must also consider special circumstances that "may lessen the importance of
A-1207-23
20
[the] interest," such as the potential for future confinement and whether the
defendant has already been confined for a significant amount of time. Sell, 539
U.S. at 180. Also, "lengthy confinement in an institution for the mentally
ill . . . would diminish the risks that ordinarily attach to freeing without
punishment one who has committed a serious crime." Ibid. We further
narrowed the scope of this consideration in R.G., 460 N.J. Super. at 430,
"agree[ing] . . . that Sell's first factor is not informed by defendant's maximum
[sentencing] exposure but by defendant's probable sentence if convicted."
Here, the trial court properly applied the legal standards to the record.
Specifically, the court found that prosecuting drug distribution is an important
governmental interest, but also recognized that defendant was not charged with
violent crimes. We perceive no error in the court's finding that the State's
interest in prosecution diminishes when considering defendant's incarceration
since February 2018, through a worldwide pandemic, which certainly exacted a
deterrent impact. We note that defendant's likely sentence if convicted would
be reduced, given the apparently undisputed laboratory testing removing any
potential second-degree exposure.
Further, as the trial court stated, AKFC professionals did not determine
defendant to be dangerous to himself or others, and although applying its own
A-1207-23
21
internal clinical standard, found forcible medication unwarranted in defendant's
case. The court did not err in determining these findings of non-dangerousness
diluted the governmental interest in prosecution.
We also recognize the record did not support, by clear and convincing
evidence, that involuntary medication was necessary to further the interests in
continued prosecution. Under Sell, the "administration of the drugs [must be]
substantially likely to render the defendant competent to stand trial," and
"substantially unlikely to have side effects that will interfere significantly with
defendant's ability to assist counsel in conducting a trial defense . . . ." Sell, 539
U.S. at 181.
Here, the court addressed Dr. Smith's opinion that involuntary medication
had a "substantial probability" of restoring defendant, weighing that opinion in
conjunction with the record. We discern no error in the court's recognizing that
defendant had been involuntarily medicated for a substantial period of time
between 2021 and 2023, yet his evaluations during that period revealed
defendant remained delusional, only "partially responded to treatment," and had
an unwillingness to cooperate likely due to his mental illness. Further, the court
noted the testimony that experimenting with medication could cause side effects
like sedation that might be detrimental to defendant and his ability to engage in
A-1207-23
22
the trial process. We note that the record also reflects that defendant was not
medicated during his small window of competence in 2019.
As the record lacked clear and convincing evidence that forced medication
would restore defendant without medical side effects and advance the
government interest, the court reasonably declined to enter such an order. The
Supreme Court in Sell warned its standard would permit involuntary
administration of drugs for trial competence purposes, but "[these] instances
may be rare." Id. at 180. We are satisfied defendant's is not one of those unique
cases.
Affirmed.
A-1207-23
23