J.F. v. Egg Harbor Township School District – Board of Education ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3127-22
J. F. and C. F.,1
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
EGG HARBOR TOWNSHIP
SCHOOL DISTRICT—
BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Defendant-Respondent.
Argued September 23, 2024 – Decided October 8, 2024
Before Judges Sabatino, Gummer, and Jacobs.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Atlantic County, Docket No. L-2663-21.
Keith Andrew Peterson argued the cause for appellants
(Donelson, D'Alessandro & Peterson, LLC, attorneys;
Keith Andrew Peterson, on the briefs).
1
The trial court referred to the child by initials in its May 3, 2023 statement of
reasons entered pursuant to Rule 1:6-2(f). We use the parents' and child's initials
for the continued protection of the child's privacy interest. That compelling
interest outweighs the Judiciary's commitment to transparency.
Jennifer B. Barr argued the cause for respondent
(Cooper Levenson, PA, attorneys; Carl A. Taylor III,
on the briefs).
Kevin F. Milton, Deputy Attorney General, argued the
cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New
Jersey (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney;
Donna Arons, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel;
Kevin F. Milton, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiffs J.F. and C.F., the parents of a school-age child with special
needs, appeal the trial court's May 3, 2023 decision dismissing their claim that
defendant, a public school district, is obligated to pay them fees for the father's
time in tutoring the child at their home.
The parents contend the district must pay those fees, even though the
father is not a certified schoolteacher, based on their interpretation of a written
agreement that had been negotiated between them and the district concerning
the child's educational needs. On summary judgment, the court rejected the
parents' contractual interpretation, and, specifically, their argument that the
father's at-home tutoring constituted an eligible "placement" the district must
pay for. The parents appeal that determination.
On appeal, the district maintains the court properly construed the
agreement by carrying out the parties' manifest intent to limit an eligible
A-3127-22
2
"placement" to services provided only by a "school." Additionally, the district—
joined by the Attorney General as amicus curiae—submits that our State's
educational statutes and regulations do not allow a parent without a teaching
certificate to be paid by a school district for time the parent spends in home
schooling a child.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I.
Plaintiffs, who live in Egg Harbor Township, have one child, who was a
minor at the times relevant to this case. Plaintiffs' child, who has special needs,
was a student enrolled at Egg Harbor Township School District until they filed
what is known as a "petition for due process" on behalf of their child with the
New Jersey Department of Education pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6) of the
Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act ("IDEA") and N.J.A.C. 6A:14 -
2.7(a). In the petition plaintiffs alleged the district's educational programs and
placements were inadequate and deprived their child of a free and appropriate
public education.
In November 2018, the district's School Board and plaintiffs entered into
a settlement agreement, which was signed by both parties and approved by an
Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:14-6.5(c). In that
A-3127-22
3
agreement, the Board agreed to reimburse plaintiffs up to $50,000 per year for
their child's education, subject to certain conditions we will discuss below.
At the time the parties signed their agreement, plaintiffs' child was
enrolled at Bridge Academy,2 a unilateral placement chosen by plaintiffs while
the due process claim was pending. According to plaintiffs, Bridge Academy
was unable to meet their child's specific needs and so they did not re-enroll their
child at the school. Plaintiffs allege they "searched for an alternate school in the
area . . . but none were available." Consequently, the agreement was negotiated
to provide for other options.
Relevant Contract Terms
Among other things, the agreement contains the following relevant
provisions, referring to plaintiffs as "petitioners":
1. The Board will reimburse Petitioners an amount up
to but not to exceed $50,000 towards [plaintiffs'
child's] tuition at Bridge . . . .
2. The reimbursements described in Paragraph 1 shall
be fully contingent upon the Petitioners timely
providing the District's Business Administrator with
fully executed copies of all Bridge enrollment or
other contracts. In addition, Petitioners must
provide proof that they incurred, and paid for, the
2
Bridge Academy, sometimes referred to in the record as the "Bridge School,"
is a school in New Jersey designed for children with special educational needs.
A-3127-22
4
education program and other expenses for which
they seek[] reimbursement . . . .
3. Should [plaintiffs' child] become unable to attend
Bridge for any reason, the Petitioners will have the
option of unilaterally placing [their child] at any
other placement of their choosing. Should
Petitioners do this, it is understood and
acknowledged that such placement, like the Bridge
placement, will be deemed a unilateral placement for
all purposes, and the Board's financial responsibility
for such placement shall be . . . as though [plaintiffs'
child] continued to attend Bridge.
....
6. Petitioners agree[] to transport [their child] to
Bridge or other school as discussed in Paragraph 3
of this Agreement. . . .
....
8. Petitioners understand and agree that this Settlement
Agreement and Release does not obligate the Board
to undertake any expenditure other than the
expenditures specifically and explicitly set forth
above.
9. Petitioners agree to complete and submit any forms,
including vouchers and payment orders, as
necessary in order to receive reimbursement
pursuant to this Agreement.
10. Petitioners acknowledge[] and agree[] that [their
child's] placement at Bridge, or any school at which
they might place [their child] pursuant to Paragraph
3 of this Agreement, is, and shall for all purposes be
deemed, a unilateral placement. The District neither
A-3127-22
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endorses nor recommends [plaintiffs' child's]
placement at Bridge or any other school at which
Petitioner[s] might place [their child] pursuant to
Paragraph 3 of this Agreement, nor does the District
concede that such a placement is necessary to
provide [plaintiffs' child] with [a free and
appropriate public education]. The Parties
acknowledge and agree that the Board has no control
or supervision over Bridge's program or the program
of any other school at which Petitioner may place
[their child] pursuant to Paragraph 3 of this
Agreement . . . .
....
25. It is expressly understood and agreed that this
Settlement Agreement and Release shall be subject
to the laws of the State of New Jersey.
[(Emphasis added).]
Ensuing Events
According to plaintiffs, "[u]nable to locate an appropriate school, [they]
began designing a tutoring placement for [their child] at home" utilizing the
services of New Jersey Advocacy, a non-profit agency that assists in hiring in-
home tutors. Through these services, plaintiffs hired two private tutors.
However, plaintiffs allege that "[d]ue to emotional incompatibility" with their
child, the tutor for reading and math did not work out.
After searching for a replacement tutor, the father began tutoring his child
in those subjects and plaintiffs sought reimbursement for his time and what they
A-3127-22
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claimed to be related charges. To document those charges, plaintiffs submitted
to the Board (1) what they styled as a private tutoring "contract" between the
two plaintiffs and the father and (2) "invoices" written from the father to
plaintiffs showing "payments" in the form of bank transfers from both plaintiffs
to the father as proof of them incurring expenses. In general, the father charged
slightly more than $50 per hour for his tutoring services. It is undisputed the
father is not a teacher certified as an instructor by the Department of Education
pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-38.
In February 2020, the School Board, before it could process any requests
for reimbursement, requested additional information regarding the "home
educational program" it appeared plaintiffs had created for their child. The
School Board specifically sought details about teacher certification, the subjects
being taught, time sheets, and a detailed daily schedule.
Plaintiffs objected to these inquiries, responding to the School Board that
nothing in the contract required them to provide this information to receive
reimbursement. The School Board responded and referenced paragraph 9 of the
agreement, noting plaintiffs had "agree[d] to complete and submit any forms
. . . as necessary in order to receive reimbursement." Referencing paragraph 10
of the agreement, the School Board maintained that per the language of the
A-3127-22
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agreement, if plaintiffs' child could not attend Bridge Academy, "[the child] was
to be placed at another school." The School Board offered, however, to allow
plaintiffs "to have a 'home educational program' in an effort to resolve this
matter without . . . litigation if they received the necessary information,"
including proof of instructor certification.
Plaintiffs responded that they did not concur with the School Board's
interpretation of the agreement, asserting the phrase "any other placement" in
paragraph 3 was not meant to be read as "any other school."
The Lawsuit
In August 2021, plaintiffs filed a complaint against the School Board in
the Law Division, alleging breach of the parties' agreement. The School Board
moved to dismiss the case, alternatively seeking to have the case transferred to
the New Jersey Office of Special Education ("the OSE") within the Department
of Education. The trial court denied that dismissal motion without prejudice,
but granted the School Board's alternative relief of transferring the case to the
OSE.
In February 2022, the OSE returned the request for enforcement back to
the trial court, asserting the dispute did not involve the implementation of a
student's programs or services and therefore was not within its administrative
A-3127-22
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jurisdiction.
At plaintiffs' request, the trial court reinstated the complaint. After the
filing of additional claims and counterclaims, the School Board moved for
summary judgment and to stay discovery in the meantime. Plaintiffs opposed
the motions, arguing, among other things, that the issues of contract
interpretation were not suitable for summary judgment, and that discovery
concerning the parties' intent should be allowed to proceed. Alternatively,
plaintiffs also cross-moved for summary judgment.
The Trial Court's Summary Judgment Decision
After hearing argument, the trial court issued orders on May 3, 2023, (1)
granting the School Board summary judgment and dismissing plaintiffs'
complaint with prejudice; (2) dismissing the School Board's counterclaims with
prejudice; (3) denying plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment; and (4)
denying plaintiffs' motions regarding discovery as moot. The court issued a
written opinion to accompany the orders.
In its opinion, the court first expressed its belief that "the OSE [wa]s better
suited and has special expertise in deciding whether [the] educational costs were
covered by the settlement agreement approved by the ALJ," because there was
"disagreement as to the interpretation of the terms of the agreement . . . , not
A-3127-22
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simply a reimbursement issue." Nonetheless, the court "accepted jurisdiction"
to decide the merits of the case.
As for the merits, the court found summary judgment was appropriate
because there were "essentially no disputed issues of fact" besides "the
interpretation of the settlement agreement which speaks for itself and is a finding
of law for the court." The court additionally found "the terms in the settlement
agreement must be reviewed in the context utilized in the applicable
administrative code sections and statutes which govern education issues[,]
including IDEA, N.J.S.A. [18A:46-1 to -55] and N.J.A.C. 6A:14-1 [to -10.2]."
The court recognized "it must consider the surrounding circumstances at
the time the settlement agreement was entered into," which included the
undisputed fact that "the settlement agreement permitted a unilateral placement
of the child at Bridge School." Notably, the court observed "the agreement
always attached the word 'school' when addressing any alternative placement
other than the Bridge School."
The court particularly focused upon language found in paragraphs 2, 3, 6,
and 10 of the agreement. It noted paragraph 2 "required plaintiff[s] to provide
a copy of the Bridge School enrollment or other contracts," while paragraph 3
"addressed the 'placement' of the child into Bridge School." The court further
A-3127-22
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noted that paragraph 3 provided that "if the child was unable to attend Bridge
School for any reason that the plaintiffs will have the option of unilaterally
placing the child at any other placement of their choosing."
The agreement does not define the term "placement." However, the court
emphasized language in paragraphs 6 and 10, which states that "[p]etitioners
agree[] to transport [the child] to Bridge or other school" and "[p]etitioners
acknowledge and agree[] that [the child's] placement at Bridge or any other
school at which they might place [the child] pursuant to paragraph 3 of the
agreement is, and shall for all purposes be deemed a unilateral placement."
The court further highlighted language in paragraph 10, stating that "[t]he
[School Board] neither endorses or recommends [the child's] placement at
Bridge or any other school at which petitioner[s] might place [the child]
pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Agreement."
In its legal analysis, the court cited Forstrom v. Byrne, 341 N.J. Super. 45(App. Div. 2001), in which we held that home education did not fit the definition
of a "nonpublic school" and that "[educational] services for children who were
home schooled [were not] covered under federal or state statutes." We reasoned
that the parties' agreement and "its use of the term 'school' did not intend to
A-3127-22
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include home schooling as the alternative unilateral placement to the Bridge
School."
The trial court determined "under a plain meaning and rational reading of
the settlement agreement that the only costs which were permitted to be
reimbursed [by the School District] were that of either Bridge School or the
equivalent of a 'school' as interpreted and defined by" Forstrom. The court noted
we had ruled in Forstrom that the term "'school' is [] used in its institutional
sense as a 'place' where children receive education. It is akin to the second
category or group delineated in the New Jersey compulsory education statute as
those attending 'a day school in which there is given instruction equivalent to
that [of] public schools.'" 341 N.J. Super. at 54 (quoting N.J.S.A. 18A:38-25).
Finally, the court found "the pertinent administrative code section
concerning reimbursement again includes the word 'school' when addressing
parental unilateral placements into unapproved schools." This language, the
court found, "is supportive of [the School Board's] position . . . because such
terminology concerns placement into unapproved 'schools' and specifically does
not include home school or home schooling." The court thus concluded no
ambiguity existed in the agreement and no further fact finding was needed.
On appeal, plaintiffs argue the trial court erred in its construction of the
A-3127-22
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agreement and in its application of the law. They assert the term" placement"
within the agreement is not restricted to schooling provided by an educational
institution and can be sensibly read to also include home tutoring by a parent.
They also maintain there is nothing in the education statutes or regulations that
prohibits a parent from being paid an hourly rate by a School Board for the time
that parent devotes to home schooling a child.
II.
This court reviews a trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo,
applying the same legal standards that govern such motions in the trial court.
Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021). This court considers
the factual record, and reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those facts,
"in the light most favorable to the non-moving party" to decide "whether the
moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rozenblit v. Lyles,
245 N.J. 105, 121 (2021) (citing Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J.
520, 540 (1995)); R. 4:46-2(c); see also Est. of Narleski v. Gomes, 244 N.J. 199,
205 (2020).
Further, because the construction of contract terms is a question of law,
see Bosshard v. Hackensack Univ. Med. Ctr., 345 N.J. Super. 78, 92 (App. Div.
2001), we independently review the trial court's construction on a de novo basis.
A-3127-22
13
Fastenberg v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 309 N.J. Super. 415, 420 (App. Div.
1998).
Applying such de novo review, we conclude the trial court soundly
interpreted the parties' agreement and that its ruling comports with the
applicable law.
A.
Under N.J.S.A. 18A:46-13, the Legislature outlined "the duty of each
board of education to provide suitable facilities and programs of education for
all the children who are classified as children with disabilities under [] chapter
[46]." N.J.S.A. 18A:46-14 specifically provides
[t]he facilities and programs of education . . . shall be
provided by one or more of the following:
a. A special class or classes in the district
....
b. A special class in the public schools of
another district in this State or any other
state in the United States;
....
f. Instruction at school supplementary to
the other programs in the school . . . .
g. Sending children capable of benefiting
from a day school instructional program to
privately operated day classes . . .
A-3127-22
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whenever . . . it is impractical to provide
services pursuant to subsection a., b., c., d.,
e., or f. otherwise;
h. Individual instruction at home or in
school whenever . . . it is impracticable to
provide a suitable special education
program for a child pursuant to subsection
a., b., c., d., e., f., or g. otherwise.
[(Emphasis added).]
New Jersey statutes also provide that parents are required to ensure their
school-aged children attend a public school or receive equivalent instruction at
a day school or "elsewhere than at school." N.J.S.A. 18A:38-25. Specifically,
"[e]very parent . . . shall cause [that parent's] child regularly to attend the public
schools of the district or a day school in which there is given instruction
equivalent to that provided in the public schools for children of similar grades
and attainments or to receive equivalent instruction elsewhere than at school."
Ibid. (emphasis added).
Pursuant to regulations enacted by the Department of Education, free and
appropriate public education and related services must be provided for students
with disabilities from age three through twenty-one. N.J.A.C. 6A:14-1.1(d). A
free and appropriate public education means special education and related
services that: (a) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision
A-3127-22
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and direction, and without charge; (b) meet the standards of the State educational
agency; (c) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school
education in the State involved; and (d) are provided in conformity with the
individualized education program ("IEP") required under § 1414(d). 20
U.S.C.A. § 1401(9).
Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:14-2.10, which was cited by the trial court in its
decision, parents can also choose to unilaterally place their disabled child in a
"school" they believe will provide the appropriate education and seek
reimbursement from the school district. Specifically, the regulation states that:
(a) Except as provided at N.J.A.C. 6A:14-6.1(a), the
district board of education shall not be required to pay
for the cost of education, including special education
and related services, of a student with a disability if the
district board of education made available a free,
appropriate public education and the parents elected to
enroll the student in a nonpublic school, an early
childhood program, or an approved private school for
students with disabilities.
(b) If the parents of a student with a disability who
previously received special education and related
services from the district of residence enroll the student
in a nonpublic school, an early childhood program, or
approved private school for students with disabilities
without the consent of, or referral by, the district board
of education, an administrative law judge may require
the district board of education to reimburse the parents
for the cost of enrollment if the administrative law
judge finds that the district board of education had not
A-3127-22
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made a free, appropriate public education available to
the student in a timely manner prior to enrollment and
that the private placement is appropriate.
1. A parental placement may be found to be
appropriate by a court of competent
jurisdiction or an administrative law judge
pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:14–6.5 for
placements in unapproved schools, even if
the parental placement does not meet the
standards that apply to the education
provided by the district board of education.
[(Emphasis added).]
N.J.A.C. 6A:14-6.5, in turn, provides guidance as to whether unilateral
placements by parents are appropriate. Specifically, that regulation directs that:
(a) Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:46-14, school-age
students with disabilities may be placed in accredited
nonpublic schools that are not specifically approved for
the education of students with disabilities with the
consent of the Commissioner of Education, by order of
a court of competent jurisdiction, or by order of an
administrative law judge as a result of a due process
hearing. . . .
[(Emphasis added).]
A related regulation, N.J.A.C. 6A:14-4.3(b), recites a list of program
options for school districts to consider for educating students with disabilities:
(b) If it is determined that a student with a disability
cannot remain in the general education setting with
supplementary aids and services for all or a portion of
the school day, a full continuum of alternative
A-3127-22
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placements as set forth in this subsection shall be
available to meet the needs of the student. Alternative
educational program options include placement in the
following:
....
9. Individual instruction at home or in other
appropriate facilities, with the prior written
notice to the Department of Education
through the county office of education;
10. An accredited nonpublic school that is
not specifically approved for the education
of students with disabilities pursuant to
N.J.A.C. 6A:14-6.5;
11. Instruction in other appropriate settings
according to N.J.A.C. 6A:14-1.1(d);
....
[Emphasis added.]
That said, "individual instruction at home" referred to in subsection (9)
above is subject to another pertinent regulation, N.J.A.C. 6A:14-4.8, which
delineates "program criteria [for] home instruction":
(a) A student with a disability shall have his or her IEP
implemented through one-to-one instruction at home or
in another appropriate setting when it can be
documented that all other less restrictive program
options have been considered and have been
determined inappropriate.
....
A-3127-22
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3. A written record of the student's home
instruction, including dates and times
during which home instruction is provided,
shall be maintained, and the teacher
providing instruction shall be
appropriately certified as teacher of
students with disabilities or for the subject
or level in which the instruction is given.
4. Instruction shall be provided for at least
10 hours per week. The 10 hours of
instruction per week shall be accomplished
in at least three visits by a certified teacher
or teachers on at least three separate days.
[(Emphasis added).]
In like manner, N.J.A.C. 6A:16-10.2 specifies rules regarding "home or
out of school instruction for a general education student for reasons other than
a temporary or chronic health condition." That regulation states , in relevant
part:
(a) The district board of education shall provide
instructional services to an enrolled general education
student at the student's home or other suitable out-of-
school setting under the following conditions:
1. The student is mandated by State law
and rule for placement in an alternative
education program, but placement is not
immediately available;
....
A-3127-22
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(c) The school district in which a student resides shall
be responsible for the costs of providing instruction in
the home or out-of-school setting either directly, or
through online services, including any needed
equipment, or through contract with another board of
education, educational services commission, jointure
commission, or approved clinic or agency.
(d) The services shall meet the following minimum
standards:
1. The school district shall establish a
written plan for delivery of instruction and
maintain a record of instructional services
and student progress.
2. The teacher providing instruction shall
be a certified teacher.
3. The teacher shall provide one-on-one
instruction for no fewer than 10 hours per
week on three separate days of the week
and no fewer than 10 hours per week of
additional guided-learning experiences
that may include the use of technology to
provide audio and visual connections to the
student's classroom.
4. The instruction shall meet the New
Jersey Student Learning Standards and the
district board of education's requirements
for promotion and graduation.
(e) During all periods of instruction delivered in the
student's home, the student's parent or other adult who
has been designated by the parent shall be present.
[(Emphasis added).]
A-3127-22
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The Standards Applied
Upon considering these and other related provisions within our
educational statutes and regulations concerning disabled children, several points
become salient:
• individual instruction "at home" of a disabled student is to be
supplied by an "appropriate" school or program (N.J.A.C. N.J.A.C.
6A:14-4.3(b)).
• "the teacher providing instruction shall be appropriately certified
as teacher of students with disabilities or for the subject or level in
which the instruction is given." (N.J.A.C. 6A:14-4.8; see also
N.J.A.C. 6A:16-10.2(d)(2)).
• during all such periods of instruction at the home by a certified
teacher, a parent or other designated adult "shall be present"
(N.J.A.C. 6A:16-10.2(e)).
• financially, "the school district . . . shall be responsible for the
costs of providing instruction in the home or out-of-school setting
either directly, or through online services, including any needed
equipment, or through contract with another board of education,
educational services commission, jointure commission, or
approved clinic or agency." (N.J.A.C. 6A:16-10.2(c)).
It is readily apparent that plaintiffs' unilateral decision to provide home
instruction to their disabled child through tutoring by the father—who is not a
certified teacher—fails to comply with these requirements. Although the
regulations, as noted above, contemplate that a parent or designated adult "shall
be present" when a certified teacher is providing the instruction at the child's
A-3127-22
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home, they do not state that the parent may serve as the teacher. Moreover,
instruction by a certified teacher or an approved educational program is a
precondition for the school district's obligation to pay the costs of such
instruction or services under N.J.A.C. 6A:16-10.
Plaintiffs argue they are not bound by these requirements for "home
instruction" because they are instead providing "home schooling" to their child.
The distinction they posit is that "home schooling" is an alternative to the state
statutory scheme and entails a relinquishment by the school district of its
programmatic and instructional obligations when parents elect to teach children
themselves in their own homes. N.J.S.A. 18A:38-25; see also Forstrom, 341
N.J. Super. at 65. But nothing in the statutes or regulations authorizes, let alone
requires, the school district to pay parents an hourly wage for undertaking such
home schooling. The School Board rightly stresses this point, which the
Attorney General echoes.
B.
With this statutory and regulatory backdrop in mind, we turn to the terms
of the parties' settlement agreement. We analyze the agreement by applying
familiar principles of contract interpretation. Generally, in "interpreting a
contract, a court must try to ascertain the intention of the parties as revealed by
A-3127-22
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the language used, the situation of the parties, the attendant circumstances, and
the objects the parties were striving to attain." Celanese Ltd. v. Essex Cnty.
Improvement Auth., 404 N.J. Super. 514, 528 (App. Div. 2009) (citations
omitted). In divining that intention, the court must consider the language of the
agreement as a whole. Boyle v. Huff, 257 N.J. 468, 478 (2024).
The meaning of contract terms is to be "decided by the court as a matter
of law unless the meaning is both unclear and dependent on conflicting
testimony." Bosshard, 345 N.J. Super. at 92 (citing Deerhurst Ests. v. Meadow
Homes, Inc., 64 N.J. Super. 134, 152 (App. Div. 1960)). "'An ambiguity in a
contract exists if the terms of the contract are susceptible to at least two
reasonable alternative interpretations.'" Nester v. O'Donnell, 301 N.J. Super.
198, 210 (App. Div. 1997) (quoting Kaufman v. Provident Life and Cas. Ins.
Co., 828 F. Supp. 275, 282 (D.N.J. 1992), aff'd, 993 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1993)).
Furthermore, all contracts are subject to compliance with the law.
Largoza v. FKM Real Est. Holdings, Inc., 474 N.J. Super. 61, 73 (App. Div.
2022). Courts will not enforce an illegal contact provision. Roman v. Bergen
Logistics LLC, 456 N.J. Super. 157, 170 (App. Div. 2018). Indeed, plaintiffs
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and the School Board acknowledged in paragraph 25 of their agreement that the
agreement "shall be subject to the laws of the State of New Jersey."
The trial court's decision adhered to these fundamental principles. It
recognized that the parties' contractual dispute hinged upon the meaning of the
term "placement" within paragraph 3 of the agreement. As we have noted, the
term is not defined within the agreement. However, the trial court appropriately
looked to other portions of the agreement—in particular, paragraph 10, which
in three places refers to the placement occurring "at Bridge or any other school."
This repeated use of the word "school" 3 within paragraph 10 signifies the parties
intended the district's agreed-upon financial contribution to be confined to
3
As stated in Merriam Webster's Dictionary, the primary definition of the term
"school" is "an institution for the teaching of children." Merriam-Webster's
Collegiate Dictionary 1111 (11th ed. 2020). Although we are cognizant, in the
wake of remote instruction widely used in the aftermath of the COVID-19
pandemic, that the notion of a school is not confined to brick-and-mortar
buildings and classrooms, the schools that provide such instruction are still
"institutions."
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reimbursing plaintiff for the costs of having their child enrolled in a school or a
school program.
Neither paragraph 3 or 10 nor any other portion of the agreement refers to
home schooling by a parent. The conspicuous absence of such a reference is
consistent with the trial court's common-sense interpretation of the agreement.
The case law cited in the briefs does not compel a contrary result. In
Forstrom we held that "education at home did not meet the definition of a
'nonpublic school'" eligible for special services funding. 341 N.J. Super. at 50.
We recognize that Forstrom did not address the precise definitional question at
issue here, i.e., the meaning of an eligible educational "placement" of a disabled
child, but we discern nothing in Forstrom that supports plaintiffs' legal position.
Nor do we read the federal district court's non-binding opinion in L.M. v.
Evesham Township Board of Education, 254 F. Supp. 2d 290 (D.N.J. 2003) to
invalidate the trial court's reasoning here, because L.M. involved the provision
of instruction by a religious institution; plaintiffs here are individual parents,
not an institution. See also N.J.A.C. 6A:14-6.5 ("School-age students with
disabilities may be placed in accredited nonpublic schools that are not
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specifically approved for the education of students with disabilities with the
consent of the Commissioner of Education") (emphasis added).
There is no consequential ambiguity in the agreement bearing upon the
dispute before us. There is no need to go outside of the four corners of the
agreement and resort to parol evidence. The trial court sensibly read the words
of the agreement as a whole and conclude the term "placement" was intended to
encompass a "school" institution and not at-home tutoring by an uncertified
parent. To the extent plaintiffs sincerely may have assumed otherwise, their
unilateral mistake does not justify changing the plain meaning of the contract.
Dugan Constr. Co. v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 398 N.J. Super. 229, 242–43 (2008).
Even if, for the sake of discussion, the agreement is read to contemplate
the School Board paying the parents for home tutoring their child themselves,
there is no authority in the education statutes or regulations that authorizes such
a financial commitment. To the contrary, the statutory and regulatory scheme
we have detailed above conditions a school board's payment obligations upon
teaching by a licensed professional. Although we presume plaintiffs want only
what is best for their child, and the father may be striving as a layperson to do
his best in good faith to serve in the role of a teacher, the taxpayers have no duty
to pay for his time and efforts. Moreover, there is no arm's-length basis for the
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over-$50 hourly rate that plaintiffs invoiced the Board. The fee "contract" they
created with themselves is not enforceable.
In sum, the trial court soundly rejected plaintiffs' demand for payment for
the father's time in tutoring their child at home. Such payment is neither
mandated by the parties' written agreement, nor is it authorized by our
educational statutes and regulations. 4
Affirmed.
4
We do not address here whether plaintiffs are entitled to any reimbursement
for the billed costs of the certified tutors who have come to the residence, or the
costs of equipment or instructional materials. To the extent there are open issues
regarding such out-of-pocket expenses, they can be addressed in the trial court.
We do not retain jurisdiction over any issues.
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