Laquane Curry v. New Jersey Department of Corrections ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2000-22
LAQUANE CURRY,
Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent.
____________________________
Submitted September 26, 2024 – Decided October 9, 2024
Before Judges Natali and Vinci.
On appeal from the New Jersey Department of
Corrections.
LaQuane Curry, appellant pro se.
Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Sookie Bae-Park, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel; Dorothy M. Rodriguez, Deputy
Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Appellant Laquane Curry, who is currently incarcerated in Northern State
Prison, appeals from a final agency decision of the New Jersey Department of
Corrections (Department) finding he committed prohibited act *002, assault of
any person, in violation of N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(1)(ii). We affirm.
On January 25, 2023, while Curry was incarcerated in South Woods State
Prison, Officer O. Flores observed an unknown substance being thrown from
Curry's cell, number 2003, at another inmate, Manuel Rodriguez. The substance
hit Manuel, causing first-degree burns on the right side of his face, right eye,
and right arm. Officer Flores also saw another inmate, Martin Rodriguez,
"attempt to throw an unknown substance from his cell[,]" number 2002, at
Manuel, but it missed.1 Officer D. Smith reported he did not see the incident
because he was walking in front of Manuel but observed that the food port of
Curry's cell was open when Manuel was splashed.
On January 26, the disciplinary charge was served on Curry. After an
internal investigation, the matter was referred to a disciplinary hearing officer.
The Department also obtained a mental health evaluation to assess, among other
issues, Curry's mental state at the time of the incident, his competency to
1
Because Martin and Manuel share a common surname, we use their first names
to distinguish between them. By doing so, we intend no disrespect.
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participate in the disciplinary hearing, and the effect any imposed penalty would
have on his mental health.
On January 30, a hearing was conducted before a disciplinary hearing
officer. Curry requested and was granted the assistance of counsel substitute
and pleaded not guilty to the charge. Curry's counsel substitute asserted he was
not involved in the incident and contended Martin threw the substance from his
cell, number 2002, and Martin later "vouched for" Curry and stated Curry "had
nothing to do with it." Curry testified and contended "the officer got [his] room
confused." Curry also submitted a written statement asserting he heard Martin
and Manuel talking before the incident and "heard [Manuel] say damn and he
closed 2002 [f]ood port."
Curry called Manuel as a witness, but he refused to testify, stating "no
comment." Curry did not call any other witnesses. He was offered the
opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses but elected not to do so. Curry's
counsel substitute signed the hearing report indicating it reflected accurately
what took place at the hearing.
The hearing officer considered all the evidence presented at the hearing,
including: Curry's testimony; counsel substitute's arguments; the disciplinary
report; the preliminary incident report; the reports of Officers Flores and Smith;
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Curry's written statement; and Curry's confidential mental health evaluation.
After reviewing the evidence, the hearing officer found Curry guilty of the
charged offense. He was sanctioned to 250 days in the restorative housing unit,
loss of 120 days of commutation time, and loss of core privileges and
recreational privileges for fifteen days.
Curry administratively appealed the hearing officer's decision. On
January 31, 2023, the Department upheld the decision and sanctions imposed.
Curry raises the following argument on appeal:
POINT 1
[APPELLANT] WAS DENIED HIS DUE PROCESS
RIGHTS WHEN HE REQUESTED A STATEMENT
FROM THE GUILTY PARTY OF THE OFFENSE.
"Our role in reviewing the decision of an administrative agency is
limited." Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J. Super. 186, 190 (App. Div.
2010). "We defer to an agency decision and do not reverse unless it is arbitrary,
capricious or unreasonable[,] or not supported by substantial credible evidence
in the record." Jenkins v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 412 N.J. Super. 243, 259 (App.
Div. 2010). "'Substantial evidence' means 'such evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Figueroa, 414 N.J. Super.
at 192 (quoting In re Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 35 N.J. 358, 376 (1961)).
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When reviewing a determination of the Department in a matter involving
prisoner discipline, we engage in a "careful and principled consideration of the
agency record and findings." Williams v. Dep't of Corr., 330 N.J. Super. 197,
204 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec. in Div. of
Consumer Affs. of Dep't of Law & Pub. Safety, 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973)). We
consider not only whether there is substantial evidence that the inmate
committed the prohibited act, but also whether, in making its decision, the
Department followed regulations adopted to afford inmates procedural due
process. See McDonald v. Pinchak, 139 N.J. 188, 194-96 (1995).
"Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution,
and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not
apply." Jenkins v. Fauver, 108 N.J. 239, 248-49 (1987) (quoting Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974)). An inmate's more limited procedural
rights, initially set forth in Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 525-46 (1975), are
codified in a comprehensive set of Department regulations. N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.1
to -9.28.
Those rights include a right to a fair tribunal, N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.15, a
limited right to call witnesses and present documentary evidence, N.J.A.C.
10A:4-9.13, a limited right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses,
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N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.14, a right to a written statement of the evidence relied upon
and the reasons for the sanctions imposed, N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.24, and, in certain
circumstances, the assistance of counsel-substitute, N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.12. The
regulations "strike the proper balance between the security concerns of the
prison, the need for swift and fair discipline, and the due-process rights of the
inmates." Williams, 330 N.J. Super. at 203 (citing McDonald, 139 N.J. at 202).
Applying these principles, we are satisfied there was substantial credible
evidence in the record supporting the Department's findings. The hearing officer
considered and found credible Officer Flores's report that he observed an
unknown substance being thrown from Curry's cell and hitting Manuel. The
hearing officer also considered Officer Smith's report that the food port of
Curry's cell was open when Manuel was splashed. The hearing officer was not
convinced by Curry's claim that he was not involved, or that Martin "vouched
for" him and admitted he threw the substance at Manuel.
Curry's contention that he was denied due process because the hearing
officer refused his request for a statement from the "individual who actually
threw the object" lacks merit. The hearing report indicates Curry called only
one witness, Manuel, who refused to testify or provide a written statement. He
did not call any other witnesses. The hearing report also indicates Curry was
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offered the opportunity to cross-examine any adverse witnesses but declined to
do so. Curry's counsel substitute signed the hearing report indicating it reflected
accurately what took place at the hearing.
We are satisfied Curry was afforded due process and the Department's
determination was supported by sufficient credible evidence on the record as a
whole and was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D).
We do not perceive any basis to disturb the Department's decision.
To the extent we have not otherwise addressed Curry's arguments, it is
because they are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written
opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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