500 Park Avenue Equities, LLC v. Cortney Williams ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0826-23
500 PARK AVENUE EQUITIES,
LLC,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CORTNEY WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Argued September 17, 2024 – Decided October 9, 2024
Before Judges Mawla and Natali.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Essex County, Docket No. DC-009248-23.
Cortney Williams, appellant, argued the cause pro se.
Barry A. Kozyra argued the cause for respondent
(Kozyra & Hartz, LLC, attorneys; Barry A. Kozyra, on
the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Cortney Williams appeals from an August 28, 2023 Special
Civil Part order ejecting her from an apartment located in a multi-unit building
at 500 Park Avenue in East Orange, currently owned by plaintiff 500 Park
Avenue Equities, LLC. Because the record is unclear as to defendant's
ownership interest, if any, in that apartment, we remand for further proceedings.
We summarize the pertinent facts from the limited record developed on
the return date for the summary ejectment action. In its verified complaint for
ejectment, supported by the certification of its property manager Jacob Marcus,
plaintiff asserted it is the legal owner of the building at 500 Park Avenue.
Plaintiff also attested it never entered either a written or verbal lease with
defendant, she never paid it rent or other compensation, and she was essentially
an "illegal squatter." Plaintiff further maintained defendant's actions caused it
significant hardships, as it was unable to take rightful possession of the premises
and use it as intended.
Defendant disputed certain of plaintiff's contentions. Specifically, she
maintained before plaintiff's purchase of the building, 500 Park Avenue E.O.,
Inc., operated as a cooperative association and that entity issued her thirty-six
shares reflecting her ownership interest in unit nineteen in the building.
A-0826-23
2
Defendant presented the court with a copy of those shares, as well as two pages
of a Proprietary Lease signed by 500 Park Avenue E.O., Inc., and her.
Plaintiff's counsel argued the "[cooperative association] . . . voted to sell
all their shares to the former owner," 500 Park Ave EO NJ, LLC. Plaintiff's
counsel also argued they have "documentation that the Board of Directors
convened and voted to sell the property." Additionally, counsel stated all the
"shareholders minus Ms. Williams and . . . two other units voted to sell in
accordance with the bylaws . . ."
After the sale, defendant did not dispute that she continued to live in unit
nineteen without paying rent, maintenance fees, or any other expenses.
Defendant justified her continued possession by arguing: 1) her occupancy was
authorized by the Proprietary Lease, 2) plaintiff's proofs did not establish it
properly obtained title to the property, and 3) the Special Civil Part did not have
jurisdiction over the ejectment action in light of her disputed ownership claims.
Before us, plaintiff reprises the arguments it made before the Special Civil
Part. Plaintiff specifically maintains defendant's claimed interest in unit
nineteen did not appear in the plaintiff's chain of title, which reflected it
possessed clear title to the building, and defendant and the other "unauthorized
A-0826-23
3
occupants", were mere "former owners who … lost [their interests] after the sale
of the … association…. "
Although not disclosed to the Special Civil Part Judge by defendant, we
take judicial notice of the fact that plaintiff was involved in a prior action with
500 Park Avenue E.O., Inc. In that action, 500 Park Avenue E.O, Inc.,
contended defendant had failed to pay her required maintenance fees and other
expenses, and it sought possession of defendant's shares, defendant's stock
certificate, the apartment, a judgment in the amount of $34,263.30 for unpaid
monthly assessments and fees, a warrant of removal or writ of possession,
unspecified compensatory damages, and counsel fees and costs. See 500 Park
Avenue E.O., Inc. v. Williams, A-3595-21 (App. Div. Oct. 16, 2023) (slip op.
at 2-3). According to 500 Park Avenue E.O., Inc.'s Bylaws and the Proprietary
Lease between 500 Park Avenue E.O., Inc. and defendant, which was submitted
in the record in that action, if a resident failed to pay monthly assessments, 500
Park Avenue E.O., Inc., had "the right to institute legal proceedings to obtain
possession of both stock certificate and the allocated apartment." Id. at 2.1
1
Although defendant did not present the Special Civil Part with the complete
Proprietary Lease, or the cooperative association's Bylaws, the entire lease and
Bylaws were included in the record in the 500 Park Avenue E.O., Inc. v.
Williams action. We accordingly consider those materials as they are "records
A-0826-23
4
After a trial, the court entered a judgment in favor of 500 Park Avenue
E.O., Inc., in the amount of $55,350.08, representing $46,143.40 in unpaid
monthly assessments and $9,206.68 in attorney's fees. Notably, it did not
address 500 Park Avenue E.O., Inc.'s, request to obtain possession of the stock
certificate, or its request for a warrant of removal and, instead, ordered
exclusively monetary, as opposed to equitable, relief. Id. at 1. We affirmed that
award. Id. at 6-7.
With respect to the Special Civil Part proceeding at issue, the court
granted plaintiff's application and issued an order of ejectment but stayed the
order until October 12, 2023. The court rejected plaintiff's jurisdictional
challenges and found defendant's proofs failed to establish a right to possession.
Instead, the court determined plaintiff met its burden of proof in establishing
ownership of the property, the absence of a landlord-tenant relationship between
the parties, and defendant failed to establish her right to possession.
On November 1, 2023, on defendant's ex parte application, the court
entered an emergent stay of the ejectment order pending an appeal to us.
of the court in which the action is pending and of any other court of this state. ..."
N.J.R.E. 201(b)(4); State v. Silva, 394 N.J. Super. 270, 274 (App. Div. 2007)
(allowing the trial court to take judicial notice of materials in the record of a
domestic violence court under N.J.R.E. 201(b)(4)).
A-0826-23
5
Plaintiff thereafter moved before us to vacate the November 1, 2023 order. We
remanded to the Special Civil Part for reconsideration, reasoning the "better
practice would have been for the trial court to conduct a hearing and consider
testimony from both parties before deciding the request for a stay or monetary
security pending the appeal."
The court subsequently held a hearing consistent with our remand
instructions. Defendant received notice of the proceeding but failed to appear.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court entered an August 1, 2024,
order conditioning the stay of execution of the order for possession on
defendant's deposit of $23,000 with the court by August 15, 2024, and $2,300
on the first of each month thereafter. In its oral decision, the court expressly
stated it was not substantively addressing defendant's contentions regarding any
alleged defects in plaintiff's ownership interest. After defendant failed to satisfy
the conditions of the August 1, 2024 order, the court entered a September 6,
2024 order vacating the stay and an October 2, 2024 order denying defendant's
supplemental request for a stay.
On appeal, defendant raises the following points for our consideration:
I. THE TRIAL COURT LACKED SUBJECT
MATTER JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND
DETERMINE THE MATTER. PURSUANT TO
RULE 6:1-2(a)(4) AS THE MATTER WAS
A-0826-23
6
OUTSIDE THE JURISDICTION OF THE
SPECIAL CIVIL PART.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER
OF LAW WHEN IT IMPROPERLY ISSUED
AN EX PARTE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE IN
THIS MATTER AS PLAINTIFF’S
APPLICATION TO THE COURT ON ITS
FACE PROVIDED NO LEGAL BASIS FOR A
SUMMARY PROCEEDING PURSUANT TO R.
4:67-1(a)
A trial judge's factual findings made following a bench trial are accorded
deference and will be left undisturbed so long as they are supported by
substantial credible evidence. Reilly v. Weiss, 406 N.J. Super. 71, 77 (App.
Div. 2009) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 483-
84 (1974)). On the other hand, "[a] trial court's interpretation of the law and the
legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any
special deference." Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co., 239 N.J. 531, 552 (2019)
(quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366,
378 (1995)).
A summary action for ejectment is a limited action brought by a party
"claiming the right of possession of real property in the possession of another,
or [a party] claiming title to such real property." See N.J.S.A. 2A:35-1; R. 6:1-
2(a)(4) (authorizing summary actions pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:35-1 to -3, "where
A-0826-23
7
the defendant has no colorable claim of title or possession"); see also J & M
Land Co. v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 166 N.J. 493, 520 (2001). To prevail, the
party seeking possession must demonstrate ownership of, or control over, the
property and that the person facing ejectment has no right to remain at the
property. See Phoenix Pinelands Corp. v. Davidoff, 467 N.J. Super. 532, 615
(App. Div. 2021). That is because new owners of property take possession
subject to any tenancies. See Chase Manhattan Bank v. Josephson, 135 N.J.
209, 223 (1994).
Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:35-1, "[a]ny person claiming the right of
possession of real property in the possession of another, or claiming title to such
real property, shall be entitled to have his rights determined in an action in the
Superior Court." In Marder v. Realty Construction Co., 84 N.J. Super. 313, 320
(App. Div. 1964) (emphasis omitted), we observed there was "no doubt" that
N.J.S.A. 2A:35-1 was "intended to allow a remedy to one who claims title to
property in the possession of another." Thus, we concluded that "[t]he statute
replace[d] the common law action of ejectment." Ibid."In an action in ejectment the plaintiff has the burden of establishing his
title, and if he fails to establish a good paper title the judgment must go against
him." Perlstein v. Pearce, 12 N.J. 198, 204 (1953). "[T]he plaintiff must recover
A-0826-23
8
upon the strength of his own title, and . . . cannot rely upon the weakness of that
of his adversary." Phoenix Pinelands Corp., 467 N.J. Super. at 615 (alterations
in original) (quoting Troth v. Smith, 68 N.J.L. 36, 37 (Sup. Ct. 1902)). "If the
plaintiff 'fails to support his own title, the defendant will retain possession until
he is ousted by someone who has a superior title.'" Ibid. (quoting Troth, 68
N.J.L. at 37).
A cooperative apartment association a is form of property ownership
which does not fit into traditional common law classifications. Plaza Road
Coop., Inc. v. Finn, 201 N.J. Super. 174, 180 (App. Div. 1985). Typically, legal
title to the real property of the housing development is held in a cooperative
entity. Presten v. Sailer, 225 N.J. Super. 178, 184-85. Individuals, or residents,
purchase shares of stock in the cooperative corporation. Id. at 185. This
provides the individual the right "to occupy a dwelling within the cooperative
project under a proprietary lease." Ibid. (citing Plaza Road Coop., Inc., 201 N.J.
Super. at 175). "A cooperative apartment association . . . is governed by
corporate law concerning its internal management." Plaza Road Coop., Inc.,
201 N.J. Super. at 180.
Based on the limited record before us, we are unable to discern defendant's
ownership interest, if any, in unit nineteen. This is so, because the record does
A-0826-23
9
not contain competent evidence as to how 500 Park Avenue E.O., Inc., divested
defendant of her thirty-six shares. Although we acknowledge the Bylaws and
Proprietary Lease related to those shares authorized the cooperative
association's board to commence judicial action against a shareholder to recover
possession of the unit, and potentially divest them of those shares in the event
of unpaid maintenance and assessments, and defendant indisputably failed to
pay the required fees resulting in the $55,350.08 judgment in the 500 Park
Avenue E.O., Inc. v. Williams action, the court in that proceeding granted
monetary relief only, and did not divest defendant of her ownership interest, or
eject her, as best we can discern from the record.
At the hearing in support of the order to show cause before the Special
Civil Part, plaintiff's counsel contended 500 Park Ave EO NJ, LLC, took
ownership of the entire building when it purchased all the shares in 500 Park
Avenue E.O., Inc. Further, counsel argued it has evidence the "board of
directors convened and voted to sell the property," yet plaintiff produced no
supporting evidence before us, and none before the Special Civil Part as best we
can discern from the record, to support these contentions. As noted, plaintiff
relied on the title search which, even if accepted as accurate, does not address
the disposition of defendant's shares.
A-0826-23
10
Accordingly, we remand for further proceedings. The court shall make
factual findings and legal conclusions with respect to defendant's prior and
current ownership interest in unit nineteen, and, in the event the court concludes
defendant was defeased of her interest, how that divestment occurred.
In light of our remand, we do not address defendant's jurisdictional
challenges other than to state, as noted, the Special Civil Part ordinarily has
jurisdiction to resolve ejectment actions. If on remand, however, the court
concludes the matter should not proceed summarily based on the nature of the
proofs submitted and issues raised, the court can proceed in a manner that
permits the proper development of the record to establish defendant's ownership
in, or divestment of, her interest in unit nineteen.
Nothing in our opinion shall be interpreted as a reflection of our views of
the outcome of the remanded proceedings, nor a limitation on any legal or
equitable argument available to the parties related to defendant's disputed
ownership interest addressed in this opinion. In light of our decision, the order
of ejectment is stayed to permit the court to conduct the remanded proceedings.
In the event the court determines ejectment is an appropriate remedy, the court
shall consider whether a further stay is appropriate, and if any modification of
the August 1, 2024, order is necessary.
A-0826-23
11
To the extent we have not specifically addressed any of defendant's
arguments it is because we have concluded they are without sufficient merit to
warrant discussion in a written opinion. See R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
A-0826-23
12