Dcpp v. J.Y.J. and K.O., in the Matter of K.J. and A.J. ( 2024 )

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1479-22
NEW JERSEY DIVISION
OF CHILD PROTECTION
AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
J.Y.J.,1
Defendant-Appellant,
and
K.O.,
Defendant.
_________________________
IN THE MATTER OF K.J.
and A.J., minors.
_________________________
Argued September 16, 2024 – Decided October 10, 2024
Before Judges Sumners and Perez Friscia.
1
We use initials and fictitious names for the parents and children to protect
their privacy and the confidentiality of the record. R. 1:38-3(d)(12).
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Morris County,
Docket No. FN-14-0055-20.
Beatrix W. Shear, Designated Counsel, argued the
cause for appellant (Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public
Defender, attorney; Beatrix W. Shear, on the briefs).
Jessica A. Prentice, Deputy Attorney General, argued
the cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney
General, attorney; Sara M. Gregory, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel; Jessica A. Prentice, on the brief).
Melissa R. Vance, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
argued the cause for minors K.J. and A.J. (Jennifer
Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, Law Guardian,
attorney; Meredith Alexis Pollock, Deputy Public
Defender, of counsel; Melissa R. Vance, of counsel and
on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant J.Y.J. (Jane) appeals from the August 2, 2021 Family Part order
following a fact-finding determination that she abused or neglected her child,
K.J. (Ken), pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4). The Law Guardian urges we
reject Jane's arguments and affirm the court's order. Having reviewed the
record, parties' arguments, and applicable legal principles, we conclude the
court's decision was supported by substantial credible evidence and consistent
with applicable law. We affirm.
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I.
We summarize the pertinent facts and procedural history adduced from
the three-day fact-finding trial. New Jersey Division of Child Protection and
Permanency (Division) presented the testimony of: two caseworkers, a Center
for Evaluation and Counseling Inc. (CEC) evaluator, Tara Devine, M.S. Ed.,
LAC, and Dr. Robert M. Parinello. Additionally, Jane and her mother testified.
In April 2019, the Division received the first of multiple referrals relating
to Jane's care and supervision of Ken. Law enforcement contacted the Division
to report a domestic violence incident between Jane and Ken's father, K.O.
(Kyle).2 Jane and Kyle share two children, Ken and A.J.,3 born in December
2018 and October 2020, respectively. Jane also has a son, J.J. (Joe), born in
March 2014, from an earlier relationship with I.P. (Ian).
In May 2014, the Division became aware of concerning incidents
involving Jane and Joe. Over six years, the Division received approximately
nine referrals regarding Jane and her children relating to homelessness, Kyle's
substance abuse, mental illness, and domestic violence by Kyle. The Division
2
K.O. is not a party to this appeal.
3
The Division also sought out-of-home placement for A.J. Because A.J. is not
the subject of this appeal, we do not consider the proceedings pertaining to him.
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closed each incident after the investigation, and Jane continued to decline most
of the Division's offered services.
In April 2019, Ian moved before the Family Part for Joe's custody, which
was granted. That month, after police responded to a call regarding domestic
violence against Jane by an intoxicated Kyle, the Division referred her for a
forensic assessment at the CEC, which she attended.
Jane also attended a psychiatric evaluation with Dr. Parinello. At trial,
Dr. Parinello was qualified as an expert in the field of psychiatry, and the
Division moved his three authored reports into evidence without objection.
After the initial examination, Dr. Parinello noted "[t]he major question
diagnostically . . . [wa]s whether this woman [wa]s delusional or not." He
recommended a further evaluation to determine whether she had "a psychiatric
condition" and could "benefit from some sort of treatment." He found Jane had
"certain qualities which suggest[ed] an underlying bipolar diagnosis." Dr.
Parinello concluded she did not present an immediate risk to others. Jane did
not attend Dr. Parinello's scheduled follow-up appointment.
On May 28, police again notified the Division of a domestic violence
incident between Jane and Kyle. In August, the Office of Temporary Assistance
(OTA) terminated Jane's housing assistance due to her failure to participate in
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the employment services offered. Jane and Ken then moved into her mother's
hotel room with Jane's brother.
The same month, the CEC issued a report, co-authored by Devine in her
capacity as a licensed associate counselor,4 concluding Jane was a high risk for
neglecting Ken "due to severe mental illness" and recommending the Division
consider an alternate placement. Devine, as a CEC forensic risk assessor, had
clinically evaluated Jane. The CEC report, admitted without objection at trial,
noted "[h]omelessness ha[d] always been a concern for [Jane] and her family,"
and at the time of evaluation, she "resided at a motel funded by the . . . OTA."
Jane relayed having been diagnosed with attention-deficit/hyperactivity
disorder, depression, cystic fibrosis, and chronic asthma. She also advised she
was autistic, a high school graduate, and had "four college degrees." Jane
explained that after she lost primary custody of Joe: she lost her appetite; "[t]he
dog tried to commit suicide" by sticking its head in a water dispenser; and Ken
refused to eat and cried all night. She elaborated, Ken "cries all day because
4
N.J.A.C. 13:34- 10.3(b) provides in pertinent part, "The scope of practice of a
licensed associate counselor includes, but is not limited to, counseling,
counseling interventions, appraisal and assessment, consulting, referral and
research activities, as defined in N.J.A.C. 13:34-10.2, under direct supervision
pursuant to the provisions of N.J.A.C. 13:34-13."
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[the Division] threatened to take him away from me, right in front of him. . . .
[and] [h]e is not stupid." Ken was approximately five months of age at the time
of the evaluation. Jane informed the CEC that Ken "started saying Mom at two
months" and was "already trying to walk." Jane denied having mental health
issues but admitted she suffered a nervous breakdown years earlier. The CEC
provided emergency recommendations due to Jane's "disheveled, paranoid and
delusional" presentation, concerning comments, and the clinically administered
test findings. The report opined Jane was "in need of long term psychiatric and
psychotherapeutic services." It stated:
[Jane] began this assessment on May 15, 2019, at which
time she presented with rapid speech, thought process
disorganization, paranoia, delusional thoughts, and
deficits with reality testing. A subsequent psychiatric
evaluation of [Jane] at New Bridge diagnosed her with
possible [b]ipolar [d]isorder and/or possible
[d]elusional [d]isorder. [Jane] did not complete her
psychiatric assessment and therefore, was not
prescribed psychotropic medication. [Jane] returned to
[the] CEC to complete her forensic assessment on July
26, 2019, at which time she "plead the Fifth" (i.e.
refused to answer questions, explaining that she viewed
her examiner as a "liar"). Her mental state appeared
unchanged at that time.
In September, Jane attended a follow-up evaluation with Dr. Parinello
during which she refused to answer many questions. Dr. Parinello noted Jane
was hostile and expressed "her belief that she was the victim of a conspiracy"
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by the Division and the court. Jane stated Ken, an infant, was angry with her,
often questioning "where is my brother?" She claimed Ken believed she
purposely had Joe removed from the home and expressed anger by pulling her
hair. Dr. Parinello reported Jane ranged from "profusely tearful" to "very
angry," vacillating between "bolt[ing] from the room" and "lung[ing] forward
and rais[ing]" her voice. Dr. Parinello concluded Jane was "acutely psychotic
as demonstrated by an elaborate delusional system whereby she is being
victimized by a host of agencies." Dr. Parinello observed that Jane began to
"incorporat[e] the infant into her persecutory delusional thinking," and he
expressed concerns regarding "where [her] psychosis will take her if left
unattended." He explained "in a psychosis where an infant becomes part of the
delusion system," there "is a risk of an adverse outcome." His mental health
status exam report indicated Jane had psychosis, not otherwise specified (NOS),
and ruling out delusional and bipolar disorders was necessary.
The same day, after Dr. Parinello called the Division expressing his
immediate welfare concerns, the Division's Special Response Unit checked on
Jane and Ken. Jane claimed Ken, who was eight-and-a-half months old at the
time, was speaking in full sentences and asked, "where is my brother?" She
admitted Ken was not up to date on his physical exam and vaccines because he
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did not have any medical insurance. Further, she claimed Joe's paternal
grandmother was trying to sell Joe in Peru. Jane continued to deny having any
mental health issues. The caseworkers determined Ken "was safe in the care of
his mother and grandmother," and "[t]here was nothing to indicate [Ken] was in
imminent danger."
The next day, on September 11, Dr. Parinello again expressed concerns
Jane "was actively psychotic and delusional." Division caseworkers again
interviewed Jane and her family, this time meeting at a fast-food restaurant.
During the interview, Jane was "very agitated" and "anxious." She raised her
voice at the Division workers, yelling profusely. Jane admitted, "I'm depressed,
stressed out[,] and you all are making it worse." A caseworker requested Jane
sign a release permitting Dr. Parinello the ability "to speak with [her] medical
doctor" and relayed medication could not "be prescribed without the
[p]sychiatrist having the ability to consult with [her] physician." Jane only
signed a Division "HIPPA form." Further, she refused to return to Dr. Parinello.
The Division continued to contact and evaluate Jane and Ken over the next
few days. Jane continued to refuse psychiatric services and to sign the medical
releases. She also failed to bring Ken to a pediatrician for a necessary check-
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up, though the Division had advised they would pay for the doctor's
appointment.
The Division filed an order to show cause and verified complaint seeking
temporary custody of Ken. On October 17, the Division effectuated an
emergency removal of Ken due to Jane's mental health condition and refusal to
participate in services. The Division placed Ken in a relative resource home
with Kyle's brother and his girlfriend. During the removal, Jane threatened to
punch the Division supervisor and lunged at him. On October 21, the court
granted the Division continued custody of Ken, finding Ken's placement with
Jane would be contrary to his welfare under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-11.2.
In December, Jane attended another evaluation with Dr. Parinello;
however, she again refused to cooperate. The evaluation ended after Jane raised
her voice, threatened violence, and lunged at Dr. Parinello. Because of her
behavior, he called the police to have her removed, noting her "increas[ed]
paranoia" and inability to "regain control" of herself.
Jane testified during the factfinding hearing she had not refused Division
and CEC services. Further, she denied suffering from any mental health issues.
Jane claimed that during her second evaluation with Dr. Parinello, he asked her
no mental health questions. She alleged Dr. Parinello called the police because
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she was on the phone during her evaluation, not because of any aggressive
behavior. Her mother testified Jane does not have a "mental illness" and does
"a good job as a mother."
On July 27, 2021, the court issued an oral opinion, followed by an order
on August 2, finding the Division demonstrated by a preponderance of the
evidence Jane's "failure to recognize or engage in treatment for her mental health
condition" constituted a "failure to exercise a minimum degree of care, which
placed and continue[d] to place [Ken] in imminent danger of substantial risk."
The court found "the credible, unrebutted, factual evidence regarding statements
directly attributable to [Jane] would lead any lay person to question [her] mental
health." The court added, "there is also substantial and persuasive expert
evidence and opinion." Finding Devine's testimony credible, the court accepted
that Jane was "in need of completing her psychiatric evaluation" as well as
"long-term . . . services." The court noted Jane failed to proffer a mental health
expert to rebut the Division's evidence. The court additionally found Dr.
Parinello's testimony reliable, stating he "testified credibly and consistent with
the findings in his report." While the court agreed with Jane's closing argument
that "expert evaluators must be trained in cultural sensitivity" and it was relevant
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to her as a Black woman, the court noted no evidence demonstrated a "lack of
cultural awareness" or "implicit bias."
The court accepted the experts' testimony finding that Ken "was in
imminent danger due to Jane's compromised mental health, including severely
compromised judgment, delusional disorder and being floridly psychotic."
Further, the court concluded:
[Jane] denies having mental health concerns and this is
the problem that remains. This untreated mental health
condition is a danger to [Ken] and the [c]ourt finds that
[Jane]'s failure to recognize or engage in treatment for
her mental health condition as described earlier is a
failure to exercise a minimum degree of care, which
placed and continues to place [Ken] in imminent danger
of substantial risk of harm.
The court highlighted Jane's failure to accept the Division's services offered.
Additionally, the court found the history of domestic violence between Jane and
Kyle "pose[d] an imminent risk to [Ken] as well." The court's August 2 order
provided the Division proved by a preponderance of the evidence Jane abused
or neglected Ken pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c).
On September 24, 2021, the court ordered the termination of Jane's
parental rights to Ken and awarded guardianship to the Division for permanent
placement and adoption. Thereafter, the court entered an emergent order
permanently changing Ken's placement to Kyle's parents' home. On October 19,
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the court entered a permanency order permitting reunification. On July 27,
2022, the court ordered physical and legal custody of Ken to Jane. Following
reunification, the court terminated the litigation on December 5.
On appeal, Jane argues the court erroneously: found abuse or neglect
without proof her conduct actually or imminently impaired Ken physically,
mentally, or emotionally; permitted Devine to opine as a psychological expert;
relied on Dr. Parinello's unrecognized diagnosis of NOS and "rule out opinions";
and relied on expert opinions authored without consideration of accurate
background information.
II.
It is well established that "[a]ppellate courts defer to a trial court's factual
findings when they are 'supported by adequate, substantial, and credible
evidence.'" N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. B.P., 257 N.J. 361, 373
(2024) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998)). "[W]e apply a
deferential standard in reviewing the family court's findings of fact because of
its superior position to judge the credibility of witnesses and weigh the
evidence." N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. J.R.-R., 248 N.J. 353, 368
(2021). Family courts "are presumed to have a 'specialized knowledge and
experience in matters involving parental relationships and the best interests of
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children.'" N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. S.K., 456 N.J. Super. 245,
261 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. F.M., 211
N.J. 420, 427 (2012)). A trial court's findings are accorded deference "unless it
is determined that they went so wide of the mark that the judge was clearly
mistaken." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. G.L., 191 N.J. 596, 605 (2007).
We owe no deference to a court's legal conclusions which are reviewed de novo.
N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. A.B., 231 N.J. 354, 369 (2017).
"The prevailing concern in abuse and neglect cases is the best interests of
the child." N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. S.G., 448 N.J. Super. 135,
146 (App. Div. 2016); see also N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.8(a) (providing that under Title
Nine, children's safety is "of paramount concern[,] and the best interests of the
child shall be a primary consideration"). "The purpose of a fact-finding hearing
in an abuse or neglect proceeding is not to assign guilt to a defendant, but to
determine whether a child is an abused or neglected child pursuant to N.J.S.A.
9:6-8.44." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. V.T., 423 N.J. Super. 320, 328
(App. Div. 2011). "An analysis of a parent's conduct must account for the
surrounding circumstances." N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. E.D.-O.,
223 N.J. 166, 180 (2015).
An abused or neglected child is one:
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whose physical, mental, or emotional condition has
been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming
impaired as the result of the failure of his parent or
guardian . . . to exercise a minimum degree of care (a)
in supplying the child with adequate food, clothing,
shelter, education, medical or surgical care though
financially able to do so or though offered financial or
other reasonable means to do so, or (b) in providing the
child with proper supervision or guardianship, by
unreasonably inflicting or allowing to be inflicted
harm, or substantial risk thereof. . . .
[N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4).]
"[T]he phrase 'minimum degree of care'" under the statute "refers to conduct that
is grossly or wantonly negligent, but not necessarily intentional." G.S. v. Dep't
of Hum. Servs., 157 N.J. 161, 178 (1999); see also N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam.
Servs. v. T.B., 207 N.J. 294, 305 (2011). "Conduct is considered willful or
wanton if done with the knowledge that injury is likely to, or probably will,
result." G.S., 157 N.J. at 178. "Whether a parent or guardian has failed to
exercise a minimum degree of care is to be analyzed in light of the dangers and
risks associated with the situation." Id. at 181-82. "Absent proof of actual
impairment, 'the critical focus is on evidence of imminent danger or substantial
risk of harm.'" B.P., 257 N.J. at 376 (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs.
v. A.L., 213 N.J. 1, 22 (2013)).
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Our Supreme Court addressed the definition of imminent danger,
elucidating that:
Per their plain meanings, "imminent" means
"threatening to occur immediately; dangerously
impending . . . [or] about to take place," Black's Law
Dictionary 898 (11th ed. 2019), and "danger" means
"peril; exposure to harm, loss, pain, or other negative
result," id. at 493. Further, Black's Law Dictionary
defines "imminently dangerous" as "reasonably certain
to place life and limb in peril." Id. at 494.
[Id. at 376 (alterations in original).]
Further, when interpreting evidence regarding imminent danger, courts must not
"fill in missing information on their own or take judicial notice of harm." N.J.
Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. R.W., 438 N.J. Super. 462, 469 (App. Div.
2014) (quoting A.L., 213 N.J. at 28).
"A parent who fails 'to exercise a minimum degree of care' by
unreasonably allowing harm to be inflicted on a child is accountable under the
statute." J.R.-R., 248 N.J. at 370 (quoting N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)). The
Division bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence a
parent abused or neglected a child. Id. at 369. To sustain that burden of proof,
the Division may seek to admit "competent, material and relevant evidence."
Ibid. (quoting N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(b)).
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III.
Jane's contention that the court erroneously found her conduct constituted
abuse or neglect because the Division did not prove actual or imminent
impairment of Ken, is belied by the record. Preliminarily, it bears
acknowledging that a parent's mental health condition does not by itself dictate
a finding of abuse or neglect. See F.M., 211 N.J. at 450 ("Mental illness, alone,
does not disqualify a parent from raising a child."). However, unaddressed
mental illness of a parent may create an environment in which the parent is
incapable of safely caring for her or his children. See N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam.
Servs. v. A.G., 344 N.J. Super. 418, 439-40 (App. Div. 2001). For the Division
to establish a substantial imminent risk of harm to the child, there must be proof
the "parent refuses to treat his [or her] mental illness, the mental illness poses a
real threat to a child, and the other parent . . . is unwilling or incapable of
following court orders to shield [his or] her child from that danger." See F.M.,
211 N.J. at 450-51.
The court found Jane committed abuse or neglect because she placed Ken
in imminent danger by failing to exercise the requisite minimum degree of care.
Ken, an infant in Jane's primary care, was at immediate risk because she failed
to exercise reasonable conduct in addressing her established serious mental
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health condition. As the court noted, the Division credibly demonstrated Jane's
"psychotic" disorder "compromised [her] mental health, . . . severely
compromis[ing] [her] judgment." Specifically, Jane's months-long continuous
refusal to accept the Division's offered psychiatric services placed Ken at
immediate risk. Additionally, Jane refused to sign the necessary medical
releases to enable: a psychiatric professional assessment, which included her
prior psychiatric history; mental health services contemplating her current
conditions; and possible medication recommendations.
After noting Jane's "denial" of mental health concerns, the court
specifically found her "failure to recognize or engage in treatment for her mental
health condition . . . is a failure to exercise a minimum degree of care" for Ken.
As the court correctly found, Jane's conduct in failing to address her untreated
mental health condition had already affected Ken and placed his "physical,
mental, [and] emotional conditions" in further immediate danger. Jane's refusal
to accept "offered services to aid her in securing housing, public assistance, or
medical care for Ken" substantiated his imminent impairment.
It is well-established that when "determining whether or not a child has
been abused or neglected, the trial court must base its findings on the totality of
the circumstances." V.T., 423 N.J. Super. at 329. Here, the court determined
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the credible evidence established an immediate risk to Ken because of the
continued residential instability, the reports of domestic violence by Kyle, and
Jane's failure to ensure proper pediatric care. We discern no reason to disturb
the court's abuse and neglect finding, as the record amply supports the court's
specific findings of impending risk to Ken based on Jane's conduct.
We also reject Jane's contention that the court erroneously based its abuse
or neglect findings on unsupported and improperly considered expert testimony
by Devine. Appellate courts "rely on the trial court's acceptance of the
credibility of the expert's testimony and the court's fact-findings based thereon,
noting that the trial court is better positioned to evaluate the witness' [s]
credibility, qualifications, and the weight to be accorded [his or her] testimony."
In re Guardianship of D.M.H., 161 N.J. 365, 382 (1999). Therefore, we exercise
limited review of a trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony.
See Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 52 (2015) ("The admission or exclusion of
expert testimony is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.");
Hisenaj v. Kuehner, 194 N.J. 6, 12 (2008) (stating trial court's evidentiary
decision to admit expert testimony is reviewed for an abuse of discretion).
The court found the Division's experts, Devine and Dr. Parinello, were
both qualified experts who credibly established Jane's "untreated mental health
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condition." Devine attested to being a "licensed associate counselor" with
experience in "perform[ing] forensic evaluations and therapy." In conducting
the forensic assessments, she was experienced in providing "psychological
testing[,] inventories[,] and therapy." She held a bachelor's degree in human
services, which she testified was "based on psychology and social services." She
also held a master's degree in school counseling and had sixty "credits in mental
health counseling." To obtain her license, she passed the National Counselor
Examination. At trial, Jane's counsel consented to Devine's qualification
regarding "information about [Jane's] clinical interview[,] . . . the tests . . .
administered[,] and [Devine's] findings."
Although counsel consented to Devine's qualifications, the court
nonetheless copiously made sufficient findings regarding her qualifications,
stating "the fields in which she is going to testify to are such that the art is in a
sufficiently reliable status and that the witness's obvious experience, she's
conducted over 200 of these type of forensic assessments, 100 leading up to the
one that is at issue" here. The court further found Devine's "curriculum vitae
and testimony outline the extensive training that she has undergone prior to
conducting these team assessments," concluding she was "an expert in the field"
and "allow[ing] her to testify, as her specialized knowledge w[ould] assist the
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trier of fact." The record supports the court's qualification of Devine as an expert
in the field of forensic risk assessments providing psychological testing.
Therefore, we discern no error in the court's permitting Devine to testify, within
a "reasonable degree of psychological certainty," to the assessments and
evaluation of Jane that she performed. See N.J. Div. of Child Prot. &
Permanency v. I.B., 441 N.J. Super. 585, 596 (App. Div. 2015) (recognizing
"Family Part judges regularly qualify experts in psychology and psychiatry and
hear the opinion testimony those experts offer in a variety of contexts," and
therefore those judges "are more than capable of evaluating the opinions of
experts.").
We further observe, Dr. Parinello's unrefuted medical opinion alone
established Jane's psychotic mental condition warranted immediate services and
intervention as her untreated mental health conditions placed Ken at imminent
risk. Thus, the court's findings were sufficiently supported regardless of
Devine's testimony.
Jane next argues the court erred in relying on Dr. Parinello's psychiatric
opinion she had a psychosis, NOS because the diagnosis of an NOS mental
illness does not establish a "specific mental disorder." Specifically, she
contends the court should have disregarded Dr. Parinello's opinion because NOS
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refers to a group of mental disorders; thus, his diagnosis was incomplete without
ruling out delusional and bipolar disorders. We are unpersuaded. Dr. Parinello's
unrefuted opinion was that Jane was "psychotic." We note the record
demonstrates Jane was uncooperative in completing Dr. Parinello's evaluation
and had to be removed from his office by the police. He explained an observer
could "see[] and appreciat[e] psychotic symptomatology" and that he "certainly
found [Jane] to be very delusional." Further, he found Jane "was suffering from
worsening psychosis over the time span which [he] worked with her" and she
"really needed hospital stabilization . . . given her denial of having any condition
and her refusal of treatment." "Many psychoses are cyclic, others are
unremitting and worsen over time." He clarified an "extended assessment"
could rule out the other disorders, but that Jane suffered from psychosis, NOS.
The court's reliance on Dr. Parinello's psychiatric diagnosis Jane was suffering
from a psychotic state is sufficiently established by the record.
Finally, Jane argues the experts' opinions were invalid because the
Division failed to disclose important background information and the experts
"misinterpreted [Jane's] statements." Each expert provided an adequate
foundation for their opinion. N.J.R.E. 703 requires an expert opinion be
grounded in "facts or data derived from (1) the expert's personal observations,
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or (2) evidence admitted at the trial, or (3) data relied upon by the expert which
is not necessarily admissible in evidence but which is the type of data normally
relied upon by experts." Polzo v. County of Essex, 196 N.J. 569, 583 (2008)
(quoting State v. Townsend, 186 N.J. 473, 494 (2006)). We discern no merit to
Jane's argument that the experts were not provided sufficient background
information and misinterpreted her statements. The nature of each experts'
mental health evaluation allowed her the opportunity to disclose relevant
information and participate in the assessments. Therefore, we conclude the
court committed no abuse of discretion considering Dr. Parinello's and Devine's
expert opinions. The court's finding that the Division met its burden of proof
establishing abuse or neglect was sufficiently supported by the record.
To the extent we have not otherwise addressed any of Jane's arguments,
we determine they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written
opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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