State of New Jersey v. David Jones ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0202-23
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DAVID JONES,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
Submitted September 25, 2024 – Decided October 18, 2024
Before Judges Paganelli and Torregrossa-O'Connor.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Hudson County, Indictment No. 17-12-0823.
Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Jeffrey L. Weinstein, Designated Counsel,
on the brief).
Esther Suarez, Hudson County Prosecutor, attorney for
respondent (Stephanie Davis Elson, Assistant
Prosecutor, and Antonio R. Dimeglio, Legal Intern,
appearing pursuant to Rule 1:21-3(b), on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant David Jones appeals from the June 19, 2023 order denying his
petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. We
affirm.
We glean the facts from the record. A grand jury returned a ten-count
indictment charging defendant with: (1) first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-
3(a)(1) and (2); (2) first-degree conspiracy to commit murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-
2(a)(1) and 2C:11-3(a)(2); (3) second-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A.
2C:12-1(b)(1); (4) third-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(2); (5)
second-degree conspiracy to commit aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(a)(1)
and 2C:12-1(b)(1); (6) third-degree possession of a weapon (knife) for an
unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d); (7) fourth-degree unlawful possession
of a weapon (knife), N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d); (8) fourth-degree possession of a
controlled dangerous substance (marijuana), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(3); (9) third-
degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (marijuana) with intent
to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1); and (10) third-degree possession of a
controlled dangerous substance (marijuana) within 1,000 feet of school
property, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(a).
Defendant and the State entered a negotiated plea deal. In exchange for
defendant pleading guilty to first-degree aggravated manslaughter, amended
A-0202-23
2
from first-degree murder; and second-degree aggravated assault, the State
agreed to dismiss the remaining counts of the indictment. In addition, the State
agreed to recommend that defendant be sentenced to fifteen years in state prison,
on the aggravated manslaughter, and seven years in state prison, on the second-
degree aggravated assault, with the sentences to run concurrently subject to him
serving eighty-five percent before parole eligibility. Defendant faced up to
thirty years in state prison for aggravated manslaughter and up to ten years in
state prison for second-degree aggravated assault.
During the plea hearing, the court questioned whether defendant had
"reviewed the discovery in [the] case." Defendant stated he had not reviewed
the discovery. However, defense counsel advised the court that defendant had
"a copy of the entire file" and they had "talked about it multiple times." Counsel
advised there were "countless jail visits[ p]robably in the neighborhood of
[fifteen] or so . . . where [they had] talked about the discovery." Further, counsel
explained he and defendant talked about the State's allegations, possible
defenses, the video footage, and helpful and unfavorable facts.
Defendant contended he never saw the video. However, defense counsel
stated he "sent [him] all of the videos." Thereafter, the court recessed the matter
A-0202-23
3
to allow defendant and counsel to privately meet and confer. The State provided
video equipment, and defendant and counsel watched the video.
Upon returning to the courtroom, the transcript reveals the following
exchange between the defendant and the plea court:
Court: Do you wish to continue with this plea?
Defendant: Yes.
Court: Yes? Are you sure?
Defendant: Yes.
Court: Okay. I want to remind you that you are still
under oath.
Defendant: Okay.
Court: Meaning that you've already sworn to tell the
truth in this courtroom. Do you understand that?
Defendant: Yes.
Court: All right. So, you've reviewed the discovery
now in this case and you've had an opportunity to
consult with [counsel].
Defendant: Yes.
Court: Are you satisfied with [counsel]'s services?
Defendant: Yes.
A-0202-23
4
After the court advised defendant of the import of a guilty plea and how
he was waiving certain constitutional rights, defendant acknowledged that he
was waiving his rights—freely and voluntarily—and that no one threatened or
forced him into waiving his rights.
Thereafter, defendant provided a factual basis to support his plea. In
addition, defendant stated he had initialed each page of the plea form, signed the
last page of the plea form, and signed the supplemental plea form. The judge
reminded defendant he was under oath, and defendant stated his answers to all
the questions on the forms were true. On defendant's forms he stated no "threats
[had] been made in order to cause [him] to plead guilty" and he was "satisfied
with the advice [he] ha[d] received from" defense counsel. In addition, he stated
he understood he was giving up rights to: (1) "a jury trial in which the State
must prove [him] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt"; (2) "remain silent"; and (3)
"confront the witnesses against" him.
Defendant returned to court for sentencing. The sentencing court
considered the relevant factors and concluded the aggravating factors
A-0202-23
5
outweighed the mitigating factors and, "find[ing] . . . this was an extremely fair
resolution[,]" sentenced defendant in accordance with the negotiated plea. 1
Defendant filed a petition for PCR. In his pro se petition he asserted
defense counsel's representation was deficient because counsel "failed to
communicat[e]" and "failed to properly investigate the case and provide [him]
with . . . full discovery before encouraging [him] to take a plea deal."
In a supplemental brief, PCR counsel argued defendant "never reviewed
the complete copy of the discovery because [defense counsel] never provided it
to" defendant. Further, "[r]easonably competent counsel would have provided
a full and complete copy of all discovery provided by the State and would have
reviewed it with" defendant.
Moreover, PCR counsel contended defendant was "pressured . . . into
entering the plea," defense counsel "refused to consider a trial," and "made no
effort to prepare for trial." Further, PCR counsel asserted defendant "wanted to
challenge the State's proofs at trial and did not want to enter a guilty plea."
The PCR court concluded defendant failed to establish defense counsel's
performance was deficient. The judge found "counsel met with [defendant]
1
We affirmed defendant's appeal of the sentence on an excessive sentencing
calendar pursuant to Rule 2:9-11. State v. David J. Jones, No. A-2239-19 (App.
Div. June 7, 2021).
A-0202-23
6
numerous times to review the discovery and had provided [defendant] with the
entire file." Moreover, regarding the video, the judge found "counsel and
[defendant] went into the jury room and w[ere] . . . able to view the video at the
same time in the presence of each other and then had an opportunity to . . . talk
about it amongst . . . themselves." Thereafter, defendant "indicated to the court
and . . . the court ensured that [defendant] wanted to proceed with the plea." The
judge concluded defendant "failed to show that . . . counsel's performance was
deficient in this regard."
Further, the judge rejected defendant's contention that counsel's
performance was deficient for having: (1) "instructed him to plead guilty"; (2)
"made no effort to prepare for trial"; and (3) "refused to consider a trial which
pressured the [defendant] into pleading guilty." Unpersuaded by defendant's
assertion "that he wanted to test the State's proofs at trial and did not want to
plead guilty," the judge concluded defendant's allegations were "contradicted by
the record." The judge stated:
during the plea colloquy [defendant] acknowledged he
understood the plea . . . . After viewing the video
footage, he acknowledged that he reviewed discovery
and . . . had an opportunity to consult with counsel.
[Defendant] told the court that he was satisfied with
counsel's services. [Defendant] had waived his rights
voluntarily and . . . no one had forced or threatened him
....
A-0202-23
7
Moreover, the judge stated that "[a]fter placing the factual basis [for the
guilty plea] on the record . . . [defendant] acknowledged that he reviewed the
plea forms and the answers on the form were his and truthful." Thus, the judge
determined defendant "ha[d] failed to show that . . . counsel's performance was
deficient in this regard."
Lastly, the judge concluded defendant merely made "bald assertions"
regarding counsel's "failure to communicate and failure to conduct a proper
investigation." The judge found defendant failed to "assert the facts that [an]
investigation would have revealed."
Having determined that defendant "failed to show a reasonable likelihood
of succeeding in his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel . . . [and there
being no] claim which c[ould] not be resolved by the re[view] of an[] existing
record," the judge concluded defendant was "not entitled to an evidentiary
hearing."
Here, defendant contends the PCR court erred because:
Point 1
The Failure of Counsel to Fully Review Discovery
With [Defendant] Prior to Entering The Guilty Plea,
And Then, Proceeding With the Plea Despite the
Opportunity to Adjourn Proceedings For A More
Thorough Review Established A Prima Facie Case of
A-0202-23
8
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel That Warranted the
Grant of an Evidentiary Hearing.
A. Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Proceeding With
the Plea Agreement After [Defendant] Claimed at the
Plea Hearing That He Had Not Reviewed Discovery
With Counsel.
B. Trial Counsel Was Ineffective In Pressuring
[Defendant] to Plead Guilty.
C. [Defendant] Was Substantially Prejudiced by
Counsel's Ineffectiveness in Connection With His
Guilty Plea.
Essentially, defendant contends trial counsel's representation was
deficient because counsel should have: (1) "sought an adjournment instead of
proceeding with a guilty plea"; and (2) "exercised his reasonable professional
judgment to ensure that [defendant] knowingly and voluntarily entered into his
plea after sufficient time to review all discovery." Further, defendant argues he
was "substantially prejudiced by defense counsel's representation, which
resulted in him accepting a guilty plea without full review of discovery. If
[defendant] had this opportunity, he would have challenged the evidence at trial,
and would not have entered a guilty plea."
PCR provides a "built-in 'safeguard that ensures that a defendant [is] not
unjustly convicted.'" State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 540 (2013) (quoting State v.
McQuaid, 147 N.J. 464, 482 (1997)). "The mere raising of a claim for PCR does
A-0202-23
9
not entitle the defendant to an evidentiary hearing." State v. Vanness, 474 N.J.
Super. 609, 623 (App. Div. 2023). Instead,
[a] defendant shall be entitled to an evidentiary hearing
only upon the establishment of a prima facie case in
support of [PCR], a determination by the court that
there are material issues of disputed fact that c[ould]
not be resolved by reference to the existing record, and
a determination that an evidentiary hearing is necessary
to resolve the claims for relief. To establish a prima
facie case, defendant must demonstrate a reasonable
likelihood that his or her claim, viewing the facts
alleged in the light most favorable to the defendant, will
ultimately succeed on the merits.
[R. 3:22-10(b).]
Therefore, if "the defendant's allegations are too vague, conclusory, or
speculative . . . then an evidentiary hearing need not be granted." State v.
Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158 (1997). A defendant's "bald assertions" will not do.
State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999).
We review a judge's decision to deny a PCR petition without a hearing for
an abuse of discretion. Marshall, 148 N.J. at 157-58. An abuse of discretion
"arises when a decision is 'made without a rational explanation, inexplicably
departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.'" Flagg
v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002) (quoting Achacoso-Sanchez
v. Immigr. and Naturalization Serv., 779 F.2d 1260, 1265 (7th Cir. 1985)).
A-0202-23
10
"Where, as here, the PCR court ha[d] not conducted an evidentiary
hearing, we review its legal and factual determinations de novo." State v.
Aburoumi, 464 N.J. Super. 326, 338 (App. Div. 2020).
A defendant petitioning for PCR must establish by a preponderance of the
credible evidence, that they are entitled to the requested relief. Nash, 212 N.J.
at 541. Here, defendant's PCR petition is predicated on his claim that his plea
counsel was ineffective, and therefore he must satisfy the two-prong test
enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see also State
v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). 2 A failure to satisfy either prong requires the
denial of a PCR petition founded on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700.
Under the first prong, defendant must establish "counsel's performance
was deficient," that is, "that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed" by the Constitutions. Id. at 687. The
first prong requires a showing that "counsel's representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688. "[T]he [PCR] court should
2
"The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1,
paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution require that a defendant receive
'the effective assistance of counsel' during a criminal proceeding." State v.
Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 352 (2013).
A-0202-23
11
recognize that counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate
assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable
professional judgment." Id. at 690.
Under the second prong, defendant must establish "the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense." Id. at 687. In the context of a guilty plea,
a defendant must establish "that there [wa]s a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel's errors, [he or she] would not have pled guilty and would have
insisted on going to trial." State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 351 (2012) (quoting
State v. Nuñez-Valdéz, 200 N.J. 129, 139 (2009)). A defendant must convince
the court that a "decision to reject a plea bargain would have been rational under
the circumstances." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010).
In conducting our de novo review, we are convinced defendant failed to
establish plea counsel's representation was inadequate. Here, defendant argues
counsel should have sought an adjournment, however, defendant advised the
plea court he wanted to proceed. Moreover, defendant advised the plea court
that he had reviewed the discovery, had an opportunity to consult with defense
counsel, and was satisfied with defense counsel's services. There is no evidence
defendant was forced or pressured or that he did not enter his plea willfully and
knowingly.
A-0202-23
12
Further, as to prejudice, defendant baldly asserts "he would have
challenged the evidence at trial, and would not have entered a guilty plea."
However, even at this stage, defendant does not support this contention with any
meaningful challenge to the evidence or the presentation of contrary evidence.
Moreover, we are satisfied that it would not have been rational for
defendant to reject the plea deal. Considering the charges to which defendant
pled guilty, he was exposed to substantially more prison time than the plea
provided. In addition, defendant's exposure to prison time, for the other counts
of the indictment, enhanced the reasonableness of accepting the plea since the
other counts were dismissed in the plea deal.
Finally, on the record presented, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the
PCR court's denial of an evidentiary hearing.
Affirmed.
A-0202-23
13