D.W. v. K.M. ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3034-22
D.W.,1
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
K.M.,
Defendant-Respondent.
_________________________
Submitted October 8, 2024 – Decided October 16, 2024
Before Judges Firko and Augostini.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Burlington County, Docket No. L-1854-19.
Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP,
attorneys for appellant (Thomas A. Gentile, of counsel
and on the briefs).
Rutgers Law Associates, attorneys for respondent
(Amy L. Braunstein, of counsel; Brian P. Latimer, J.D.,
appearing pursuant to Rule 1:21-3(a), on the brief).
1
We use initials because a domestic violence hearing is mentioned in the record
and to protect the confidentiality of the parties. R. 1:38-3(d)(10).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff D.W. appeals from an April 28, 2023 order denying her motion
for a new trial on the issue of damages and post-judgment relief. The trial court
found the jury's verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. We affirm.
I.
We discern the following facts from evidence adduced at the five-day jury
trial and the record. Plaintiff is the mother of defendant K.M. Defendant alleges
that in 2008 plaintiff created and funded the [K.] Major College Education Trust
(the Trust). According to defendant, the "irrevocable" Trust was intended to pay
the rest of her medical school education, housing, room and board, and
transportation. Defendant attended two medical schools in the Caribbean.
Plaintiff claimed that defendant was unable to find a residency position after
graduating from medical school in 2015.
Plaintiff allowed defendant to live in her home in New Jersey while she
was pursuing her career. Defendant testified that the Trust was her main source
of income and that she received "[$]4,500 each month." Defendant used the
disbursements to pay her credit card balances and Mercedes Benz lease
payments. Because of defendant's bad credit, plaintiff purchased a home in
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defendant's name to improve her credit score. Plaintiff claimed she intended to
remodel the house, sell it, and keep the proceeds.
Defendant stated that she wanted to use the Trust to purchase a house. She
testified that "it's outlined in [her] [T]rust that [she] can actually get a home . . .
up to the value . . . $250,000. It could not exceed that amount."
In 2016, defendant returned to the United States and endeavored to obtain
a mortgage to buy a home in New Jersey. Defendant explained that a loan officer
expressed "$4,500 each month may not have been substantial enough."
Defendant testified that she approached plaintiff to ascertain if the Trust's
monthly disbursements could be increased from $4,500 to $5,500, to improve
her loan application consideration. Defendant testified that plaintiff approved
this increase in monthly disbursements.
After that conversation, defendant testified that plaintiff drafted and
signed the 2017 addendum for the Trust to reflect the new increase. The
addendum provided that the increased amount would take effect on or before
"February 10, 2017, and continue through February 10, 2023, at which time the
Trust shall terminate."
Defendant testified that plaintiff later "took the document to TD Bank in
Marlton" to have it notarized. The Trust addendum reflects the name of the
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notary and notary stamp. Defendant electronically submitted the signed and
notarized 2017 addendum to the mortgagee to indicate her ability to obtain a
mortgage loan. Defendant added that she received a $42,000 bank wire from
the Trust for a down payment on the subject property and presented bank records
to support her claim that the subject property was owned by her, not plaintiff.
On February 14, 2019, defendant testified that a domestic violence
incident occurred between herself and plaintiff. Defendant testified that her
relationship with plaintiff became "tense," and "then [plaintiff] started to hit
[her] and kick [her] legs" and "pull all her hair clips out" until she "went to the
ground." On March 5, 2019, a Family Part judge granted defendant a final
restraining order (FRO) pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act,
N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, against plaintiff.
Plaintiff filed two domestic violence complaints against defendant, which
were both dismissed. Defendant testified that following the domestic violence
incident, she did not receive any more money from the Trust. Prior to the
issuance of the FRO, defendant received regular monthly disbursements of
$5,500 from the Trust through January 2019.
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In contrast, plaintiff challenged the existence of the Trust. 2 Plaintiff
contends she did not produce the 2017 addendum and did not take the document
to a notary public to have it notarized. Plaintiff asserted that the whole thing
was "fraud on [her], fraud on the [c]ourt." Additionally, plaintiff testified that
due to defendant's bad credit score, she purchased the subject property with her
own funds and put it in defendant's name to "help further her credit." In
plaintiff's view, it was always the plan that she and defendant would live at the
subject property for a period of time and then sell it. Following the domestic
violence incident, plaintiff testified defendant stole her keys and remote to the
subject property and moved into the house.
Plaintiff also claimed that defendant stole copious amounts of her personal
property and was selling some of those personal items on a consignment website.
Plaintiff compiled a "Stolen Items List" and claimed the value of the stolen items
was in excess of $200,000. Plaintiff filed a report with the local police
department claiming defendant stole personal items from her. Following a
consensual search of defendant's house, the investigating officer seized designer
luggage, handbags, clothing, drinkware, a sewing machine, a copier, and a
2
This testimony is in stark contrast to her answer to defendant's third-party
complaint, which states, "[i]t is admitted that [plaintiff] established a College
Education Trust."
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scanner. Ultimately, these items were returned to defendant because the court
did not find probable cause they were stolen due to a lack of receipts. Defendant
claimed they were gifts from plaintiff.
Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Law Division alleging promissory
estoppel (count one); breach of contract (count two); anticipatory breach (count
three); unjust enrichment (count four); and conversion (count five). Defendant
filed an answer as a self-represented litigant. Plaintiff filed an answer as a third-
party defendant to defendant's "complaint" and admitted she established a
College Education Trust.
Defendant retained counsel and filed an amended answer and
counterclaim alleging promissory estoppel (count one); breach of contract
(count two); unlawful interference with contractual relations (count three);
defamation (count four); and malicious prosecution based upon a prior criminal
proceeding (count five). Defendant also filed an amended third-party complaint
alleging breach of duty to administer trust (count one); breach of duty of loyalty
(count two); and breach of duty to disclose (count three). Plaintiff filed an
answer to the amended counterclaim essentially denying all of defendant's
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allegations. Plaintiff also filed an answer to defendant's amended third-party
complaint denying the allegations. 3
Prior to trial, plaintiff moved in limine to exclude the Trust documents
and other items from being admitted into evidence. Specifically, plaintiff
challenged the authenticity of the 2017 addendum because the attached notary
page states it was notarized on June 22, 2008, which was an impossibility
because the notary, J.B.S., was not an authorized notary in 2008. In response,
defendant's counsel claimed it was a typographical error. Additionally, plaintiff
moved in limine to exclude evidencing concerning the FRO on the basis it was
not relevant.
Regarding the Trust documents, the court ruled there was a genuine
dispute over the authenticity of the Trust documents and that the jury should
decide the issue. The court stated:
I think that the [plaintiff] can reassert these objections
if at the time of the actual testimony . . . plaintiff's
position is that . . . defendant has not presented
sufficient prima facie evidence in order to warrant the
admission of these documents.
And then the [c]ourt can make a determination at that
time after hearing the testimony as to whether or not
3
We refer to plaintiff and defendant in our opinion for consistency
notwithstanding the varying designations of the parties in the pleadings.
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. . . defendant has carried as the proponent of those
documents [her] initial burden of authentication.
The court similarly concluded that defendant would be allowed to testify
about the nature of the claims that led to the issuance of the FRO. Plaintiff was
permitted to reassert her objection, and if overruled, the jury would make the
ultimate determination as to the weight to be ascribed to the testimony or
evidence.
At trial, the court admitted the Trust and 2017 addendum to the Trust into
evidence over plaintiff's objection. The court explained:
[It's] understanding of . . . [d]efendant's testimony is
that she witnessed . . . [p]laintiff draft the addendum.
And again, these are—this is . . . [d]efendant's
testimony.
[The court is not] just accepting . . . [d]efendant's
testimony at face value, for purposes of this
determination that she said that she witnessed
[plaintiff] draft the addendum, sign it and then take it
to TD Bank to be notarized. Which is a little bit
admittedly peculiar, given that you would not sign
something before taking it to the notary. But [the court]
think[s] that that's really for the jury to assess, in terms
of the weight to give that evidence if any.
The court placed restrictions on testimony regarding the FRO:
Well, just as we're not going to attack the validity of the
[FRO] that was entered in this matter, we're similarly
not going to expand this to relitigate everything that
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was the prior history of domestic violence in
connection with the underlying [FRO].
...
[The court is] going to instruct the jury that there was,
in fact, [an FRO] that was entered in this case, that it
remains in effect to this date, and that the fact of the
entry of the [FRO] may be considered, but that we're
not going to delve into more of the details of the history
of that beyond that.
...
So there can be discussion of the facts that occurred that
day, but . . . like [the court] said, [it is not] necessary or
appropriate for relitigation of the entire prior history of
domestic violence. But they can—you can provide the
facts of what occurred that gave rise to the restraining
order that was entered.
Both parties testified about the incident leading to the issuance of the
FRO. After redacting the FRO to exclude dismissal of plaintiff's temporary
restraining order against defendant, the FRO was moved into evidence without
objection.
The jury found in favor of defendant on her breach of contract of the Trust
claim and awarded $264,000 in damages. The jury also found that defendant
converted some of plaintiff's personal property and awarded plaintiff $2,000 in
damages. The court issued a judgment in the net amount of $262,000 in favor
of defendant.
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Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied on substantive
grounds. The court concluded that plaintiff did not carry her burden under Rule
4:49-1 because she did not "clearly and convincingly show [] that there was a
miscarriage of justice under the law." The court noted there were "interpretative
issues with respect to the [T]rust" and no "clear error or mistake on the part of
the jury."
Regarding plaintiff's conversion of personal property claims, the court
determined the questions on the verdict sheet pertaining to this claim did not
contradict each other. The court stated there were a number of "potential
explanations" for how the jury reached its conclusion on this issue, but there
was no basis to set aside the verdict. The court similarly reasoned that with
regard to the real property claims, the witnesses gave conflicting testimony, and
the jury determined credibility.
Regarding the FRO, the court emphasized it barred any potential
testimony seeking to undermine the validity of the FRO, but noted it was "a
valid and enforceable order." Further, the court explained there were no
objections raised at trial about the facts that led to the issuance of the FRO. This
appeal ensued.
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On appeal, plaintiff primarily argues the court committed reversible error
in admitting the Trust documents and FRO into evidence. Plaintiff also contends
the jury's damage award was improper, and a new trial is warranted. We
disagree.
II.
"[W]e defer to a trial court's evidentiary ruling absent an abuse of
discretion." State v. Garcia, 245 N.J. 412, 430 (2021). This court reviews "the
trial court's evidentiary rulings 'under the abuse of discretion standard because,
from its genesis, the decision to admit or exclude evidence is one firmly
entrusted to the trial court's discretion.'" State v. Prall, 231 N.J. 567, 580 (2018)
(quoting Est. of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 383-84
(2010)). Under that deferential standard, appellate courts "review a trial court's
evidentiary ruling only for a 'clear error in judgment.'" State v. Medina, 242
N.J. 397, 412 (2020) (quoting State v. Scott, 229 N.J. 469, 479 (2017)).
We will not disturb a trial court's evidentiary ruling unless it "is 'so wide
off the mark' that it constitutes 'a clear error in judgment.'" See Garcia, 245 N.J.
at 430 (quoting Medina, 242 N.J. at 412). However, an evidentiary decision is
reviewed de novo if the trial court applies the wrong legal standard in deciding
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to admit or exclude the evidence. See Hassan v. Williams, 467 N.J. Super. 190,
214 (App. Div. 2021).
A.
Plaintiff maintains the court committed reversible error by admitting the
Trust and 2017 addendum into evidence because the documents "were not—and
cannot possibly ever be—properly authenticated." According to plaintiff, the
Trust documents contain "facially severe deficiencies" and could not be properly
authenticated under N.J.R.E. 901. Plaintiff asserts the 2017 addendum "bears a
notarization date of 2008," and manifests a lack of the indicia of reliability
rendering the Trust documents "null and void." Defendant counters that the
court acted well within its discretion when it admitted the documents into
evidence.
"[A] writing must be properly authenticated before it is admitted into
evidence." State v. Marroccelli, 448 N.J. Super. 349, 364 (App. Div. 2017).
N.J.R.E. 901 provides that "[t]he requirement of authentication or identification
as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the matter is what its proponent claims."
The burden of establishing authentication "was not designed to be
onerous." State v. Hockett, 443 N.J. Super. 605, 613 (App. Div. 2016). Thus,
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"[a]uthentication 'does not require absolute certainty or conclusive proof,'" but
instead requires "only 'a prima facie showing of authenticity.'" State v. Hannah,
448 N.J. Super. 78, 89 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting State v. Tormasi, 443 N.J.
Super. 146, 155 (App. Div. 2015)). Authenticity may be demonstrated by direct
evidence, id. at 90, such as testimony from the person who authored the writing,
see State v. Moore, 158 N.J. Super. 68, 83 (App. Div. 1978), or witnessed the
document's execution, see Marroccelli, 448 N.J. Super. at 365. Authentication
may also be established by circumstantial evidence, Hannah, 448 N.J. Super. at
90, including, for example, by "'evidence establishing that it was sent in reply
to a previous communication,'" ibid. (quoting State v. Mays, 321 N.J. Super.
619, 629 (App. Div. 1999)), or by evidence "'divulg[ing] intimate knowledge of
information which one would expect only the person alleged to have been the
writer or participant to have,'" ibid. (citation omitted).
Here, plaintiff first alleges that defendant did not make the requisite prima
facie showing of authentication. We consider her argument in light of the
guiding principles stated, which hold that the bar for authentication is relatively
low. The record shows defendant provided direct testimony as to the existence
of the Trust and its impact on her life from a financial perspective. Moreover,
defendant's counsel also spent a significant amount of time eliciting testimony
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from defendant regarding when and where she first came in contact with the
Trust and its addendum. For example, defendant gave the following testimony:
[Defense Counsel]: Okay. When was that [T]rust
handed to you?
[Defendant]: It was handed to me—the [T]rust along
with the addendum were handed to me together, and
that was in 2017 when my loan officer said, you know,
the underwrite—well, I'm sorry. It was—I won't—
don't want to say what someone said. But, . . . it was
expressed that $4,500 each month may not have been
substantial enough. And I was asked, are you able to
ask the grantor of your [T]rust to increase that amount
to $5,500? And that's when an addendum was drafted.
...
[Defendant]: So then she drafted [an] addendum, and
then that addendum was, as you saw, it was signed by
[plaintiff] and
[Defense counsel]: Okay. Did you see—and I'm now
going to hand you, [defendant], this, a document that's
been pre-marked D-2. Can you take a minute so I go
over that?
[Defendant]: Yes.
[Defense Counsel]: Was this the document that
[plaintiff], at that point, drafted?
[Defendant]: Yes.
[Defense Counsel]: Did you see [plaintiff] draft this
document?
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[Defendant]: Yes, I did.
[Defense Counsel]: Can you describe what you saw?
[Defendant]: So she was—we were at [address] . . . she
was in her room, at her computer, and she drafted this,
she typed it.
...
[Defense Counsel]: . . . After this was drafted, was
anything else done with the document?
[Defendant]: . . . [Plaintiff] took the document to TD
Bank in Marlton to have . . . a notary notarize it.
[Defense Counsel]: Okay. Did you go with her?
[Defendant]: I was in the car with her. I went with
her—
[Defense Counsel]: Okay. Did you—
[Defendant]: —but I didn't go in the bank.
[Defense Counsel]: Okay. You didn't go in the bank.
[Defendant]: No.
[Defense Counsel]: When [plaintiff] came out of the
bank—
[Defendant]: Mm-hmm.
[Defense Counsel]: —did she hand you that document?
[Defendant]: She handed this to me, yes.
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[Defense Counsel]: And when [plaintiff] handed you
this document, did it appear as it appears now?
[Defendant]: Yes, it does.
[Defense Counsel]: Okay. Has this document been
altered or manipulated in any way?
[Defendant]: Absolutely not.
Defendant was also able to recall specific conversations she had with
plaintiff regarding the exhibits. We conclude the testimony and evidence
supported the court's decision to admit the Trust documents into evidence.
Plaintiff's argument is unavailing. In our view, the court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting the Trust documents.
Plaintiff next argues that the "documents bear on their face numerous
irregularities that make it impossible for [defendant] to make the requisite prima
facie showing." However, we have stated "the ultimate question of authenticity
of the evidence is left to the jury." State v. Brown, 463 N.J. Super. 33, 52 (App.
Div. 2020) (quoting Mays, 321 N.J. Super. at 628). And, as plaintiff stated in
her appellate brief, she was able to "repeatedly point[ ] out th[ese] discrepancies
to the trial court." The jury was therefore well aware of any potential
discrepancies contained in the documents, and as the ultimate fact finder, were
able to weigh the evidence as they saw fit. See State v. Ingenito, 87 N.J. 204,
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211 (1981) (explaining "[t]he jury's fact-finding function is all-inclusive and
encompasses the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and the weight and
worth of evidence.").
Plaintiff also challenges the court's purported "failure to recognize the
numerous indicia of unreliability" and the fact that "there was zero questioning
of [defendant]" about the irregularities and inconsistencies in the exhibits.
Again, we are unpersuaded. First, the record clearly established the court's
awareness of the potential irregularities surrounding both exhibits. During the
trial—outside the presence of the jury—the court allowed both exhibits to be
moved into evidence but noted the addendum was "admittedly peculiar, given
that you would not sign something before taking it to the notary." We are
satisfied the court correctly found that issue was "really for the jury to assess, in
terms of the weight to give that evidence if any."
Second, plaintiff's counsel had ample opportunity to cross-examine
defendant about any potential irregularities in the Trust documents. Further, the
court provided plaintiff's counsel the opportunity to call and question defendant
as a hostile witness, however, counsel chose not to. Based on our review, we
discern no reversible error or abuse of discretion in the court's admittance of the
Trust documents into evidence.
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B.
Next, plaintiff contends the jury's award of damages was improper and
should be vacated, and a new trial on the issues of damages is warranted. In
particular, plaintiff argues that the jury's award to defendant was "excessive ,"
and the jury's award to plaintiff was "inappropriately low" because the jury only
awarded $2,000 in damages for stolen property worth more than $200,000,
which goes against the weight of the evidence. Defendant counters that the
jury's damages awards were rational and should be affirmed.
We begin our analysis with the standard of review. "A jury's verdict,
including an award of damages, is cloaked with a 'presumption of
correctness[,]'" which "is not overcome unless [an appellant] can establish,
'clearly and convincingly,' that the award is 'a miscarriage of justice.'" Cuevas
v. Wentworth Grp., 226 N.J. 480, 501 (2016) (quoting Baxter v. Fairmont Food
Co., 74 N.J. 588, 598 (1977)). "[S]ubstantial deference . . . must be accorded
[to] a damages award rendered by a jury." Graphnet, Inc. v. Retarus, Inc., 250
N.J. 24, 37 (2022) (alterations and omission in original) (quoting Orientale v.
Jennings, 239 N.J. 569, 589 (2019)).
Because of the importance of the jury, the system requires "judicial
restraint in exercising the power to reduce a jury's damages award." Cuevas,
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226 N.J. at 485. A jury award should stand unless it "is so patently excessive,
so pervaded by a sense of wrongness, that it shocks the judicial conscience."
Ibid. The award must be so "disproportionate" that it would "constitute a
miscarriage of justice" to allow it to stand. Id. at 487.
Here, we are satisfied that the jury's award of damages was rational and
not improper. The jury's award of $264,000 to defendant is not so patently
excessive that it shocks the judicial conscience. At the trial, defendant testified
that the last time she received a disbursement from the Trust was January 2019.
The 2017 addendum to the Trust clearly established that defendant would
receive $5,500 monthly from February 10, 2017, to February 10, 2023. Based
on that information, the jury was able to consider the months defendant did not
receive a disbursement—February 2019 to February 2023—and multiplied that
number by $5,500. The jury's logic was sufficiently reasonable, and comported
with the evidence, thus making the $264,000 award not so "disproportionate"
that it would "constitute a miscarriage of justice."
Second, as to plaintiff's jury award, we also conclude that $2,000 is not
inappropriately low that it is clearly and convincingly constituted a miscarriage
of justice. As the court correctly noted during the hearing for plaintiff's motion
for a new trial, there were significant factual disputes regarding which personal
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property was allegedly "stolen." Moreover, defendant testified numerous times
that the "stolen" items she had in her possession were actually "gifts" from
plaintiff or items she purchased herself. Thus, the only evidence plaintiff
submitted at trial to support her claim that the "stolen" items totaled more than
$200,000 was the Stolen Items List "that she compiled herself."
Plaintiff's "Stolen Items List" arbitrarily listed: (1) certain items she paid
for; (2) what the replacement cost would be; and (3) items with an approximate
purchase price. Further, the Stolen Items List contained one known example
where an item was listed as "stolen," but was revealed during trial to be a gift
from plaintiff to defendant. Based on the contested testimony, the trial court
found the jury believed some of what each party said. Therefore, the court was
satisfied the jury appropriately considered the information and arguments and
arrived at a reasoned judgment on the issue of damages, which was not so
disproportionate as to shock the conscience or to be manifestly unjust. Thus,
we discern no abuse of discretion in the court's denial of plaintiff's motion for a
new trial.
C.
Finally, plaintiff contends that evidence concerning the FRO was
irrelevant and prejudicial, warranting a new trial. Specifically, plaintiff argues
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that the court committed reversible error when it admitted the FRO into evidence
and allowed defendant to give "lengthy" testimony concerning the physical
altercation that gave rise to the FRO. Defendant contends that evidence
concerning the FRO was not objected to and thus was not preserved for appeal. 4
We apply an abuse of discretion standard to questions of whether the
probative value of evidence is "substantially outweighed by its prejudicial
nature" under N.J.R.E. 403. Green v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 160 N.J. 480, 492
(1999). Under N.J.R.E. 403 "relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the risk of: (a) undue prejudice, confusion
of issues, or misleading the jury; or (b) undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence." The burden is on "[t]he party seeking the
exclusion of the evidence [to] demonstrate that one or more of the factors listed
in N.J.R.E. 403 substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence."
Griffin v. City of E. Orange, 225 N.J. 400, 420 (2016) (citations omitted).
4
We disagree with defendant's assertion. Plaintiff's motion in limine was
partially based on her desire to exclude the FRO from evidence, and plaintiff's
counsel objected to defendant's testimony regarding the FRO. See Willner v.
Vertical Reality, Inc., 235 N.J. 65, 79 (2018) (stating "[p]ursuant to Rule 1:7-2,
in order to preserve an issue for appeal, a party . . . shall make known to the
court specifically the action which the party desires the court to take or the
party's objection to the action taken and the grounds therefor.").
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In general, "[e]vidence claimed to be unduly prejudicial is excluded only
when its 'probative value is so significantly outweighed by [its] inherently
inflammatory potential as to have a probable capacity to divert the minds of the
jurors from a reasonable and fair evaluation' of the issues in the case." Id. at
421 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). "[W]hen a party challenges the
admission of evidence under N.J.R.E. 403, the question is not whether the
challenged testimony will be prejudicial to the objecting party, 'but whether it
will be unfairly so.'" Ibid. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). "[E]vidence
that has overwhelming probative worth may [still] be admitted even if highly
prejudicial." Rosenblit v. Zimmerman, 166 N.J. 391, 410 (2001) (quoting
Green, 160 N.J. at 496).
The court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the FRO into evidence
or in permitting defendant to testify about the underlying predicate act. First,
defendant's testimony concerning the issuance of the FRO and the FRO itself
both met the low threshold for relevance. See Verdicchio v. Ricca, 179 N.J. 1,
34 (2004) (stating "if evidence does support the existence of a specific fact, even
obliquely, it is relevant and admissible."). Here, the evidence concerning the
FRO was offered to explain plaintiff's potential intent or motive behind
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terminating defendant's monthly disbursements from the Trust. This is clearly
relevant to defendant's/third-party plaintiff's breach-of-contact claim.
Second, the evidence concerning the FRO was not unduly prejudicial as
the court properly placed limitations on the testimony and the documents that
could be admitted to ensure the prejudice would not outweigh the probative
value. For example, on the first day of trial, defendant began to testify about an
incident where plaintiff allegedly punched her in the face. The court
immediately interjected and limited the testimony to only allow discussion of
the domestic violence incident that resulted in the FRO because the court did
not believe it to be "necessary or appropriate" to relitigate the parties' entire
prior history of domestic violence. 5
Moreover, when defendant's counsel sought to move the FRO into
evidence, the court properly redacted the page that dealt with the dismissal of
plaintiff's temporary restraining order on the grounds that it was not relevant to
defendant's FRO. Additionally, in charging the jury, the court emphasized that
"[t]he existence of [an FRO] is not an element of any claim of any party in this
case." At bottom, the record clearly establishes that the court went to great
5
On the record, plaintiff's counsel was asked if the limiting instruction was
reasonable. He replied, "I think so."
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lengths to ensure the evidence regarding the FRO was relevant, narrow, and not
unduly prejudicial.
We conclude that the remaining arguments—to the extent we have not
addressed them—lack sufficient merit to warrant any further discussion in a
written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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