State of New Jersey v. Edgar Martinez ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2693-22
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
EDGAR MARTINEZ, a/k/a
MARTINEZ EDGAR A.,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________
Submitted September 10, 2024 – Decided October 17, 2024
Before Judges Sumners and Susswein.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 16-01-
0025.
Jennifer Nichole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Richard Sparaco, Designated Counsel, on the
brief).
Yolanda Ciccone, Middlesex County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Hudson Earl Knight, Assistant
Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Edgar Martinez appeals the February 27, 2023 Law Division
order denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) following an
evidentiary hearing. He seeks to overturn his jury trial convictions for murder,
unlawful possession of a weapon, and possession of a weapon for an unlawful
purpose. Defendant contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to abide by his desire to testify at trial and by failing to
prepare him to testify. Defendant argues that had he testified, he would have
explained to the jury his level of intoxication which, defendant posits, would
have altered the jury's verdict. After carefully reviewing the record in light of
the arguments of the parties and governing legal principles, we affirm.
I.
We need not recount in detail the circumstances leading to the stabbing
death, which are fully described in our previous opinion, State of New Jersey v.
Edgar Martinez, No. A-4143-17 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 2, 2020). It
suffices to note that on July 4, 2015 the victim, J.G.-E.1, and Jacquline Martinez 2
1
As we did our earlier opinion, we use initials to refer to the decedent in this
opinion. State v. Martinez, No. A-4143-17 (slip op. at 2 n.1).
2
Because Jacqueline Martinez and defendant coincidentally share the same
surname, we refer to her by her first name to avoid confusion. We intend no
disrespect in doing so.
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2
went to a restaurant around 2:00 am. J.G.-E. called his former girlfriend,
Benigna Reyes, and asked her to come to the restaurant. When she arrived, she
spoke to a group of men, including defendant, who were seated at a table. After
speaking with them, Jacqueline prepared to leave so the victim and Reyes could
discuss their relationship, but J.G.-E. asked her to wait so he could take her
home.
Reyes confronted Jacquline outside the restaurant and struck her,
knocking her to the ground. J.G.-E. attempted to break up the altercation. The
men who had previously spoken with Reyes in the restaurant stepped outside
and confronted J.G.-E., resulting in a fight. J.G.-E. attempted to escape and fled
into the restaurant's kitchen. However, defendant pursued him, knocked him to
the ground, and then stabbed the victim, who later succumbed to the knife
wounds.
At police headquarters, defendant told officers he was already "drunk"
when he and his friends arrived at the restaurant where the violent confrontation
occurred. Defendant told police he "was so drunk" that he could not remember
how many times he stabbed the victim or where he stabbed him.
In January 2016, defendant was charged by indictment with first-degree
murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1)(2), unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A.
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2C:39-5(d), and possession of a weapon for unlawful purposes, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-
4. He was tried before a jury during October and November 2017.
Defendant presented one witness at trial, Marco Gonzalez, one of the men
who was with defendant on the night of the stabbing. Gonzalez testified he and
defendant began drinking beer around 7:00 or 8:00 p.m. The group left one bar
and traveled to a different bar around 10:00 p.m. The group continued drinking
there until 2:00 a.m., and then went to the restaurant where the confrontation
occurred. They continued drinking at the restaurant. Gonzalez testified that
when the incident occurred defendant "was a little drunk."
The jury found defendant guilty of all counts that were charged in the
indictment. In February 2018, the trial judge sentenced defendant on the murder
conviction to a thirty-year prison term with a thirty-year parole ineligibility
period. The trial judge also imposed a concurrent eighteen-month prison term
on the conviction for unlawful possession of a weapon. 3 We affirmed
defendant's conviction and sentence, and the Supreme Court denied defendant's
petition for certification. State v. Martinez, A-4143-17 (slip op. at 3), cert.
denied, 244 N.J. 456 (2020).
3
The conviction for possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose was
merged with the murder conviction.
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In February 2021, defendant filed a pro se petition for PCR. In February
2022, defendant's PCR counsel filed a brief in support of defendant's PCR
petition along with defendant's certification.
In November 2022, the PCR court heard oral argument and entered an
order denying defendant's claims except for the contention that trial counsel
deprived defendant of his right to testify at trial. As to that claim, the PCR court
conducted a February 24, 2023 evidentiary hearing relating solely to
communications between defendant and his trial counsel.
At the hearing, defendant's trial counsel testified that he advised defendant
of his right to testify and told defendant that he should testify because he did not
have a prior record. Trial counsel recalled that defendant told him he did not
want to testify. Trial counsel explained that he believed the reason defendant
did not testify was because he "got cold feet." Trial counsel further testified that
he was "taken aback because [he] wanted to put him on the stand. But it wasn't
[trial counsel's] decision."
Defendant testified at the PCR hearing that from the beginning of the case
it was his plan to testify in his own defense. He claimed that if he had testified,
he would have stated that he consumed about twenty-four beers and smoked
marijuana at every place he went to that night. He stated that he wanted the jury
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to "hear [his] version of the events of the story. And [he] also wanted the jury .
. . to hear how much [he] had to drink and also the drugs that [he] had used
throughout the night [and] what happened that night."
Defendant also testified that the only time he discussed whether he was
going to testify with his trial counsel was during the trial when the judge asked
him directly if he wanted to. Defendant testified that trial counsel told him it
would not be a good idea to testify because the prosecutor was going to "eat
[him] alive." Defendant stated his trial counsel did not prepare him to testify,
nor did trial counsel prepare him for any anticipated cross-examination
questions. Because defendant did not feel prepared, he decided not to testify.
Moreover, defendant testified that he wrote letters to the Public Defender's
Office and the trial judge advising them he wanted a new attorney because trial
counsel seemed like he did not want to work with him.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the PCR court rendered an oral decision,
denying defendant's last remaining PCR claim. The PCR court found trial
counsel's testimony credible. It also found the record established a discussion
between the trial judge and defendant occurred regarding the decision to testify,
and that defendant was provided additional time to make that decision. The PCR
court determined defendant was provided enough time to discuss the decision,
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and ultimately, he decided that he did not want to testify and expressed as such
to the trial judge.
The PCR court further found that the jury was given evidence of
defendant's state of intoxication because they had the opportunity to view his
statement to police after the incident. The court also noted that the jury had the
opportunity to view video footage of the crime, which "provided the jury with
firsthand evidence to assess the degree of intoxication."
Based on these findings, the PCR court concluded there was insufficient
evidence to establish that trial counsel deprived defendant of his right to testify.
The PCR court further found a lack of evidence to support defendant's
contention that had he testified, the outcome of the trial would have been
different.
Defendant raises the following single contention for our consideration:
POINT I
TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING
TO ABIDE [BY] DEFENDANT'S DESIRE TO
TESTIFY AT TRIAL AND IN FAILING TO
PREPARE HIM TO TESTIFY, AND BECAUSE OF
SUCH INEFFECTIVENESS, THE RESULT WOULD
HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT.
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II.
We preface our analysis by acknowledging the legal principles governing
this appeal. "Post-conviction relief is New Jersey's analogue to the federal writ
of habeas corpus." State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992). "A petitioner
must establish the right to such relief by a preponderance of the credible
evidence." Ibid. (citing State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 579 (1992)). "To sustain
that burden, specific facts" that "provide the court with an adequate basis on
which to rest its decision" must be articulated. Mitchell, 126 N.J. at 579.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,
Paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution guarantee criminal defendants the
right to the effective assistance of counsel. State v. O'Neil, 219 N.J. 598, 610
(2014) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984); State v.
Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987)). To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, the defendant must meet the two-prong test established by Strickland
and adopted by our Supreme Court in Fritz. 466 U.S. at 687; 105 N.J. at 58.
Under the Strickland paradigm, a defendant first must show that their
attorney made errors "so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel'
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." 466 U.S. at 687. Counsel's
performance is deficient if it "[falls] below an objective standard of
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reasonableness." Id. at 688. "A court evaluating a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel must avoid second-guessing defense counsel's tactical
decisions and viewing those decisions under the 'distorting effects of hindsight.'"
State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 157 (1997) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).
Turning to the second prong of the Strickland/Fritz test, a defendant also
must show that counsel's "deficient performance prejudiced the defense[,]"
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, because "there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different." Id. at 694. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome" of the trial. Ibid.Importantly for purposes of this appeal, "[w]e defer to trial court's factual
findings made after an evidentiary hearing on a petition for PCR." State v.
Blake, 444 N.J. Super. 285, 294 (App. Div. 2016). "However, we do not defer
to legal conclusions, which we review de novo." State v. Holland, 449 N.J.
Super. 427, 434 (App. Div. 2017).
III.
Applying these principles to the present matter, we concur with the PCR
court that defendant established neither prong of the Strickland/Fritz test. We
repeat the relevant findings made by the PCR court:
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To this [c]ourt it appears that the testimony of
[trial counsel] was credible when he stated that after the
witness for the defendant [Marco Gonzalez] did not
testify as strongly as what was anticipated, that the
defendant then had cold feet, in [trial counsel's] words,
cold feet and chose not to testify.
The transcript from the trial record reflects the
[c]ourt adequately explaining the rights of the
defendant regarding testifying. The [c]ourt then states
the following:
Do you understand these three choices?
The defendant: Yes.
The [c]ourt: Did you have sufficient time to
discuss your choice or discuss these choices with
[trial counsel], your attorney?
The defendant: No.
[Trial counsel] then says: I need a few minutes.
The [c]ourt: All right. I'm going to give you some
time to talk to [trial counsel]. When you're ready,
can you please tell me.
[Trial counsel]: Yes.
Later, defendant comes back into the courtroom
with counsel, and the court states the following:
Okay, [defendant]. Please stand. Have you made
a decision about whether you want to testify?
The defendant: Yes.
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The [c]ourt: What's that decision?
The defendant: I am not going to testify.
The [c]ourt: All right. And you've had a
sufficient opportunity to speak to your lawyer
about this?
The defendant: Yes.
Defendant asks this [c]ourt to find that if he had
testified, he would have been able to explain to the jury
the extent of his drinking or marijuana smoking that
evening.
The jury, however, was presented with evidence
of the defendant's intoxication, and this defense was
presented throughout the trial. The State also presented
a recording of the defendant's sworn statement in which
he told the police that he had been drinking. In
watching the video, the jury had the opportunity to view
the defendant only hours after the crime. The recording
provided the jury with firsthand evidence to assess the
degree of intoxication the defendant labored under.
Similarly, the jury had the opportunity to view
surveillance videos that showed the crime.
Ultimately, it appears to this [c]ourt as well as to
the Appellate Division, who reviewed this case on
appeal, that there was strong evidence of—by the
verdict and by the Appellate Division's decision of the
defendant's guilt.
Against the weight of this evidence, the
defendant now alleges the trial was unfair because he
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did not testify. And he did not testify, he states, on the
advice of counsel.
Enough evidence of intoxication had been given
in the case for the intoxication instruction to be given.
Given that defendant would have been cross-examined
where the State could confront him with the video
depicting the crime and his prior statement, it is also
reasonable to conclude that if the defendant testified, he
easily could have been put in a position of not being
seen as credible.
To this [court], [trial counsel] testified credibly.
He testified that he wanted his client to testify and at
the last minute, the defendant chose not to testify.
To this [c]ourt, the objective record supports the
finding that defendant freely chose not to testify.
As noted, we defer to the PCR court's factual and credibility findings.
Blake, 444 N.J. Super. at 294. Trial counsel testified credibly at the PCR hearing
that he advised defendant to testify and expected he would do so, while
acknowledging the decision ultimately was defendant's to make. Counsel's
performance in no way "[falls] below an objective standard of reasonableness."
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Defendant has thus failed to establish that his trial
counsel was ineffective under the first prong of the Strickland/Fritz test.
We also agree with the PCR court that given the evidence of defendant's
intoxication presented to the jury, defendant has failed to establish that his
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testimony would create a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
proceedings would have been different. Id. at 694. As our Supreme Court
stressed in State v. Gideon, the second prong "is an exacting standard." 244 N.J.
538, 551 (2021) (quoting State v. Allegro, 193 N.J. 352, 367 (2008)). "Prejudice
is not to be presumed[,]" but "the defendant must affirmatively prove
prejudice." Ibid. (citing Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52, and quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 693). Defendant has failed to do so.
To the extent we have not specifically addressed them, any remaining
arguments raised by defendant lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion. R.
2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
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