State of New Jersey v. Ronnie Watkins ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0204-23
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
RONNIE WATKINS,
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________
Submitted November 6, 2024 – Decided November 18, 2024
Before Judges Gooden Brown and Chase.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Burlington County, Indictment No.
20-01-0049.
Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Jeffrey L. Weinstein, Designated Counsel,
on the brief).
LaChia L. Bradshaw, Burlington County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Alexis R. Agre, Assistant
Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Ronnie Watkins appeals from a June 20, 2023 denial of his
petition for post-conviction relief ("PCR"). The PCR court denied the petition
without a hearing, finding defendant failed to meet his burden that plea counsel
was ineffective in failing to apply him to Recovery Court and at sentencing. We
affirm substantially for the reasons set forth by Judge Mark Tarantino in his
well-reasoned written opinion.
I.
After selling heroin, cocaine, and fentanyl to undercover officers on two
occasions, defendant was indicted by a grand jury. Counts One, Three, Five,
Seven, and Nine charged defendant with third-degree Possession of a Controlled
Dangerous Substance, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a(1). Counts Two, Four, Six, Eight,
and Ten charged defendant with third-degree Possession of a Controlled
Dangerous Substance with Intent to Distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1) and 2C:35-
5b(3).
In exchange for defendant's guilty plea to one count of third-degree
Possession of a Controlled Dangerous Substance with Intent to Distribute, the
State agreed to recommend a sentence of four years in New Jersey State Prison
with a sixteen-month parole disqualifier period. The State also agreed to dismiss
the remaining charges at sentencing.
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The plea hearing began with the terms of the agreement being placed on
the record by counsel for the State and defendant. After being placed under
oath, defendant admitted that he was in possession of less than one-half ounce
of heroin and possessed the heroin with the intent to distribute it.
Defendant testified that he was twenty-seven years old and had graduated
from high school and that he understood the rights that he was waiving. He
stated he did not have any physical or mental condition that would prevent him
from understanding the terms of the plea agreement. Further, he confirmed he
was not under the influence of any drugs or alcohol and had not been threatened,
coerced, or promised anything to encourage him to plead guilty.
When questioned, defendant stated that he understood the nature of the
charges against him and the charge to which he was entering a guilty plea. He
said he understood his sentencing exposure, including financial obligations.
Defendant stated that he had enough time to review the discovery with his
attorney and they discussed the case "ad nauseum."
Defendant informed the court that he had initially wanted to file a motion
to suppress but opted against it. He also confirmed he wanted a more favorable
plea offer but accepted the current offer from the State. Defendant informed the
court that his attorney had agreed to return a portion of defendant's money to
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him but stated that his guilty plea was not induced by the promise of a refund.
At no time during the plea did defendant ask about, refer to, or mention
Recovery Court.
Defendant appeared before the court on January 28, 2022, for sentencing.
Counsel informed the court that defendant had two open matters in Camden
County.1 Defendant contended that he was being considered for Recovery Court
for those matters. The presentence report reflected that defendant was screened
for mandatory Recovery Court in Burlington County but was deemed ineligible.
The court noted that the sentence was fashioned in accordance with the Brimage
Guidelines 2 and asked defendant if he wanted to allocate before sentencing.
Defendant declined to speak.
The court found aggravating factor three, the risk defendant would commit
another offense, based on defendant's criminal history. It noted defendant had
six indictable convictions, three violations of probation, twelve juvenile
adjudications, and five disorderly persons offenses. It found aggravating factor
six based on the extent of defendant's criminal history and the seriousness of
1
Defendant also had a pending case in Gloucester County for which he was
sentenced to a period of incarceration.
2
State v. Brimage, 153 N.J. 1 (1998).
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defendant's prior convictions. Finally, the court held there was a need to deter
defendant and found aggravating factor nine. The court did not find any
mitigating factors. In accordance with the plea agreement, defendant was
sentenced to four years in state prison, with sixteen months to be served without
the possibility of parole and all applicable fines and penalties. Defendant was
given 109 days of jail credit. The sentencing court informed defendant of his
right to appeal, including the time frame in which he had to file; defendant
acknowledged these rights.
Defendant did not appeal his conviction or sentence and instead filed a
motion to withdraw his guilty plea and then withdrew the motion a month later.
He then filed a PCR. In his PCR, he argued he was denied effective assistance
of counsel because (1) counsel advised defendant he would get Recovery Court
if he pled guilty; (2) at sentencing, counsel failed to address Recovery Court;
(3) counsel failed to appeal his sentence; and (4) counsel made cumulative
errors.
After hearing the arguments of PCR counsel, Judge Tarantino issued a
written opinion denying the motion on June 20, 2023. The judge held that
defendant failed to meet the threshold needed to establish ineffective assistance
of counsel. He held that defendant did not support his contention that he would
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get into Recovery Court with any credible evidence from the record.
Additionally, he determined defendant's Camden County matters would have
prevented defendant from receiving a Recovery Court sentence. Turning to the
remaining claims, the judge held defendant failed to establish a prima facie basis
for an evidentiary hearing and failed to meet either prong of the Strickland3
standard. Therefore, he denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing.
Defendant now appeals the denial of his PCR arguing:
POINT I
THE FAILURE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL TO
FOLLOW THROUGH ON A DRUG COURT
APPLICATION IN THE FACE OF DEFENDANT'S
CRIMINAL HISTORY THAT POINTED TO A
SUBSTANCE ABUSE PROBLEM AND TO
ADVOCATE FOR A LOWER SENTENCE
ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL THAT
WARRANTED THE GRANT OF AN EVIDENTIARY
HEARING.
A. Petitioner's Criminal History Shows a
Pattern of Crimes Consistent With A
Substance Abuse Problem, Thereby
Presenting a Prima Facie Claim of
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel for
Failing to Pursue a Drug Court Application
Entitling Petitioner to an Evidentiary
Hearing.
3
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
A-0204-23
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B. The PCR Court Erroneously Found That
Petitioner Was Precluded From Admission
Into Drug Court By Applying Track I
Prohibitions Even Though Petitioner Could
Have Been Admitted Under Track II.
POINT II
PETITIONER RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT PLEA AND
SENTENCING WHEN COUNSEL FAILED TO
ARGUE AGAINST A DISCRETIONARY PERIOD
OF PAROLE INELIGIBILITY AND FAILED TO
ARGUE ANY MITIGATING FACTORS THAT
COULD HAVE WEIGHED AGAINST THE
IMPOSITION OF SUCH A SENTENCE IN LIGHT OF
THE STATE'S BURDEN TO SHOW THAT THE
AGGRAVATING FACTORS SUBSTANTIALLY
OUTWEIGHED THE MITIGATING.
POINT III
PETITIONER RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHEN TRIAL
COUNSEL FAILED TO ADVISE PETITIONER OF
THE RIGHT TO APPEAL HIS SENTENCE; THE PCR
COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED AN
EVIDENTIARY HEARING DUE TO THE LIMITED
RECORD AT SENTENCING REGARDING
PETITIONER'S UNDERSTANDING OF HIS
APPELLATE RIGHTS.
POINT IV
THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF ERRORS DENIED
PETITIONER A FAIR OUTCOME.
II.
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"Post-conviction relief is New Jersey's analogue to the federal writ of
habeas corpus." State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 576 (2015) (quoting State v.
Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992)). PCR provides a "built-in 'safeguard that
ensures that a defendant was not unjustly convicted.'" State v. Nash, 212 N.J.
518, 540 (2013) (quoting State v. McQuaid, 147 N.J. 464, 482 (1997)). The
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 10
of the New Jersey Constitution guarantee a defendant in a criminal proceeding
"'the right to the effective assistance of counsel.'" Nash, 212 N.J. at 541.
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686). Our review is deferential to a PCR court's
factual findings supported by sufficient credible evidence. State v. Gideon, 244
N.J. 538, 551 (2021) (citing Nash, 212 N.J. at 540). Review of a PCR court's
interpretation of law is de novo. Nash, 212 N.J. at 540-41.
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims must satisfy the two-prong test
set forth in Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, and adopted by the New Jersey Supreme
Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 57-58 (1987). To satisfy the first prong, the
defendant must show counsel's performance was deficient by demonstrating
counsel's handling of the matter "fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness" and "counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment."
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Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. To satisfy the second prong, "'[t]he defendant
must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel 's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.'" State v. Gideon, 244 N.J. 538, 550-51 (2021) (alteration in original)
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). "Prejudice is not to be presumed." Id. at
551 (citing Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52). "The defendant must 'affirmatively prove
prejudice.'" Ibid. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693).
When a guilty plea is involved, a defendant must show "'that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, [the defendant] would not
have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'" State v. Nuñez
Valdéz, 200 N.J. 129, 139 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting State v.
DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 457 (1994)). "In other words, 'a petitioner must
convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been
rational under the circumstances.'" State v. Aburoumi, 464 N.J. Super. 326, 339
(App. Div. 2020) (quoting State v. O'Donnell, 435 N.J. Super. 351, 371 (App.
Div. 2014)). "The petitioner must ultimately establish the right to PCR by a
preponderance of the evidence." O'Donnell, 435 N.J. Super. at 370.
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This is because there is a strong presumption counsel "rendered adequate
assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable
professional judgment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Therefore, counsel's errors
"even if professionally unreasonable" will not require setting aside a judgment
if they had no effect on the judgment. Id. at 691. Prejudice is not presumed,
Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52, and a defendant must demonstrate "how specific errors of
counsel undermined the reliability of the finding of guilt." United States v.
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 n.26 (1984).
A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if they present a prima
facie case supporting PCR, the court determines there are material issues of fact
that cannot be resolved based on the existing record, and the court finds an
evidentiary hearing is required to resolve the claims presented. R. 3:22-10(b);
see also State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354 (2013) (citing R. 3:22-10(b)); see also
State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158 (1997). When a PCR court does not hold an
evidentiary hearing, our review is de novo. State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 421
(2004). If a prima facie case is made, a hearing must be held; the court should
not presume the outcome of the hearing. State v. Russo, 333 N.J. Super. 119,
140 (App. Div. 2000). On appeal, the court analyzes a PCR judge's decision to
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deny a hearing on an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Brewster, 429 N.J.
Super. 387, 401 (App. Div. 2013).
"A petitioner is generally barred from presenting a claim on PCR that
could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal, R[ule] 3:22-4(a), or that has
been previously litigated, R[ule] 3:22-5." Nash, 212 N.J. at 546.
Pursuant to these principles and having conducted a de novo review of the
record, we affirm substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Tarantino's
thorough and well-written opinion. We add the following comments.
III.
There is nothing in the record to suggest that trial counsel materially
misrepresented the terms of the plea to defendant or promised Recovery Court
in exchange for his guilty plea. The record clearly states the terms of the plea
agreement, and the plea court was very detailed in having defendant confirm
that there were no other promises that induced him to plead guilty.
Even if defendant could have met the threshold for prong one of the
Strickland test, which would require more evidence than defendant's bare
assertions, defendant would have failed when it came to the second prong.
Defendant could not show that he was prejudiced by defense counsel's actions
because defendant would not have received a Recovery Court sentence. He was
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ineligible in Camden County. Moreover, his State Prison sentence out of
Gloucester County renders his claims moot.
Additionally, defendant's sentence is not the appropriate subject for a
PCR. While the court may review illegal sentences, sentencing arguments are
"not [ ] appropriate ground[s] for post -conviction relief." State v. Acevedo, 205
N.J. 40, 46 (2011) (internal citations omitted).
To permit post-conviction review of the adequacy of
the sentencing judge's findings and conclusions would
open the gates to an avalanche of grievances, often long
after the sentence was imposed. In light of the
availability of relief by way of direct appeal, we
perceive no need to make post-conviction relief an open
sesame for the wholesale review of sentences.
[State v. Flores, 228 N.J. Super. 586, 595-96 (App. Div.
1988).]
Although defendant couches his sentencing argument in terms of ineffective
assistance of counsel, the argument is an attempt to circumvent the procedural
bars that prohibit the review of sentences on PCR. If defendant wished to
challenge his sentence, he could have and should have challenged it by direct
appeal.
On appeal, defendant argues for the applicability of mitigating factors that
were not presented to the PCR court. As these arguments were not presented to
the PCR court, they are not properly before us. See Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins.
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Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973) (stating "[A]ppellate courts will decline to consider
questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity
for such a presentation is available unless the questions so raised on appeal go
to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concern matters of great public interest. "
(internal quotation marks omitted)). To the extent that defendant argues that a
finding of mitigating factor fourteen would have tipped the scales towards a
probationary sentence, that argument is without a basis in the record created at
the trial and PCR court. As with his PCR arguments, however, the arguments
are rooted in supposition rather than articulable facts upon which the trial court
reasonably rely. As Judge Tarantino stated, "defendant himself does not
convincingly suggest that any other mitigating factors would have applied in his
case. He only speculates about some mitigating evidence an attorney could have
presented at sentencing."
To the extent we have not addressed an argument raised on this appeal, it
is because it lacks sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R.
2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
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