State of New Jersey v. Karl T. Stahl ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1165-23
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
KARL T. STAHL,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
Argued October 29, 2024 – Decided November 18, 2024
Before Judges Chase and Vanek.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Ocean County, Municipal Appeal No. 23-03.
Kevin T. Flood argued the cause for appellant (Law
Office of Kevin T. Flood, LLC, attorneys; Lon C.
Taylor, of counsel and on the briefs; Kevin T. Flood, on
the briefs).
Cheryl L. Hammel, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the
cause for respondent (Bradley D. Billhimer, Ocean
County Prosecutor, attorney; Samuel Marzarella, Chief
Appellate Attorney, of counsel; Cheryl L. Hammel, on
the brief).
PER CURIAM
More than ten years after pleading guilty to his fourth charge of driving
while intoxicated ("DWI"), N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a), defendant Karl T. Stahl sought
to run his sentence concurrent with his other license suspensions, to renegotiate
his sentence, or withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant now appeals from the
November 2, 2023 Law Division order denying, de novo, his petition for post-
conviction relief ("PCR") and motion to vacate his guilty plea. We affirm.
I.
On June 4, 2011, defendant was arrested and charged with several motor
vehicle violations, including DWI in Ship Bottom. At the scene, defendant
presented a Pennsylvania driver's license bearing his picture and the name,
"Michael Wendroff." It was subsequently discovered that this Pennsylvania
license was fraudulent.
After defendant was admitted into the pre-trial intervention program on
the indictable charge stemming from presenting false identification, defendant
appeared with counsel in the Borough of Ship Bottom Municipal Court on five
Title 39 summonses: reckless driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-96; DWI, N.J.S.A. 39:4-
50; traffic on marked lanes, N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(b); driving while suspended,
N.J.S.A. 39:3-40; and failure to produce a valid driver's license, N.J.S.A. 39:3-
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29. At his court appearance, defendant entered a guilty plea. The court began
the plea proceeding by having the prosecutor and defendant's counsel place the
terms of the agreement, including a ten-year license suspension, on the record.
Then the court conducted a colloquy with defendant. First, the court confirmed
that defendant had ample opportunity to review his case with counsel and was
satisfied with counsel's advice. Next, the court confirmed that defendant
understood he had a right to trial but was waiving his rights by entering the plea;
that he was entering the plea freely and voluntarily; and that nobody was forcing
him to do so. The judge next established that defendant was pleading guilty to
DWI with the understanding that the balance of the charges against him would
be dismissed. Defendant was explained the fines and penalties he faced because
of his plea specifying, "[y]ou're going to receive a 10-year loss of your driving
privileges." Defendant agreed and then gave a factual statement admitting that
he had been imbibing alcoholic beverages and his ability to operate his vehicle
was impaired. He further admitted to taking an Alcotest with a result of 0.12
blood alcohol content.
The court found there was a sufficient factual basis to accept the plea and
sentenced defendant to ten years' loss of driving privileges; 180 days in Ocean
County Jail, ninety days of which would be served at an inpatient rehabilitation
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program; two years' ignition interlock (subsequent to the ten-year revocation
period); and payment of all applicable fines and penalties. The court then
dismissed all remaining charges. Defendant had the following colloquy with the
court after the sentence was imposed:
THE COURT: Do you have a driver's license?
DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: Suspended already?
DEFENDANT: Yeah.
THE COURT: Yes?
DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Well as a result of your plea of guilty
here today, sir, it's suspended for 10 more years from
today's date, you understand that?
DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
On December 12, 2022, defendant moved for PCR pursuant to Rule 7:10-
2(b)(1) and, "in the alternative, vacating [his] plea." In support of this motion,
PCR counsel provided their own certification stating that his client "only learned
recently that he was not sentenced in accordance with the terms of his plea
agreement," and that plea counsel had passed away. Defense counsel argued
that the ten-year suspension of defendant's driving privileges was supposed to
run concurrent to the suspension period he was already serving at the time of his
plea, but the Division of Motor Vehicles was running it consecutively. Defense
counsel thus argued that either defendant's sentence needed to be "corrected" so
that his license would be restored or alternatively, he should be permitted to
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have his plea back. Defendant provided neither a certification nor support for
his alternative argument to vacate his plea.
In January 2023, the Ship Bottom Municipal Court conducted a hearing
on defendant's PCR motion, and reserved decision. The court then denied the
motion, issuing an order supported by a written statement of reasons. The court
citied to N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 which states, in relevant part:
If the driving privilege of any person is under
revocation or suspension for a violation of any
provision of this Title or Title 2C of the New Jersey
Statutes at the time of any conviction for a violation of
this section, the revocation or suspension period
imposed shall commence as of the date of termination
of the existing revocation or suspension period.
As such, the court determined, pursuant to the plain language of the statute, it
had no authority to run defendant's DWI sentence concurrent to his other license
suspension as it would be an illegal sentence.
Defendant then filed a motion for reconsideration, supplementing his prior
filing with a certification from defendant. The court denied reconsideration and
issued an order and accompanying statement of reasons finding the motion
untimely. Moreover, the court explained, that on a motion for reconsideration,
it is improper to supplement one's original moving papers with additional
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information in order to cure an inadequacy in the motion record. Defendant then
filed a notice of appeal with the Law Division, Ocean County.
Trial de novo was held on November 2, 2023, in the Law Division. At its
conclusion, the court denied defendant's request to run his license suspensions
concurrently. Moreover, the court denied defendant's requested relief to remand
the matter for a renegotiation of the plea agreement or withdrawal of defendant's
plea. As to the argument that defendant's sentence should be corrected, the de
novo court found the plain language of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)(3) "clear and
unambiguous." The court found that even if it "were to accept [] defendant's
argument . . . it cannot do so because having the suspensions run concurrently
would be tantamount to an illegal sentence which this [c]ourt cannot endorse."
The de novo court then found:
When the Municipal Court Judge stated that his license
would be suspended for [ten] more years from today's
date, this was in the broader context of the discussion
on defendant's license already having been suspended.
The con—in this context, "more" implies that the
suspension is in addition to the earlier suspension and
it's not simply to run concurrently.
....
Upon a de novo review of the trial [c]ourt's record, this
[c]ourt is satisfied that the defendant's plea was made
knowingly, intelligently[,] and voluntarily and that []
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defendant was fully apprised of the potential
consequences of a guilty plea.
Thus, the court held defendant's argument that he was not aware of the
consecutive nature was without merit.
On appeal, defendant makes the following argument:
DEFENDANT MUST BE GIVEN THE OPTION TO
WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA BASED UPON HIS
ATTORNEY AND THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE
TO INFORM DEFENDANT OF THE FACT THAT
HIS LICENSE SUSPENSION WAS REQUIRED, BY
STATUTE, TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY WITH THE
PRIOR LICENSE SUSPENSION, A MATERIAL
PENAL CONSEQUENCE. INSTEAD,
DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY AND THE TRIAL
COURT MISLED DEFENDANT BY INDICATING
THAT THE LICENSE SUSPENSION WOULD END
IN 2023, RATHER THAN 2033.
II.
"Our review of a de novo decision in the Law Division is limited." State
v. Troisi, 471 N.J. Super. 158, 164 (App. Div. 2022) (citing State v. Clarksburg
Inn, 375 N.J. Super. 624, 639 (App. Div. 2005)). Importantly, "[w]e do not
independently assess the evidence as if we were the court of first instance." Ibid.(citing State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471 (1999)). Instead, our review involves
"whether there is 'sufficient credible evidence . . . in the record' to support the
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trial court's findings." State v. Robertson, 228 N.J. 138, 148 (2017) (omission
in original) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964)).
Deference is especially appropriate when, as in this case, two judges have
examined the facts and reached the same conclusion. As the Supreme Court
made clear in Locurto, "[u]nder the two-court rule, appellate courts ordinarily
should not undertake to alter concurrent findings of facts and credibility
determinations made by two lower courts absent a very obvious and exceptional
showing of error." 157 N.J. at 474 (citing Midler v. Heinowitz, 10 N.J. 123,
128-29 (1952)). Therefore, our review of the factual and credibility findings of
the municipal and the Law Division "'is exceedingly narrow.'" State v. Reece,
222 N.J. 154, 167 (2015) (quoting Locurto, 157 N.J. at 470). But "[a] trial
court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from
established facts are not entitled to any special deference." Manalapan Realty,
L.P. v. Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995). Thus, "[t]he standard of review
of a trial court's denial of a motion to vacate a guilty plea for lack of an adequate
factual basis is de novo." State v. Tate, 220 N.J. 393, 403-04 (2015).
A.
We affirm the trial court's denial of relief because of the fundamental
procedural infirmities in defendant's application. See State v. Armour, 446 N.J.
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Super. 295, 310 (App. Div. 2016) (explaining an appellate court may affirm a
trial court's decision for reasons different from those expressed by the trial
court). We do so by first reviewing the prerequisites to seeking PCR from a
DWI conviction and then by examining the timeliness of such PCR.
A defendant may seek PCR from a municipal conviction by filing a
petition. R. 7:10-2(a). The petition shall be in writing and conform to the
requirements of Rule 7:10-2(f). R. 7:10-2(g)(3). The defendant shall verify the
petition and set forth "with specificity the facts upon which the claim for relief
is based . . . ." R. 7:10-2(f)(2). The petition also shall not be accepted for filing
more than five years after the challenged conviction "unless it alleges facts
showing that the delay in filing was due to defendant's excusable neglect." R.
7:10-2(b)(2). Additionally, a petition to correct an illegal sentence may be filed
at any time. R. 7:10-2(b)(1).
Defendant's PCR did not contain a verified petition signed by defendant.
Instead, counsel for defendant submitted his own certification. The certification
relied on hearsay from many different sources and is not a substitute for
defendant setting forth facts which his claim for relief is based on and what he
knew or understood at the time of his plea. Moreover, defendant inappropriately
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sought relief by way of a notice of motion, unsupported by any cognizable
evidence demonstrating that his conviction should be set aside.
We next address the untimeliness of defendant's application to withdraw
his plea. In the context of the court rules concerning PCR petitions, our Supreme
Court has noted:
As time passes after conviction, the difficulties
associated with a fair and accurate reassessment of the
critical events multiply. Achieving "justice" years after
the fact may be more an illusory temptation than a
plausibly attainable goal when memories have dimmed,
witnesses have died or disappeared, and evidence is lost
or unattainable.
[State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 575 (1992).]
The Court has also noted "the need for achieving finality of judgments and to
allay the uncertainty associated with an unlimited possibility of relitigation." Id.
at 576. Of additional significance in the case before us is the absence of a claim
by defendant that he was not guilty of DWI or did not understand a nuanced
element of either statutory violation. Considering the problems caused by the
passage of significant time following defendant's guilty pleas, defendant's non-
assertion of innocence or misunderstanding of the nature of the charges, and the
trial court's determination of defendant's motivation, defendant's motion to
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withdraw his plea does not constitute a manifest injustice. Defendant's
arguments to the contrary are devoid of merit.
While defendant attempted to couch this PCR as a motion to correct an
illegal sentence, both judges below correctly held that the sentence being
consecutive was not only a legal sentence, but also it was defendant's request,
that if granted, would make the sentence illegal. Defendant's sentence was not
illegal and, as a result, defendant was required to file his PCR petition within
the five-year time limit set forth in Rule 7:10-2(b)(2). Consequently, his
application was time-barred by the rules regarding the filing of PCR petitions in
Municipal Court and in Superior Court.
Moreover, a trial court's order on a motion for reconsideration will not be
set aside unless shown to be a mistaken exercise of discretion. Granata v.
Broderick, 446 N.J. Super. 449, 468 (App. Div. 2016) (citing Fusco v. Bd. of
Educ., 349 N.J. Super. 455, 462 (App. Div. 2002)). Reconsideration should only
be granted in those cases in which the court had based its decision "'upon a
palpably incorrect or irrational basis,'" or did not "'consider, or failed to
appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence.'" Ibid. (quoting
D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990)).
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A motion for "[r]econsideration cannot be used to expand the record and
reargue a motion." Capital Fin. Co. of Delaware Valley v. Asterbadi, 398 N.J.
Super. 299, 310 (App. Div. 2008). It "is designed to seek review of an order
based on the evidence before the court on the initial motion, . . . not to serve as
a vehicle to introduce new evidence in order to cure an inadequacy in the motion
record." Ibid. (citation omitted); see also Palombi v. Palombi, 414 N.J. Super.
274, 288 (App. Div. 2010) (finding that a motion for reconsideration "is not
appropriate merely because a litigant is dissatisfied with a decision of the court
or wishes to reargue a motion . . ."). A court may "in the interest of justice"
consider new evidence on a motion for reconsideration only when the evidence
was not available prior to the decision by the court on the order that is the subject
of the reconsideration motion. D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. at 401; see also Palombi,
414 N.J. Super. at 289 (finding that facts known to the party prior to entry of an
original order did not provide an appropriate basis for reconsideration); Fusco,
349 N.J. Super. at 462 (finding the party not entitled to reconsideration where
evidence was available but not submitted to the court on the motion for the
original order). Defendant failed to make such a showing here. Dissatisfied
with the municipal court's original decision, defendant then filed his own
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certification which was certainly available prior to the first motion and was not
"new evidence."
B.
Rule 7:6-2(a)(1) provides in part that a municipal court "shall not . . .
accept a guilty plea without first . . . determining . . . there is a factual basis for
the plea." Maida v. Kuskin, 221 N.J. 112, 123 (2015) (quoting Rule 7:6-
2(a)(1)). "A factual basis for a plea must include either an admission or the
acknowledgement of facts that meet 'the essential elements of the [offense].'"
Tate, 220 N.J. at 406 (quoting State ex. rel. T.M., 166 N.J. 319, 333 (2001)).
"[A]n inadequate factual basis does not necessarily entitle a defendant to relief
upon a collateral attack of a conviction." State v. Belton, 452 N.J. Super. 528,
540 (App. Div. 2017). It is only under "extraordinary circumstances" that "a
court's improper acceptance of a guilty plea may constitute an illegal sentence"
for purposes of its determination of the timeliness of a PCR petition. Mitchell,
126 N.J. at 577; see also State v. D.D.M., 140 N.J. 83, 95 (1995). Thus, "[f]or
a guilty plea to be illegal in that sense, . . . its acceptance must implicate
constitutional issues . . . ." Mitchell, 126 N.J. at 577. It is only where the failure
to obtain an adequate factual basis "rises to constitutional dimensions" that the
resulting "sentence [is] rendered illegal." State v. Pena, 301 N.J. Super. 158,
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163 (App. Div. 1997) (citing Mitchell, 126 N.J. at 577); see also D.D.M., 140
N.J. at 95-96.
It is well-settled that a guilty plea must be entered into knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily. State v. Johnson, 182 N.J. 232, 236 (2005).
Before executing a plea, "the defendant must understand the nature of the charge
and the consequences of the plea" including "consequences that are 'direct' or
'penal.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Howard, 110 N.J. 113, 122 (1988)); see also
Rule 3:9-2 (requiring the defendant to complete and sign the appropriate plea
forms before accepting a guilty plea). "Obviously, this is best accomplished by
the court satisfying itself, through specific question[s] and answer[s]," during a
plea colloquy. State v. Kovack, 91 N.J. 476, 484 (1982).
What is involved here is the judicial obligation to enforce a legislatively
mandated sentence. When the Legislature imposes minimum penalties for
certain offenses, the judiciary must enforce that mandate. See State v.
Jefimowicz, 119 N.J. 152, 162 (1990); State v. Des Marets, 92 N.J. 62, 80-81
(1983); State v. Bausch, 83 N.J. 425, 433 (1980); State v. Fearick, 69 N.J. 32,
38 (1976). We would frustrate the legislative mandate command if we were to
conclude that defendant could avoid the statutorily required minimum sentence
for a fourth time DWI offender.
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The defendant's unsupported claim that he didn't know of the consecutive
nature of the sentence is belied by the facts of this case. Rather, the municipal
judge's advisement regarding the suspension of defendant's license for "10 more
years" was "in the broader context of the discussion on defendant's license
already having been suspended." To capitalize on remarks made by the judge
after the sentence was imposed, would further thwart justice from being
accomplished.
Clearly, defendant could have no reasonable expectation that if he
continually drove while intoxicated, he would be subject only to concurrent
penalties. In another context, we have held that the failure to receive written or
oral notice of the penalties applicable to a second, third, or subsequent
conviction does not bar imposition of the progressively enhanced sentences
mandated by our statutes. State v. Petrello, 251 N.J. Super. 476, 478-79 (App.
Div. 1991); see also N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(c). The underlying principle applies with
equal force here. The record before us does not suggest that defendant pled
guilty because he erroneously believed he was subject only to a suspension
concurrent to his other DWI convictions.
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To the extent we have not specifically addressed any of defendant's
arguments, it is because we have concluded any such contention was of
insufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
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