Luciana Gonzaga v. Estate of Jose A. Barros ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2171-22
LUCIANA GONZAGA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ESTATE OF JOSE A. BARROS,
deceased,
Defendant-Respondent.
____________________________
JOANA BARROS and NADIA
BARROS,
Respondents.
____________________________
Submitted October 29, 2024 – Decided November 18, 2024
Before Judges Chase and Vanek.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Union County, Docket
No. FD-20-1054-22.
Lorraine M. Medeiros, attorney for appellant.
Christopher A. Kozlowski, attorney for respondents
Joana Barros and Nadia Barros.
PER CURIAM
In this Family Part matter, plaintiff Luciana Gonzaga appeals from the
November 4, 2022 order denying her motion for reconsideration of the trial
court's order dismissing the complaint with prejudice, finding a prenuptial
agreement (the agreement) between Luciana1 and her now-deceased husband,
Jose Barros, enforceable. Based on our de novo review of the record and
prevailing law, we affirm.
I.
We glean the following salient facts from the record. Luciana was born
in Brazil and her native language is Portuguese. Luciana and Jose entered into
a romantic relationship in 2007. Prior to the relationship, Luciana had one
child—Luan—and Jose had two—Joana and Nadia. On December 5, 2010,
Luciana and Jose had a child together, Sophia.
In contemplation of their marriage, Luciana and Jose executed an
agreement, which is dated February 24, 2015. Attorney Nelson C. Monteiro
1
Since several parties share the surname Barros, we refer to the parties by their
first names for clarity and intend no disrespect by doing so.
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notarized Jose's signature on January 9, and attorney Anabela DaCruz-Melo
notarized Luciana's signature on February 24.
Paragraph 7 of the agreement provides that Luciana and Jose would each
maintain certain assets and income as separate property, and Luciana "waive[d]
and release[d] all rights and interests," including "distribution in intestacy"
which she might otherwise have acquired as his widow or distributee.
Luciana and Jose married on March 18, 2015. Following the marriage,
Jose financially supported Luciana, Sophia, and Luan. The couple remained
married until Jose's death on November 23, 2021.
Jose died intestate on November 23, 2021. Luciana asserts that Jose spoke
often about his will and his intention to provide for her and Sophia after his
death. However, no will was found after Jose's death. Luciana asserts that Jose
made representations regarding his intentions to financially support her and
Luan to the federal government in connection with an immigration application
for her and Luan to become legal residents. There are no corroborating
documents in the record which support her assertion.
Luciana was appointed administrator of Jose's estate (the Estate). Joana
and Nadia opposed Luciana's claims for relief as interested parties and potential
heirs. After a hearing on March 10, 2022, the Probate Part appointed a third-
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party administrator for the Estate and a guardian ad litem (GAL) to represent
Sophia's interests, and instructed Luciana to file a complaint in the Family Part
to determine the validity of the agreement.
Luciana filed a two-count verified complaint in the Family Part seeking
to (1) dissolve the agreement as unconscionable, thus allowing her to claim part
of the Estate, and (2) compel the Estate to provide interim financial support to
her and Sophia. Luciana also demanded punitive damages, court costs, and
attorney's fees. In her verified complaint, Luciana asserts she was unduly
pressured into signing the agreement, contending Jose told her if she did not
sign it, he would not marry her and she would be separated from Sophia when
she was deported back to Brazil.
Luciana was represented by a Portuguese-speaking attorney in connection
with the agreement, but contends she did not understand the agreement since it
was written in English, the provisions of the agreement were never explained to
her, and she did not have the opportunity to negotiate the terms. Luciana alleges
that she was not permitted to choose her own attorney to review the agreement,
but rather, Jose chose DaCruz-Melo to witness Luciana signing the document.
Luciana contends she was never given a copy of the executed agreement, and
the schedule of Jose's assets set forth in the agreement was incomplete.
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Although Luciana states she did not know what she was signing, she also
contends that Jose told her the provisions of the agreement were of "no
consequence" because he did not intend to enforce them. Luciana alleges this
stipulation, as well as Jose's promise to support her and Sophia after his death ,
was made in front of unidentified third-party witnesses.
On September 20, 2022, the Family Part held oral argument on a motion
and cross-motion as to the enforceability of the agreement, Luciana's request for
financial support for Sophia, and her request to use certain assets that Joana and
Nadia sought to liquidate. After the proceedings, the trial court entered an order
which: (1) deemed the agreement enforceable, (2) denied Luciana's motion to
set aside the agreement, (3) transferred all remaining issues surrounding the
Estate, including distribution of support for Sophia, to the Probate Part for
further consideration, and (4) dismissed Luciana's verified complaint with
prejudice.
Luciana filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing the Family Part (1)
made an inappropriate credibility judgment in reaching its decision, (2) failed to
give the parties adequate notice it would resolve the ultimate issue in the case
in connection with the motion, and (3) failed to afford her a sufficient
opportunity to present relevant evidence.
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The Family Part issued an order and written opinion denying
reconsideration on November 4, 2022. The trial court rejected Luciana's
argument that she did not have sufficient notice that the ultimate issue of the
enforceability of the agreement would be decided at oral argument on September
20, since Luciana requested in the verified complaint that the court both
determine the validity of the agreement and compel interim relief. The trial
court explained "there could be no discussion of interim spousal su pport paid
via the [E]state if the [agreement] was deemed enforceable." Accordingly, the
trial court determined "the validity of the [agreement] has to be adjudicated first
before even entertaining the issue of interim support."
The trial court also rejected Luciana's argument that she was not
represented by counsel at the signing of the agreement. The trial court stated it
was unpersuaded by Luciana's argument that Moses Aspan, Luciana’s long-time
immigration attorney, was unaware of the agreement. The court further noted
Aspan’s representation in immigration matters was insufficient to prove
DaCruz-Melo was not representing Luciana’s interests at the time she signed the
agreement.
The trial court was unpersuaded by Luciana's argument that Jose disclosed
assets in the agreement that differed from the documentation he filed with the
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federal government. In the agreement, Jose listed the value of his plumbing
business as plus or minus $250,000. However, in support of Luciana's
immigration application, Jose stated he made "around $200,000" annually from
his plumbing business. The trial court "d[id] not find that there is a material
difference" between the two amounts sufficient enough to invalidate the
agreement. Rather, the court noted "[i]t seems highly likely . . . that a small
business owner such as [Jose] would have significant income fluctuations year
over year, and perhaps even month over month," and there was no suggestion
the discrepancy was a result of Jose's attempt to hide assets from Luciana.
Accordingly, the trial court found "[p]laintiff never established a prima
facie case for challenging the enforceability of the [agreement]," and denied
Luciana's motion for reconsideration. This appeal followed. 2
II.
Our standard of review of legal conclusions of Family Part judges is the
same de novo standard applicable to legal decisions in other cases. Amzler v.
Amzler, 463 N.J. Super. 187, 197 (App. Div. 2020). Interpretation of the
2
The administrator of the Estate and the GAL filed letters of non-participation
on appeal.
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language of a contract is reviewed de novo. Est. of Pickett v. Moore's Lounge,
464 N.J. Super. 549, 554-55 (App. Div. 2020).
We review a trial judge's decision on whether to grant or deny a motion
for reconsideration under Rule 4:49-2 for an abuse of discretion. Branch v.
Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021). We find "abuse of discretion
when a decision is 'made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed
from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.'" U.S. Bank Nat'l
Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467-68 (2012) (quoting Iliadis v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 191 N.J. 88, 123 (2007)).
A motion for reconsideration is "an opportunity to seek to convince the
court that either 1) it has expressed its decision based upon a palpably incorrect
or irrational basis, or 2) it is obvious that the court either did not consider, or
failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence."
Kornbleuth v. Westover, 241 N.J. 289, 301 (2020) (quoting Guido v. Duane
Morris LLP, 202 N.J. 79, 87-88 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The
moving party must "state with specificity the basis on which [the motion] is
made" and supply "a statement of the matters or controlling decisions that
counsel believes the court has overlooked or as to which it has erred." R. 4:49-2.
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The trial court's decision to hold a plenary hearing is reviewed for abuse
of discretion. See Costa v. Costa, 440 N.J. Super. 1, 4 (App. Div. 2015). "[N]ot
every factual dispute that arises in the context of matrimonial proceedings
triggers the need for a plenary hearing." Harrington v. Harrington, 281 N.J.
Super. 39, 47 (App. Div. 1995).
III.
Our de novo review of the record and prevailing law leads us to conclude
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying reconsideration of the order
dismissing the complaint and denying interim support predicated on Luciana's
failure to establish a prima facie showing that the agreement was unenforceable
by clear and convincing evidence.
A.
Prenuptial agreements are enforceable assuming full disclosure and
comprehension by each party, and absent unconscionability. Rogers v. Gordon,
404 N.J. Super. 213, 219 (App. Div. 2008). Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 37:2-38, the
party seeking to invalidate a prenuptial agreement must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that "[t]he party executed the agreement involuntarily[,]"
or the agreement is unconscionable. N.J.S.A. 37:2-38(c) also provides that an
agreement is unconscionable if, before the execution, the party:
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(1) Was not provided full and fair disclosure of the
earnings, property and financial obligations of the other
party;
(2) Did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing,
any right to disclosure of the property or financial
obligations of the other party beyond the disclosure
provided;
(3) Did not have, or reasonably could not have had, an
adequate knowledge of the property or financial
obligations of the other party; or
(4) Did not consult with independent legal counsel and
did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, the
opportunity to consult with independent legal counsel.
We are unpersuaded by Luciana's argument that the trial court was
palpably incorrect in finding she did not meet her prima facie burden of
establishing the unenforceability of the agreement by clear and convincing
proof. Luciana's contentions that she was not apprised of Jose's financial assets
prior to execution of the agreement, she was not represented by counsel, and
that a copy of the agreement was never given to her or explained to her, do not
equate to the clear and convincing prima facie evidence required to meet her
substantial burden.
Luciana's claim that her legal representation was deficient as to the
agreement is not grounded in the record. First, there is no evidence her
immigration attorney had any involvement with the agreement, rather the only
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evidence is that attorney DaCruz-Melo was retained. Paragraph fifteen of the
agreement sets forth "[e]ach of the parties hereto acknowledge that they have
been represented by independent counsel of his or her own choice, and has
carefully reviewed [the agreement] with said counsel." As stated by the trial
court, simply being "represented by a different attorney . . . with respect to the
[agreement]" does not mean that DaCruz-Melo's representation of Luciana was
necessarily insufficient. Luciana had years to raise any issues with counsel's
representation, if any, and address any deficiencies in the signing of the
agreement, obtain a copy and have it translated to her into Portuguese. There is
no competent evidence in the record that Luciana was not properly represented
in connection with the agreement or given a copy of the document sufficient to
meet the clear and convincing evidence standard.
Luciana also fails to support her allegations that Jose's assets, at the time
of his death, were not recorded on the financial disclosure section in the
agreement. There is no evidence in the record to support counsel's argument
that "there is a life insurance policy, bank accounts in Portugal, real property in
Portugal, a safety deposit box . . . with several thousands of dollars in cash, and
essentially an estate worth multi-millions of dollars" which were not disclosed
to Luciana until after the marriage.
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There was no evidence proffered to the trial court establishing that its
denial of Luciana's motion for interim support predicated on the
unenforceability of the agreement, dismissal of the complaint was palpably
incorrect, or that it failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent
evidence. Thus, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Luciana's reconsideration motion.
B.
We are unpersuaded that the trial court's order dismissing Luciana's
complaint without further discovery was clearly capable of producing an unjust
result.
Our review is under the plain error standard, since the issue was not raised
to the trial court. R. 2:10-2. "Relief under the plain error rule, R[ule] 2:10-2, at
least in civil cases, is discretionary and 'should be sparingly employed.'" Baker
v. Nat'l State Bank, 161 N.J. 220, 226 (1999) (quoting Ford v. Reichert, 23 N.J.
429, 435 (1957)). Further, the rule sets "a 'high bar,' requiring reversal only
where the possibility of an injustice is 'real' and 'sufficient . . . .'" State v. Alessi,
240 N.J. 501, 527 (2020) (quoting State v. Santamaria, 236 N.J. 390, 404 (2019);
and quoting State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 336 (1971)). We also "generally defer
to a trial court's disposition of discovery matters unless the court has abused its
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discretion or its determination is based on a mistaken understanding of the
applicable law." State v. Brown, 236 N.J. 497, 521 (2019) (quoting Pomerantz
Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 371 (2011)).
Luciana does not point to specific discovery which would have impacted
the trial court's decision to deny her motion to set aside the agreement and
dismiss the complaint. "[A] plaintiff 'has an obligation to demonstrate with
some degree of particularity the likelihood that further discovery will supply the
missing elements of the cause of action.'" Wellington v. Est. of Wellington, 359
N.J. Super. 484, 496 (App. Div. 2003) (quoting Auster v. Kinoian, 153 N.J.
Super. 52, 56 (App. Div. 1977)).
Rather, Luciana broadly argues the trial court "erred in not setting a
discovery schedule." Luciana further proffers the trial court should have found
additional discovery was needed as to the unconscionability of the agreement,
without the issue having been raised to the trial court, simply because there was
an assertion that Jose "pledge[d] financial support for [Luciana] as well as
[Luan]," without mention of an agreement. Luciana has not substantiated this
sweeping allegation with any proofs in the record nor any jurisprudence
requiring a trial court to raise a discovery issue sua sponte.
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Setting aside her failure to raise the issue to the trial court, Luciana has
not set forth with specificity what additional discovery would have uncovered
and how it would have impacted the court's determination that the agreement
was valid and enforceable. Without setting forth "with some degree of
particularity" what further discovery would cure the deficiencies in her
complaint, we conclude Luciana has not met her burden of establishing the trial
court erred in not ordering additional time for discovery before dismissing
Luciana's complaint. Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J. 449, 472 (2020) (quoting
Badiali v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Grp., 220 N.J. 544, 555 (2015)).
C.
We are unconvinced that Luciana's due process rights were violated based
on dismissal of the complaint after the trial court found Luciana did not establish
a prima facie showing the agreement was unenforceable. Luciana had sufficient
notice that the court was considering the validity of the agreement because she
was the party who requested the ruling through her verified complaint.
Luciana's motion sought interim support which necessarily required the trial
court to determine whether the agreement was an enforceable bar to certain
monetary relief.
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The trial court held oral argument and permitted counsel for both parties
to present arguments as to the enforceability of the agreement, which was a
finding necessary to decide Luciana's interim support application. Luciana was
provided with an interpreter as to those proceedings. Therefore, pursuant to the
standard set forth by Klier v. Sordoni Skanska Const. Co., 337 N.J. Super. 76,
84 (App. Div. 2001), we conclude Luciana had notice and an opportunity to be
heard.
Finally, Luciana asserts she was deprived of due process because the trial
court based its decision on "the relationship of the [c]ourt with the two attorneys
involved and nothing more." This contention is belied by the record. We discern
no error with the trial court's acknowledgement that both attorneys who
represented Jose and Luciana as to the agreement were "well[-]known to th[e]
[c]ourt as they are experienced and competent matrimonial practitioners and
both of them speak fluent Portuguese." The trial court then proceeded with a
thorough analysis as to the language of the agreement, the facts established in
the record, and the standard to invalidate the agreement, finding that Luciana
had not met her prima facie burden by clear and convincing evidence.
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To the extent we have not addressed any of Luciana's remaining
arguments, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a
written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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