Mildred A. Green v. Ricardo A. Arboleda Guapacha ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1928-23
MILDRED A. GREEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
RICARDO A. ARBOLEDA
GUAPACHA and ALBA VIDAL,
Defendants-Respondents.
_____________________________
Argued October 22, 2024 – Decided November 21, 2024
Before Judges Smith and Vanek.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-8001-20.
David Maran argued the cause for appellant (Maran &
Maran, PC, attorneys; David Maran, on the briefs).
Hillary C. Kruger argued the cause for respondents
(Law Offices of Frank A. Viscomi, attorneys; Hillary
C. Kruger, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
In this personal injury case, plaintiff Mildred Green appeals from the
January 22, 2024 trial court order granting summary judgment to defendants
Arboleda Guapacha and Vidal. The trial court determined there were no
genuinely disputed issues of material fact from which a reasonable jury could
conclude defendant negligently operated his vehicle at the time of the
intersectional collision in which plaintiff was injured. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm.
The summary judgment motion record, construed in the light most
favorable to plaintiff as required by Rule 4:46-2 and Brill v. Guardian Life Ins.
Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995), discloses the following salient facts.
On December 7, 2018, at around 4:00 p.m., Green and Arboleda Guapacha
were operating motor vehicles on 1st Street in Newark, near the entrance to
Route 280. It is undisputed that Arboleda Guapacha's vehicle was in the left
lane of traffic and Green's vehicle was in the middle lane of the roadway.
Green was initially stopped at a red light controlling her lane of traffic , located
to Arboleda Guapacha's right.
The photographs of the intersection, along with the police report and
deposition testimony, confirm that the only lane of traffic that was authorized
to execute a left turn onto Route 280 was the lane that Arboleda Guapacha was
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travelling in. The lane that Green was travelling in was designated by traffic
markings on the roadway as a "straight only" lane. When the left-hand turn
signal controlling only Arboleda Guapacha's lane of travel displayed green, he
proceeded to make the left turn. Green disregarded the middle lane's red light
along with the lane markings and began negotiating a left-hand turn. Plaintiff
submitted an affidavit in opposition to defendants' summary judgment motion
stating that both she and other drivers have made left-hand turns onto Route
280 from the middle lane due to traffic at the intersection, despite the traffic
markings allowing her to only proceed straight.
The record shows plaintiff told the police that she was in the middle lane
making a left turn onto Route 280 when Arboleda Guapacha's vehicle sped up
and hit her vehicle, causing her to sustain damage to her driver side rear
fender. At her deposition, Green testified that when executing the left-hand
turn, Arboleda Guapacha's vehicle drifted over the dashed white lines into the
right lane, striking her vehicle.
Green alleged that she sustained personal injuries as the result of the
accident and filed suit against Arboleda Guapacha and the owner of the
vehicle, Vidal. After discovery, Arboleda Guapacha and Vidal moved for
summary judgment. On January 22, 2024, the trial court heard oral arguments
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on Arboleda Guapacha and Vidal's summary judgment motion and granted the
motion dismissing the complaint against both defendants with prejudice. In
the court's oral statement of reasons it found there was no evidence in the
record that Arboleda Guapacha failed to operate his vehicle in accordance with
prevailing law. Absent any evidence of Arboleda Guapacha's negligence, the
trial court granted defendants' summary judgment motion. Green's appeal
followed.1
We begin our discussion with a review of the principles governing our
analysis. We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the
same legal standards as the trial court. Green v. Monmouth Univ., 237 N.J.
516, 529 (2019). Thus, we consider "whether the competent evidential
materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non -
moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the
alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party." Brill, 142 N.J. at
540; see R. 4:46-2. If there is no genuine issue of material fact, we must then
"decide whether the trial court correctly interpreted the law." DepoLink Ct.
1
Although plaintiff appealed the entirety of the trial court order which granted
summary judgment in favor of both defendants, Green confirmed at oral
argument that the portion of the order granting summary judgment in favor of
Vidal was not being appealed.
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Reporting & Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J. Super. 325, 333 (App.
Div. 2013) (quoting Massachi v. AHL Servs., Inc., 396 N.J. Super. 486, 494
(App. Div. 2007)).
Green's allegations sound in negligence. "To sustain a cause of action
for negligence, a plaintiff must establish four elements: '(1) a duty of care[;]
(2) a breach of that duty[;] (3) proximate cause[;] and (4) actual damages.'"
Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 51 (2015) (quoting Polzo v. Cnty. of Essex,
196 N.J. 569, 584 (2008)). The plaintiff must establish those elements "by
some competent proof." Ibid. (quoting Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd.,
219 N.J. 395, 406 (2014)). The mere happening of an accident does not raise a
presumption of negligence. Allendorf v. Kaiserman Enters., 266 N.J. Super
662, 670 (App. Div. 1993).
Here, the threshold question is whether Arboleda Guapacha owed a duty
of care to Green. "The question of whether a duty exists is a question of law."
Franco v. Fairleigh Dickinson Univ., 467 N.J. Super. 8, 25 (App. Div. 2021)
(citing Robinson v. Vivirito, 217 N.J. 199, 208 (2014)). "Any common law
duty imposed by [a c]ourt must 'satisf[y] an abiding sense of basic fairness
under all of the circumstances in light of considerations of public policy.'"
Est. of Narleski v. Gomes, 244 N.J. 199, 213 (2020) (second alteration in
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original) (quoting Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426, 439 (1993)).
For a court to impose a duty of care, "there must be a foreseeable risk of
harm." Franco, 467 N.J. Super. at 26 (citing J.S. v. R.T.H., 155 N.J. 330, 337
(1998)).
When determining whether one party owed a duty of care to another,
foreseeability refers to
the knowledge of the risk of injury to be apprehended.
The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to
be obeyed; it is the risk reasonably within the range of
apprehension, of injury to another person, that is taken
into account in determining the existence of the duty
to exercise care.
[Clohesy v. Food Circus Supermarkets, Inc., 149 N.J.
496, 503 (1997) (quoting Hill v. Yaskin, 75 N.J. 139,
144 (1977) (quoting 57 Am. Jur. 2d Negligence § 58
(1970))).]
The parties do not dispute that Green's lane was controlled by a red light
and a designation on the roadway that only a straight path of travel is
permitted. Instead of obeying that traffic command, she negotiated a left-hand
turn from the middle lane. Green elected to disregard the red light and the
middle lane markings and drive her vehicle into a lane of travel she should not
have occupied. Although both drivers had a duty to make proper observations,
see Beck v. Washington, 149 N.J. Super. 569, 572 (App. Div. 1977), Green's
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presence on the roadway next to Arboleda Guapacha's lane of travel at the time
of impact was not reasonably foreseeable. We conclude on de novo review
that Arboleda Guapacha owed no duty to Green.
For purposes of completeness, we address certain other arguments
posited on appeal. The trial judge properly rejected Green's argument that she
and other drivers have made a left-hand turn onto Route 280 from the middle
lane, despite the traffic control device and in contravention of the roadway
markings requiring a vehicle in the middle lane of travel to proceed straight.
Only vehicles in the left most lane are permitted to turn left at that
intersection. Even if other drivers have previously disregarded traffic laws at
this intersection, such conduct by others does not exempt Green from the
consequences of proceeding in contravention of designated traffic markings.
Green contends that Arboleda Guapacha could be found by a jury to be
negligent since he failed to comply with N.J.S.A. 39:4-123(c), requiring that
"after entering the intersection the left turn shall be made so as to leave the
intersection, as nearly as practicable, in the left-hand lane lawfully available to
traffic moving in such direction upon the roadway being entered." However,
Green proffers no evidence that any such statutory violation by Arboleda
Guapacha proximately caused the accident. Even if Arboleda Guapacha made
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an improper wide left turn or sped up as she made the turn, there is no
evidence in the record that Green's vehicle would have been struck had she not
been making a prohibited left-hand turn from the middle lane.
Arboleda Guapacha posits that plaintiff cannot recover damages from
him because she violated N.J.S.A. 39:4-124, which states "[n]o driver shall fail
to turn in the manner so directed when such direction signs are installed by
[the] authorities." We recognize that a violation of the statutory rules of the
road is evidential, but not conclusive, on the issue of negligence. Eaton v.
Eaton, 119 N.J. 628, 642 (1990). Thus, although it is undisputed that Green
violated N.J.S.A. 39:4-124 by proceeding notwithstanding a red light and
markings on the roadway requiring that she drive straight, our decision rests on
negligence principles rather than a statutory violation.
Summary judgment is appropriate "when the evidence 'is so one-sided
that one party must prevail as a matter of law . . . .'" Brill, 142 N.J. at 540(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 259 (1986)). Such is
the case here, where there is substantial evidence of Green's negligence and a
dearth of evidence of Arboleda Guapacha's negligence. In short, "there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and [] the moving party is
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entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law." R. 4:46-2(c); Brill, 142
N.J. at 529.
To the extent we have not addressed any of Green's remaining
arguments, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a
written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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