State of New Jersey v. Jameel Rollins ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1237-23
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JAMEEL ROLLINS,
a/k/a JAMEEL BURGESS,
SHAKIL CLARK,
JAMAL ROLLINS,
SHAREEK ROLLINS,
JAMIL WILEY, MILTON
CRAWFORD, MALIK
WILEY, MILFORD
CRAWFORD, MILTON
VAUGHN, and JAMIL WILLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________
Submitted November 14, 2024 – Decided November 25, 2024
Before Judges Natali and Vinci.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 09-01-0262.
Jameel Rollins, appellant pro se.
Theodore N. Stephens, II, Essex County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Frank J. Ducoat, Assistant
Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Jameel Rollins appeals from the November 1, 2023 order
denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence. We affirm.
We previously discussed the underlying facts and procedural history of
defendant's case on direct appeal. State v. Rollins, No. A-2468-11 (App. Div.
Aug. 19, 2014) (slip op. at 11-14). We provide a summary of the facts for
purposes of addressing defendant's arguments.
On October 15, 2008, defendant and his co-defendant, Emmanuel
Pierrevil, used a stolen Lexus to "box in" a vehicle owned by Ahmad Mann, a
BMW, as he was leaving his mother's house in Newark. The men approached
Mann carrying guns and attempted to force him into the Lexus. Mann's mother
arrived home during the incident and one of the defendants pointed a gun at her
while the other struck Mann in the head twice with his gun. Mann broke free
and the assailants fired several shots at him, all of which missed. Defendant and
Pierrevil drove off in the Lexus and Mann's BMW.
A police officer spotted the vehicles after hearing a report of the incident
and attempted to stop them. They accelerated rapidly and entered an industrial
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area in Jersey City where they stopped. The officer exited his vehicle, and the
cars turned and headed toward him. Both vehicles swerved to avoid hitting the
officer as they sped away. The officer identified defendant as the driver of the
Lexus. A high-speed chase ensued, during which the vehicles weaved among
lanes and crossed into oncoming traffic.
The BMW crashed and Pierrevil was arrested after attempting to flee on
foot. Witnesses saw Pierrevil throw something onto the roof of a building.
Police recovered a loaded handgun from the roof which was matched to the shell
casings found near Mann's mother's house. The Lexus crashed into a vehicle
driven by Igor Jean-Mary. A police officer saw defendant exit the Lexus and
arrested him after he fell down a hill while attempting to flee. A loaded handgun
was found in the Lexus.
Defendant and Pierrevil were tried together. Defendant was convicted of
second-degree conspiracy to commit carjacking, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and N.J.S.A.
2C:15-2; second-degree conspiracy to commit aggravated assault, N.J.S.A.
2C:5-2 and N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1); second-degree eluding, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-
2(b); two counts of second-degree unlawful possession of a firearm, N.J.S.A.
2C:39-5(b); two counts of second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful
purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a); two counts of third-degree receiving stolen
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property, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7; two counts of third-degree resisting arrest by
creating a risk of physical injury, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(3)(b); and second-degree
aggravated assault by causing or attempting to cause serious bodily injury to
Jean-Mary, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1).
After appropriate mergers, the court sentenced defendant for second-
degree conspiracy to commit carjacking to an extended term of twenty years
subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, as a persistent
offender pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a).1 The court grouped the numerous
offenses into three categories and imposed consecutive sentences within the
ordinary sentencing ranges for each group, including a sentence of ten years
subject to NERA for second-degree aggravated assault of Jean-Mary concurrent
to the other offenses in the same group.
On direct appeal, we vacated defendant's conviction for aggravated assault
of Jean-Mary and otherwise affirmed his convictions and sentence. We
concluded the court's finding of aggravating factors three, N.J.S.A. 2C:44 -
1(a)(3), six, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(6), and nine, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9), was
unassailable. The court carefully considered the appropriateness of the extended
1
There is no dispute defendant qualified as a persistent offender based on his
extensive criminal history.
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term for conspiracy to commit carjacking and we found its decision to impose
the maximum sentence on that count and the other counts reflected a careful
weighing of the sentencing criteria. We rejected defendant's contention that the
court misapplied its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences. The court
properly evaluated the factors set forth in State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627, 643-
44 (1985), because the crimes were committed against different victims at
different times. We remanded the matter for the entry of an amended judgment
of conviction. Our Supreme Court denied certification. State v. Rollins, 220
N.J. 573 (2015).
After the matter was remanded, the State moved to dismiss the indictment
for second-degree aggravated assault of Jean-Mary. On September 23, 2014,
the court entered an amended judgment of conviction dismissing that count. The
sentence originally imposed was not otherwise amended.
Defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR), which the
court denied without an evidentiary hearing. We affirmed the denial of PCR.
State v. Rollins, No. A-4726-15 (App. Div. Feb. 22, 2018). Our Supreme Court
denied certification. State v. Rollins, 236 N.J. 33 (2018).
On August 7, 2023, defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence,
arguing the court imposed too many consecutive sentences, relied on evidence
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relating to dismissed counts, should have resentenced him and imposed a lesser
sentence after the aggravated assault count was dismissed, and failed to conduct
an overall fairness assessment pursuant to State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246 (2021).
On November 1, 2023, the court entered an order denying the motion supported
by a written opinion. The court found defendant was properly sentenced to an
extended term as a persistent offender for conspiracy to commit carjacking and
all the sentences imposed complied with the applicable sentencing ranges.
On appeal, defendant raises the following arguments for our
consideration.
POINT I:
THE JUDGE ERRED BY FAILING TO CORRECT
DEFENDANT'S ILLEGAL SENTENCE BECAUSE
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT COUNT [TEN] WAS
DISMISSED [AND] THE SENTENCING COURT
USED THAT AS THE BASIS FOR THE IMPOSING
CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES; AS SUCH,
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO HAVE THE
CONSECUTIVE SENTENCE VACATED AND
RESENTENCED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
CODE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE.
A. The [j]udge [e]rred by [s]entencing [d]efendant
to [n]ine [c]onsecutive [t]erms, [r]esulting in an
[e]xcessive [forty-]year [s]entence with [thirty-and
one-half years] of [p]arole [i]neligibility.
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B. The [j]udge [e]rred by imposing an [e]xtended
term based upon [c]harges [d]efendant was found [n]ot
[g]uilty.
We affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in the court's November
1, 2023 written opinion. We add the following comments.
Whether a defendant's sentence is illegal is an issue of law subject to de
novo review. State v. Drake, 444 N.J. Super. 265, 271 (App. Div. 2016). "[A]n
illegal sentence is one that 'exceeds the maximum penalty provided in the Code
[of Criminal Justice] for a particular offense' or a sentence 'not imposed in
accordance with the law.'" State v. Acevedo, 205 N.J. 40, 45 (2011) (quoting
State v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 247 (2000)). Pursuant to Rule 3:21-10(b)(5), a
motion to correct an illegal sentence may be filed at any time. However, "[a]
defendant's contentions regarding consecutive sentences . . . do not relate to the
issue of sentence 'legality' and are not cognizable . . . under the present Rule
3:21-10(b)(5)." Id. at 47.
The court correctly determined defendant's sentence is not illegal. All the
custodial terms and other penalties imposed fall squarely within the applicable
sentencing guidelines. Defendant failed to set forth a meritorious argument of
illegality.
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We are not persuaded by defendant's excessive sentence arguments. An
appellate court's review of a sentencing court's imposition of a sentence is
guided by an abuse of discretion standard, which requires the sentence be
affirmed so long as "'the trial judge follow[ed] the Code and the basic precepts
that channel sentencing discretion,'" State v. Trinidad, 241 N.J. 425, 453 (2020)
(quoting State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 65 (2014)), and the sentence does not "shock
the judicial conscience." Case, 220 N.J. at 65 (quoting State v. Roth, 95 N.J.
334, 365 (1984)).
Having reviewed the sentence anew, we remain convinced the court's
finding of aggravating factors three, six, and nine is unassailable and the court
appropriately imposed an extended term for conspiracy to commit carjacking
because defendant was a persistent offender. We are satisfied the court properly
evaluated the Yarbough factors and did not misapply its discretion by imposing
consecutive sentences. Even after dismissal of the aggravated assault charge,
defendant's crimes involved different victims and were committed at different
times. The court adhered to all applicable sentencing guidelines and the
sentence does not shock the judicial conscience.
Defendant's contention that the court failed to conduct an overall fairness
analysis pursuant to Torres lacks merit. Torres was decided nine years after
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defendant was sentenced and is not applicable. Moreover, the court adequately
explained the basis for its decision to impose consecutive sentences and detailed
the reasons for concluding the overall sentence was warranted as required by
Torres. 246 N.J. at 267-68.
To the extent we have not addressed any remaining arguments, it is
because they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R.
2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
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