State of New Jersey v. Gregory Williams ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2548-22
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
GREGORY WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
Submitted July 30, 2024 – Decided November 25, 2024
Before Judges Rose and Gummer.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Camden County, Indictment No. 08-03-0976.
Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (John J. Bannan, Designated Counsel, on the
brief).
Grace C. MacAulay, Camden County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Jason Magid, Assistant
Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Gregory Williams appeals from an amended order in which the
court denied his post-conviction relief (PCR) petition without conducting an
evidentiary hearing. The court concluded defendant had failed to file a timely
petition pursuant to Rule 3:22-12 and had not demonstrated a prima facie claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard established by the United
States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984),
and adopted under our State Constitution in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58
(1987). Perceiving no abuse of discretion or misapplication of the law, we
affirm.
I.
Defendant was sixteen years old when he participated in a convenience -
store robbery and fatal stabbing. He was subsequently charged with conduct
that, if committed by an adult, would constitute, among other offenses, the crime
of murder. After a first waiver hearing was dismissed, a Family Part judge on
the State's motion conducted a second waiver hearing, found probable cause to
justify waiver of the Family Part's jurisdiction over defendant, and referred this
matter to the Law Division.
Defendant subsequently was charged in an Essex County indictment with
first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and (2); first-degree felony murder,
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N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3); first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; third-degree
possession of a weapon (a knife) for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39 -4(d);
fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d);
third-degree endangering an injured victim, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2; and
third-degree hindering apprehension or prosecution, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b)(1).
After a Law Division judge denied his motion to suppress certain
evidence, defendant entered a negotiated guilty plea to first-degree aggravated
manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a), as amended from the murder charge.
Consistent with the plea agreement and the State's recommended sentence, the
trial court on November 20, 2009, entered a judgment of conviction finding
defendant guilty of first-degree aggravated manslaughter, dismissed all
remaining charges, and sentenced defendant to a twenty-four-year incarceration
term subject to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(d)(2). After
imposing the sentence, the court advised defendant of the forty-five-day
deadline for filing an appeal but did not advise him of the time limitations for
PCR petitions. See R. 3:21-4(i) ("After imposing sentence, whether following
the defendant's plea of guilty or a finding of guilty after trial, the court shall
advise the defendant of the right to appeal . . . . The court shall also inform the
defendant of the time limitations in which to file petitions for [PCR].")
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Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress and the extent of
his sentence. Affirming his conviction and sentence, we rejected defendant's
arguments regarding the motion and his sentence and found "meritless" his "pro
se argument that it was erroneous to transfer this case from the Family Part to
the Law Division." State v. Williams, No. A-2447-09 (App. Div. Mar. 21, 2012)
(slip op. at 2, 12 n.3). We denied defendant's motion for reconsideration. State
v. Williams, No. A-2447-09 (App. Div. Apr. 19, 2012). The Supreme Court
denied defendant's petition for certification. State v. Williams, 212 N.J. 462(2012).
Around March 31, 2021, 1 defendant filed a pro se PCR petition in which
he asserted, with no further detail, he had been denied his right to the effective
assistance of counsel. In a counseled brief, defendant asserted the State had
failed to file a new written statement of reasons prior to his second juvenile
waiver hearing and argued waiver counsel was ineffective in not objecting to
that omission and appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising that issue on
appeal. He also contended waiver counsel had been ineffective for not calling
1
Defendant dated his pro se petition March 31, 2021. His counsel dated her
brief September 6, 2022. According to the State and the PCR judge, defendant
filed his petition on February 4, 2022. For purposes of this appeal, we accept
March 31, 2021, as the date defendant filed his petition.
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any witnesses on the issue of probable cause at the second waiver hearing or
requesting additional time to prepare for the hearing. Defendant asserted "any
procedural bars should be relaxed to correct a fundamental injustice in this
regard."
On February 10, 2023, the PCR court heard argument and denied the
petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing. The court found defendant
had failed to allege his delay in filing the PCR petition was due to excusable
neglect but had made only "a blanket statement not supported by any facts that
the rule should be relaxed to correct a fundamental injustice." The court also
found defendant had failed to show a fundamental injustice and had failed to
meet any of the requirements for a relaxation of the time deadlines set forth in
Rule 3:22-12.
Considering the petition substantively, the court held defendant had failed
to demonstrate a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel pursuant
to the Strickland standard. Specifically, the court found defendant had not
established the State failed to submit a written statement of reasons before the
second waiver hearing and that defense counsel acknowledged on the record
receiving the statement before the second waiver hearing. The court also held
that defendant's "blanket statements" regarding trial counsel's purported failure
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to call witnesses and appellate counsel's ineffectiveness were not sufficient to
meet the Strickland standard, citing our conclusion that defendant's transfer
argument was meritless and finding defendant had failed to show his claims, if
raised on appeal, would have been successful. The PCR court entered an
amended order denying the petition on February 13, 2023, and a second
amended order memorializing the court's reasons for denying the petition on
May 3, 2023.
Defendant raises the following arguments in this appeal:
POINT I
[DEFENDANT]'S CLAIMS ARE NOT
PROCEDURALLY BARRED FROM BEING RAISED
IN THIS PETITION FOR [PCR].
POINT II
BECAUSE [DEFENDANT] RECEIVED
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, THE
PCR COURT ERRED IN DENYING [HIS] PETITION
FOR PCR.
POINT III
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, BECAUSE DEFENDANT
PRESENTED A PRIMA FACIE CLAIM OF
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND
BECAUSE THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF
MATERIAL FACTS IN DISPUTE, THE PCR COURT
ERRED IN DENYING AN EVIDENTIARY
HEARING.
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On appeal, defendant contends waiver counsel's performance was
ineffective at the second waiver hearing due to "counsel's failure to seek a
continuance when counsel received the State's [s]tatement of [r]easons on the
day of the second waiver hearing, . . . to present any defense witnesses at the
hearing, and . . . to present evidence available to counsel about defendant's
cognitive deficits" and that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise
those issues on appeal.
We affirm. The PCR court did not err in finding defendant had neither
timely filed his petition nor established a prima facie showing of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Nor did the PCR court abuse its discretion in deciding
the petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing given plaintiff's failure
to establish a prima facie showing of ineffectiveness.
II.
We review the PCR court's legal and factual determinations de novo
because it rendered its decision without an evidentiary hearing. State v. Harris,
181 N.J. 391, 419 (2004); State v. Vanness, 474 N.J. Super. 609, 623 (App. Div.
2023). As directed by our Supreme Court, we "view the facts in the light most
favorable to the defendant." State v. Jones, 219 N.J. 298, 311 (2014); see also
State v. Chau, 473 N.J. Super. 430, 443 n.7 (App. Div. 2022).
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When a defendant claims ineffective assistance of counsel as the basis for
relief, he must satisfy the two-pronged test formulated in Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 687, which was adopted by our Court in Fritz, 105 N.J. at 58. "First, the
defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient . . . . Second, the
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense."
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Bare assertions are "insufficient to support a prima
facie case of ineffectiveness." State v. Blake, 444 N.J. Super. 285, 299 (App.
Div. 2016) (quoting State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 171 (App. Div.
1999)). A defendant seeking PCR based on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claim "bears the burden of proving his or her right to relief by a preponderance
of the evidence." State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 350 (2012). If a defendant fails
to sustain his burden under either prong of the standard, ineffective-assistance-
of-counsel claim fails. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
Under the first Strickland prong, a defendant must show "counsel's acts or
omissions fell outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance
considered in light of all the circumstances of the case." State v. Allegro, 193
N.J. 352, 366 (2008) (quoting State v. Castagna, 187 N.J. 293, 314 (2006)).
Under the second Strickland prong, a defendant must "affirmatively prove" "a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of
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the proceeding would have been different." State v. Gideon, 244 N.J. 538, 551
(2021) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94). "A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Ibid. (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). Proof of prejudice under Strickland's second prong
"is an exacting standard." Ibid. (quoting Allegro, 193 N.J. at 367). A defendant
"must 'affirmatively prove prejudice'" in a PCR petition to satisfy the second
prong of the Strickland standard. Ibid. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693).
"[A] conviction is more readily attributable to deficiencies in defense counsel's
performance when the State has a relatively weak case than when the State has
presented overwhelming evidence of guilt." Id. at 557.
A defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel extends to the plea -
negotiation process. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162 (2012); see also Chau,
473 N.J. Super. at 445. When a defendant seeks "[t]o set aside a guilty plea
based on ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show . . . 'that there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, [he or she] would not
have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'" State v. Nuñez-
Valdez, 200 N.J. 129, 139 (2009) (alterations in original) (quoting State v.
DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 457 (1994)); Lafler, 566 U.S. at 163 (holding a
defendant claiming ineffective assistance at the plea stage must show that "the
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outcome of the plea process would have been different with competent advice").
A defendant also "must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea
bargain would have been rational under the circumstances." Padilla v.
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010); see also State v. Aburoumi, 464 N.J. Super.
326, 339 (App. Div. 2020). Defendant seeks to set aside his guilty plea but does
not attribute any ineffective assistance to his plea counsel.
A petitioner is not automatically entitled to an evidentiary hearing. State
v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 355 (2013); see also State v. Peoples, 446 N.J. Super.
245, 254 (App. Div. 2016) (holding "[t]he mere raising of a claim of [ineffective
assistance of counsel] does not entitle the defendant to an evidentiary hearing").
We review under an abuse-of-discretion standard the PCR court's decision to
proceed without an evidentiary hearing. State v. L.G.-M., 462 N.J. Super. 357,
365 (App. Div. 2020). Rule 3:22-10(b) provides a court should hold an
evidentiary hearing on a PCR petition only if the defendant establishes a prima
facie case in support of PCR, "there are material issues of disputed fact that
cannot be resolved by reference to the existing record," and "an evidentiary
hearing is necessary to resolve the claims for relief." See also Porter, 216 N.J.
at 354. "A prima facie case is established when a defendant demonstrates 'a
reasonable likelihood that his or her claim, viewing the facts alleged in the light
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most favorable to the defendant, will ultimately succeed on the merits.'" Id. at
355 (quoting R. 3:22-10(b)).
"[T]o establish a prima facie claim, a petitioner must do more than make
bald assertions that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel." Ibid.(quoting Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. at 170). PCR petitions must be
"accompanied by an affidavit or certification by defendant, or by others, setting
forth with particularity[,]" Jones, 219 N.J. at 312, "facts sufficient to
demonstrate counsel's alleged substandard performance," Cummings, 321 N.J.
Super. at 170. "[F]actual assertions in a [PCR petition must] be made by
affidavit or certification in order to secure an evidentiary hearing." Jones, 219
N.J. at 312 (citing R. 3:22-10(c)). Defendant verified his pro se PCR petition
but did not make any factual assertions in that petition; he made only a blanket
statement his right to effective assistance of counsel had been denied.
We address first the PCR court's finding that defendant's petition was
time-barred. Defendant was sentenced on November 20, 2009. According to
defendant, he submitted his PCR petition around March 31, 2021, more than
eleven years later.
In State v. Brewster, 429 N.J. Super. 387 (App. Div. 2013), we explained:
Rule 3:22-12(a)(1) sets a five-year time
limitation for the filing of a PCR petition, unless the
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petition itself shows excusable neglect for the late filing
and fundamental injustice if defendant's claims are not
considered on their merits. By its subsection (a)(2),
Rule 3:22-12 allows an additional one-year limitation
period if the courts recognize a new constitutional right
or defendant discovers a previously unknown factual
predicate justifying relief from the conviction.
[Id. at 398.]
In State v. McQuaid, 147 N.J. 464, 485 (1997), our Supreme Court
"emphasized the important policy underlying the requirement that PCR petitions
be timely filed":
There are good reasons for [Rule 3:22-12]. As time
passes after conviction, the difficulties associated with
a fair and accurate reassessment of the critical events
multiply. Achieving "justice" years after the fact may
be more an illusory temptation than a plausibly
attainable goal when memories have dimmed,
witnesses have died or disappeared, and evidence is lost
or unattainable. . . . Moreover, the Rule serves to
respect the need for achieving finality of judgments and
to allay the uncertainty associated with an unlimited
possibility of relitigation. The Rule therefore strongly
encourages those believing they have grounds for
[PCR] relief to bring their claims swiftly, and
discourages them from sitting on their rights until it is
too late for a court to render justice.
[Ibid. (alterations in original) (quoting State v.
Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 575-76 (1992)).]
Although "a court may relax the time bar if the defendant alleges facts
demonstrating that the delay was due to the defendant's excusable neglect or if
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the 'interests of justice demand it,'" State v. Goodwin, 173 N.J. 583, 594 (2002)
(quoting Mitchell, 126 N.J. at 576), "a court should only relax the bar of Rule
3:22-12 under exceptional circumstances," State v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41, 52
(1997). In that regard, a "court 'should consider the extent and cause of the
delay, the prejudice to the State, and the importance of the petitioner's claim in
determining whether there has been an "injustice" sufficient to relax the time
limits.'" Goodwin, 173 N.J. at 594 (quoting Afanador, 151 N.J. at 52); see also
State v. Walker, 478 N.J. Super. 553, 560 (App. Div. 2024). "Absent
compelling, extenuating circumstances, the burden to justify filing a petition
after the five-year period will increase with the extent of the delay" because
"[a]s time passes, justice becomes more elusive and the necessity for preserving
finality and certainty of judgments increases." Afanador, 151 N.J. at 52.
"Mindful of these policy considerations," in State v. Brown, 455 N.J.
Super. 460, 470 (App. Div. 2018), we held:
[W]hen a first PCR petition shows it was filed more
than five years after the date of entry of the judgment
of conviction, . . . a PCR judge has an independent, non-
delegable duty to question the timeliness of the petition,
and to require that defendant submit competent
evidence to satisfy the standards for relaxing the rule's
time restrictions pursuant to Rule 3:22-12. Absent
sufficient competent evidence to satisfy this standard,
the court does not have the authority to review the
merits of the claim.
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[Ibid.]
We agree with the PCR court that defendant failed to show by competent
evidence that the delay was due to excusable neglect, and we are satisfied
enforcement of the time bar will not result in a fundamental injustice. See State
v. Milne, 178 N.J. 486, 492-93, 495 (2004) (finding "no compelling reason to
relax the procedural bar of Rule 3:22-12" where the defendant had
"opportunities to assert his claims in a timely fashion but failed to do so," "the
State would be significantly prejudiced if now forced to relitigate issues
pertaining to crimes and a trial that occurred nearly two decades ago," and the
judiciary would be faced "with the prospect of evaluating the propriety of a
sixteen-year-old criminal conviction").
Defendant contends he showed excusable neglect for his delay in filing
his PCR petition "because the trial court failed to inform defendant of the time
limits for filing PCR petitions, which it was required to do at the time of
defendant's sentencing." He faults the PCR court for not addressing that
purported failure by the trial court. Defendant, however, did not raise this issue
before the PCR court, not in his petition, his counseled brief, or his PCR
counsel's presentation during oral argument. Although defendant did not raise
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this issue before the PCR court, we have considered and reject defendant’s
argument.
In support of his excusable-neglect argument, defendant cites Rule 3:21-
4(i), which requires a court at sentencing to inform a defendant about the time
limits for filing an appeal and a PCR petition. Defendant also cites cases in
which we held a sentencing court's failure to advise a defendant about appeal
deadlines extended the defendant's time to file an appeal. See State v. Johnson,
396 N.J. Super. 133, 142 (App. Div. 2007); State v. Fletcher, 174 N.J. Super.
609, 614 (App. Div. 1980).
Defendant, however, did not cite a case in which the defendant's time to
file a PCR petition was extended due to a sentencing court's failure to advise a
defendant of the time limits associated with PCR petitions. Nor did defendant
address State v. Molina, 187 N.J. 531, 542 (2006), in which the Court held a
defendant who had not been advised of his right to appeal was entitled to "as
within time relief" if "his application for leave to appeal as within time [was]
filed no later than five years from the date of his sentencing." Defendant did
not file his petition until more than eleven years had passed since the date of his
sentencing. Even if we were inclined to grant defendant additional time to
submit his PCR petition in light of the court's failure to advise him of the
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applicable deadlines, we see no basis to give him more than twice the additional
time the Court found appropriate for defendants who had not been advised of
their appellate rights. Accordingly, we agree with the PCR court that
defendant's petition is time-barred.
We nevertheless for the sake of completeness consider the substance of
defendant's petition. Defendant does not contend plea counsel "provide[d]
misleading, material information that result[ed] in an uninformed plea." Gaitan,
209 N.J. at 353 (quoting Nuñez-Valdez, 200 N.J. 140). Nor does he assert he
would not have pleaded guilty but for counsel's errors or that a decision to reject
the plea would have been rational. Vanness, 474 N.J. Super. at 624.
Instead, defendant faults waiver counsel for not requesting an
adjournment of the second waiver hearing when presented with the prosecutor's
written statement the day of the hearing and for not calling witnesses during that
hearing. He did not support his petition with an affidavit or certification setting
forth factual assertions describing what, if any, differences existed between the
written statement presented at the first waiver hearing and the written statement
presented at the second waiver hearing or explaining in what way waiver counsel
was unprepared for the hearing, what waiver counsel would have done with
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additional time, what witnesses he should have called, and how that additional
time or witnesses would have altered the final outcome.
When a defendant claims his attorney was unprepared or failed to
adequately investigate the case, which is what defendant appears to be arguing
regarding waiver counsel, "he must assert the facts that an investigation would
have revealed, supported by affidavits or certifications based upon the personal
knowledge of the affiant or the person making the certification." Porter, 216
N.J. at 355 (quoting Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. at 170). Defendant's mere
assertion waiver counsel should have asked for more time, with nothing more,
fails to meet that standard.
As for witnesses, defendant seems to suggest in his merits brief – not in
any affidavit or certification – waiver counsel should have called defendant and
his father to testify about defendant's undisputed age at the time of the incident
and that he lived with his cousin and experts to testify about defendant's
purported cognitive deficiencies. But defendant fails to demonstrate that
hypothetical testimony would have altered the court's waiver decision or the
ultimate outcome of the case.
At the time of the second waiver hearing, N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26 (repealed
2016), required, on the State's motion, a Family Part judge to waive jurisdiction
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over a case involving a juvenile if the judge found the juvenile was at least
fourteen years old at the time of the alleged act and there was "probable cause
to believe that the juvenile committed a delinquent act or acts which if
committed by an adult would constitute" certain enumerated crimes, including
"[c]riminal homicide" and first-degree robbery. See also State v. J.M., 182 N.J.
402, 412 (2005) (finding "when a sixteen-year old or above is charged with an
enumerated offense, the prosecutor need only establish probable cause for the
court to waive the juvenile to adult court"). "Probable cause is a well-grounded
suspicion or belief that the juvenile committed the alleged crime." J.M., 182
N.J. at 417; see also In re State ex rel. A.D., 212 N.J. 200, 220 (2012).
During the second waiver hearing, the lead investigator on the case, who
was a member of the homicide unit in the prosecutor's office, testified: when
police found defendant after the victim had been stabbed, defendant had told
police he was "the one you're looking for"; in a subsequent recorded statement
defendant had admitted he went to the convenience store with a knife to rob the
store and he hit the victim twice with the knife; and defendant's brother had told
an investigator defendant admitted to him he had stabbed someone. The court
found defendant's age was not disputed and that the State had proven by a
preponderance of the evidence police had probable cause to arrest defendant and
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the State had probable cause to charge defendant with murder. The court held
it was waiving its jurisdiction and that defendant would be tried in the Law
Division.
As the waiver court held, the State "had substantial evidence from
witnesses at the scene, . . . substantial evidence from the juvenile, himself, . . .
and from his brother that linked him to the scene of the offense and corroborated
his involvement in the homicide." Testimony about defendant's undisputed age,
living arrangements, and cognitive deficiencies would not have altered the
court's conclusion the State had established probable cause or decision to waive
jurisdiction.
Defendant's argument regarding appellate counsel is equally speculative
and unconvincing. Appellate counsel's failure to make an unsuccessful
argument does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Echols,
199 N.J. 344, 365 (2009).
Defendant failed to satisfy Strickland's two-pronged test. He did not
demonstrate waiver counsel's or appellate counsel's performance was deficient
or that the alleged deficiency prejudiced his defense. The bare assertions he
made in support of his petition were "insufficient to support a prima facie case
of ineffectiveness." Blake, 444 N.J. Super. at 299 (quoting Cummings, 321 N.J.
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Super. at 171). He did not show a reasonable probability that but for counsel's
alleged ineffectiveness, "the result of the proceeding would have been
different." Gideon, 244 N.J. at 551 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
Defendant did not state anywhere in his petition that he would not have pleaded
guilty had counsel rendered effective assistance and, thus, has not demonstrated
"there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not
have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart,
474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); see also Nuñez-Valdez, 200 N.J. at 139.
Finally, we discern no abuse of discretion in the PCR court's decision to
forego an evidentiary hearing given that defendant failed to establish a prima
facie showing of ineffective assistance of counsel or any other basis to support
the holding of a hearing. Defendant contends the record "contained facts that
were in dispute between himself and his trial and appellate counsel" that n eeded
to be resolved in an evidentiary hearing. But defendant did not identify any
disputed facts, and we don't perceive any.
Allegations of ineffective assistance that are unsupported or are "too
vague, conclusory, or speculative" do not merit an evidentiary hearing. State v.
Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158 (1997). With his unsupported, bald assertions,
defendant failed to demonstrate a prima facie case in support of his petition.
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Accordingly, the PCR judge did not abuse her discretion by deciding and
denying the petition without an evidentiary hearing.
Affirmed.
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