Brian J. Diehl v. Kim M. Friedlander ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1134-23
BRIAN J. DIEHL,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
KIM M. FRIEDLANDER,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________
Submitted November 13, 2024 – Decided November 25, 2024
Before Judges Chase and Vanek.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Morris County,
Docket No. FD-14-0163-18.
Heymann & Fletcher, attorneys for appellant (Alix
Claps, on the brief).
Brian J. Diehl, respondent pro se.
PER CURIAM
Defendant Kim Friedlander appeals from a November 1, 2023 Family Part
order, granting in part and denying in part, her motion for child support related
expenses from plaintiff Brian Diehl. We vacate and remand for further
proceedings.
I.
Plaintiff and defendant are the parents of two children, a ten-year-old and
a seven-year- old. The parties were never married, and their relationship ended
not long after the birth of the second child. Pursuant to a July 2018 order,
weekly child support was set at $94, payable from defendant to plaintiff, with
the parties' proportional net income indicated at 76% and 24%, respectively.
Defendant filed an application with the trial court in July 2023 seeking
reimbursement for numerous out-of-pocket expenses utilizing the proportions of
the parties' net incomes set forth in the 2018 order. Defendant claimed she made
requests for reimbursement from plaintiff for certain non-guidelines expenses
for the children on many occasions but did not receive payment. The parties do
not contest that they have a 50/50 parenting time schedule; the children have
certain non-reimbursed medical bills; the children participate in extra-curricular
activities; and that the children attended preschool as work-related childcare
when they were younger.
A hearing was set for October 17, 2023. Either the day before or two days
before, plaintiff filed opposition papers. The parties appeared for court and oral
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argument ensued. Defendant claimed she was owed $8,204.58 for
reimbursement of plaintiff's proportionate share of childcare expenses. Plaintiff
subsequently argued that based on his submissions he was owed $3,459.65.
Most of the argument centered around a question raised concerning funds that
were paid by on behalf of plaintiff, by a subsidy, from the Counsel on Family
Relations ("CFR"). Plaintiff argued he was entitled to full credit for that amount
because it was based on his income level. Defendant argued that her claim was
only for out-of-pocket expenses, which should not include money that was paid
by a third-party. Moreover, defendant posited that if plaintiff was given a credit,
then it should adjust what he owed in child support. Because of the timing of
the opposition, the trial court provided defendant the opportunity to file a reply
after argument, which she did.
The trial court subsequently entered an order on November 1, 2023 which
stated:
Parties appeared via zoom on October 17, 2023.
Plaintiff was pro se, and defendant was represented by
Ms. Claps. The parties subsequently submitted letters
to the court. Having reviewed the submissions and
heard the testimony and representations and for good
cause: Plaintiff shall reimburse Defendant for the
following: $1644 for orthodontist; $53.95 for the
dermatologist; $325 for the dentist. Plaintiff has
previously paid for the therapist and swimming costs,
and received a subsidy for childcare, therefore the
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request for reimbursement for those items is denied.
Any other relief not addressed above is denied without
prejudice.
This appeal follows.
II.
"Appellate courts accord particular deference to the Family Part because
of its 'special jurisdiction and expertise' in family matters." Harte v. Hand, 433
N.J. Super. 457, 461 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394,
412 (1998)). "We do 'not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of
the trial judge unless . . . convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by
or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence
as to offend the interests of justice.'" Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015)
(alterations in original) (quoting Pascale v. Pascale, 113 N.J. 20, 33 (1988)).
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to order plaintiff to
pay his proportional share of the out-of-pocket work-related childcare costs for
the parties' two children. Moreover, defendant posits that because there was no
statement of reasons, either in writing or on the record, it is impossible to know
if the court made a legal error or factual error regarding what was calculated for
childcare expenses and credits. Defendant also contends that if he was entitled
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to full credit for CFR payments, then his net income for child support should
have been imputed with that amount.
It is fundamental that "[t]he court shall, by an opinion or memorandum
decision, either written or oral, find the facts and state its conclusions of law
thereon . . . on every motion decided by a written order that is appealable as of
right . . . ." R. 1:7-4(a); see also Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 569-70 (1980);
Ronan v. Adely, 182 N.J. 103, 110 (2004) (finding the record in a child name
change dispute "deficient to make a meaningful review" because "the trial court
received no testimony from either of the parties and made no findings of fact").
"Naked conclusions do not satisfy the purpose of R[ule] 1:7-4." Curtis, 83 N.J.
at 570.
We appreciate the motion judge's efforts to actively manage a difficult
dispute without the necessity of successive, and undoubtedly costly, motion
practice. We do not pass judgment on the merits of the parties' claims or
defenses but identify them solely to illustrate that by failing to provide any
reasons for its decision, we, along with the litigants, "are left to conjecture as to
what the judge may have had in mind." Salch v. Salch, 240 N.J. Super. 441, 443
(App. Div. 1990). See also Est. of Doerfler v. Fed. Ins. Co., 454 N.J. Super.
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298, 302 (App. Div. 2018) (noting that Rule 1:7-4's "requirements are
unambiguous").
On remand, the court shall "'state clearly [its] factual findings and
correlate them with relevant legal conclusions, so that parties and the appellate
courts [are] informed of the rationale underlying th[ose] conclusion[s]. '"
Avelino-Catabran v. Catabran, 445 N.J. Super. 574, 594-95 (App. Div. 2016)
(alterations in original) (quoting Monte v. Monte, 212 N.J. Super. 557, 565
(App. Div. 1986)). See also R. 1:7-4.
For these reasons, we are constrained to vacate and remand the matter for
the judge to render findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Vacated and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
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