State of New Jersey v. Ronald Rutan ( 2024 )


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  •                                  NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-2659-22
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    RONALD RUTAN,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Submitted November 7, 2024 – Decided November 26, 2024
    Before Judges Rose and DeAlmeida.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Law Division, Bergen County, Indictment No.
    92-03-0447.
    Jennifer N. Selletti, Public Defender, attorney for
    appellant (Monique Moyse, Designated Counsel, on
    the brief).
    Mark Musella, Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney for
    respondent (Ian C. Kennedy, Assistant Prosecutor, of
    counsel and on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Defendant Ronald Rutan appeals from the March 24, 2023 order of the
    Law Division denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an
    evidentiary hearing. We affirm.
    I.
    On New Year's Eve in 1991, defendant and his codefendant escaped
    from a maximum-security prison in Connecticut. They committed a carjacking
    outside the prison and fled, eventually hiding out in a hotel in Nanuet, New
    York, a short distance from the New Jersey border. On January 7 and 9, 1992,
    the pair crossed into Bergen County and committed several armed robberies.
    Defendant was captured about a week later.
    A grand jury indicted defendant, charging him with: (1) five counts of
    first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; (2) two counts of third-degree
    possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d); and (3)
    two counts of fourth-degree possession of a knife under circumstances not
    manifestly appropriate for lawful use, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d). In March 1996, a
    jury found defendant guilty on all counts in the indictment.
    The trial court sentenced defendant to an extended term as a persistent
    offender, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a), for an armed robbery in Rutherford, and
    imposed an aggregate one-hundred-year term of imprisonment with a forty-six-
    A-2659-22
    2
    year period of parole ineligibility. The controlling sentences were a sixty -year
    term of imprisonment with a twenty-six-year period of parole ineligibility for
    the   Rutherford   armed   robbery,   a   consecutive    twenty-year   term     of
    incarceration, with a ten-year period of parole ineligibility for an armed
    robbery in Montvale, and a consecutive twenty-year term of incarceration,
    with a ten-year period of parole ineligibility for an armed robbery in
    Waldwick. Defendant's sentence was imposed consecutively to the sentence
    he was serving in Connecticut when he escaped.
    We affirmed defendant's convictions. State v. Rutan, No. A-5587-95
    (App. Div. Apr. 23, 1998). However, we remanded for resentencing, directing
    the trial court to explain its reasoning for imposing consecutive sentences on
    the New Jersey convictions and to reduce the period of parole ineligibility on
    the Rutherford armed robbery to twenty-five years. Id. slip op. at 15. The
    Supreme Court denied defendant's petition for certification. State v. Rutan,
    
    155 N.J. 587
     (1998).
    Resentencing did not take place until November 18, 2016, because
    defendant was serving his Connecticut prison sentence. The court resentenced
    defendant to a sixty-year term of incarceration with a twenty-five-year period
    of parole ineligibility on the Rutherford armed robbery, consecutively to a
    A-2659-22
    3
    fifteen-year sentence with a seven-year period of parole ineligibility on the
    Waldwick armed robbery. The court ran the prison terms on the remaining
    robbery counts concurrently to the sentence on the Rutherford armed robbery
    and concurrently to each other.    The court did not address the statutory
    aggravating and mitigating factors, provide reasons for imposing an extended
    term for the Rutherford armed robbery, or apply State v. Yarbough, 
    100 N.J. 627
     (1985).
    On October 30, 2018, we again remanded to the sentencing court to
    provide a more detailed statement of reasons for the sentence, including
    findings on the aggravating and mitigating factors, as well as reasons for
    imposing an extended term. State v. Rutan, No. A-2784-17 (App. Div. Oct.
    30, 2018).
    On December 14, 2018, the court resentenced defendant.       The court
    imposed the same aggregate sentence that it imposed in 2016 and provided
    more detailed findings with respect to the aggravating and mitigating factors
    and its reasons for imposing an extended term for the Rutherford armed
    robbery. The court again failed to apply Yarbough.
    On October 23, 2019, we concluded the court did not provide adequate
    findings to support imposition of consecutive terms. State v. Rutan, No. A-
    A-2659-22
    4
    3172-18 (App. Div. Oct. 23, 2019). We therefore remanded the matter for
    resentencing for the third time.
    On January 22, 2020, the court again sentenced defendant to an
    aggregate sixty-five-year term of incarceration with a twenty-seven-year
    period of parole ineligibility.    The court issued a detailed written opinion
    setting forth its reasons for the sentence.
    We affirmed defendant's sentence. State v. Rutan, No. A-4298-19 (App.
    Div. Feb. 8, 2021).      The Supreme Court denied defendant's petition for
    certification. State v. Rutan, 
    248 N.J. 259
     (2021).
    On May 9, 2022, defendant filed a PCR petition. He argued his trial and
    appellate counsel were ineffective because they failed to: (1) object to the
    resentencing court's reliance on a presentencing report prepared by
    Connecticut for his sentencing in that State; (2) argue in support of mitigating
    factor ten, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(10) ("[t]he defendant is particularly likely to
    respond affirmatively to probationary treatment . . . ."), that defendant was
    paroled by Connecticut during the eighteen-year period his resentencing was
    A-2659-22
    5
    pending; and (3) argue that an updated New Jersey presentencing report be
    prepared prior to his third resentencing. 1
    On March 24, 2023, the PCR court issued an oral opinion denying
    defendant's petition. 2 The PCR court found that defendant did not establish
    counsel's failure to request an updated presentence report fell below an
    objective standard of reasonableness, given that Rule 3:21-2 does not require a
    new presentence report prior to resentencing. The PCR court noted that at the
    third resentencing, the resentencing court stated defendant was being
    considered as he "stood before the court" at that time. In addition, the PCR
    court found that defendant failed to demonstrate an updated presentence report
    would have materially changed the sentence he received, which was
    significantly lower than the sentence originally imposed.     The PCR court
    rejected defendant's remaining arguments as vague, conclusory, and
    speculative. A March 24, 2023 order memorialized the PCR court's decision.
    This appeal followed. Defendant raises the following argument:
    [DEFENDANT] IS ENTITLED TO RELIEF OR AN
    EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON HIS CLAIM THAT
    [TRIAL   AND     APPELLATE]    COUNSEL
    1
    Defendant filed a PCR petition in 2015. The court dismissed that petition
    without prejudice because defendant's resentencing was then pending.
    2
    The PCR judge was not the judge who resentenced defendant.
    A-2659-22
    6
    RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE BY
    FAILING TO ADVOCATE ADEQUATELY AT
    SENTENCING.
    II.
    Under Rule 3:22-2(a), a defendant is entitled to PCR if there was a
    "[s]ubstantial denial in the conviction proceedings of defendant's rights under
    the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws of the State of
    New Jersey . . . ." "A petitioner must establish the right to such relief by a
    preponderance of the credible evidence." State v. Preciose, 
    129 N.J. 451
    , 459
    (1992). "To sustain that burden, specific facts" which "would provide the
    court with an adequate basis on which to rest its decision" must be articulated.
    State v. Mitchell, 
    126 N.J. 565
    , 579 (1992).
    The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,
    Paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution guarantee criminal defendants the
    right to the effective assistance of counsel. State v. O'Neil, 
    219 N.J. 598
    , 610
    (2014) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 686 (1984); State v.
    Fritz, 
    105 N.J. 42
    , 58 (1987)). To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance
    of counsel, the defendant must meet the two-part test established by Strickland
    and adopted by our Supreme Court in Fritz. 
    466 U.S. at 687
    ; 
    105 N.J. at 58
    .
    A-2659-22
    7
    Under Strickland, a defendant first must show that his or her attorney
    made errors "so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel'
    guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment."             
    466 U.S. at 687
    .
    Counsel's performance is deficient if it "[falls] below an objective standard of
    reasonableness." 
    Id. at 688
    .
    A defendant also must show that counsel's "deficient performance
    prejudiced the defense[,]" 
    id. at 687
    , because "there is a reasonable probability
    that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceed ing would
    have been different[,]" 
    id. at 694
    . "A reasonable probability is a probability
    sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome" of the trial. 
    Ibid.
     "[A]
    court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before
    examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged
    deficiencies." 
    Id. at 697
    ; State v. Marshall, 
    148 N.J. 89
    , 261 (1997). "If it is
    easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient
    prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed."
    Strickland, 
    466 U.S. at 697
    .
    We review a judge's decision to not hold an evidentiary hearing on a
    PCR petition for abuse of discretion. State v. Brewster, 
    429 N.J. Super. 387
    ,
    401 (App. Div. 2013) (citing Marshall, 
    148 N.J. at 157-58
    ). Where the PCR
    A-2659-22
    8
    court has not conducted an evidentiary hearing, we review its legal and factual
    determinations de novo. State v. Aburoumi, 
    464 N.J. Super. 326
    , 338 (App.
    Div. 2020); see also State v. Nash, 
    212 N.J. 518
    , 540-41 (2013).
    A hearing is required only when: (1) a defendant establishes a prima
    facie case in support of PCR; (2) the court determines that there are disputed
    issues of material fact that cannot be resolved by review of the existing record;
    and (3) the court determines that an evidentiary hearing is required to resolve
    the claims asserted. State v. Porter, 
    216 N.J. 343
    , 354 (2013) (citing R. 3:22-
    10(b)). "A prima facie case is established when a defendant demonstrates 'a
    reasonable likelihood that his or her claim, viewing the facts alleged in the
    light most favorable to the defendant, will ultimately succeed on the merits.'"
    
    Id. at 355
     (quoting R. 3:22-10(b)).
    "[T]o establish a prima facie claim, a petitioner must do more than make
    bald assertions that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel." 
    Ibid.
    (quoting State v. Cummings, 
    321 N.J. Super. 154
    , 170 (App. Div. 1999)). A
    PCR petition must be "accompanied by an affidavit or certification by
    defendant, or by others, setting forth with particularity[,]" State v. Jones, 
    219 N.J. 298
    , 312 (2014), "facts sufficient to demonstrate counsel's alleged
    A-2659-22
    9
    substandard performance[,]" Porter, 
    216 N.J. at 355
     (quoting Cummings, 
    321 N.J. Super. at 170
    ); see also R. 3:22-10(c).
    Having reviewed defendant's arguments in light of the record and
    applicable legal principles, we affirm the March 24, 2023 order. Defendant 's
    counsel secured a significant reduction in the sentence originally imposed. In
    addition, the resentencing court considered defendant as he stood before the
    court and found he made no showing that an updated sentencing report would
    have contained information not already before the court that would have
    resulted in an even further reduction in his sentence. Finally, defendant was
    subject   to   mandatory     incarceration,    rendering   mitigating   factor   ten
    inapplicable. See State v. Washington, 
    408 N.J. Super. 564
    , 581 (App. Div.
    2009). Thus, defendant raised no claims that would change the outcome of his
    resentencing hearing.      Defendant cannot demonstrate that if his trial and
    appellant counsel had not made the errors he alleges they made he would have
    received a shorter sentence for his armed robbery spree.
    Affirmed.
    A-2659-22
    10
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-2659-22

Filed Date: 11/26/2024

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/26/2024