Philip Grill v. Rutgers University and David Amador ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2074-21
PHILIP GRILL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
RUTGERS UNIVERSITY
and DAVID AMADOR,
Defendants-Respondents.
__________________________
Submitted November 9, 2023 – Decided November 27, 2024
Before Judges Accurso and Vernoia.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. L-4609-19.
Law Office of David H. Kaplan, LLC, attorneys for
appellant (David H. Kaplan, of counsel; Jeffrey Zajac,
on the brief).
Greenbaum, Rowe, Smith & Davis, LLP, attorneys for
respondents (Maja M. Obradovic, of counsel and on the
brief; Joel Clymer, on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
VERNOIA, J.A.D.
Plaintiff Philip Grill appeals from an amended order granting summary
judgment to defendants Rutgers University and David Amador (collectively
"defendants") on plaintiff's causes of action for violations of the New Jersey
Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49, and breach of an
implied contract. Based on our review of the summary judgment record, the
parties' arguments, and the applicable legal principles, we vacate the summary
judgment order, remand for reconsideration of the motion, and direct that the
court make appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting its
disposition of the motion as required under Rule 1:7-4.
Discovery in the case revealed that following its merger with the
University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey (UMDNJ), Rutgers decided
to eliminate its physical mailroom and replace it with a digital mailroom that
was to be maintained by an outside contractor. Rutgers determined the
reorganization of the mailroom would result in a cost savings of $875,000.
Plaintiff was born in May 1954 and employed by Rutgers as a principal
clerk from February 2013 to April 2018. Plaintiff claims that in a May 2015
meeting with Rutgers's accounts payable manager Amador, he was advised
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Rutgers intended to eliminate his position due to the reorganization of the
mailroom and that the "reorganization was not performance related."
In his complaint against defendants, plaintiff alleged that following the
termination of his employment, Rutgers gave his job duties to other employees,
fired "two older employees in plaintiff's group," and hired a younger employee.
Plaintiff also alleged he was qualified to perform the essential functions of his
job, and his work performance had met Rutgers's legitimate expectations.
Plaintiff further averred he had notified defendants of what he claimed was
discriminatory treatment and defendants failed to "remediate" the wrongful
termination of his employment.
Plaintiff also claimed Rutgers had issued an employee manual setting
forth the terms and conditions of his employment. According to plaintiff, the
manual prohibited discrimination in violation of the LAD "and otherwise acting
in a discriminatory or retaliatory manner."
Plaintiff's complaint asserted four causes of action. Plaintiff claimed
Rutgers's actions constituted age discrimination in violation of the LAD and
Amador violated the LAD by aiding and abetting Rutgers's unlawful
discrimination. Plaintiff also claimed Rutgers had breached an implied
contract—the employee manual—by violating its prohibition against
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discrimination. Plaintiff's complaint also included a cause of action for punitive
damages.1
Following completion of discovery, defendants moved for summary
judgment. In support of the motion, defendants filed a 110-paragraph statement
of material facts supported by certifications that included 657 pages of exhibits.
Plaintiff filed a response to defendants' statement of material facts and what
constituted a counterstatement of material facts spread across 61 paragraphs.
Plaintiff's response and counterstatement were supported by his counsel's
certification, which included exhibits totaling 134 pages. Defendants filed
supplemental certifications with an additional 144 pages of exhibits and a
separate 101-paragraph, 96-page statement in response to plaintiff's opposition
to defendants' statement of material facts and in reply to plaintiff's
counterstatement of material facts.
In support of their summary judgment motion, defendants argued plaintiff
lacked evidence establishing a prima facie age-discrimination claim under the
LAD. See generally Meade v. Twp. of Livingston, 249 N.J. 310, 328-30 (2021)
(explaining the analytical framework for determining an LAD discrimination
1
The complaint also included a separate cause of action against fictitiously
named parties, but plaintiff never amended the complaint to identify those
parties.
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claim that is founded on circumstantial evidence); Victor v. State, 203 N.J. 383,
409 (2010) (explaining the elements of a prima facie claim of wrongful
termination in violation of the LAD). Defendants further argued that even if
plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence establishing a prima facie cause of
action for age discrimination, they were entitled to summary judgment because
plaintiff could not sustain his burden of establishing defendants' legitimate non -
discriminatory reason for the termination of his employment—the
reorganization of the mailroom and attendant cost savings—was a pretext for
the alleged age discrimination. See ibid.Plaintiff argued defendants were not entitled to summary judgment
because the record presented, when viewed in a light most favorable to him,
Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995), satisfied his burden
of establishing a prima facie case of age discrimination and that defendants '
stated legitimate non-discriminatory reason for terminating his employment was
a pretext for age discrimination. Plaintiff further argued there were a myriad of
genuine issues of material fact precluding a summary-judgment award. See
Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 405-06 (2014).
Following argument on the motion, the court rendered an opinion from
the bench explaining that in its view the summary-judgment record presented a
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case that is "kind of factually and legally on all fours" with our decision in
Young v. Hobart West Group, 385 N.J. Super. 448 (App. Div. 2005). The court
tersely summarized some of the facts in Young and then briefly referred to a few
of the purported facts in this case, noting that following Rutgers's merger with
UMDNJ, the "mail room was dismantled" to replace the "antiquated physical
mailroom" with a "digital mailroom" at a cost savings of "$875,000."
The court then again briefly restated some of the facts in Young and noted
the plaintiff in Young had failed to present evidence the defendant's "stated
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for termination of [Young's]
position . . . was a pretext." The court also opined that the "problem" with
plaintiff's case is that "he probably could get by with a prima facie case," and
then the court found "the fourth element" of a prima facie discrimination claim
"and the ability to establish that the stated reasons for the defense is a pretext
are sort of one in the same thing." 2
2
Because we vacate the court's order and remand for other reasons, it is
unnecessary to address plaintiff's claim that the court erred in its explanation of
the standard for determining whether a plaintiff has established a prima facie
discrimination claim and whether a plaintiff has sustained the burden of
establishing an employer's legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse
employment action is a pretext. See, e.g., Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 182 N.J.
436, 446-55 (2005) (detailing the elements of a prima facie case of age
discrimination and a plaintiff's burden of establishing a defendant's legitimate
non-discriminatory reason for terminating an employee is a pretext).
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The court found it was undisputed Rutgers had embarked on "getting rid
of a physical mailroom and having a digital mailroom" because it would be more
modern and less expensive to do so. Without making a single finding of fact
based on the parties' extensive Rule 4:46-2 submissions and the accompanying
voluminous record, the Court concluded it would not be "possible
for . . . plaintiff to sustain [his] burden of" proving both the fourth element of a
prima facie discrimination claim or that defendants' stated reason for terminating
plaintiff's employment was a pretext for unlawful discrimination.
The court entered an order granting defendants' summary judgment
motion. This appeal followed.
"In light of the important interests at stake when a party seeks summary
judgment, [a] motion court must carefully evaluate the record in light of the
governing law, and determine the facts in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party." Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 479 (2016) (emphasis
added) (citing R. 4:46-2(c)). Rule 4:46's requirements are "designed to 'focus
[a court's] . . . attention on the areas of actual dispute' and [to] facilitate the
court's review of the motion." Claypotch v. Heller, Inc., 360 N.J. Super. 472,
488 (App. Div. 2003) (second alteration in original) (quoting Pressler &
Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 1.1 on R. 4:46-2 (2003)).
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Application of Rule 4:46 requires that a motion court determine the facts
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party by reviewing the statements
of material fact, deciding which facts are undisputed, determining whether
disputed facts are material, and analyzing whether the undisputed facts permit
entry of a judgment in the moving party's favor as a matter of law. See e.g.,
Kenney v. Meadowview Nursing & Convalescent Ctr., 308 N.J. Super. 565, 573
(App. Div. 1998) (finding a court must decide a summary judgment motion
based on the "factual assertions . . . that were . . . properly included in the
motion [for] and [in opposition to] . . . summary judgment" in accordance with
Rule 4:46-2). We can determine if the court correctly analyzed the parties' Rule
4:46-2 statements, found the undisputed facts, and made the appropriate legal
conclusions only if the court makes the required findings of fact, and correlates
them to the applicable law, in the first instance. See Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.,
Inc. v. Checchio, 335 N.J. Super. 495, 498 (App. Div. 2000) (explaining a court
reviewing a summary judgment order must measure the trial court's "factual
findings" correlated to its legal conclusions "against the standards set forth in "
Brill, 142 N.J. at 540). Indeed, "[t]he obligation to make specific findings on
summary judgment motions in accordance with [Rule] 1:7-4 has been explicitly
stated in [Rule] 4:46-2 since 1972." Ibid.; R. 1:7-4(a) (requiring a "court, by an
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opinion or memorandum decision, either written or oral, find the facts and state
its conclusions of law thereon"). That obligation was not fulfilled here.
We have observed that "neither the parties nor [a reviewing court] are
well-served by an opinion devoid of analysis." Checchio, 335 N.J. at 498.
"Failure to make explicit findings and clear statements of reasoning '"constitutes
a disservice to the litigants, the attorneys and the appellate court."'" Gnall v.
Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015) (quoting Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 569-
70 (1980)). And, of course, it is impossible to determine if the court correctly
satisfied its obligation to "determine the facts in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party" where, as here, the summary judgment award is based solely
on brief and cursory references to no more than a few purported facts.
We recognize that we conduct a de novo review of a summary judgment
order applying the same standard as the trial court, Conforti v. Cnty. of Ocean,
255 N.J. 142, 162 (2023), but "our function as an appellate court is to review the
decision of the trial court, not to decide the motion tabula rasa," Est. of Doerfler
v. Fed. Ins. Co., 454 N.J. Super. 298, 301-02 (App. Div. 2018). We decline to
exercise original jurisdiction here because disposition of the issues presented by
defendants' summary judgment motion is necessarily dependent on proper
findings of the undisputed facts based on a careful analysis of the parties' Rule
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4:46-2 statements, and the motion court is required to conduct that analysis and
make those findings in the first instance. See ibid.; see also Price v. Himeji,
LLC, 214 N.J. 263, 294 (2013) (explaining Rule 2:10-5 "allow[s an] appellate
court to exercise original jurisdiction to eliminate unnecessary further litigation,
but discourage[s] its use if factfinding is involved") (alterations in original)
(quoting State v. Santos, 210 N.J. 129, 142 (2012)).
In the absence of such findings, we vacate the summary judgment order
and remand for reconsideration of the motion anew. Est. of Doerfler, 454 N.J.
Super. at 302. The court shall permit re-argument by the parties' counsel and
conduct such proceedings as may be appropriate based on the arguments
presented. The remand court shall conduct the requisite analysis of the parties'
Rule 4:46-2 statements, the competent evidence presented, and the applicable
legal principles, and make findings of fact and conclusions of law as required
under Rule 1:7-4 in support of its decision. See Checchio, 335 N.J. Super. at
498 (explaining a court deciding a summary judgement motion "is obliged to set
forth factual findings and correlate them to legal conclusions").
Nothing in this opinion shall be construed as expressing an opinion on the
merits of defendants' motion or plaintiff's opposition.
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Vacated and remanded for further proceedings. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
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