76 Berlin Road, LLC v. Colleen Gormley ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0342-23
76 BERLIN ROAD, LLC,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
COLLEEN GORMLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
Submitted September 23, 2024 – Decided November 14, 2024
Before Judges Sabatino and Jacobs.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Camden County, Docket No. LT-004155-23.
Hegge & Confusione, LLC, attorneys for appellant
(Michael Confusione, of counsel and on the brief).
McNichol, Byrne & Matlawski, PC, attorneys for
respondent (Michael J. Hawley, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Colleen Gormley appeals a judgment of possession entered
following trial in the Special Civil Part on September 14, 2023. Because the
trial court based its decision on a misinterpretation of pertinent provisions of the
Anti-Eviction Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 to -61.12 ("the Act"), we reverse.
I.
Defendant has lived as a tenant on the second floor of a residential home
in Cherry Hill since 2012. In August 2021, plaintiff, 76 Berlin Road, LLC,
purchased the subject residence. After taking ownership, plaintiff tendered to
defendant a one-year lease agreement with a term running from August 1, 2021
to July 31, 2022. Pursuant to the terms of the lease, signed by both parties,
defendant's tenancy would convert to a month-to-month term upon expiration of
the first year on August 1, 2022. Thereafter, either party had "the option to
cancel the tenancy with at least thirty (30) days['] notice or the minimum time-
period set by the State, whichever is shorter."
On May 18, 2023, plaintiff's attorney sent defendant a letter terminating
the leasehold effective July 31, 2023, demanding that she vacate by that date.
Defendant remained on the premises after the July 31 expiration date and
plaintiff filed suit for eviction. The grounds for eviction read in their entirety:
"Notice to [v]acate no later than 1 [sic] July 2023 for expired month-to-month
lease given on 5/22/2023[.] [D]efendant refuses to vacate."
On the trial date, defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that
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plaintiff failed to plead good cause as provided by the Act and that plaintiff's
reliance on related provisions, N.J.S.A. 2A:18-53 and N.J.S.A. 2A:18-56, was
misplaced, in that those provisions are applicable only to residential and
commercial premises not subject to the Act. As such, there would not be a basis
to evict or to find defendant in holdover status for remaining on the premises
after thirty days' notice.
The trial court denied defendant's motion to dismiss, reasoning that entry
of a judgment of possession was proper. Reading what it perceived to be
controlling language in the lease, the court stated:
Conditions of the agreement, having the option to
continue to occupy the premises under the terms and
conditions of this agreement under a month-to-month
agreement, tenancy-at-will, with either the landlord or
tenant having the option to cancel the tenancy with at
least 30 days' notice or the minimum time period set by
the State, [whichever is shorter.] [F]or the tenant to
continue under month-to-month tenancy [a]t the
expiration of the lease term, [the] landlord [must] be
notified within 60 days before the end of the lease term.
So I think the parties agree to how this lease agreement
would be terminated. It's right in there. The parties
agreed to it. Okay? So [the motion is] denied.
Defense counsel challenged the court's ruling:
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So I just wanted to kind of reiterate that this does fall
under the Anti-Eviction Act in general and we haven't
really reached that part, that N.J.S.A. 2A:18-53 actually
does not apply to this tenancy. This is not an owner-
occupied property. This is not a commercial tenancy.
This is a person living within this apartment complex
who falls under the Anti-Eviction Act. And under the
Anti-Eviction Act, there's a whole host of reasons that
you can evict for. There's actually 20 of them. If you
look at the landlord case information statement, they
have a menu to choose from. The option that they chose
here is not admissible into evidence. It doesn't matter.
. . . . This tenancy itself, regardless of what's in the
lease, falls under the Anti-Eviction Act.
[(Emphasis added).]
The court reiterated its position:
It's contractually agreed to by the parties as to how this
lease term would end when it was month to month.
Okay? That's that. The parties agreed to it. The parties
are going to agree to something, but then you're going
to come and say, ["W]ell, this is unenforceable, I didn't
know what I was agreeing to?["] Well, maybe if it was
all convoluted and a bunch of legalese in there but, no,
it basically says you're month[-]to[-]month and it can
be terminated by either party within 30 days. It can't be
any clearer than that and that['s] the contractual
agreement between the parties. That's what you agreed
to. You know what I mean? If you didn't want to agree
to it, you wouldn't sign it.
Upon confirming that the landlord's registration statement was on file, the
court entered a judgment of possession, having found one month's notice
properly served by landlord's counsel. N.J.S.A. 2A:18-56(b).
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We note that plaintiff also adduced proofs of an email purportedly sent by
plaintiff's counsel on January 26, 2023, representing that plaintiff intended to
demolish the subject residence. Defendant denied receiving the email in
question, and plaintiff did not move to amend its complaint or request entry of
judgment under this facially recognized basis for eviction under the Act. See
N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(h).
After the trial court announced its ruling, defendant requested a stay of
the proceedings. The trial court denied the request and issued a warrant of
removal at the landlord's request on September 19, 2023. Defendant filed an
emergent motion seeking to stay execution of the warrant of removal pending
appeal. In assessing the factors propounded by Crowe v. De Gioia, 90 N.J. 126,
132-33 (1982) and progeny, we granted defendant's application, noting that
plaintiff "did not seek to show good cause under the Anti-Eviction Act." We
observed in our order granting a stay pending appeal that:
the record does include a notice purportedly sent to
defendant by the landlord in which the landlord stated
that it was terminating the lease because it planned to
demolish the entire building. If landlord is planning to
demoli[sh] the entire rental property with the plan to
take it out residential use, and can prove that claim in a
proper proceeding, that might constitute good cause
under the Act. See N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(h).
Nevertheless, the landlord did not proceed with that
theory in the underlying eviction action. The stay that
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we are entering applies to the warrant of removal issued
in this matter on September 19, 2023. That stay and the
pendency of this appeal is without prejudice to the
landlord's right to institute a separate action to evict the
tenant under the Act, if the landlord believes it has good
cause under the Act and can prove good cause in a
proper action.
Notwithstanding our initial finding and concomitant observation of a
likely deficiency in the judgment entered and alternative facially valid cause of
action, we declined to make a final determination until "after full consideration
of defendant's appeal on the merits." The appeal since having been briefed, we
revisit the merits.
II.
Defendant advances a single argument:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
JUDGMENT FOR POSSESSION AND EVICTING
THE TENANT, APPELLANT GORMLEY,
BECAUSE THE LANDLORD FAILED TO PLEAD
AND PROVE GOOD CAUSE FOR THE
RESIDENTIAL EVICTION AS REQUIRED BY NEW
JERSEY’S ANTI-EVICTION ACT.
We review a trial court's legal determinations de novo. See 279 4th Ave.
Mgmt., LLC v. Mollett, 386 N.J. Super. 31, 36 (App. Div. 2006) (citing Rova
Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Insurance Co. of America, 65 N.J. 474, 483-84
(1974)) (reviewing a grant of judgment of possession de novo). A trial court's
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interpretation of a statute and its application of the law to facts are not entitled
to any special deference. Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of
Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995) (finding that an appellate court does not
need to accept a trial court's legal conclusions that are inconsistent with well -
established law). "[W]hen the language of a statute is clear on its face, 'the sole
function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.'" Hubbard v.
Reed, 168 N.J. 387, 392 (2001) (quoting Sheeran v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co., 80 N.J. 548, 556 (1979)).
"[T]he dictates of public policy may require invalidation of
private contractual arrangements where those arrangements directly contravene
express legislative policy or are inconsistent with the public interest or
detrimental to the common good." Sacks Realty Co. v. Shore, 317 N.J. Super.
258, 269 (App. Div. 1998) (citing Vasquez v. Glassboro Serv. Ass'n, 83 N.J. 86,
98 (1980) (invalidating on public policy grounds a migrant worker contract that
provided for the worker's summary ejection from employer-provided housing in
the event of his discharge)).
N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.4 declares that "[a]ny provision in a lease whereby any
tenant covered by section 2 of this act agrees that his tenancy may be terminated
or not renewed for other than good cause . . . , or whereby the tenant waives any
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other rights under this act shall be deemed against public policy and
unenforceable."
Consistent with legislative intent and public policy, courts invalidate
waivers of any rights guaranteed by the Act. For example, in Chase Manhattan
Bank v. Josephson, the Supreme Court held that absent a showing of good cause,
a foreclosing mortgagee may not evict a tenant, even if the Act alters the
"contract and common-law property rights" of the landlord. 135 N.J. 209, 232-
33 (1994). The Chase Court clarified that the "substantial public interest in
preventing eviction of blameless tenants" justifies the alteration of the contract
and property rights. Id. at 234.
The Act prohibits the removal of a tenant "from any house, building,
mobile home or land in a mobile home park or tenement leased for residential
purposes" unless the landlord establishes one or more of the grounds furnishing
good cause to evict as specified in N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 to -61.12 (emphasis
added). In the residential sphere, the Act's protections explicitly do not apply
to the following:
(1) owner-occupied premises with not more than two
rental units or a hotel, motel or other guest house or part
thereof rented to a transient guest or seasonal tenant;
(2) a dwelling unit which is held in trust on behalf of a
member of the immediate family of the person or
persons establishing the trust, provided that the member
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of the immediate family on whose behalf the trust is
established permanently occupies the unit; and (3) a
dwelling unit which is permanently occupied by a
member of the immediate family of the owner of that
unit, provided, however, that exception (2) or (3) shall
apply only in cases in which the member of the
immediate family has a developmental disability.
[N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1.]
As the record below and briefs on appeal reflect, it is undisputed that
defendant is a residential tenant in a non-owner-occupied dwelling who is
subject to the protections of the Act. None of the exceptions to the Act's
protections apply. As such, plaintiff was required to plead and prove good cause
for removal as provided by the Act. The sole basis articulated for notice in the
underlying complaint was the purported expiration of a month-to-month lease
term. That event is not a recognized cause of action supporting the termination
of residential tenancies under the Act. The waiver of the right to continued
tenancy by an otherwise blameless tenant, as in this case, is invalidated by
operation of law. N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.4.
Because plaintiff failed to plead good cause for the removal of defendant
as defined by the Act, the trial court erred as a matter of law in granting a
judgment of possession. Accordingly, the judgment of possession is vacated
and the warrant of removal nullified without prejudice to the respective rights
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of the parties, if a new complaint is filed with appropriate grounding under the
Act.
Reversed.
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