Michael Marrara v. New Jersey Department of Corrections ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0209-23
MICHAEL MARRARA,
Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent.
__________________________
Submitted October 17, 2024 – Decided November 1, 2024
Before Judges Mawla and Vinci.
On appeal from the New Jersey Department of
Corrections.
Michael Marrara, appellant pro se.
Mathew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Sookie Bae-Park, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel; Eric Intriago, Deputy Attorney
General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Appellant Michael Marrara appeals from the August 16, 2023 final agency
decision of the Department of Corrections (Department) finding he was not
entitled to public health emergency (PHE) credits under the Public Health
Emergency Credits Act, N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.100 to -123.103. We affirm.
On July 11, 2018, Marrara was sentenced to twenty years in prison for
first-degree aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a), subject to the No
Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, with concurrent sentences for other
offenses. Marrara is currently incarcerated in East Jersey State Prison, and his
maximum sentence expiration date is May 12, 2035.
On July 14, 2023, Marrara submitted an inquiry to the Department
requesting "an explanation of why certain incarcerated persons were excluded"
from the grant of PHE credits under the statute. On July 21, the Department
responded that it "did not have any control over who received the credits" under
the statute. In response, Marrara filed a grievance in which he requested "an
explanation" of why the "[PHE] credits . . . were . . . distributed to only a select
few incarcerated persons and not all who suffered under the pandemic" and
further requested "an administrative remedy if one is available." On August 10,
an Assistant Superintendent of the Department replied that the Department
already responded to Marrara's inquiry regarding PHE credits.
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On August 16, Marrara filed a final administrative appeal from that
response. The same day, the Department replied that Marrara had "already been
provided a response" and "[t]here is no remedy that can be provided" because
"the rules for qualification were set by" the statute. This appeal followed.
On December 26, the Department filed an amplification of the record on
appeal pursuant to Rule 2:5-1(d). It stated: "Marrara was ineligible for PHE[]
credits . . . because he had a maximum sentence expiration date of [May 12,
2035]."
On appeal, Marrara raises the following point for our consideration.
POINT I
THE COMMISSIONER OF THE [DEPARTMENT]
HAD THE ABILITY TO REMEDY THE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL SANCTIONS WITHIN THE
COVID-19 LEGISLATION, AND THE ADDITIONS
TO THE NEW JERSEY ADMINISTRATIVE CODE,
BUT FAILED TO DO SO.
"Our role in reviewing the decision of an administrative agency is
limited." Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J. Super. 186, 190 (App. Div.
2010). "We defer to an agency decision and do not reverse unless it is arbitrary,
capricious or unreasonable[,] or not supported by substantial credible evidence
in the record." Jenkins v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 412 N.J. Super. 243, 259 (App.
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Div. 2010) (citing Bailey v. Bd. of Rev., 339 N.J. Super. 29, 33 (App. Div.
2001)).
Legal questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. Bowser
v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 455 N.J. Super. 165, 170-71 (App.
Div. 2018). "We may give 'substantial deference to an agency's interpretation
of a statute that the agency is charged with enforcing,' particularly when its
interpretation involves a permissible construction of an ambiguous
provision . . . ." Id. at 171 (quoting Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., Police &
Firemen's Ret. Sys., 192 N.J. 189, 196 (2007)). "However, we are 'in no way
bound by the agency's interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly
legal issue.'" Ibid. (quoting Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85,
93 (1973)).
We conclude the Department correctly determined Marrara was ineligible
for PHE credits, and it did not have discretion to award PHE credits not
authorized by the statute. "When a court construes a statute, its 'paramount goal'
is to discern the Legislature's intent." In re Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 244
N.J. 1, 18 (2020) (quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)).
Appellate courts "'look first to the statute's actual language and ascribe to its
words their ordinary meaning.'" Ibid. (quoting Kean Fed'n of Tchrs. v. Morell,
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233 N.J. 566, 583 (2018)). "[T]he best indicator of [the Legislature's] intent is
the statutory language, thus it is the first place we look." Ibid. (alterations in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Richardson, 192 N.J. at
195). "'If the plain language leads to a clear and unambiguous result, then our
interpretive process is over.'" Ibid. (quoting Richardson, 192 N.J. at 195).
N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.100(a) provides that whenever the Governor declares a
public health emergency pursuant to the Emergency Health Powers Act,
N.J.S.A. 26:13-1 to -36, the Department "shall award inmates [PHE] credits in
accordance with this section if the public health emergency: (1) arises as a result
of a communicable or infectious disease; and (2) results in substantial
modifications to department-wide correctional facility operations." Subsection
(b) provides "[PHE] credits shall be awarded to any inmate in the custody of the
[Department] who: (1) is serving a sentence . . . ; and (2) is scheduled to be
released from . . . custody . . . within 365 days." Subsection (f) provides, "[a]n
inmate who was in the custody of the [Department] during the [p]ublic [h]ealth
[e]mergency and [s]tate of [e]mergency declared by the Governor in Executive
Order 103 of 2020 concerning the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic shall
receive [PHE] credits in accordance with this section."
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The Governor issued Executive Order (EO) 103 at the outset of the
COVID-19 pandemic, declaring a public health emergency. Exec. Order No.
103 (Mar. 9, 2020), 52 N.J.R. 549(a) (Apr. 6, 2020). On February 11, 2022, the
Governor issued EO 288, which extended the public health emergency for the
last time and expired on March 13, 2022. Exec. Order No. 288 (Feb. 11, 2022),
54 N.J.R. 395(c) (Mar. 7, 2022).
Pursuant to the plain, unambiguous language of the statute, individuals
are only eligible to receive PHE credits if a public health emergency exists when
the individual is within 365 days of their release date. The COVID-19 public
health emergency ended on March 4, 2022. Exec. Order. No. 292 (Mar. 4,
2022), 54 N.J.R. 511(a) (Apr. 4, 2022). Because Marrara's release date is May
12, 2035, he was not within 365 days of his release during a public health
emergency and is therefore ineligible to receive PHE credits.
We are also convinced the Department correctly determined it does not
have discretion to award PHE credits not authorized by the statute. The statute
directs the Department to award PHE credits "in accordance with" the statute.
It does not vest the Department with discretion to award PHE credits to
individuals who do not qualify for credits under the statute.
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We reject Marrara's constitutional challenges to the decision. His claims
that the Department should have awarded him discretionary credits because the
statue is unconstitutional and the Department violated the New Jersey
Administrative Procedures Act (NJAPA), N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15, by "not
rejecting the addition" of the unconstitutional statutory award of PHE credits at
N.J.A.C. 10:A:9-5.1(c)(2) lack merit.
Marrara's claim that the statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution and the right to equal protection conferred under
Article 1, paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution, see Doe v. Poritz, 142
N.J. 1, 94 (1995), because it distinguishes between classes of prisoners based on
the offenses they committed and their release dates, is unavailing. A
classification that does not impact a suspect class or impinge "upon a
fundamental constitutional right will be upheld if it is rationally related to a
legitimate government interest." Doe, 142 N.J. at 92 (citing Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970)).
The classification at issue here does not impinge upon a suspect class or
fundamental constitutional right. See Merola v. Dep't of Corr., 285 N.J. Super.
501, 514-15 (App. Div. 1995) (finding classification "between inmates based on
the severity of the crimes committed" does not implicate a suspect class).
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Therefore, the State need only show the classification was rationally related to
a legitimate government purpose.
The legislative history of the statute shows it was intended to, "expedite
the release of certain inmates who are approaching the end of their sentences in
order to reduce the risk of harm to inmates and correctional facility staff, while
simultaneously protecting the public safety." S. Com. Comm. Statement to S.
2519 1 (July 23, 2020); see also Assemb. Budget Comm. Statement to S. 2519
1 (Sept. 22, 2020).
The Legislature's determination that certain individuals would be awarded
PHE credits to reduce the risk of harm to inmates and correctional facility staff
during the public health emergency, while simultaneously protecting the public
safety, is plainly a distinction rationally related to a legitimate government
interest. We conclude therefore the statute does not violate Marrara's right to
equal protection under the United States or New Jersey Constitutions.
Marrara's claim that the Department violated his due process rights
because he was deprived of PHE credits to which he was entitled is without
merit. As discussed previously, he was not entitled to PHE credits. Marrara's
claim that the Department violated the NJAPA is not persuasive because the
statute was not a product of administrative rulemaking and it is constitutional.
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We conclude the Department correctly determined Marrara was not
entitled to PHE credits. The Department properly exercised its considerable
discretion in denying Marrara's request for an award of non-statutory credits and
its decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
To the extent we have not otherwise addressed appellant's arguments, it is
because they are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written
opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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