Township of Morris v. Borough of Morris Plains ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1464-23
TOWNSHIP OF MORRIS,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
BOROUGH OF MORRIS PLAINS,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
169 JOHNSON ROAD, LLC,
Defendant.
______________________________
Argued October 29, 2024 – Decided November 15, 2024
Before Judges Chase and Vanek.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Morris County, Docket No. L-1589-22.
John E. Horan argued the cause for appellant (Horan &
Aronowitz, LLP, attorneys; John E. Horan, on the
briefs).
Michael A. Sabony argued the cause for respondent
(Antonelli Kantor Rivera, PC, attorneys; Jarrid H.
Kantor, of counsel and on the brief; Gregory D. Emond
and Michael A. Sabony, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
The Borough of Morris Plains ("Borough") appeals from a Law Division
order dated December 8, 2023, granting the Township of Morris's ("Township")
motion for summary judgment in this contract dispute over sewer connection
fees. We affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Franzblau in
his cogent statement of reasons.
I.
In 1971 the Borough and Township entered into an agreement (the "1971
Agreement") in which sewage from the Borough would flow to the Township
and the Township would provide metered bulk sewage treatment at its treatment
facilities. As part of this agreement, the Borough was to "construct and
commence operations of a system of mains for the collection of sewage within
the Borough." In 1973, the parties entered into a subsequent agreement (the
"1973 Agreement") to allow the Borough to connect to the Township's system
earlier than contemplated in the 1971 Agreement. The 1973 Agreement
provided that the Township would receive a fee for houses within the Borough
being connected into the system.
A-1464-23
2
The Borough, Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills ("Parsippany"), and the
property owner entered into an agreement concerning use of the Borough's
sanitary sewerage system to carry waste from an office building located on
Route 10 and Johnson Road in Parsippany in November 1973 (the "November
1973 Agreement"). The November 1973 Agreement explicitly stated it was
contingent upon the approval of the Township. However, despite the Township
never approving the November 1973 Agreement, the parties elected to ope rate
under its terms, and sewage from the property was transmitted to and treated by
the Township. When the Township found out about the agreement it objected.
In 1981, the Township, the Borough, Parsippany Associates, and Trustees
of the General Electric Pension Trust entered into two agreements regarding
property located in Parsippany. The first agreement (the "First 1981
Agreement"), required payment to the Township of "sewer service charges as
set forth in and required by the ordinances of the Township." The second
agreement (the "Second 1981 Agreement"), required payment of "a sanitary
sewer fee to [the Township] for the office building complex." Further, the
Second 1981 Agreement superseded the November 1973 Agreement in its
entirety. At the end of 1981, a third agreement was entered into between the
Township, the Borough, and Travelers Insurance Company (the "1981 Johnson
A-1464-23
3
Road Agreement") regarding property located in Parsippany. Pursuant to this
1981 Johnson Road Agreement, the property owner agreed to pay a sanitary
sewer service fee directly to the Township.
The Borough and Parsippany entered into an agreement in 1983 (the "1983
Johnson Road Agreement"). Pursuant to the 1983 Johnson Road Agreement,
seven residential units located on Johnson Road in Parsippany connected to the
Borough's sewage system which was ultimately treated by the Township. In
1984, the Township and Borough executed an agreement concerning properties
located on Johnson Road in Parsippany (the "1984 Johnson Road Agreement").
Pursuant to the 1984 Johnson Road Agreement, the Borough expressly agreed
to remit to the Township the sewer connection fee for five of the residential units
provided for in the earlier 1983 Johnson Road Agreement, an agreement which
did not include the Township. Further, in the 1984 Johnson Road Agreement,
the Borough explicitly agreed to pay a connection fee to the Township for any
new connection along Johnson Road. In 1988, the Borough paid a connection
fee to the Township when the Township approved the sewer connection for
Johnson Plaza.
The Borough and Township entered into yet another agreement for "Bulk
Sewer Treatment Services" in 1999 (the "1999 Agreement"). Under the 1999
A-1464-23
4
Agreement, the Township agreed to continue supplying bulk sewage treatment
services for the Borough. Section 6.1 of the 1999 Agreement provides
"Connection Fees-The Borough shall have the right to impose and receive
connection fees as permitted by law to any user of said services in the Borough
and may retain all said amount received without claim from the Township."
Additionally, Section 6.5 of the 1999 Agreement provides in relevant part:
Out of town buildings – The parties acknowledge that
some users are located outside of the Borough for
which sewerage is transmitted through mains and lines
through the Borough to the Township Treatment Plant.
The Township agrees that it will bill said commercial
users directly and further acknowledges that the
Borough may reserve the right to impose an additional
fee upon such user, for the use of the Borough pipes and
other property by said user, which fee shall be billed to
the user by the Borough.
Several years later, in 2017, the Township and Parsippany were parties to
litigation in response to an emergent situation involving sewerage issues. The
litigation resolved and the settlement agreement provided that connection fees
from Parsippany would be paid to the Township. The Borough was not a party
to the litigation.
Thereafter, in 2021, Bowman Consulting Group, Ltd. ("Bowman"), on
behalf of a developer, applied for authorization to connect into the existing
sanitary sewer system in anticipation of the construction of an eighty-seven-unit
A-1464-23
5
residential development at 169 Johnson Road (the "Subject Property"). Bowman
requested the Township approve a Treatment Works Authorization Endorsement
("TWA"), as the sewage flow from the Subject Property would ultimately be
conveyed, through the Borough, to the sewage plant owned and operated by the
Township.
The Township sent a formal demand to Bowman requesting payment of
the connection fee. On March 11, 2022, the Borough responded to the demand
and contested the Township's claim to the connection fee. As the Borough had
already collected some of the fees, an escrow agreement was entered into by and
between the Township, the Borough, Bowman, and an escrow agent. Pursuant
to Section 2 of the escrow agreement, the Township formally demanded that
both the Borough and the developer provide written instructions to the escrow
agent for the immediate release of the escrowed funds to the Township. After
the Borough failed to respond to the demand, the Township commenced the
instant action by filing a complaint.
After discovery ended, the parties filed cross motions for summary
judgment. The Borough claimed according to Section 6.1 of the 1999
Agreement they were entitled to the connection fees. The Township claimed
that pursuant to Section 6.5 of the 1999 Agreement and the prior Agreements,
A-1464-23
6
they were entitled to the connection fees. In a cogent, well-reasoned opinion,
Judge Franzblau determined that the Township was entitled to the connection
fees, thus granting their motion for summary judgment and denying the
Borough's motion for summary judgment.
In the court's written statement of reasons supporting the summary
judgment orders, it noted that the Township's complaint asserted claims for
breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and conversion. The court found that the
terms of the 1999 Agreement were clear and unambiguous and when read in
conjunction with Sections 6.1 and 6.5, entitled the Township "to all connection
fees for users outside the Borough for which sewage is transmitted through
mains and lines through the Borough to the Township Treatment Plant." The
court found "it was of no moment" that Section 6.5 did not mention the term
"connection fees." The court further determined that Section 6.1 allowed the
Borough to impose and collect connection fees for users within, not outside, the
Borough. Although both parties contended that the 1999 Agreement was
unambiguous, the court noted that its interpretation of the 1999 Agreement was
"consistent with the parties' prior course of dealing in which the Township is
entitled to connection fees for properties outside the Borough." Moreover, the
court reasoned that there was no evidence within the 1999 Agreement that the
A-1464-23
7
parties intended to change their course of dealings or change the 1984 Johnson
Road Agreement which also provided for the Township to receive connection
fees for properties along Johnson Road. Lastly, the trial court granted summary
judgment as to the Township's claims for unjust enrichment and conversion. 1
This appeal by the Borough follows in which they argue that based on the
language of the contracts, summary judgment should have been granted in their
favor.
II.
We review a ruling on a summary judgment motion de novo, applying the
same standard governing the trial court. Conley v. Guerrero, 228 N.J. 339, 346
(2017) (citing Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of
Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016)). Thus, we consider, as the motion judge
did, "whether 'the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational
1
The Borough has not challenged summary judgment on those two counts. New
Jersey law is well-settled, "[a]n issue not briefed on appeal is deemed waived."
Sklodowsky v. Lushis, 417 N.J. Super. 648, 657 (App. Div. 2011); Pressler &
Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 5 R. 2:6-2 (2024) ("It is, of course,
clear that an issue not briefed is deemed waived."); State v. Amboy Nat. Bank,
447 N.J. Super. 142, 148 n.1 (App. Div. 2016) (issue addressed for first time in
reply brief deemed waived); 539 Absecon Boulevard, L.L.C. v. Shan Enters.
Ltd. P'ship, 406 N.J. Super. 242, 272 n.10 (App. Div. 2009) (noting claims not
briefed are deemed abandoned).
A-1464-23
8
factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving
party.'" Holmes v. Jersey City Police Dep't, 449 N.J. Super. 600, 602-03 (App.
Div. 2017) (quoting Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540
(1995)). "If there is no genuine issue of material fact, we must then 'decide
whether the trial court correctly interpreted the law.'" DepoLink Ct. Reporting
& Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J. Super. 325, 333 (App. Div. 2013)
(quoting Massachi v. AHL Servs., Inc., 396 N.J. Super. 486, 494 (App. Div.
2007)).
III.
With those principles in mind, we turn to the Borough's argument that the
trial court committed legal error in its interpretation of the agreements, and that
it is entitled to all connection fees for properties outside its boundaries. We
discern no error in the determinations made by Judge Franzblau and affirm
essentially for the rationale in his statement of reasons. We add the following
comments.
The trial court was presented with a strictly legal issue: the interpretation
of a contract. The construction of a written contract is almost always a legal
question for the court, suitable for disposition on summary judgment, unless
there is ambiguity or the need for parol evidence to aid in interpretation.
A-1464-23
9
Driscoll Constr. Co. v. State Dep't of Transp., 371 N.J. Super. 304, 313-14 (App.
Div. 2004). The court's aim is to determine the intentions of the parties to the
contract, as revealed by the language used, the relations of the parties, the
attendant circumstances, and the objects the parties were trying to attain. Id. at
313. "[W]here the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous there is no
room for interpretation or construction and the courts must enforce those terms
as written." Schor v. FMS Fin. Corp., 357 N.J. Super. 185, 191 (App. Div. 2002)
(quoting Kampf v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 33 N.J. 36, 43 (1960)). Absent
ambiguity, the intention of the parties is to be ascertained by the language of the
contract. Dontzin v. Myer, 301 N.J. Super. 501, 507 (App. Div. 1997). The law
is well-settled, "it is the function of a court to enforce it as written and not to
make a better contract for either of the parties." Kampf, 33 N.J. at 43 (1960).
Here, a plain reading of the 1999 Agreement gives the Borough the right
to impose and receive connection fees as permitted by law to any user of said
services in the Borough. The plain language of the 1999 Agreement does not
give the Borough the right to collect fees for connections outside the Borough.
Given the Subject Property is not located in the Borough, the Borough's reliance
on Section 6.1 of the 1999 Agreement is misplaced and does not provide for
payment of the connection fee to them.
A-1464-23
10
Although the Borough claims the 1999 Agreement supersedes the 1984
Johnson Road Agreement, nothing in the record suggests that parties intended
the 1999 Agreement to amend, change, or replace the 1984 Johnson Road
Agreement. If the agreements were inconsistent, a subsequent contract would
supersede a prior inconsistent contract to the extent of the inconsistences.
Rosenberg v. D. Kaltman & Co., 28 N.J. Super. 459, 463-64 (Ch. Div. 1953).
Given that the Borough is only entitled to fees from properties within the
Borough under the plain language of the 1999 Agreement, we discern no
inconsistency with the 1984 Johnson Road Agreement, which dealt with
property, like the Subject Property, that was outside the Borough. The 1984
Johnson Road Agreement explicitly provided any new connection along Johnson
Road required a connection fee to be paid to the Township, not the Borough.
To the extent the parties argue different readings of the entire 1999
Agreement, "[e]vidence of the circumstances is always admissible in the aid of
the interpretation of an integrated agreement, even where the contract is free
from ambiguity, not for the purpose of changing the writing, but to secure light
by which its actual significance is measured." Newark Publishers' Ass'n v.
Newark Typographical Union, 22 N.J. 419, 427 (1953); see Atlantic Northern
Airlines, Inc. v. Schwimmer, 12 N.J. 293, 301-02 (1956). The circumstances
A-1464-23
11
here, and in all agreements, are in accordance with the parties' course of action
in connection fees from properties on Johnson Road in Parsippany being paid to
the Township.
To the extent we have not otherwise addressed the Borough's other
arguments, they are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written
opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
A-1464-23
12