State of New Jersey v. W.G. ( 2024 )

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2462-23
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
W.G.,1
Registrant-Appellant.
________________________
Submitted October 21, 2024 – Decided November 6, 2024
Before Judges Berdote Byrne and Jacobs.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Hudson County, Docket No. ML-09-008.
Schuman, Hanlon Margulies, attorneys for appellant
(Gerald D. Miller, on the briefs).
Esther Suarez, Hudson County Prosecutor, attorney for
respondent (Angela Halverson, Assistant Prosecutor,
on the brief).
PER CURIAM
1
We use initials to protect appellant's privacy interests. R. 1:38-11(b).
Registrant appeals from the denial of his motion to terminate his Megan's
Law registration obligation. On August 14, 2000, registrant pleaded guilty to
third-degree endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a). He was
sentenced to 180 days of imprisonment and two years of probation. As a
condition of his sentence, registrant was ordered to comply with Megan's Law
and community supervision for life ("CSL"). Decades later in 2023, defendant
moved to terminate his Megan's Law registration and CSL obligations, claiming
he was eligible because he had been offense-free for longer than the minimum
fifteen-year period required in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f). However, in 2007, registrant
had been convicted of wandering or prowling with the purpose of unlawfully
obtaining or distributing a controlled dangerous substance ("CDS"), N.J.S.A.
2C:33-2.1(b), specifically marijuana. Registrant sought to overcome this
obstacle by relying on provisions of the New Jersey Cannabis Regulatory,
Enforcement Assistance, and Marketplace Modernization Act ("CREAMM
Act"),2 which was enacted in 2021, in part, to allow for the expungement of
certain enumerated marijuana offenses. The trial court ruled the CDS offense
was not included in the list of marijuana offenses eligible for expungement
pursuant to the CREAMM Act.
2
N.J.S.A. 24:6I-31 to -56.
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Registrant appeals, arguing his CDS offense should be deemed
expungable pursuant to the CREAMM Act to avoid "absurd" results that would
be contrary to the Act's purpose.
He questions:
I. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO TERMINATE HIS
MEGAN'S LAW OBLIGATION WHEN HE HAS
REMAINED OFFENSE-FREE, BUT FOR A
WANDERING OR PROWLING TO OBTAIN
MARIJUANA OFFENSE THAT IS NOT
ENUMERATED UNDER THE CREAMM ACT AS
EXPUNGABLE?
We conclude the trial court did not err and affirm.
I.
On April 28, 2000, a Monmouth County grand jury returned an indictment
containing three counts: second-degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(5),
now 2C:14-2(c)(4) (count one); third-degree endangering the welfare of a child,
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) (count two); and fourth-degree criminal sexual contact,
N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(b) (count three). Registrant pleaded guilty to count two, and
the State agreed to recommend that the remaining counts be dismissed.
On November 21, 2000, registrant was sentenced to 180 days
incarceration and two years' probation. He was obligated to comply with
Megan's Law and CSL as a condition of his sentence.
A-2462-23
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On May 16, 2006, registrant was arrested and charged with possession of
CDS, specifically marijuana, in contravention of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(4). He
subsequently pleaded guilty on June 29, 2007, to the lesser offense of
wandering, remaining in, or prowling public places with the purpose of
obtaining or selling CDS, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2.1(b), a disorderly-
persons offense.
On January 11, 2023, registrant moved to terminate his obligation to
register under Megan's Law and be released from CSL, claiming he had not
committed any crimes during the fifteen years since his release from custody.
The State objected to registrant's removal from Megan's Law registration
but did not oppose his removal from CSL. Registrant's CSL obligation was
terminated; he does not seek review of the trial court's order with respect to this
issue. On March 14, 2024, the trial court denied the motion to terminate
registrant's Megan's Law obligation, ruling the CDS offense to which registrant
had pleaded guilty was not an enumerated offense eligible for expungement
pursuant to the CREAMM Act. The trial court found the language of the statute
enumerating the expungable offenses to be clear and unambiguous.
II.
Our review of the applicability, validity, or interpretation of statutes is de
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novo. See Kocanowski v. Twp. of Bridgewater, 237 N.J. 3, 9 (2019); State v.
Fuqua, 234 N.J. 583, 591 (2018). "A trial court's interpretation of the law and
the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any
special deference." Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co., 239 N.J. 531, 552 (2019)
(quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366,
378 (1995)).
When interpreting the language of a statute, if the language "is clear on
its face, 'the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.'"
Cashin v. Bello, 223 N.J. 328, 335 (2015) (quoting Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J.
387, 392 (2001)). "If a plain-language reading of the statute 'leads to a clear and
unambiguous result, then [the court's] interpretive process is over.'" State v.
Amer, 254 N.J. 405, 422 (2023) (quoting State v. Hupka, 203 N.J. 222, 232
(2010)). "[I]f there is ambiguity in the statutory language that leads to more
than one plausible interpretation, we may turn to extrinsic evidence, 'including
legislative history . . . .'" Williams v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 255 N.J. 36, 46
(2023) (quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492-93 (2005)). Likewise,
we may examine legislative history if "a plain reading of the statute leads to an
absurd result or [] the overall statutory scheme is at odds with the plain
language." State v. Rodriguez, 238 N.J. 105, 114 (2019) (quoting DiProspero,
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183 N.J. at 493).
Megan's Law is a sex-offender-registration and community-notification
statute. See N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -11. As noted by the Legislature, the danger of
recidivism posed by sex offenders, particularly those offenders who commit
sexual acts against children, "require[s] a system of registration that will permit
law enforcement officials to identify and alert the public when necessary for the
public safety." N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1. Megan's Law requires registration by a person
"who has been convicted, adjudicated delinquent or found not guilty by reason
of insanity" for the commission of a listed "sex offense." N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(a)(1).
Registration pursuant to the statute is an obligation for life, but registrants are
afforded a one-time opportunity to apply to terminate the obligation "upon proof
that the person has not committed an offense within [fifteen] years following
conviction or release from a correctional facility . . . whichever is later, and is
not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others." N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f). This
narrow exception to the lifetime registration requirement in Megan's Law
requires a registrant be "offense free" and is not available to registrants who
commit an offense during the fifteen years following conviction or release but
later remain offense-free for a subsequent period of fifteen years. See In re
H.D., 241 N.J. 412, 421 (2020). The fifteen-year requirement "plainly refers to
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the conviction or release that trigger[ed] the registration requirement . . . . " Ibid.The term "offense" is defined as "a crime, a disorderly persons offense or
a petty disorderly persons offense . . . . " N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14(k) Thus, a
disorderly-persons offense is an "offense" within the codified definition of
Megan's Law. See N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14(k).
Accordingly, we agree with the trial court. The court could not terminate
W.G.'s Megan's Law registration obligation pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f)
because, having been convicted of a disorderly-persons offense in 2007, he was
not offense-free for fifteen years since the end of his period of incarceration.
The CREAMM Act is a wide-ranging statute that decriminalized certain
marijuana offenses, provided for the expungement of some offenses, and
redressed many adverse consequences to citizens who were disparately affected
by marijuana offenses. State v. Gomes, 253 N.J. 6, 11 (2023). The Act, passed
by the Legislature in February 2021, is codified, in relevant part, at N.J.S.A.
24:6I-31 to -56. Pursuant to the Act, prosecutors are advised not to pursue
certain enumerated marijuana offenses, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-23.1, and certain
enumerated marijuana convictions are expunged by operation of law. N.J.S.A.
2C:52-6.1.
N.J.S.A. 2C:52-6.1 directs the automatic expungement of any prior
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conviction for the obtaining or possession of marijuana, certain other marijuana
offenses, and "any disorderly persons offense or petty disorderly persons offense
subject to conditional discharge pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:36A-1." N.J.S.A.
2C:52-6.1 applies to "any case that, prior to [the] effective date, includes a
conviction or adjudication of delinquency solely for one or more crimes or
offenses involving" one of the following four categories of offenses:
[1] manufacturing, distributing, or dispensing, or
possessing or having under control with intent to
manufacture, distribute, or dispense, marijuana or
hashish in violation of paragraph (12) of subsection b.
of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5, or [2] obtaining, possessing,
using, being under the influence of, or failing to make
lawful disposition of marijuana or hashish in violation
of paragraph (3) or (4) of subsection a., or subsection
b., or subsection c. of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10, or [3] a
violation involving marijuana or hashish as described
herein and a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:36-2 for using or
possessing with intent to use drug paraphernalia with
that marijuana or hashish, alone or in combination with
each other, or [4] any disorderly persons offense or
petty disorderly persons offense subject to conditional
discharge pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:36A-1[.]
[Ibid.]
At the time of his CDS offense, registrant was arrested and charged with
possession of a CDS, marijuana, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(4). The
offense for which registrant was arrested is eligible for automatic expungement
under the second category of expungable offenses. See N.J.S.A. 2C:52-6.1.
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However, the lesser offense to which registrant pleaded guilty, "wandering,
remaining in or prowling public places with purpose of obtaining or selling
CDS," contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2.1(b), is not enumerated as being eligible for
expungement in N.J.S.A. 2C:52-6.1. Although a disorderly-persons offense
may be expungable pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:52-6.1's fourth category, W.G.'s
wandering offense does not meet the condition that it be "subject to conditional
discharge pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:36A-1." Offenses subject to conditional
discharge pursuant to N.J.S.A 2C:36A-1 are "any disorderly persons offense or
petty disorderly persons offense under chapter 35 or 36 of this title." It is an
ineluctable fact that registrant's offense was neither a chapter 35 nor 36 offense
subject to conditional discharge.
W.G. posits an absurd outcome would result from the CREAMM Act's
permitted expungement of a possession of marijuana offense but disallowed
expungement of a lesser-included offense. That argument is equally unavailing
for two reasons. First, the Legislature purposefully did not include N.J.S.A.
2C:33-2.1(b) as part of the CREAMM Act. "The Legislature is presumed to
know the law." Comm. of Petitioners for Repeal of Ordinance No. 522 (2013)
of Borough of W. Wildwood v. Frederick, 435 N.J. Super. 552, 567 (App. Div.
2014) (quoting David v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co, 360 N.J. Super. 127, 143 (App.
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Div. 2003)). The decision of the Legislature must be respected, as "a court may
not rewrite a statute or add language that the Legislature omitted." State v.
Munafo, 222 N.J. 480, 488 (2015) (citing DiProspero 183 N.J. at 492).
Second, even if registrant had been able to demonstrate expungement was
available to him, it does not necessarily follow expungement pursuant to the
CREEAM ACT would apply to the narrow exception to lifetime registration
obligations offered to litigants pursuant to Megan's Law. As our Supreme Court
recently observed when reviewing the effect expungement had upon a different
statute, "[t]he relief afforded 'by . . . expungement . . . does not include the
wholesale rewriting of history.'" N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. A.P.,
258 N.J. 266, 278 (2024) (quoting G.D. v. Kenny, 205 N.J. 275, 294-95 (2011)).
The Supreme Court found:
In addition to N.J.S.A. 2C:52-19, the Legislature
prescribed other exceptions to the expungement
statute’s restrictions on the use and disclosure of
expunged records and information. See, e.g., N.J.S.A.
2C:52-18 (exception for certain uses of expunged
records by the Violent Crimes Compensation Office);
id. at -20 (exception for certain uses of expunged
records in conjunction with supervisory treatment or
diversion programs); id. at -21 (exception for certain
uses of expunged records in conjunction with setting
bail, authorizing pretrial release, preparing a
presentence report, or sentencing); id. at -22 (exception
for certain uses of expunged records by the Parole
Board); id. at -23 (exception for certain uses of
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expunged records by the Department of Corrections);
id. at -23.1 (exception for certain uses of expunged or
sealed records" to facilitate the State Treasurer’s
collection of any court-ordered financial assessments
that remain due at the time of an expungement or
sealing of records granted by a court"); id. at -27(a)
(exception for disclosure of the "fact of an
expungement, sealing, or similar relief" under N.J.S.A.
2C:52-8(b)); id. at -27(b) (exception for disclosure of
the "fact of an expungement of prior charges" dismissed
in certain settings involving supervisory treatment or
other diversion programs); id. at -27(c) (exception for
"information divulged on expunged records," which
"shall be revealed by a petitioner seeking employment
within the judicial branch or with a law enforcement or
corrections agency," and which "shall continue to
provide a disability as otherwise provided by law").
[A.P., 258 N.J. at 27 n.4.]
For example, in State v. G.L., 420 N.J. Super. 158 (App. Div. 2011), the
defendant argued his multiple convictions for failure to re-register pursuant to
Megan's Law should be vacated because the underlying conviction subjecting
him to the Megan's Law's registration requirement was vacated and replaced
with an offense where he was not subject to registration. Id. at 161. We found
this argument futile, noting "[n]othing in the statute suggests that the
requirements of registration should be retroactively annulled because a plea to
a crime subject to Megan's [Law] is later withdrawn." Id. at 166. We further
disagreed with the defendant's contention fundamental fairness required we
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vacate his re-registration convictions, indicating at the time the defendant was
convicted for failing to re-register, "[he] was made fully aware of his reporting
obligations" and his violations were therefore "inarguably knowing." Id. at 167.
Although we need not reach that issue here because the CREEAM Act did
not enumerate the offense to which defendant had pleaded guilty, we conclude
no absurd result is created by this outcome.
Affirmed.
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