Debra Runowicz v. State of New Jersey ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2155-22
DEBRA RUNOWICZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
DIVISION OF STATE POLICE,
CAPTAIN WILLIAM HARKNESS
(#5355), LIEUTENANT ANTHONY
GUIDI (#5161), LIEUTENANT
COLONEL SCOTT EBNER (#5346),
MAJOR JOHN BALDOSARO
(#5027), CAPTAIN BRENDAN
MCINTYRE (#5079), CAPTAIN
JEANNE HENGEMUHLE (#5600),
SERGEANT FIRST CLASS
CHRISTOPHER POMMERENCKE
(#5391), and LIEUTENANT
RAYMOND PALOVCAK (#5387),
Defendants-Respondents.
Argued October 2, 2024 – Decided November 6, 2024
Before Judges Currier and Paganelli.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Mercer County, Docket No. L-2509-17.
George T. Daggett argued the cause for appellant.
Walter F. Kawalec, III, argued the cause for
respondents (Marshall Dennehey, PC, attorneys;
Walter F. Kawalec, III, and Leonard C. Leicht, on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
In this action, arising out of plaintiff's allegations that defendants violated
the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -14, in
transferring her to different departments and delaying her promotion, plaintiff
appeals from the orders granting defendants summary judgment and denying
reconsideration. The court granted summary judgment to all defendants, finding
the alleged acts of retaliation occurred outside the one-year statute of
limitations.
Because we conclude there are disputed material facts regarding
defendants' treatment of plaintiff and certain alleged acts of retaliation fell
within the statute of limitations, we vacate and reverse the order granting
summary judgment to all defendants, except defendant Sergeant First Class
(SFC) Christopher Pommerencke. We affirm the portion of the order granting
Pommerencke summary judgment.
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2
I.
Plaintiff graduated from the State Police Academy on October 3, 1997.
She was promoted to Sergeant in 2009. The following year, plaintiff was
transferred to the Office of Professional Services (OPS) and later plaintiff
became the Assistant Administrative Officer (AAO) of OPS, which was a
supervisory role. In 2014, plaintiff became an SFC.
Though plaintiff's title was AAO/SFC, her duties were that of an
Administrative Officer (AO), which is considered a Lieutenant position.1 She
explained she was not the AO because "position numbers" for AOs/lieutenants
that were originally allocated to OPS were removed and used to promote
individuals to AOs/lieutenants in other units.
On November 28, 2015, plaintiff states two civilian female employees told
her they were being harassed by certain members of OPS. The employees
repeated comments made by two male state troopers about another female
employee's weight and eating habits. The troopers admitted making the
comments. According to plaintiff, the female civilian employees were also told
they could not eat in the OPS kitchen area at the same time the Intake Unit was
1
Captain William Harkness explained the ranking system of the State Police is
as follows, from highest ranking to lowest: Colonel, Lieutenant-Colonels,
Majors, Captains, Lieutenants, Sergeants First Class, Sergeants, and Troopers.
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3
in there, despite it being a common area available to everyone. Plaintiff testified
she reported the incident to her direct supervisor, defendant Captain William
Harkness.2
Plaintiff also testified about certain email exchanges she had with
defendant Lieutenant Anthony Guidi in December 2015 which she described as
"abusive." Plaintiff stated she believed Guidi responded as he did because she
was a female. She said she was "treated like a secretary," someone that is
"supposed to take orders and do my job." Plaintiff testified that she observed
Guidi and other male members in his unit treat females differently than the male
troopers, describing the treatment as condescending towards females. She
informed Harkness about the emails.
According to plaintiff, she was told by Guidi and Captain Chris Nunziato
not to have any contact with the Intake Unit moving forward, and that they had
"closed the door." Plaintiff testified,
[T]here were many instances where my job as the
[AAO] with their unit specifically, and my job
specifically with their unit pretty much stopped. I was
not able to go into their office at all, correspond with
them in any way.
....
2
Harkness was a Lieutenant at the time.
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. . . [I]t was pretty much unapproachable to go into that
office in any way or correspond with them. So[,] I was
advised by the captain to send my e-mails directly
through him in reference to their unit.
Plaintiff described the "atmosphere in the office" as "frat boys where they
just kind of hung out, joked, had fun . . . but the females within OPS were treated
not with respect." If she went into the cafeteria when Intake Unit members were
present, they would not speak to her.
On July 26, 2016, plaintiff submitted a complaint with the Attorney
General's (AG) Office of Equal Employment (EEO), checking the boxes labeled
"Sex/Gender" and "Differential Treatment"; referring to the December 2015
incidents, requesting mediation and stating she "would like for the unfair
treatment to stop." 3 The AG's office informed plaintiff in October 2016 that it
was beginning its investigation of the complaint.
Also in October 2016, defendant Captain Brendan McIntyre asked
plaintiff if she was interested in transferring to the State Police Academy. Since
plaintiff had earned the Lieutenant position in OPS, she asked whether that
position was going to be returned to the unit. McIntyre said he would find out.
According to plaintiff, she had earned her points needed for the Lieutenant
3
This is the only information that can be seen on the complaint as the remainder
of the document is redacted.
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5
position after having served in the OPS position for more than six years. The
points would not apply to a promotion in another unit.
On November 3, 2016, defendant Major John Baldosaro asked plaintiff if
she was interested in going to the Academy, to which plaintiff responded no.
She again inquired into becoming a lieutenant in OPS and whether she could be
a lieutenant in the Academy. Earlier that day, Baldosaro asked plaintiff to leave
a meeting. Plaintiff did not know why she was told to leave as it had never
happened before, and an AAO attended every meeting that the Major was in.
Plaintiff decided to speak with defendant Captain Jeanne Hengemuhle at
the Academy about the potential move. During that conversation, Hengemuhle
told plaintiff she was unaware of plaintiff's potential transfer to the Academy,
and there was no AO position there. Hengemuhle informed plaintiff she was
aware of plaintiff's EEO complaint. Plaintiff's request to speak with defendant
Lieutenant Colonel Scott Ebner about the transfer was denied.
On November 15, 2016, plaintiff was transferred to the Academy.
Plaintiff testified that the reason for her transfer—as it was presented to her—
was that she was a female and "that [she] would be working under Jeanne
Hengemuhle and she's a female and it would probably be a lot easier to be
working under a female being . . . that [she is] a female." She also believed she
A-2155-22
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was transferred to the Academy because of the EEO investigation. Plaintiff
testified she considered the transfer as retaliation on the part of Ebner,
Baldosaro, and McIntyre because of her EEO complaint, since, in her
experience, "nothing is confidential" in the OPS. She testified:
Not that somebody specifically told me . . . that was the
reason why I was being transferred, but based on not
being able to sit in meetings anymore after that letter
[regarding the investigation]was sent to me in the mail,
not being directly in meetings with the major, being
kicked out of meetings, not given work to do, yes, that
to me was retaliation and the transfer was retaliation
based upon my EEO complaint.
A male SFC officer replaced plaintiff at OPS as the AAO.
Immediately following the transfer, plaintiff filed a retaliation complaint
against Ebner, Baldosaro, and McIntyre, which was investigated along with the
EEO complaint.
While plaintiff was at the Academy, she stated she
was not a part of any meetings whatsoever with the
captain or the assistant. . . . [I] never sat in on any
meetings, I never did any [AO] responsibilities, I was
never given any. I just kind of sat there. There was a
secretary that answered the phone[,] so I really had no
responsibilities whatsoever given to me as the [AO]
there, which is unheard of.
A-2155-22
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According to plaintiff, Hengemuhle assigned administrative work, that should
have been assigned to her, to the assistant head of the Training Support Unit and
had closed door meetings with him.
Plaintiff testified the following created a hostile work environment for her
while at the Academy:
[N]ot having any work to do, not being assigned
anything, not being able to approach the office for any
work, not being a part of any meetings, dealing with a
secretary that pretty much didn't talk all day long, had
closed-door meetings with the captain and not myself
involved. I was assigned her scheduling and she totally
avoided me in reference to her scheduling whatsoever
and would go to the captain every time for days off and
this and that. So[,] she never really—me being her
supervisor, she never even acknowledged that.
Basically, again, like I said, not being given any work
and knowing that [the assistant] [was] doing the
admin[istrative] work that I should be doing.
According to plaintiff, when she asked why she was not being assigned work,
Hengemuhle responded that everything was already arranged before plaintiff
was transferred, and since plaintiff's position was not one created by the unit,
Hengemuhle did not know what work to assign her.
In March 2017, Hengemuhle's assistant told plaintiff "this is not working
out." Plaintiff was then transferred to the Training Support Unit with the title
of assistant unit head. The existing male assistant unit head was moved to the
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Academy as the AAO. The unit head was defendant Lieutenant Raymond
Palovcak. According to plaintiff,
[she] was in charge of . . . five enlisted and one civilian
as the assistant, but there was a unit head that was never
there. So[,] when [she] came over, [she] had [her] one
and only meeting with the unit head and [the former
assistant]. Both of them were very annoyed and pissed
off that [the assistant] was leaving the unit. And
basically [plaintiff] was told . . . what [her] job
responsibilities were, and that was the last time [she]
pretty much had a meeting with [her] unit head and he
was really never in the unit. [She] think[s] [she] saw
him maybe once or twice for a short amount of time.
So [she] got no training in [her] unit.
Plaintiff's responsibilities included providing computer support and testing for
new recruits.
Immediately after this second transfer, Hengemuhle sent plaintiff an email
asking her to set up a training for the Academy staff. Plaintiff testified this
request fell under the responsibilities of the new AAO at the Academy. She
considered it to be a retaliatory action because she was in a different unit.
In July 2017, plaintiff was transferred to the Management Review Unit.
According to plaintiff, prior to the transfer, Major James Parker informed her
the transfer was being "held up" by Hengemuhle, who felt plaintiff did not
deserve to be in a position that would lead to becoming a lieutenant. Plaintiff
testified that
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Parker tried to fight to get me there because the unit
head there was retiring in the Management Review
Unit, so there would have been a six-month time frame
from July to when the retirement hit to when the job
would be posted, which would give me my eight points
[needed for the lieutenant promotion]. So basically
[Hengemuhle] was doing everything in her power [to
prevent] and delay the transfer.
Plaintiff also testified that Parker told her Hengemuhle said plaintiff was "not a
team player, that [she was] a problem child, that [she] c[a]me to work and [did
not] do anything."
According to plaintiff, she lost all the points she accumulated from being
in OPS towards her promotion after she was transferred from the Academy to
the Training Support Unit, and then to the Management Review Unit. She
explained an individual must remain in a unit for at least six months to maintain
the points. She testified, "I kept getting bounced around and not really having
any stability anywhere to gain points. I went with seven-and-a-half-years in
OPS [to] being transferred out to zero points."
Plaintiff was evaluated by Palovcak for the period of April 1, 2017 to June
30, 2017. She was found "satisfactory" in all areas but "cooperation" and
"accepts direction," which were marked as "some improvement needed." She
learned that one basis for the low mark arose from Hengemuhle's conversation
with Palovcak about a mandatory training session plaintiff refused to attend.
A-2155-22
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Plaintiff formally responded to the evaluation, stating Palovcak and
Hengemuhle lied in their comments about the training. Plaintiff said she never
refused to go and in fact did attend the mandatory session as documented in
emails. Plaintiff further testified that Palovcak was never in the office and did
not train or supervise her. Therefore, he did not know what she did or did not
do.
Plaintiff testified that all her prior evaluations as a state police officer were
positive. The record included the 2015 performance evaluation for plaintiff
while in OPS, which stated her job performance, proficiency, initiative,
judgment/decision making, interpersonal relationships, communications,
readiness for duty, effectiveness under stress, leadership, knowledge of rules,
were all "Exceptional."
As a result of the evaluation, Major Mark Wondrack recommended
plaintiff for a promotion to Lieutenant in April 2016, stating plaintiff "is a
[hardworking], dedicated and trustworthy member of [OPS]." Ebner concurred
with the evaluation, stating plaintiff "is an extremely competent, professional
and dedicated worker who has excelled in her duties as [AO] for [OPS]."
A-2155-22
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The 2016 performance evaluation again stated plaintiff's performance was
"Exceptional." Lieutenant Thomas Bonham recommended plaintiff for a
promotion in January 2017.
On November 21, 2017, plaintiff filed her complaint in Superior Court
against defendants, alleging they systematically discriminated against her,
created a hostile work environment, and deprived her of a promotion to
Lieutenant in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD),
N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50; and retaliated against her for filing an EEO complaint in
violation of CEPA, and for reporting violations of State Police rules and LAD
regulations.
In December 2017, the AG sent plaintiff a letter stating: "After
interviewing the relevant witnesses and reviewing the pertinent documents, the
Office of EEO found [her complaint] to be unsubstantiated."
On May 2, 2018, plaintiff was promoted to Lieutenant, Unit Head of the
Management Review Unit. In July 2018, the SFC who replaced plaintiff in OPS
after she was transferred, was promoted to Lieutenant, AO of the OPS.
II.
On May 1, 2020, defendants filed a notice of motion for summary
judgment, supported by several certifications. Ebner stated that the Deputy
A-2155-22
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Superintendent of Administration asked him to select three members to be
transferred to the Training Bureau; that "[p]laintiff was the obvious choice . . .
from OPS because she was a holdover from [the prior] administration as the de
facto [AO]. It was traditional in the State Police that when a Major took over a
Bureau, he (or she) could choose their own [AO]"; and that plaintiff had prior
experience in the Academy and "Captain Hengemuhle . . . was willing to have"
plaintiff.
Ebner submitted an additional certification stating he did not learn about
plaintiff's EEO complaint and investigation until April 2017 when he was asked
by the AG's office for a statement regarding plaintiff's November 2016 transfer.
Captain Harkness certified that plaintiff "resisted going through the chain
of command" in the email exchange Guidi had with her, and Guidi's response
was "completely appropriate." He stated:
Plaintiff's issues with the chain of command were an
ongoing pattern. She would insist that she could reach
out directly to people below her rank, and tell them
what to do, because she was their superior based strictly
on her command, even if she was not in their chain of
command. In [an] attempt to mentor her, I would talk
to her and explain that she shouldn't jump the chain of
command. She would honor the chain of command for
a while and then go back to her old habits. We had
multiple situations where she would reach out and
direct people in another person's chain of command
without any attempt to go through their superiors. To
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ameliorate the problem, I requested that . . . [p]laintiff
go through me or Captain Nunziato if she needed
something from the Intake Unit. This was not done for
discriminatory or retaliatory reasons, but because . . .
[p]laintiff created friction by violating the chain of
command, and I wanted to [e]nsure that the bureau was
running smoothly.
Neither Lt. Guidi nor I ever received either an
email or any other written communication indicating
that as the [AAO], [p]laintiff was exempt from going
through the chain of command.
Neither Lt. Guidi nor I was told verbally by a
superior that [p]laintiff was allowed to bypass the chain
of command when she sought resources or personnel
not in her chain of command.
....
There was never a general rule that the women in
the office, including the civilians, could not send the
people in the Intake unit [emails] or other
communications or questions, nor did I or anyone else
tell them that.
Harkness further certified that plaintiff's allegation of retaliatory conduct
for being asked to leave meetings was "absurd," because others were also asked
to leave during confidential conversations, including himself. He also stated his
conversations with the female civilians "made it clear that no violation . . .
occurred." He stated: "The women all indicated that they did not believe that
A-2155-22
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the alleged comments had been made because of their sex, and in any event that
they were not offended."
Guidi provided a certification stating, "[t]here is nothing unusual about
being transferred within the State Police" and he had "absolutely nothing to do"
with plaintiff's transfer out of OPS. McIntyre executed a certification reiterating
Guidi's comments and asserting Ebner made the determination regarding
plaintiff's transfer. Baldosaro provided a certification stating it was not unusual
to permit him to choose his own AAO, and that Ebner facilitated plaintiff's
transfer.
Pommerencke provided a certification stating he had no knowledge as to
why he was a defendant in this matter; he worked briefly with plaintiff in the
Academy and he once contacted plaintiff "about possibly transferring
assignments," but nothing came of it; and a decision to approve a transfer was
beyond his control.
Hengemuhle certified that she considered plaintiff to be a friend; she did
not request nor object to plaintiff's transfer to the Academy; plaintiff was
unhappy with her commute to the Academy and preferred to be at the division
headquarters; and she recalled plaintiff attempted to do a mutual transfer with
Pommerencke but that to her knowledge an official request was not made.
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Palovcak provided a certification stating plaintiff had advised him that the
transfer was against her wishes, and her "two main goals" were to be transferred
closer to home and promoted; there was nothing improper about plaintiff's
training and she did not "take advantage of" training opportunities presented to
her; his evaluation of plaintiff's performance was "fair and honest"; plaintiff
became "angry" when she was told to undergo specific training and said she
would not attend unless ordered; and plaintiff was happy about her transfer to
Management Review Unit because the job was closer to her home.
Plaintiff opposed the motion in a statement of disputed material facts
including: denying she was acting out of the chain of command when contacting
members directly, as that was her job; denying that she got "loud" but rather it
was defendants who yelled and screamed at her; stating communications were
blown out of proportion because she was a woman; stating though some
meetings were sensitive, she disagreed that she should be excluded; den ying
Ebner's reason for the transfer, asserting that Baldosaro had praised her work
and there was no reason he would want a different AAO; and denying that her
transfer was necessary since there was no work for her when she arrived at the
Academy.
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In August 2020, the court granted defendants' motion for summary
judgment as to plaintiff's LAD claims but denied the motion as to her CEPA
claims. In the accompanying opinion, the court found there appeared to be
genuine issues of material facts as to whether plaintiff endured a hostile work
environment, and that her LAD claims were waived because she presented
CEPA claims grounded in the same protected action.
III.
In April 2022, defendants renewed their motion for summary judgment.
In the supporting statement of material facts, defendants asserted the AG's
Office of EEO found plaintiff's allegations in her EEO complaint were
unsubstantiated. Defendants also informed the court of plaintiff's promotion and
that the lieutenant position in OPS was filled on July 17, 2018, after plaintiff
was promoted to Lieutenant in the Management Review Unit. The certifications
from defendants previously attached to the first summary judgment motion were
submitted again.
Harkness, Guidi, McIntyre, and Baldosaro asserted that the one-year
statute of limitations under CEPA barred any claims against them because they
had no interaction with plaintiff in the year before she filed her Superior Court
complaint. As to Hengemuhle, Pommerencke, and Palovac, they contended that
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since they only worked with plaintiff at the Academy following her transfer,
they were not involved in the decision-making process regarding the transfer.
Ebner asserted plaintiff had not presented any facts to counter the reasons he
proffered for her transfer. Because there were non-retaliatory reasons for
transferring plaintiff, defendants asserted plaintiff could not support her CEPA
claim.
Plaintiff opposed the motion, asserting that the prior order denying
summary judgment as to her CEPA claim was the law of the case. In addition,
in its oral decision, the first court found there were issues of material fact
regarding the presence of a hostile work environment. Plaintiff stated she
responded to defendants' certifications and the statement of facts.
In its August 8, 2022 oral decision, the court found it was not precluded
from considering the second summary judgment motion because the statute of
limitations under CEPA had not previously been raised or adjudicated. The
court stated that plaintiff did not submit a counterstatement of material facts
stating the facts in dispute.
The court noted plaintiff filed her EEO complaint in July 2016 and she
was transferred out of OPS in November 2016. Plaintiff filed her Superior Court
complaint on November 21, 2017. Therefore, under the CEPA one-year statute
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of limitations, she could only assert claims for alleged retaliatory actions that
occurred within the year prior to November 21, 2017. The court found that
Harkness, Guidi, McIntyre, and Baldosaro did not have any interaction with
plaintiff during that one-year period. Therefore, the court granted summary
judgment to those defendants.
In considering the allegations against Ebner, the court found he provided
a "non-retaliatory business justification for the transfer[,]" stating: "[T]here's
no genuine issue of material fact[] that ha[s] been raised in opposition to this
motion as to there being anything inappropriate about the . . . reason articulated
by Lieutenant Colonel Ebner for the transfer." The court similarly found
plaintiff had not presented an issue of material fact as to Hengemuhle's
interactions with her that could support a CEPA claim for retaliation.
The court entered a memorializing order that same day granting all
defendants summary judgment.
Thereafter, plaintiff filed motions for reconsideration of the court's
August 8, 2022 order and to vacate the order under Rules 4:49 or 4:50. Plaintiff's
counsel asked for the opportunity to fully address the issues raised in the second
summary judgment motion because he had not done so initially, as he assumed
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the law of the case asserted in the first order denying summary judgment would
prevail.
In its February 21, 2023 oral decision, the court found plaintiff had
opposed the second motion for summary judgment and had addressed the issues
raised in the motion. The court denied the motion for reconsideration, stating
plaintiff did not "raise any issue that the [c]ourt did not consider." The court
also denied the motion to vacate as plaintiff presented no meritorious grounds
under which to support the motion. That same day, the court entered an order
denying the motions for reconsideration and to vacate the summary judgment
order.
IV.
On appeal, plaintiff contends the court erred in rejecting her "law of the
case" argument and in denying her request to "reopen" the case to permit her to
respond more completely to defendants' contentions in the summary judgment
motion. Plaintiff also challenges the court's determination that the statute of
limitations barred her CEPA claims as to all defendants.
We review a trial court's decision on a motion for summary judgment de
novo, "applying the same standard used by the trial court." Samolyk v. Berthe,
251 N.J. 73, 78 (2022). A motion for summary judgment should be granted
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when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and . . . the
moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law." R. 4:46-
2(c). The court should "consider whether the competent evidential materials
presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are
sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in
favor of the non-moving party." Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J.
520, 540 (1995).
"A trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that
flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference." Rowe v.
Bell & Gossett Co., 239 N.J. 531, 552 (2019) (quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P.
v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).
A.
We briefly discuss and dispose of plaintiff's argument that the "law of the
case" doctrine prohibited the trial court from considering defendants' second
summary judgment motion.
"The law of the case doctrine teaches us that a legal decision made in a
particular matter 'should be respected by all other lower or equal courts during
the pendency of that case.'" Lombardi v. Masso, 207 N.J. 517, 538 (2011)
(quoting Lanzet v. Greenberg, 126 N.J. 168, 192 (1991)). "Importantly, the law
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of the case doctrine is only triggered when one court is faced with a ruling on
the merits by a different and co-equal court on an identical issue." Id. at 539.
However, we have also recognized that "an order denying summary
judgment is not subject to the law of the case doctrine because it decides nothing
and merely reserves issues for future disposition." Cadre v. Proassurance Cas.
Co., 468 N.J. Super. 246, 259 (App. Div. 2021) (quoting Gonzalez v. Ideal Tile
Importing Co., 371 N.J. Super. 349, 356 (App. Div. 2004)). "Denial of summary
judgment preserves rather than resolves issues; therefore, later reconsideration
of matters implicated in the motion, including the reasons in support of the
denial, are not precluded." Ibid. (quoting Blunt v. Klapproth, 309 N.J. Super.
493, 504 (App. Div. 1998)).
Under Rule 4:42-2(b),
[A]ny order or form of decision which adjudicates
fewer than all the claims as to all the parties shall not
terminate the action as to any of the claims, and it shall
be subject to revision at any time before the entry of
final judgment in the sound discretion of the court in
the interest of justice.
The court's August 7, 2020 order denied in part and granted in part
defendants' motion for summary judgment. Therefore, this was an interlocutory
order "because [it] did not resolve, either individually or collectively, all issues
as to all parties." Gonzalez, 371 N.J. Super. at 355. Accordingly, it was not an
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abuse of discretion for the court to consider defendants' second summary
judgment motion. Furthermore, the first court did not find that plaintiff
established a CEPA claim. The August 2020 order stated: "After taking into
account all the papers and arguments from both sides it appears that there are
genuine issues of material fact as to whether plaintiff endured a hostile work
environment."
B.
We turn then to the court's order granting summary judgment to all
defendants as barred under the applicable statute of limitations.
"[CEPA] protects workers who blow the whistle on their employers'
illegal, fraudulent, or otherwise improper activities that implicate the health,
safety, and welfare of the public." D'Annunzio v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.,
192 N.J. 110, 114 (2007). The statute "is remedial social legislation designed
to promote two complementary public purposes: 'to protect and [thereby]
encourage employees to report illegal or unethical workplace activities and to
discourage public and private sector employers from engaging in such conduct.'"
Id. at 119 (alteration in original) (quoting Yurick v. State, 184 N.J. 70, 77
(2005)). Because CEPA is a remedial statute, it "should be construed liberally
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to effectuate its important social goal." Chiofalo v. State, 238 N.J. 527, 540
(2019) (quoting Battaglia v. UPS, 214 N.J. 518, 555 (2013)).
CEPA protects against retaliatory action taken by an employer against an
employee. "CEPA defines actionable retaliation as 'the discharge, suspension
or demotion of an employee, or other adverse employment action taken against
an employee in the terms and conditions of employment.'" Green v. Jersey City
Bd. of Educ., 177 N.J. 434, 446 (2003) (quoting N.J.S.A. 34:19-2(e)). N.J.S.A.
34:19-5 states: "Upon a violation of any of the provisions of this act, an
aggrieved employee or former employee may, within one year, institute a civil
action in a court of competent jurisdiction."
Our Supreme Court has held that the CEPA one-year statute of limitations
"begins to run from the final act of retaliation when there is a continued course
of retaliatory conduct by the employer." Green, 177 N.J. at 437-38. In Green,
the plaintiff was a teacher who refused to participate in what she considered to
be a fraudulent scheme and reported the scheme to a supervisor. Id. at 438-39.
The plaintiff claimed she was retaliated against for the following two years by
conduct that included denied requests for training or to participate in programs,
substandard evaluations despite previous evaluations being consistently
satisfactory, being moved to a dilapidated and inadequate classroom, and her
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students also being denied access to programs or permitted to go on field trips.
Id. at 439.
The Court found
"[r]etaliation," as defined by CEPA, need not be a
single discrete action. Indeed, "adverse employment
action taken against an employee in the terms and
conditions of employment," N.J.S.A. 34:19-2(e), can
include, as it did in this case, many separate but
relatively minor instances of behavior directed against
an employee that may not be actionable individually but
that combine to make up a pattern of retaliatory
conduct.
[Id. at 448.]
The Court found that even though the plaintiff reported what she believed was
illegal conduct in 1995, the treatment she received continued until she retired in
1997, and, therefore, her CEPA claim filed in May 1997 was not barred. Ibid.Here, plaintiff filed an EEO complaint on September 20, 2016, regarding
the unfair and differential treatment of females in OPS. She reported her
complaints to Harkness, her superior officer. Two weeks later, McIntyre and
Baldosaro discussed with plaintiff a transfer to the Academy. On November 15,
2016, plaintiff was notified that she was going to be transferred to the Academy
against her wishes; she was physically transferred ten days later. On November
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18, 2016, plaintiff filed a retaliation complaint with the EEO against Ebner,
Baldosaro, and McIntyre.
Plaintiff filed her complaint in Superior Court on November 21, 2017.
She alleged she was retaliated against for having filed an EEO complaint and
retaliation complaint with EEO, and that she was "transferred several times
thereby being deprived of promotion to Lieutenant and . . . subject[ed] to a
hostile work environment."
All of the events giving rise to plaintiff's allegations occurred within the
one year before the filing of her complaint. Plaintiff has presented facts
regarding Harkness, Ebner, Baldosaro, and McIntyre's actions leading to her
transfer. Plaintiff alleges the remaining defendants continued their mistreatment
of her and retaliated against her while she was at the Academy, resulting in
another transfer. Those allegations clearly fall within the year period before the
filing of her complaint. From the time plaintiff filed her EEO complaint, there
was a continuing course of retaliatory conduct. Therefore, the court erred in
granting defendants summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds.
C.
We address then whether plaintiff has presented a prima facie case to
withstand summary judgment on her CEPA claim. Although we have stated the
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August 2020 order denying summary judgment was not binding on the second
court considering the application, nevertheless, the facts and documents
presented in both motions were the same—plaintiff's deposition testimony, and
defendants' certifications prepared to support the motions.
A cause of action pursuant to CEPA requires the following proofs:
(1) [the employee] reasonably believed that [their]
employer's conduct was violating either a law, rule, or
regulation promulgated pursuant to law, or a clear
mandate of public policy; (2) [the employee] performed
a "whistle-blowing" activity described in N.J.S.A.
34:19-3(c); (3) an adverse employment action was
taken against [them]; and (4) a causal connection exists
between the whistle-blowing activity and the adverse
employment action.
[Battaglia, 214 N.J. at 556 (2013) (quoting Dzwonar v.
McDevitt, 177 N.J. 451, 462 (2003)).]
We are satisfied, after a careful review of the evidence, that the record
contains disputed facts as to the reasons behind plaintiff's transfers, and as to
why she was not promoted while in OPS. Some certifications portray plaintiff
as unlikeable, sensitive, and a person who "stirs" things up. Parker certified
plaintiff "rubbed" people the wrong way. He believed she was not being
promoted for personal reasons.
The 2015 and 2016 evaluations described plaintiff as exceptional in her
work, and she was recommended for promotion to Lieutenant by two supervisors
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before her transfer out of OPS. However, she was not promoted despite being
in the unit for more than seven years. The male AAO who replaced her in OPS
was promoted to Lieutenant within two years of his arrival there.
When viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, there are disputed
material facts in the record regarding defendants' treatment of plaintiff and
whether the treatment, including the transfers and failure to promote were
related to the EEO and retaliation complaints. Therefore, we vacate the
summary judgment order as to all defendants except for Pommerencke, as a
review of the evidence reflects plaintiff has not demonstrated a prima facie case
of a CEPA violation against Pommerencke.
The August 8, 2022 order is vacated except for defendant Pommerencke.
We remand for further proceedings. We do not retain jurisdiction.
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