State of New Jersey v. Angel Medina ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0098-23
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ANGEL MEDINA,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________
Submitted October 22, 2024 – Decided November 7, 2024
Before Judges Gooden Brown and Smith.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 04-09-2973.
Angel Medina, appellant pro se.
Theodore N. Stephens II, Essex County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Frank J. Ducoat, Assistant
Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant appeals from the June 29, 2023, Law Division order denying
his second petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). We affirm.
The procedural history and underlying facts in this matter are set forth at
length in our prior unpublished opinion on defendant's direct appeal, in which
we affirmed his convictions and sentence for murder and related weapons
possession offenses stemming from the fatal shooting of Mutah Coleman after
an argument outside a Newark fast-food restaurant in the early morning hours
of January 1, 2004. See State v. Medina, No. A-4611-05 (App. Div. June 23,
2008), certif. denied, 196 N.J. 466 (2008). After the jury returned a guilty
verdict in late 2005, defendant was subsequently sentenced to an aggregate term
of forty years in prison, with a thirty-five-year period of parole ineligibility. Id.
at 3.
On June 28, 2013, the trial court denied defendant's first PCR petition.
After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the court rejected defendant's
contention that his trial attorney was ineffective by failing to keep him apprised
of the case status and provide him with complete discovery and determined that
trial counsel's credible testimony negated defendant's claims. We affirmed in
an unpublished opinion, noting "the judge's credibility findings were sufficiently
supported in the record to be afforded substantial deference." State v. Medina,
No. A-3204-13 (App. Div. May 11, 2015) (slip op. at 12-13). The Supreme
Court denied certification. State v. Medina, 224 N.J. 244 (2016).
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Defendant also challenged his convictions in federal courts. On April 7,
2017, defendant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied in the federal
district court. Medina v. Johnson, No. 16-cv-2162, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
53418, at *1 (D.N.J. Apr. 7, 2017). The Third Circuit denied a certificate of
appealability, Medina v. Adm'r N.J. State Prison, No. 17-cv-1975, 2017 U.S.
App. LEXIS 22556 (3d Cir. July 27, 2017), and the United States Supreme Court
denied defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari. Medina v. Johnson, 586 U.S.
829 (2018).
On May 18, 2022, defendant filed a second PCR petition and moved for a
determination of good cause for the assignment of counsel. In the petition,
defendant again asserted his trial attorney was ineffective by failing to provide
him with complete discovery and relay plea offers. To overcome the procedural
bar and time limitations prescribed in Rules 3:22-4 and 3:22-12, defendant
certified that "despite [his] diligent work to pursue all available avenues for
relief," he only obtained the complete discovery "in or around the summer of
2021" and "only discovered the facts and charges of ineffective assistance of
counsel . . . in or around September 2021."
In a written opinion and order, the second PCR judge determined that "on
the face of the . . . petition," defendant failed to allege "a basis for precluding
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dismissal under [Rule] 3:22-4," and dismissed the petition for "failure to show
good cause" under Rule 3:22-6(b). The judge also found that defendant failed
to establish "a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel" based on
trial counsel's credible testimony during the evidentiary hearing conducted in
connection with defendant's first PCR petition. The judge recounted that trial
counsel had testified "that he did in fact review complete discovery with
[d]efendant." As a result, the judge concluded that defendant's claims to the
contrary were nothing "more than 'bald assertions.'" See State v. Cummings,
321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999) ("[I]n order to establish a prima facie
claim, a petitioner must do more than make bald assertions that he was denied
the effective assistance of counsel.") (italicization omitted). This appeal
followed.
On appeal, defendant raises the following single point for our
consideration:
THE [PCR] COURT ERRED IN IT[S] DECISION
DENYING DEFENDANT'S . . . SECOND [PETITION
FOR] POST[-]CONVICTION RELIEF[.]
Under Rule 3:22-4(b), "[a] second or subsequent petition for post-
conviction relief shall be dismissed" unless:
(1) it is timely under [Rule] 3:22-12(a)(2); and
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(2) it alleges on its face either:
(A) that the petition relies on a new rule of
constitutional law, made retroactive to
defendant's petition by the United States
Supreme Court or the Supreme Court of
New Jersey, that was unavailable during
the pendency of any prior proceedings; or
(B) that the factual predicate for the relief
sought could not have been discovered
earlier through the exercise of reasonable
diligence, and the facts underlying the
ground for relief, if proven and viewed in
light of the evidence as a whole, would
raise a reasonable probability that the relief
sought would be granted; or
(C) that the petition alleges a prima facie
case of ineffective assistance of counsel
that represented the defendant on the first
or subsequent application for post-
conviction relief.
[R. 3:22-4(b).]
Under Rule 3:22-12(a)(2), a second or subsequent PCR petition is timely
only if it is filed within one year of "the date on which the [new] constitutional
right asserted was initially recognized"; "the date on which the factual predicate
for the relief sought was discovered, if that factual predicate could not have been
discovered earlier through the exercise of reasonable diligence"; or "the date of
the denial of the first or subsequent application for post-conviction relief where
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ineffective assistance of counsel that represented the defendant on the first or
subsequent application for post-conviction relief is being alleged."
"[E]nlargement of Rule 3:22-12's time limits 'is absolutely prohibited.'"
State v. Jackson, 454 N.J. Super. 284, 292 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting Aujero v.
Cirelli, 110 N.J. 566, 577 (1988)); see R. 3:22-12(b) ("These time limitations
shall not be relaxed, except as provided herein."); see also R. 1:3-4(c) ("Neither
the parties nor the court may . . . enlarge the time specified by . . . R[ule] 3:22-
12 . . . .") (citations omitted). In addition, "[a] petitioner is generally barred
from presenting a claim on PCR that could have been raised at trial or on direct
appeal, R[ule] 3:22-4(a), or that has been previously litigated, R[ule] 3:22-5."
State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 546 (2013) (footnote omitted).
A second or subsequent PCR petitioner shall be assigned counsel "only
upon application therefor and showing of good cause." R. 3:22-6(b). "[G]ood
cause exists only when the court finds that a substantial issue of fact or law
requires assignment of counsel and when a second or subsequent petition alleges
on its face a basis to preclude dismissal under R[ule] 3:22-4." R. 3:22-6(b). To
find good cause, the court must be satisfied "that there is some merit in the
subsequent petition and that it is not wholly frivolous." Pressler & Verniero,
Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 2 on R. 3:22-6(b) (2025). We review de novo
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the trial court's legal conclusion that defendant's second PCR petition is
procedurally barred. See State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 419 (2004) ("Assessing
[ineffective assistance of counsel] claims involves matters of fact, but the
ultimate determination is one of law and . . . '[a] trial court's interpretation[s] of
the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not
entitled to any special deference.'" (second alteration in original) (quoting
Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Committee, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995))).
Our review of the record readily reveals that defendant's second petition
is procedurally barred. The petition was filed May 18, 2022. In his certification,
defendant vaguely asserts he only obtained the complete discovery "in or around
the summer of 2021." However, defendant failed to adequately explain exactly
what records he received or when he received the records to justify the late
filing. Without greater specificity, we conclude the issues were raised more than
one year after the factual predicate for the relief sought was discovered. Further,
given the procedural history of the case and the fact that the identical issue was
previously raised and litigated in an evidentiary hearing in the first PCR petition,
we are convinced the factual predicate could have been discovered earlier
through the exercise of reasonable diligence. Additionally, given the prior
adjudication of the first PCR petition, the issue has been previously litigated.
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Defendant's arguments are therefore precluded by Rules 3:22-4, 3:22-5, and
3:22-12(a).
We also reject defendant's vague assertion that his second PCR counsel
was ineffective as it was never raised in the trial court and therefore is not
properly before us. See State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 20 (2009) ("[A]ppellate
courts will decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the
trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is available unless the
questions so raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concern
matters of great public interest." (quoting Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62
N.J. 229, 234 (1973))). To the extent we have not addressed any specific
argument, it is because it lacks sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written
opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
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