State of New Jersey v. Kalel E. Baldwin ( 2024 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2269-22
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent/
Cross-Appellant,
v.
KALEL E. BALDWIN,
Defendant-Appellant/
Cross-Respondent.
_______________________
Submitted October 8, 2024 – Decided November 13, 2024
Before Judges Firko and Bishop-Thompson.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Union County, Indictment No. 21-11-0774.
Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant/cross-respondent (Laura B. Lasota, Deputy
Public Defender II, of counsel and on the briefs).
William A. Daniel, Union County Prosecutor, attorney
for respondent/cross-appellant (Milton S. Leibowitz,
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Kalel E. Baldwin appeals from the August 10, 2022 Law
Division order denying his motion for admission into the pre-trial intervention
(PTI) program following his rejection by the Union County Prosecutor's Office
(Prosecutor's Office). The State cross-appeals from the March 24, 2023 order
sentencing defendant to probation for a first-degree conviction for distribution
of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS). We affirm.
I.
During an undercover drug investigation on October 19, 2020, a Union
undercover police officer completed a drug transaction for the purchase of fifty
ecstasy pills with co-defendant Timothy Hanlein-Hubble.1 After the completion
of a drug transaction, the officers observed Hanlein-Hubble drive to a nearby
location and approach a car driven by defendant. The officers later determined
defendant's identity based on the numerous motor vehicle summonses issued to
him as the driver, although the car was registered to another person.
Two days later, Hanlein-Hubble and the undercover officer arranged for
the purchase of 500 ecstasy pills in Clark. While surveilling a pre-arranged
meeting area, officers observed defendant in the same car and a female
1
Hanlien-Hubble pleaded guilty to one count of first-degree possession of a
controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute under Union County
Accusation No. 21-09-0406.
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passenger arrive at the location. Hanlein-Hubble walked over to defendant's car
and leaned into the open passenger door. After Hanlein-Hubble walked away
from defendant's car, the officer received a phone call. Twenty minutes later,
Hanlein-Hubble and the officer met and completed the drug transaction.
Hanlein-Hubble was subsequently arrested. Around the same time, defendant's
car was stopped; and marijuana and methamphetamine were found in the female
passenger's purse on the passenger floorboard, and two jars of marijuana and a
digital scale were found in the trunk. 2
Defendant waived his Miranda3 rights and provided an initial statement to
the police. Defendant admitted he delivered the ecstasy pills to a person named
"Tim" in Clark. He also admitted that he approached "Tim's" job, "Tim"
approached the passenger side of defendant's car and defendant gave him a
plastic bag of ecstasy pills. Defendant also provided a description of the pills
during the police interview.
Defendant again waived his Miranda rights and provided a second
statement. Defendant admitted his part in the drug transaction and said he
2
While not specified in the record, the charges against the female passenger for
the CDS found in her purse were dismissed.
3
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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3
bought the pills from a person named "G" in Newark. Defendant stated that he
planned to keep most of the profits from the sale of the pills and give some of
the profit to Hanlein-Hubble. Thereafter, in November 2021, defendant was
indicted on charges of first-degree distribution of methamphetamine, N.J.S.A.
2C:35-5(a)(1) and 2C:35-5(b)(8), and third-degree possession of CDS, N.J.S.A.
2C:35-10(a)(1).
In March 2022, defendant applied to Union County's PTI program. In his
PTI application, defendant acknowledged that he was charged with a crime that
carried a presumption of imprisonment. In support of his application, defendant
submitted a statement of compelling circumstances, stating that he had (1) no
prior criminal conviction or arrests, (2) full-time employment, and (3) received
and continued to receive psychiatric care and was hospitalized as a teenager and
adult.
Defendant also stated that he would "struggle with the incarceration
period due to [his] fragile mental state." Defendant also submitted a personal
statement, letters from his psychotherapist, Dr. Engin Bahce, and mental health
treatment records. Lastly, defendant admitted regret for his participation in the
distribution and possession of the pills.
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Bahce's letters provided an overview of the history of defendant's mental
health illness. Defendant was treated from September 2009 to June 2010,
December 2014 to June 2018, and June 3, 2020 to July 8, 2020. He began
counseling with Bahce when he was ten years old. At the age of twelve,
defendant spent nineteen months in a residential setting after multiple
psychiatric admissions. At the age of fifteen, defendant was diagnosed with
bipolar disorder — characterized by extreme mood swings including emotional
highs (mania or hypomania) and lows (depression). 4 Defendant received
inpatient treatment at various times and was placed on several psychotropic
medications.
Due to behavioral issues, defendant was placed in an alternative
educational setting from fifth grade through high school. He graduated high
school in 2018 and was discharged from counseling services because he no
longer met the criteria for further services. Bahce opined defendant's emotional
4
Bipolar disorder is one of seven categories of depressive disorders under the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. See Am. Psychiatric
Ass'n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed. text rev.
DSM-5-TR 2022) and (5th ed. DSM-5 2013), Section II Bipolar and Related
Disorders (enumerating diagnostic criteria for bipolar disorders and other
characteristics).
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immaturity presented significantly younger than his physiological age and
physical stature as an adult.
Defendant was hospitalized on numerous occasions — most recently from
May 20, 2020 to June 20, 2020 — after a suicide attempt. Defendant then
resumed counseling with Bahce and taking psychotropic medication but stopped
treatment after four sessions.
Defendant resumed treatment in November 2021 after his arrest but was
no longer on psychotropic medication. Bahce opined defendant's mental health
had "deteriorated considerably" and, as a result, defendant "exhibited poor
judg[]ment and limited insight." Thus, in Bahce's clinical opinion, defendant
"could benefit from a more intensive and structured mental health treatment
program" and that prison should "be averted as that would be the worst
environment for him."
The Prosecutor's Office reviewed and rejected defendant's PTI
application. In rejecting defendant's application, the prosecutor analyzed each
of the N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e) factors, finding the factors weighed against
admittance into the program. The prosecutor specifically found defendant
engaged in organized criminal activity and a continuing criminal enterprise.
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In addressing defendant's "struggling" mental health, the prosecutor
considered defendant's explanation for not taking medication due to the "poor
side effects" but noted defendant had not been on medication for the past year
and was not then-currently seeking or undergoing mental health treatment.
Moreover, defendant did not provide information on how his mental health
would be addressed, or the type of treatment required in the context of the short-
term rehabilitative goals of PTI and defendant's "long struggle" with mental
health.
On June 3, 2022, defendant appealed from the denial of his application
and moved to compel entry into PTI. In an oral opinion issued on August 10,
2022, the trial court denied the defendant's petition, finding the State
appropriately considered the statutory factors, and therefore, there was no patent
and gross abuse of discretion by the State in rejecting defendant's application.
The court rejected the State's theory that defendant was a "mastermind" or
"involved in organized crime," but found defendant was involved in a
"significant drug-related transaction." The court also noted both defendant and
the State recognized his mental health issues but multiple attempts to assist
defendant were fruitless. The court further noted "there was nothing that [PTI]
could do or change" defendant's noncompliance with treatment.
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Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to first-
degree distribution of CDS, in exchange for a recommended sentence of a "flat"
five-year prison term as if defendant was convicted of a second-degree crime
and the dismissal of the remaining charge.
On March 24, 2023, the sentencing court imposed a downgraded five
years' probation subject to a reverse sentence of 364 days in county jail to be
served following the probationary period, rather than the State's recommended
five-year prison term.
The court then analyzed the statutory aggravating and mitigating factors.
The court found aggravating factors three (risk of reoffending), and nine (need
for deterrence) applied. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3); (9). The court also found
mitigating factors one (the nature and circumstances of the offense); seven (prior
criminal history); ten (likely to respond affirmatively to probationary treatment);
thirteen (conduct of youthful defendant substantially influenced by another
person more mature than defendant); and fourteen (under twenty-six years of
age at the time of the commission of the crime). N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1); (7);
(10); (13); (14). The court determined the mitigating factors substantially
outweighed aggravating factors three and nine.
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In sentencing defendant, the court used the "serious injustice" standard of
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d), which addresses the presumption of incarceration for first-
and second-degree offenses. In doing so, the court explained that "imprisonment
would have an excessive hardship" on defendant's mental health and an
imprisonment sentence would be "a serious injustice" that overrides the need to
deter others.
In addressing the specific circumstances of the case, the court recounted
defendant's "extraordinary" mental health history and "well-documented set of
circumstances":
In this particular instance, we have a [twenty-three]-
year-old young man, who was [twenty] years old at the
time of the offense. Only mere months before he had
attempted suicide and was hospitalized. I want to go
through why I think this falls outside of the
["h]eartland" of] case[s] or outside of the run-of-the-
mill case. This, this young man has been on one, two,
three, four, five, six, seven different medications from
2010 through 2020: Zoloft, Abilify, . . . Depakote,
Risperdal, Lithium, Seroquel, Trileptal. And when I
reviewed the medical records that were provided and
the summary that were provided, they have had a
number of different impacts on this young man, effects
on him: [w]eight gain, depressed, further depressive
disorders, suicidal ideations. And, . . . the father had
mentioned, it [was] a trial-and-error situation. They
tr[ied] these different cocktails[,] and they ha[d]
varying degrees of effects on individuals.
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When I reviewed the, the reports here, he was
diagnosed as early as fifth grade with bipolar order,
mood dysregulation disorder, oppositional defiant
disorder, generalized bipolar disorder, . . . depressive
disorder. He's had several hospitalizations. According
to the medical professionals, he's functioning well
below average in intellectual cognitive acts. He has a
history of cutting, suicide attempts, hospitalizations,
auditory and visual hallucinations.
This is not just a run-of-the-mill situation. He has
really struggled. And for a person who has struggled
with all these different issues and not to have criminal
— contact with criminal justice system until now I, I
think it speaks volumes about what we're dealing with
here and why this is outside of the realm of, of the
average and run-of-the-mill case and why this shouldn't
be treated as the co-defendant's case.
The court further reasoned the impact of imprisonment on defendant's
mental health
He was — he, he suffered from bullying, which is
another part of the concern that this [c]ourt has in
sending him to, sentencing him to a term of
imprisonment that when he gets there, that he is going
to decompensate in a way that could lead to a successful
suicide attempt. That is something that the
psychotherapist indicated was their concern if he was
sent to, to jail or to prison. And this [c]ourt does not
take that lightly, particularly in light of the history of
the attempts previously and his reaction to bullies.
The court found defendant did not have the "mental fortitude to deal" with
"survival 24/7" because
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There was documentation of abuse in the facilities that
were supposed to help defendant — the bruising and the
scars and the inappropriate sexual comments and
conduct by staff that were left either unattended or
almost a slap on the wrist.
In considering the human cost of punishing defendant. The court
reasoned:
This [c]ourt simply feels like the record is very clear
here that a person with this level of, of mental health
challenges and cognitive disability would not survive
in a prison setting without some serious
decompensation and a real risk of, of potential human
loss.
The court recommended defendant's placement in the mental health unit of
probation and the remaining charges were dismissed. Defendant's sentence was
automatically stayed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2). The appeal and cross-
appeal followed.
II.
Defendant appeals the denial of entry into PTI, arguing:
POINT I. THE PROSECUTOR'S REJECTION OF
DEFENDANT'S ADMISSION INTO [PTI] WAS AN
ARBITRARY, PATENT, AND GROSS ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHICH MUST BE CORRECTED BY
THIS COURT.
A. The Prosecutor Erred in Characterizing the
Crimes as Part of Organized Criminal Activity or a
Continuing Criminal Enterprise and Applying the
A-2269-22
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Presumption Against Admission under Rule 3:28-
4(b)(1).
B. The Prosecutor's Decision was not Based on an
Individualized Assessment of [Defendant's]
Amenability to Rehabilitation, Including His
Documented Mental Health History and Post-Arrest
Rehabilitative Efforts, and Relied Substantially on the
Erroneous Belief that PTI Could Not Provide Adequate
Supervision.
In its cross-appeal, the State argues:
POINT I. THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL THE STATE
TO ADMIT HIM INTO PTI BECAUSE THE STATE'S
REJECTION WAS NOT A PATENT AND GROSS
ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
POINT II. THE SENTENCING COURT'S
IMPOSITION OF PROBATION FOR A FIRST-
DEGREE CRIME WAS UNLAWFUL.
In response to the State's cross-appeal, defendant argues:
BECAUSE THE SENTENCING COURT DID NOT
ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN IMPOSING A TERM
OF PROBATION FOR DEFENDANT'S
CONVICTION FOR FIRST-DEGREE DRUG
DISTRIBUTION, THE SENTENCE SHOULD BE
AFFIRMED.
We first address defendant's appeal. Our review of a PTI rejection "is
severely limited," and "serves to check only the 'most egregious examples of
injustice and unfairness.'" State v. Negran, 178 N.J. 73, 82 (2003) (quoting State
A-2269-22
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v. Leonardis, 73 N.J. 360, 384 (1977)); see also State v. Denman, 449 N.J. Super.
369, 376 (App. Div. 2017). We apply the same standard of review as the trial
court and review its decision de novo. State v. Waters, 439 N.J. Super. 215, 226
(App. Div. 2015).
"'PTI is essentially an extension of the charging decision, . . . the decision
to grant or deny PTI is a "quintessentially prosecutorial function."'" State v.
Johnson, 238 N.J. 119, 128 (2019) (quoting State v. Roseman, 221 N.J. 611, 624
(2015)). "'As a result, the prosecutor's decision to accept or reject a defendant's
PTI application is entitled to a great deal of deference.'" Ibid. (quoting
Roseman, 221 N.J. at 624). Thus, "[a] court reviewing a prosecutor's decision
to deny PTI may overturn that decision only if the defendant 'clearly and
convincingly' establishes the decision was a 'patent and gross abuse of
discretion.'" Id. at 128-29 (quoting State v. Wallace, 146 N.J. 576, 583 (1996)).
A PTI application that requires prosecutor consent pursuant to Rule 3:28-
1(d)(1) must "include a statement of the extraordinary and compelling
circumstances that justify consideration of the application notwithstanding the
presumption of ineligibility based on the nature of the crime charged and any
prior convictions." R. 3:28-3(b)(1). In establishing compelling reasons for
admission into PTI, "there must be a showing greater than that the accused is a
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first-time offender and has admitted or accepted responsibility for the crime."
State v. Nwobu, 139 N.J. 236, 252 (1995).
To establish an abuse of discretion, a defendant must show the
prosecutor's denial of his or her PTI application "'(a) was not premised upon a
consideration of all relevant factors, (b) was based upon a consideration of
irrelevant or inappropriate factors, or (c) amounted to a clear error in judgment.'"
Roseman, 221 N.J. at 625 (quoting State v. Bender, 80 N.J. 84, 93 (1979)). An
abuse of discretion rises to the level of patent and gross when the defendant
shows the prosecutor's denial "'clearly subvert[s] the goals underlying [PTI].'"
Ibid. (quoting Bender, 80 N.J. at 93).
Defendant argues the State abused its discretion in denying his PTI
application because he was an "ideal" candidate, and the State improperly
characterized his participation in the drug transaction as part of organized
criminal activity or part of a continuing criminal enterprise. Defendant also
argued the State did not fully assess or document his mental health history and
his amenability to rehabilitation. Defendant's arguments are not supported by
the motion record.
We are satisfied the court appropriately considered the merits of
defendant's PTI application. Based on our review of the record, the prosecutor
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considered defendant's submissions and reasons articulated for entry into PTI.
The prosecutor's denial of defendant's PTI application was based on an
appropriate review of each factor. While defendant and the prosecutor may
disagree regarding the proper weight of the factors, such disagreement is not a
basis for reversing the prosecutor's decision. Moreover, both the prosecutor and
the trial court considered defendant's documented mental history, and noted
defendant was not in treatment at the time he applied for PTI, and his
noncompliance did not establish compelling circumstances to justify PTI. We
therefore conclude there was no gross abuse of discretion.
We agree with the court that defendant has not provided compelling
evidence demonstrating his amenability to the rehabilitative process or that the
prosecutor's decision was arbitrary or unreasonable. Given our deferential
review of prosecutorial decisions concerning admission into PTI programs, we
see no reason to disturb the court's denial of defendant's admission into the PTI
program.
II.
In its cross-appeal, the State contends the court improperly sentenced
defendant because this matter does not present the "demanding and
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extraordinary circumstances" to overcome the presumption of imprisonment.
We disagree.
Our review of the sentence imposed by the trial court is limited. State v.
Miller, 205 N.J. 109, 127 (2011). A trial court's sentence is reviewed on an
abuse of discretion standard. State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246, 272 (2021). Pursuant
to that deferential standard, we "must not substitute [our] judgment for that of
the sentencing court." State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 70 (2014) (citing State v.
O'Donnell, 117 N.J. 210, 215 (1989)). Thus, we will affirm the sentence "unless:
(1) the sentencing guidelines were violated; (2) the findings of aggravating and
mitigating factors were not 'based upon competent credible evidence in the
record;' or (3) 'the application of the guidelines to the facts' of the case 'shocks
the judicial conscience.'" State v. Bolvito, 217 N.J. 221, 228 (2014) (quoting
State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984)). "However, 'the deferential standard
of review applies only if the trial judge follows the Code and the basic precepts
that channel sentencing discretion.'" State v. Trinidad, 241 N.J. 425, 453 (2020)
(quoting State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 65 (2014)).
It is long settled that a sentencing court must consider and apply
aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) and (b).
Case, 220 N.J. at 64. "'Proper sentencing thus requires an explicit and full
A-2269-22
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statement of aggravating and mitigating factors and how they are weighed and
balanced.'" State v. McFarlane, 224 N.J. 458, 466 (2016) (quoting State v.
Randolph, 210 N.J. 330, 348 (2012)); see Case, 220 N.J. at 66. We, therefore,
defer to the sentencing court's assessment of those factors if supported by
"competent, credible evidence in the record." State v. Yarbough, 195 N.J. Super.
135, 140 (App. Div. 1984).
Having reviewed the sentencing court's reasons in support of findings as
to the aggravating and mitigating factors, we discern no abuse of discretion in
the court's decision. The court scrupulously engaged in the required inquiry in
stating its findings as to the aggravating and mitigating factors. We are satisfied
the court's findings on the aggravating and mitigating factors were properly
based on the evidence in the record and did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
We also reject the State's argument that the judge abused his discretion by
waiving the presumption of imprisonment under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d) and
imposing a probationary term and reverse sentence.
The "serious injustice" standard found in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d) permits the
court to waive the presumption of imprisonment for a first- or second-degree
offender when "having regard to the character and condition of the defendant, it
is of the opinion that [his] imprisonment would be a serious injustice which
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overrides the need to deter such conduct by others." In State v. Evers, the Court
gave "trial courts guideposts for determining the extraordinary or extremely
unusual case where the human cost of imprisoning a defendant for the sake of
deterrence constitutes a serious injustice." 175 N.J. 355 (2003). The Court held
that
In deciding whether the "character and condition" of a
defendant meets the "serious injustice" standard, a trial
court should determine whether there is clear and
convincing evidence that there are relevant mitigating
factors present to an extraordinary degree and, if so,
whether cumulatively, they so greatly exceed any
aggravating factors that imprisonment would constitute
a serious injustice overriding the need for deterrence.
We do not suggest that every mitigating factor will bear
the same relevance and weight in assessing the
character and condition of the defendant; it is the
quality of the factor or factors and their uniqueness in
the particular setting that matters.
[Id. at 393-94.]
"[T]he standard governing the downgrading of a defendant's sentence . . . is
high." State v. Megargel, 143 N.J. 484, 500 (1996). Thus, a defendant
attempting to overcome the presumption of imprisonment bears a "heavy
burden." Evers, 175 N.J. at 392. The standard for establishing a serious
injustice "is extremely narrow." State v. Cooke, 345 N.J. Super. 480, 487 (App.
Div. 2001). "A probationary sentence for a first[-] or second[-]degree offense
A-2269-22
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is rarely warranted and only in 'truly extraordinary and unanticipated
circumstances.'" Ibid. (quoting Roth, 95 N.J. at 358).
The presumption may be overcome only in those truly extraordinary and
idiosyncratic cases where the human suffering resulting from imprisoning "a
particular defendant to deter others from committing" the same offense "would
be 'too great.'" Evers, 175 N.J. at 389 (quoting State v. Rivera, 124 N.J. 122,
125 (1991)). In the singular case of State v. Jarbath, 114 N.J. 394 (1989), our
Court found the presumption of imprisonment was overcome where defendant
was a psychotic, mentally disabled woman who accidentally killed her baby and,
while in prison, suffered abuse almost daily and attempted to commit suicide .
The Court reasoned that imprisoning an emotionally impaired defendant who
could not sufficiently comprehend the "wrongfulness of her conduct" did not
further the goal of general deterrence. Id. at 405-06. The combination of her
mental condition and her level of culpability led the Court to conclude
imprisonment of defendant was a serious injustice that outweighed the needs of
general deterrence. Ibid.Governed by these standards, we discern no basis to reverse the sentencing
court's imposition of a reverse sentence. The record reflects the sentencing court
analyzed the State's recommendation because of defendant's "extraordinary"
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mental health and cognitive challenges given the "well-documented" history of
"cutting, suicide attempts, hospitalizations, auditory and visual hallucinations,"
and "abuse" at facilities. The court further found defendant "could not clearly
appreciate the magnitude" of his offense. Lastly, the court determined the
"human cost [was] simply too great" for a first-time offense and defendant "with
that level of mental health challenges and cognitive disabilities would not
survive in a prison setting without some serious decompensation and a real risk
of potential human loss."
We are satisfied there is sufficient credible evidence in the record to
overcome the presumption of imprisonment. Thus, we hold the sentencing court
did not abuse its discretion by sentencing defendant to probation by imposing a
sentence outside of the sentencing guidelines based on the extraordinary
circumstances presented in this matter.
Affirm.
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