Roselle Borough v. Mamco Association C/O Alman Group LLC ( 2017 )

TAX COURT OF NEW JERSEY
Joshua D. Novin Washington & Court Streets, 1st Floor
Judge P.O. Box 910
Morristown, New Jersey 07963
Tel: (609) 815-2922, Ext. 54680
Fax: (973) 656-4305
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL
OF THE TAX COURT COMMITTEE ON OPINIONS
December 15, 2017
Robert F. Renaud, Esq.
Palumbo, Renaud & DeAppolonio, LLC
190 North Avenue East
Cranford, New Jersey 07016
Carleton Kemph, Esq.
Genova Burns LLC
494 Broad Street
Newark, New Jersey 07102
Re: Roselle Borough v. Mamco Association c/o Alman Group LLC
Docket Nos. 016723-2013 & 016726-2013
Dear Mr. Renaud and Mr. Kemph:
This letter constitutes the court’s opinion following trial of the above local property tax
appeals. Plaintiff, Roselle Borough, a municipal corporation of the State of New Jersey
(“plaintiff”), challenges the 2013 Memorandum of Judgments issued by the Union County Board
of Taxation, reducing the 2013 tax year local property tax assessments on the improved properties
owned by defendant, Mamco Association (“defendant”).
For the reasons stated more fully below, the court affirms the 2013 Union County Board
of Taxation Memorandum of Judgments.
I. Procedural History and Findings of Fact
As of the October 1, 2012 valuation date, defendant was the owner of the real property and
improvements located at 217-221 Highland Parkway, and 224-240 Highland Parkway (also known
as 228 Highland Parkway), in the Borough of Roselle, County of Union, and State of New Jersey.
The properties are identified on Roselle Borough’s municipal tax map as Block 2902, Lot 2.03
(“217-221 Highland Parkway”) and Block 2903, Lot 1 (“224-240 Highland Parkway”) (217-221
Highland Parkway and 224-240 Highland Parkway shall be collectively referred to as the “subject
properties”).
217-221 Highland Parkway is a rectangular shaped .337-acre lot, with approximately
146.77 feet of frontage along the northerly side of Highland Parkway. As of the valuation date, it
was improved with an 11,707 square foot masonry structure, constructed in 1968.1 The structure
consists of approximately 5,137 square feet, or 44% warehouse area, and 6,570 square feet, or 56%
finished office area, contained in two-stories. The office area consists of finished sheetrock walls,
carpeted and tile flooring, acoustical tile ceilings, overhead fluorescent lighting, two conference
rooms, seven offices, two kitchenettes, two half bathrooms, and a storage room. The office area
contains central heating and air conditioning. The warehouse contains 20-foot high ceilings,
overhead heating units, two drive-in doors, a locker room, and a half bathroom. Alongside the
building is a fenced yard and driveway that also fronts Highland Parkway. Vehicle parking is
afforded along Highland Parkway and in an 8’ to 10’ paved area between the front of the building
and the lot line.
224-240 Highland Parkway is an irregular, triangular shaped .337-acre lot, with
approximately 234.56 feet of frontage along the southerly side of Highland Parkway. As of the
valuation date, it was improved with an 11,050 square foot masonry warehouse structure,
1
During trial, conflicting testimony was offered by plaintiff and defendant regarding the gross building area of 217-
221 Highland Parkway. Plaintiff’s appraiser measured the interior warehouse area and exterior of the building to
calculate his estimated 11,707 square foot gross building area. In addition, plaintiff submitted a July 5, 2000 plot
plan, prepared by defendant’s engineer, disclosing that the structure contained 11,707 square feet. Defendant
offered that the structure consists of 11,320 square feet, based on wheel measurements of its appraiser. The court
finds plaintiff’s evidence is more accurate, and concludes that 217-221 Highland Parkway consists of 11,707 square
feet of gross building area.
2
constructed in 1979.2 The building is equipped with five (5) drive-in doors. However, access
within the interior of the warehouse is limited, as the building is divided into several individual
sections, requiring warehouse occupants to access the separate warehouse areas from the exterior.
The warehouse contains 20-foot high ceilings, and two overhead heating units. The warehouse
contains a small office area. Both plaintiff’s appraiser and defendant’s appraiser expressed that
224-240 Highland Parkway is inferior, in condition, use, and functionality to 217-221 Highland
Parkway.
As of the valuation date, the subject properties were occupied by Garden State Brickface
(“Garden State Brickface”), an entity whose principal owner, is also one of the principals of
defendant. Garden State Brickface occupied and used the subject properties as an office, a mixing
area, and for storage of construction materials, equipment, and trucks.
The subject properties are located in plaintiff’s I-Industrial zoning district, with permitted
light industrial uses, including office buildings for executive, engineering and administrative
purposes, scientific or research laboratories, manufacturing of light machinery, fabrication of
metal, wood, and paper products, etc. Thus, use of the subject properties is legally conforming.
The subject properties are located in Flood Zone X, denoting an area of minimal flooding risk.
For the 2013 tax year, the subject properties bore the following tax assessments:
(217-221 Highland Parkway) (224-240 Highland Parkway)
Land: $150,000 Land: $164,000
Improvement: $285,900 Improvement: $152,400
Total: $435,900 Total: $316,400
2
During trial, conflicting testimony was offered by plaintiff and defendant regarding the gross building area of 224-
240 Highland Parkway. Pages 18 and 41 of plaintiff’s appraisal report reflect that the structure contains a gross
building area of 11,050 square feet. However, during trial plaintiff’s appraiser offered testimony that 224-240
Highland Parkway consists of 11,320 square feet. Defendant offered that the structure contains 11,050 square feet,
based on the wheel measurements of its appraiser. The court finds defendant’s evidence is more accurate, and
concludes that 224-240 Highland Parkway consists of 11,050 square feet of gross building area.
3
Defendant filed petitions of appeal with the Union County Board of Taxation (the “Board)
challenging the 2013 tax year assessments. Following a hearing, the Board entered Memorandum
of Judgments (the “Judgments”), reducing the 2013 tax year local property tax assessments on the
subject properties as follows:
(217-221 Highland Parkway) (224-240 Highland Parkway)
Land: $150,000 Land: $164,000
Improvement: $195,700 Improvement: $ 78,000
Total: $345,700 Total: $242,000
The average ratio of assessed to true value, commonly referred to as the Chapter 123 ratio,
for plaintiff was 57.61% for the 2013 tax year. See N.J.S.A. 54:1-35a(a). Applying the average
ratio to the local property tax assessments and to the Judgments produces the following implied
equalized values for the subject properties:
Implied equalized value Implied equalized
of tax assessment value of Judgment
217-221 Highland Parkway $756,639.47 $600,069.43
224-240 Highland Parkway $549,210.20 $420,065.96
Plaintiff filed timely Complaints with the Tax Court contesting the Board’s Judgments.
The defendant did not file any Counterclaims.
During trial, plaintiff and defendant each offered testimony from State of New Jersey
certified general real estate appraisers, who were accepted by the court, without objection, as
experts in the property valuation field. Each appraiser prepared an appraisal report expressing an
opinion of the true market value of the subject properties. The appraisers offered their opinions
that the subject properties had a true market value, as of the October 1, 2012 valuation date, as
follows:
Plaintiff’s appraiser Defendant’s appraiser
217-221 Highland Parkway $870,000 $550,000
224-240 Highland Parkway $672,000 $400,000
4
Plaintiff elicited testimony from defendant’s appraiser during trial that in or about 2015,
217-221 Highland Parkway was offered for lease or for sale. Moreover, plaintiff submitted copies
of SR1A forms reflecting that 217-221 Highland Parkway sold on August 31, 2015, and 224-240
Highland Parkway sold on February 24, 2016.
II. Conclusions of Law
a. Presumption of Validity
“Original assessments and judgments of county boards of taxation are entitled to a
presumption of validity.” MSGW Real Estate Fund, LLC v. Borough of Mountain Lakes, 18 N.J.
Tax 364, 373 (Tax 1998). The complaining party bears the burden of proving that the county
board judgment, or original tax assessment, is erroneous. Ford Motor Co. v. Edison, 127 N.J. 290,
313-4 (1992). See also Rodwood Gardens, Inc. v. Summit, 188 N.J. Super. 34, 38 (App. Div.
1982) (concluding that on appeal to the Tax Court “a similar presumption [of correctness] attaches
to the county board judgment.”) Thus, when a municipality seeks to “establish a value for the
taxpayer's property which exceeds the value established by the county board’s judgment, the
taxpayer is ‘favored by the nonstatutory presumption of correctness of the county board's
judgment.’” Warren Twp. v. Suffness, 225 N.J. Super. 399, 415 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 113
N.J. 640 (1988) (quoting Rumson Bor. v. Peckham, 7 N.J. Tax 539, 549 (1985)).
The presumption of correctness stands “until sufficient competent evidence to the contrary
is adduced.” Little Egg Harbor Township v. Bonsangue, 316 N.J. Super. 271, 285-86 (App. Div.
1998). The complaining party can only rebut the presumption by introducing “cogent evidence”
of true value; that is, evidence “definite, positive and certain in quality and quantity to overcome
the presumption.” Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Newark City, 10 N.J. 99, 105 (1952). Thus, at the close
of the challenging party’s proofs, the court must be presented with evidence that raises a “debatable
5
question” as to the validity of the county board judgment or tax assessment. MSGW Real Estate
Fund, LLC, supra, 18 N.J. Tax at 376.
In evaluating whether the evidence presented meets the “cogent evidence” standard, the
court “must accept such evidence as true and accord the plaintiff all legitimate inferences which
can be deduced from the evidence.” Id. at 376 (citing Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of
America, 142 N.J. 520 (1995)). The evidence presented, when viewed under the Brill standard
“must be ‘sufficient to determine the value of the property under appeal, thereby establishing the
existence of a debatable question as to the correctness of the assessment,’” or county board
judgment. West Colonial Enters, LLC v. City of East Orange, 20 N.J. Tax 576, 579 (Tax 2003)
(quoting Lenal Properties, Inc. v. City of Jersey City, 18 N.J. Tax 405, 408 (Tax 1999), aff’d, 18
N.J. Tax 658 (App. Div. 2000), certif. denied, 165 N.J. 488 (2000)). “Only after the presumption
is overcome with sufficient evidence. . . must the court ‘appraise the testimony, make a
determination of true value and fix the assessment.’” Greenblatt v. Englewood City, 26 N.J. Tax
41, 52 (Tax 2011) (quoting Rodwood Gardens, Inc., supra, 188 N.J. Super. at 38-39). Hence, even
in the absence of a motion to dismiss under R. 4:37-2(b), the court is nonetheless required to
determine if the plaintiff has overcome the presumption of correctness. If the court independently
concludes that plaintiff has not carried the requisite burden, dismissal of the action is warranted
under R. 4:40-1 and the trial court need not engage in an evaluation of the evidence to make an
independent determination of value.
According plaintiff all reasonable and legitimate inferences which can be deduced from
the evidence presented, the court concludes that plaintiff produced cogent evidence sufficient to
overcome the presumption of correctness that attaches to the Union County Board of Taxation
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Judgments. If accepted as true, the opinions of plaintiff’s appraiser and the facts upon which he
relied raise debatable questions regarding the correctness of the Judgments for the 2013 tax year.
However, concluding that the presumption of correctness has been overcome, does not
equate to a finding by the court that either a county board judgment, or a tax assessment, is
erroneous. Once the presumption has been overcome, “the court must then turn to a consideration
of the evidence adduced on behalf of both parties and conclude the matter based on a fair
preponderance of the evidence.” Ford Motor Co., supra, 127 N.J. at 312. Although the proofs,
when measured against the liberal standards employed in evaluating a motion under R. 4:37-2(b),
may be sufficient to overcome the presumption of correctness at the close of plaintiff’s case-in-
chief, the burden of proof remains with the complaining party “to demonstrate that the judgment
under review was incorrect.” Id. at 314-15 (citing Pantasote Co. v. Passaic City, 100 N.J. 408, 413
(1985)).
b. Highest and Best Use
An indispensable element not only to principles of property valuation, but to the
determination of the true market value of property is discerning its highest and best use. Ford
Motor Co., supra, 10 N.J. Tax at 161, aff’d o.b., 12 N.J. Tax 244 (App. Div. 1990), aff’d, 127 N.J.
290 (1992). See also General Motors Corp. v. City of Linden, 22 N.J. Tax 95, 107 (Tax 2005).
“For local property tax assessment purposes, property must be valued at its highest and best use.”
Entenmann's Inc. v. Totowa Borough, 18 N.J. Tax 540, 545 (Tax 2000). Thus, the highest and
best use analysis is often referred to as “the first and most important step in the valuation process.”
Ford Motor Co., supra, 10 N.J. Tax at 161.
The highest and best use analysis comprises the “sequential consideration of the following
four criteria, determining whether the use of the subject property is: 1) legally permissible; 2)
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physically possible; 3) financially feasible; and 4) maximally productive.” Clemente v. Township
of South Hackensack, 27 N.J. Tax 255, 267-269 (Tax 2013), aff’d, 28 N.J. Tax 337 (App. Div.
2015).
Here, both appraisers opined that the highest and best use of the subject properties, “as
improved,” are their current use as a warehouse with offices (217-221 Highland Avenue) and as a
warehouse (224-240 Highland Parkway).
c. Methodology
“There is no single determinative approach to the valuation of real property.” 125 Monitor
Street LLC v. City of Jersey City, 21 N.J. Tax 232, 237-238 (Tax 2004) (citing Samuel Hird &
Sons, Inc. v. City of Garfield, 87 N.J. Super. 65, 72 (App. Div. 1965)); ITT Continental Baking
Co. v. East Brunswick Township, 1 N.J. Tax 244, 251 (Tax 1980). “There are three traditional
appraisal methods utilized to predict what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller on a given
date, applicable to different types of properties: the comparable sales method, capitalization of
income and cost.” Brown v. Borough of Glen Rock, 19 N.J. Tax 366, 376 (App. Div. 2001), certif.
denied, 168 N.J. 291 (2001) (internal citation omitted)). The “decision as to which valuation
approach should predominate depends upon the facts of the particular case and the reaction to these
facts by the experts.” Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of New York v. Neptune Township, 8 N.J. Tax 169,
176 (Tax 1986) (citing New Brunswick v. Tax Appeals Div., 39 N.J. 537 (1963)). See also WCI-
Westinghouse, Inc. v. Edison Township, 7 N.J. Tax, 610, 619 (Tax 1985), aff’d, 9 N.J. Tax 86(App. Div. 1986). However, when the proofs submitted in support of one approach overshadow
those submitted in support of any other approach, the court may conclude which approach should
prevail. ITT Continental Baking Co., supra, 1 N.J. Tax 244; Pennwalt Corp. v. Holmdel Township,
4 N.J. Tax 51 (Tax 1982).
8
Here, both appraisers considered all three approaches to value. However, plaintiff’s
appraiser rejected the cost and sales comparison approaches to value, as unreliable, and relied
exclusively on the income-capitalization approach. Conversely, defendant’s appraiser utilized all
three approaches to value, placing equal weight on the income-capitalization and sales comparison
approaches to value. Although included in his appraisal reports, defendant’s appraiser attributed
no weight to the cost approach.
1. Income Capitalization Approach
When a property is income-producing, the income capitalization approach is the favored
method for determining the estimated value of that property. Parkway Village Apartments Co. v.
Township of Cranford, 8 N.J. Tax 430 (Tax 1985), aff’d, 9 N.J. Tax 199 (App. Div. 1986), rev'd
on other grounds, 108 N.J. 266 (1987); Helmsley v. Borough of Fort Lee, 78 N.J. 200 (1978); Hull
Junction Holding Corp. v. Borough of Princeton, 16 N.J. Tax 68, 79 (Tax 1996). “The income
capitalization approach to value consists of methods, techniques, and mathematical procedures
that an appraiser uses to analyze a property’s capacity to generate benefits (i.e., usually the
monetary benefits of income and reversion) and convert[s] these benefits into an indication of
present value.” Appraisal Institute, The Appraisal of Real Estate, 439 (14th ed. 2013). Central to
the income capitalization approach, is the concept of anticipation, which is a process designed to
forecast future economic benefits, and convert those benefits into a present value estimate. Id. at
440. Stated differently, the income capitalization approach converts the benefits to be realized
from a future stream of income and reversionary benefit into a present value.
The first, and often most critical step under the income-capitalization approach, is
forecasting a property’s potential gross income. This requires an appraiser to discern “the
economic rent, also known as the ‘market rent’ or ‘fair rental value.’” Parkway Village
9
Apartments, supra, 108 N.J. at 270; see also New Brunswick v. State Div. of Tax Appeals, 39 N.J.
537 (1963).
a. Market Rent
The term market rent or economic rent, refers to “the most probable rent that a property
should bring in a competitive and open market reflecting all conditions and restrictions of the lease
agreement, including permitted uses, use restrictions, expense obligations, term, concessions,
renewal and purchase options and tenant improvements.” The Dictionary of Real Estate Appraisal,
supra, at 121-22. The market rent ascribed to a property under the income-capitalization approach
may differ substantially from the “contract rent,” or actual rent collected by the owner of the
property, which may be below market rates. Parkview Village Assocs. v. Borough of
Collingswood, 62 N.J. 21, 29-30 (1972).
1. Plaintiff’s appraiser
In determining a market rent for 217-221 Highland Parkway, plaintiff’s appraiser relied
upon five (5) leases of industrial warehouses. Two of the leased properties are located in Linden,
and three are located in Roselle. Additionally, in determining a market rent for 224-240 Highland
Parkway, plaintiff’s appraiser relied upon seven (7) leases of industrial warehouses. The seven
leased properties are located in the following municipalities: one in Roselle, four in Linden, one
in Springfield, and one in Elizabeth. In plaintiff’s appraiser’s opinion, a market exists for the
“lower end industrials where uses are more permissive.” According to plaintiff’s appraiser, that
market exists in Roselle, Linden, Carteret, and parts of Woodbridge and Edison.
In calculating the annual rent and rent per square foot for the comparable leases, plaintiff’s
appraiser averaged the aggregate annual rent over the life of its lease. Plaintiff’s appraiser offered
that most of the comparable lease information was obtained from property he inspected or
10
appraised during the course of his representation of Roselle and Linden, in defense of tax appeal
matters. The following table contains the comparable leases relied on by plaintiff’s appraiser:
Lease Address Use Constructed Gross Bldg. Lease date Avg. annual
Occupancy Renovated Size Lease term rent
Condition Leased Area Lease type Avg. rent psf.
% Office Area
#1 Brunswick Ave. Multi-tenanted 1900 523,842 sq. ft. 2/1/2012 $25,960.00
Linden, NJ warehouse Renovated 2,000 sq. ft. 5 years $7.98 psf
2-story former 1986/1987 20% Office Net
manufacturing Average
facility
#2 Tremley Point Rd. Multi-tenanted 1928 167,000 sq. ft. 8/1/2011 $92,056.00
Linden, NJ warehouse Renovated 2001 12,648 sq. ft. 5 years $7.28 psf
14 loading dock Average 15% Office Net
doors
7 drive-in doors
#3 Cox Street Multi-tenanted 1955 43,560 sq. ft. 10/30/2009 $52,768.00
Roselle, NJ warehouse Renovated 2009 23,900 sq. ft. 5 years $7.54 psf
Shared Average 5% Office Net
overhead doors
#4 W 1st Avenue Multi-tenanted 1950 8,000 sq. ft. 9/15/2009 $23,200.00
Roselle, NJ warehouse Average 3,000 sq. ft. 5 years $7.73 psf
3% Office Mod. Gross
#5 Cox Street Multi-tenanted 1987 51,906 sq. ft. 9/1/2008 $92,700.00
Roselle, NJ warehouse Average 10,000 sq. ft. 5 years $9.27 psf
2 loading docks 50% Office Net
#6 Brunswick Ave. Multi-tenanted 1900 523,842 sq. ft. 06/1/2008 $91,420.00
Linden, NJ warehouse Renovated 14,977 sq. ft. 5 years $6.10 psf
2-story former 1986/1987 Net
manufacturing Below average
facility
#7 Lower Road 1 & 2 story 1962 213,749 sq. ft. 4/5/2010 $52,992.00
Linden, NJ Multi-tenanted Average 8,832 sq. ft. 2 years $6.00 psf
warehouse Net
#8 Cox Street Multi-tenanted 1987 51,906 sq. ft. 1/1/2008 $42,250.00
Roselle, NJ warehouse Average 6,500 sq. ft. 1.5 years $6.50 psf
2 loading docks Net
#9 Fadem Road Multi-tenanted 1962 122,222 sq. ft. 3/1/2011 $36,000.00
Springfield, NJ warehouse Average 7,200 sq. ft. 5 years $5.00 psf
Net
#10 Dowd Avenue Single tenanted 1950 14,390 sq. ft. 1/30/2009 $90,000.00
Elizabeth, NJ warehouse Average 14,390 sq. ft. 3 years $6.25 psf
1 drive-in door Net
2 loading dock
doors
#11 W Elizabeth Ave. Multi-tenanted 1989 79,102 sq. ft. 8/1/2009 $63,350.00
Linden, NJ warehouse Good 10,136 sq. ft. 5 years $6.25 psf
Net
#12 Tremley Point Rd. Multi-tenanted 1975 160,543 sq. ft. 8/1/2010 $92,482.00
Linden, NJ warehouse Average 19,620 sq. ft. 2 years $4.71 psf
Net
11
Plaintiff’s appraiser applied adjustments to the comparable leases to account for perceived
differences in physical age and condition, economic size, and expense allocation. Comparable
lease 2 was adjusted -5% for physical age and condition, resulting in an adjusted rent of $6.92 psf.
Comparable lease 3 was adjusted -5% for physical age and condition, resulting in an adjusted rent
of $7.16 psf. Comparable lease 4 was adjusted -15% for expense allocation, to account for it being
a modified gross rental, resulting in an adjusted rent of $6.57 psf. Comparable lease 5 was adjusted
-15% for physical age and condition, resulting in an adjusted rent of $7.88 psf. Comparable lease
7 was adjusted +5% for physical age and condition and -5% for economic size, resulting in an
adjusted rent of $6.00 psf. Comparable lease 8 was adjusted -5% for physical age and condition
and -5% for economic size, resulting in an adjusted rent of $5.85 psf. Comparable lease 9 was
adjusted -5% for economic size, resulting in an adjusted rent of $4.75 psf. Comparable lease 11
was adjusted -5% for physical age and condition, resulting in an adjusted rent of $5.94 psf.
After adjustments to comparable leases 1 to 5, the resulting range of economic rents was
$6.57 to $7.98. Plaintiff’s appraiser concluded a market rent of $7.25 psf for 217-221 Highland
Parkway. Plaintiff’s appraiser multiplied his concluded $7.25 psf market rent by the 11,707 gross
building area of 217-221 Highland Parkway to determine Gross Potential Income of $84,875.00.
After adjustments to comparable leases 6 to 12, the resulting range of economic rents was
$4.71 to $6.10. Plaintiff’s appraiser concluded a market rent of $5.60 psf for 224-240 Highland
Parkway. Plaintiff’s appraiser multiplied his concluded $5.60 psf market rent by a gross building
area of 11,320 square feet, to determine Gross Potential Income of $63,392.00 for 224-240
Highland Parkway.3
3
As stated above, plaintiff’s appraisal report and plaintiff’s appraiser’s trial testimony offered conflicting evidence
regarding the gross building area attributable to 224-240 Highland Parkway.
12
Plaintiff's appraiser then applied a vacancy and collection loss factor of 5% to the Gross
Potential Income calculations for 217-221 Highland Parkway and 224-240 Highland Parkway to
determine their Effective Gross Incomes.
For 217-221 Highland Parkway, plaintiff’s appraiser applied stabilized management fees
and leasing expenses of 9%, and reserves of 2% of Effective Gross Income. However, for 224-
240 Highland Parkway, plaintiff’s appraiser applied stabilized management fees of 3%, leasing
expenses of 4%, and reserves of 1% of Effective Gross Income.
Plaintiff’s appraiser next determined a capitalization rate of 8.25% employing the band of
investment technique, and applied it to the subject properties Net Operating Income. In
determining his capitalization rate, plaintiff’s appraiser consulted the American Council of Life
Insurance (“ACLI”) tables for the 3rd Quarter of 2012, PWC-Korpacz surveys of the National
Warehouse market for the 3rd Quarter 2012, and Real Estate Research Corporation’s (“RERC”)
“Snapshot OAR” for the 3rd Quarter 2012. Although the ACLI tables were not reproduced in
plaintiff’s appraisal report, according to plaintiff’s appraiser, they disclosed that interest rates for
“Grade A” warehouses ranged from 6.24% to 8.79%, with an average rate of 6.95%. 4
Plaintiff’s appraiser concluded a value of $870,000 for 217-221 Highland Parkway, and a
value of $672,000 for 224-240 Highland Parkway, as of the October 1, 2012 valuation date.
2. Defendant’s Appraiser
In determining his market rent, defendant’s appraiser relied upon four (4) leases of
industrial warehouses that he deemed comparable to both 217-221 Highland Parkway and 224-
4
Plaintiff’s appraisal report for 224-240 Highland Parkway contained ACLI tables for Commercial Mortgage
Commitments for the 3rd Quarter 2013. Plaintiff’s appraisal report for 217-221 Highland Parkway did not contain
any ACLI tables. Neither of plaintiff’s appraisal reports contained the RERC surveys.
13
240 Highland Parkway. One of the comparable leased properties is located in Kenilworth and
three are located in Linden.
Lease Address Use Condition Gross Bldg. Lease date Rent psf.
Occupancy Size Lease type
Leased Area
#1 Michigan Ave. Single tenanted Average 23,000 sq. ft. 12/29/2011 $4.80 psf
Kenilworth, NJ warehouse 23,000 sq. ft. Net
1-story with 13%
office area
#2 1418 E. Linden Ave. Single tenanted Average 20,056 sq. ft. 9/2011 $4.50 psf
Linden, NJ warehouse 20,056 sq. ft. Net
1-story
#3 1375 E. Linden Ave. Single tenanted Average 13,857 sq. ft. 1/2012 $5.00 psf
Linden, NJ warehouse 13,857 sq. ft. Net 2 months
1-story free rent
#4 340 S. Stiles St. Single tenanted Average 28,729 sq. ft. 1/2012 $4.01 psf
Linden, NJ warehouse 28,729 sq. ft. Net 2 months
1-story free rent
In performing his analysis of 217-221 Highland Parkway, defendant’s appraiser applied a
-10% location adjustment to comparable lease 1, resulting in an adjusted rent of $4.32 psf. No
other adjustments were made to the comparable leases by defendant’s appraiser for 217-221
Highland Parkway. The resulting range of adjusted economic rents was $4.01 to $5.00 psf.
Defendant’s appraiser concluded a market rent of $4.50 psf for 217-221 Highland Parkway.
Defendant’s appraiser then multiplied his concluded $4.50 psf market rent by his estimated gross
building area of 11,320 square feet, to determine a Gross Potential Income of $50,940.00 for 217-
221 Highland Parkway.
In performing his analysis of 224-240 Highland Parkway, defendant’s appraiser applied a
-10% location adjustment to comparable lease 1, resulting in an adjusted rent of $4.32 psf. In
addition, defendant’s appraiser applied a -15% condition adjustment to comparable leases 1, 2, 3,
and 4. The resulting range of adjusted economic rents was $3.41 to $4.25 psf. Defendant’s
appraiser concluded a market rent of $3.75 psf for 224-240 Highland Parkway. Defendant’s
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appraiser multiplied his concluded $3.75 psf market rent by the gross building area of 11,050
square feet, to determine a Gross Potential Income of $41,438.00 for 224-240 Highland Parkway.
Defendant's appraiser applied an 8% vacancy and collection loss factor to the Gross
Potential Income for both 217-221 Highland Parkway and 224-240 Highland Parkway to
determine the Effective Gross Income for the subject properties. Defendant’s appraiser then
applied stabilized leasing expenses of 2.5%, reserves of 3%, and management fees of 5% of
Effective Gross Income. In addition, defendant’s appraiser deducted a stabilized expense for
professional fees of $2,500.
Defendant’s appraiser determined a capitalization rate of 8.33%, employing the band of
investment technique. In determining his capitalization rate, defendant’s appraiser consulted the
ACLI tables for Commercial Mortgage Commitment for the 3rd Quarter of 2012.5
Defendant’s appraiser concluded a value of $485,000 for 217-221 Highland Parkway, and
a value of $390,000 for 224-240 Highland Parkway, as of the October 1, 2012 valuation date.
b. Adjustments
Adjustments must have a foundation obtained from data extracted from the marketplace,
market-derived sources or objective data, and not be based on subjective observations and/or
personal experiences. An appraiser’s adjustments “must have a foundation obtained from the
market. . .” Greenblatt, supra, 26 N.J. Tax at 55. “[T]he opinion of an expert depends upon the
facts and reasoning which form the basis of the opinion. Without explanation as to the basis, the
opinion of the expert is entitled to little weight in this regard.” Ibid. When an expert “offers an
opinion without providing specific underlying reasons. . . he ceases to be an aid to the trier of fact.”
5
Defendant’s appraisal report for 217-221 Highland Parkway contained the ACLI tables for Commercial Mortgage
Commitments for the 3rd Quarter 2011. Defendant’s appraisal report for 224-240 Highland Parkway contained the
ACLI tables for Commercial Mortgage Commitments for the 3 rd Quarter 2012.
15
Jimenez v. GNOC, Corp., 286 N.J. Super. 533, 540 (App. Div. 1996), certif. denied, 145 N.J. 374(1996)). The expert is required to “give the why and wherefore of his expert opinion, not just a
mere conclusion.” Ibid. When an expert’s opinion lacks a reliable foundation, supported by facts
and market data, “the court cannot extrapolate value.” Inmar Associates v. Edison Township, 2
N.J. Tax 59, 66 (Tax 1980). Thus, when an expert does not provide a sufficient explanation for
his adjustments, rooted in fact, observation, and an analysis of market data, “the opinion of the
expert is entitled to little weight in this regard.” Dworman v. Tinton Falls, 1 N.J. Tax 445, 458
(Tax 1980) (citing to Passaic v. Gera Mills, 55 N.J. Super. 73 (App. Div. 1959), certif. denied, 30
N.J. 153 (1959)).
Here, neither plaintiff’s appraiser, nor defendant’s appraiser offered any meaningful
evidence, facts, data, or testimony to the court supporting their adjustments for economic size, age
and condition, or location.
In plaintiff’s appraiser’s “judgment,” 217-221 Highland Parkway was “inferior” to
comparable leases 2, 3, and 5, thus he applied physical age and condition adjustments of -5% to
lease 2, -5% to lease 3, and -15% to lease 5. Similarly, in plaintiff’s appraiser’s opinion, the
condition of 224-240 Highland Parkway was “superior” to comparable lease 7, and “inferior” to
comparable leases 8 and 11, thus he applied physical age and condition adjustments of +5% to
comparable lease 7, -5% to comparable lease 8, and -5% to comparable lease 11.
According to plaintiff’s appraiser, he inspected all the comparable leased properties, but
“cannot describe to the court everything that I see, it is a feeling that I see, it is a gut feeling of
what I am seeing, I describe it as best as I can, as objectively as I can . . . I take some pictures and
I go in and look at the properties.” However, other than the appraiser’s subjective “judgment” and
“gut feeling,” no detailed testimony was elicited from plaintiff’s appraiser, nor was any description
16
offered in his appraisal report providing the court with any meaningful insight into the alleged
differences or variations in condition that plaintiff’s appraiser observed. In fact, in describing the
age and condition adjustments, plaintiff’s appraisal report states only that “[t]he subject is superior
to lease 2 and inferior to leases 3 and 6.” Notwithstanding plaintiff’s appraisal report’s notation
(which would require a correction of the adjustment to lease 2 from -5% to +5%), plaintiff’s
appraiser did not identify any physical characteristics, and offered no description of the varying
conditions he observed between the properties. Thus, the court was deprived of the opportunity to
fully consider, evaluate, and accord any weight to the adjustment evidence.
Moreover, plaintiff’s appraiser did not identify any analysis, studies, surveys, or pinpoint
any data that he extracted from the market on which his physical age and condition, or economic
size adjustments were based. In sum, no data, evidence, or testimony was offered by plaintiff’s
appraiser providing any objective market support for his adjustments.
In plaintiff’s appraiser’s opinion, 224-240 Highland Parkway was inferior in size to
comparable leases 7, 8, and 9, thus he applied an -5% size adjustment. This court has observed
that an inverse relationship can exist between leased area and rental values. See VBV Realty, LLC
v. Scotch Plains Twp., 29 N.J. Tax 548, 570 (2017). This principle expresses that the smaller the
leased area, the higher the rental value per square foot, and the larger a leased area, the lower the
rental value per square foot. However, plaintiff’s appraiser offered no evidence to support his
conclusion that comparable leases 7, 8, and 9, comprising respective rental areas of 8,832 square
feet (20% smaller), 6,500 square feet (40% smaller), and 7,200 square feet (35% smaller), all
warranted the same -5% size adjustment, or that a -5% adjustment appropriately accounted for the
differences in size. Additionally, the court observes that comparable lease 12 consists of a rental
area of 19,620 square feet, or approximately 77% larger than 224-228 Highland Parkway, however
17
plaintiff’s appraiser did not apply any upward size adjustment to account for this material
deviation.
The court further highlights that comparable lease 3 was 40% smaller than 217-221
Highland Parkway, and comparable lease 9 was 35% smaller than 224-240 Highland Parkway,
however plaintiff’s appraiser applied a -5% size adjustment only to comparable lease 9, but made
no size adjustment to comparable lease 3. In addition, comparable lease 1 was 2,000 square feet,
or approximately 83% smaller than 217-221 Highland Parkway, however, plaintiff’s appraiser
made no downward adjustment to comparable lease 1 to account for this significant size deviation.
Similarly, defendant’s appraiser offered only the rationale for his adjustments, but offered
no market derived data or objective evidence supporting his adjustment calculations. Defendant’s
appraiser concluded that comparable lease 1 was “superior” in location to the subject properties,
warranting a -10% adjustment. However other than citing the subject properties distance to the
New Jersey Turnpike, defendant’s appraiser offered no explanation what made the comparable
lease locations superior, nor how he derived that a -10% adjustment accurately accounts for the
perceived superiority in location. In fact, during cross-examination, defendant’s appraiser was
seemingly unaware that the subject properties may be located closer to New Jersey Turnpike exit
ramps than the comparable leased properties.
In comparing and contrasting the condition of 224-240 Highland Parkway, defendant’s
appraiser posited that comparable leases 1, 2, 3, and 4 were in “average” condition, yet 224-240
Highland Parkway was in “below avg” condition. Although defendant’s appraiser offered
testimony regarding the interior condition he observed in 224-240 Highland Parkway, defendant’s
appraiser offered no testimony explaining or describing for the court the interior condition of
comparable leases 1, 2, 3, and 4, or the notable condition differences between the properties. The
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court further highlights that only a single, black-and-white exterior photo of each comparable lease
was included in defendant’s appraisal report from which the court could not accurately discern any
differences in quality or condition. Additionally, defendant’s appraiser offered no market-derived
or extracted data or information in support of his conclusion that a -15% adjustment accurately
and appropriately accounted for the perceived condition differences between 224-240 Highland
Parkway and comparable leases 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Moreover, the court observes that leased area of defendant’s comparable lease 1 is
approximately 100% larger than the subject properties, comparable lease 2 is approximately 71%
larger than the subject properties, and comparable lease 4 is approximately 145% larger than the
subject properties. However, defendant’s appraiser failed to account for or address, in either his
appraisal report or testimony before the court, the size disparity that exists between comparable
leases 1, 2, and 4 and the subject properties. Defendant’s appraiser made no adjustment for these
significant size disparities, and seemingly ignored their size differences in arriving at a market
rent.
Finally, defendant’s appraiser offered testimony that industrial warehouses that possess a
lower percentage of finished ancillary office space are less valuable than industrial warehouses
possessing a higher percentage of finished ancillary office space. However, defendant’s appraiser
offered no evidence, either in his appraisal report or in his testimony to the court, regarding the
finished office areas in comparable leases 1, 2, 3, or 4. Therefore, the court is unable to conclude
with any degree of certainty, which comparable lease was competitive in the marketplace with
either 217-221 Highland Parkway or 224-240 Highland Parkway, as of the October 1, 2012
valuation date.
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For the above stated reasons, including plaintiff’s appraiser’s seemingly inconsistent
application of size adjustments, the court finds both plaintiff’s and defendant’s appraisers
adjustments inherently unreliable. Neither plaintiff’s appraiser, nor defendant’s appraiser
produced or presented the court with any analysis, studies, surveys, or pinpointed any extracted
market data supporting their adjustments. Additionally, ignoring both plaintiff’s and defendant’s
appraisers adjustments would be inappropriate, as that would fail to recognize the differences that
exist between the properties. Accordingly, without adequate evidence to account for the
differences between the subject properties and the comparable leases, the court accords no weight
to either plaintiff’s comparable leases, or defendant’s comparable leases.
Thus, without adequate credible evidence of market or economic rent, the court is unable
to determine the fair market value of the subject properties employing the income-capitalization
approach.
2. Sales Comparison Approach
According to defendant’s appraiser, the “market” or sales comparison approach is practical
to valuing the subject properties because they are not located in large industrial warehouse parks,
and typically, these types of warehouse units are owner-occupied.
The sales comparison approach derives an opinion of market value “by comparing
properties similar to the subject property that have recently sold, are listed for sale, or are under
contract.” The Appraisal of Real Estate, supra, at 377. Like the income capitalization approach,
the sales comparison approach requires an appraiser to dissect and weigh market data, including
trends in the marketplace, to derive a credible opinion of value. The appraiser must engage in a
“comparative analysis of properties” and focus on the “similarities and differences that affect
value. . . which may include variations in property rights, financing, terms, market conditions and
20
physical characteristics.” Id. at 378. When credible and reliable market data is available, the sales
comparison approach “is the most straight forward and simple way to explain and support an
opinion of market value.” Greenblatt, supra, 26 N.J. Tax 41.
In performing his sales comparison approach, defendant’s appraiser reviewed sales of
industrial warehouses in Union County, focusing on five properties that sold between November
2011 and December 2012. Defendant’s appraiser utilized the same five sale transactions to derive
a value for both 217-221 Highland Parkway and 224-240 Highland Parkway. The five sale
transactions were located in Linden, Elizabeth, Union, Berkeley Heights, and Plainfield. The
unadjusted prices of the five sale transactions ranged from $48.15 to $59.52 per square foot.
Defendant’s appraiser applied adjustments to the comparable sales to account for perceived
differences in location, condition, percentage of office area, and building coverage.
For 217-221 Highland Parkway, after adjustments, the adjusted sale prices of the
comparable sale transactions ranged from $46.12 to $63.78 per square foot. Ultimately,
defendant’s appraiser concluded a fair market value of $54.00 per square foot. The appraiser then
applied that figure to his estimated gross building area, which he calculated at 11,320 square feet,
to arrive at a concluded value of $610,000, as of the October 1, 2012 valuation date.
For 224-240 Highland Parkway, after adjustments, the adjusted sale prices of the
comparable sale transactions ranged from $29.18 to $47.03 per square foot. Ultimately,
defendant’s appraiser concluded a fair market value of $37.00 per square foot. The appraiser then
applied that figure to the gross building area of 11,050 square feet, to arrive at a concluded value
of $410,000, as of the October 1, 2012 valuation date.
When undertaking the sales comparison approach to value appraisers must adhere to
“systematic procedure[s].” The Appraisal of Real Estate, supra, at 381. Appraisers must conduct
21
research of the competitive marketplace for “information on properties that are similar to the
subject property” and that have recently sold. Ibid. A crucial element of this investigation and
research involves the data verification process. An appraiser must verify the integrity of the
information by “confirming that the data obtained is factually accurate and that the transactions
reflect arm’s-length market considerations.” Ibid. During the data verification process an appraiser
must “elicit additional information about the property such as buyer motivation, economic
characteristics, [and] value component allocations. . . to ensure that comparisons are credible.”
Ibid. The process demands an appraiser “verify information with a party to the transaction to
ensure its accuracy and gain insight into the motivation behind each transaction.” Id. at 385. An
appraiser must endeavor to confirm “statements of fact with the principals to the transaction. . . or
with brokers, closing agents, or lenders involved.” Ibid.
Here, both direct examination and cross-examination revealed that defendant’s appraiser
did not speak with any transaction participant involving comparable sale 3 or comparable sale 4.
The solitary source of his knowledge and information regarding such sales was his review of
Costar listings, the deed, and public tax records. Our Legislature has mandated that, in Tax Court
proceedings, any person being offered as a witness with respect to the review of a local property
tax assessment must possess information or knowledge regarding comparable properties acquired
from owners, sellers, purchasers, lessees, brokers or attorneys who were a party to, or participated
in, the transaction. N.J.S.A. 2A:83-1. Here, defendant’s appraiser did not confirm the terms of
comparable sale 3 or comparable sale 4 with any transaction participants and therefore, failed to
adhere to the standards for offering valuation testimony under N.J.S.A. 2A:83-1.
Additionally, in defendant’s appraiser’s opinion “Union is superior to Roselle and Berkeley
Heights is very superior to Roselle, [so] a -10% adjustment was made to Union and -20% to
22
Berkeley Heights.” However, defendant’s appraiser failed to explain why Union and Berkeley
Heights were “superior” in location to Roselle and, more importantly, how that perceived location
superiority translated into 10% and 20% differences in market value. In short, defendant’s
appraiser offered no statistics, data, surveys, or analysis illustrating that a comparable and
competitive industrial warehouse in Berkeley Heights or Union would lease for 10% or 20% less
than a similarly situated industrial warehouse in Roselle.
Accordingly, for the above-stated reasons, the court must exclude from consideration
defendant’s comparable sale 3 and comparable sale 4.
In analyzing 224-240 Highland Parkway, defendant’s appraiser applied a -15% condition
adjustment to comparable sales 1, 2, 3, and 4 to account for perceived differences in condition. In
support of this condition adjustment, defendant’s appraiser offered testimony that the condition of
224-240 Highland Parkway “is significantly below average as far as the overall appeal and the
condition of the interior, a 15% condition adjustment was made across the board, I was not able to
bracket it, I was not able to find usable sales around the sampling period of this type of condition
building, so a 15% adjustment was made.” Defendant’s appraiser further conceded during cross-
examination that he made the extraordinary assumption that the comparable sales were in better
condition that 224-240 Highland Parkway. Thus, neither defendant’s appraiser’s report, nor his
testimony to the court offered any market-derived evidence in support of his -15% condition
adjustment. Moreover, defendant’s appraiser furnished the court with no evidence that any of the
comparable sales were in a superior condition to 224-240 Highland Parkway, or that a -15%
adjustment accurately accounted for the alleged condition differences.
Additionally, in defendant’s appraiser’s opinion, an industrial warehouse that possesses a
“higher percentage for office space is more valuable. . . therefore the subject [properties are]
23
superior to the comparable sales.” Accordingly, defendant’s appraiser applied a +10% adjustment
to each of the comparable sales to account for every 30% less office space than the subject
properties. In other words, if a comparable industrial warehouse consisted of 21% less office space
than the subject properties, a +7% office space adjustment was applied.
Defendant’s appraiser further posited that the percentage of building coverage an industrial
warehouse occupies on the lot impacts its usefulness, and correspondingly, its value. He offered
that building coverage is important for parking for office and warehouse staff, and customers, thus
the more parking available, the more superior the warehouse building. Accordingly, defendant’s
appraiser applied a +10% adjustment to each of the comparable sales to account for every 40%
more of building coverage than the subject properties. In other words, if a comparable industrial
warehouse building occupied 20% more of a lot, he deemed it inferior to the subject properties,
and applied a +5% building coverage adjustment.
However, defendant’s appraiser offered no market-derived data, treatises, surveys, or other
means of support for these adjustments or concepts. Moreover, defendant’s appraisal report failed
to provide any meaningful insight into how defendant’s appraiser arrived at the building coverage,
or office percentage adjustment formulas. Defendant’s appraiser’s report and testimony offered
only unbridled speculation regarding the impact and influence that building coverage, office
percentage, condition, and location had on the comparable sales he identified.
As stated above, adjustments must have a foundation obtained from data extracted from
the marketplace, market-derived sources or objective data, and not be based on subjective
observations and/or personal experiences. An appraiser’s adjustments “must have a foundation
obtained from the market. . .” Greenblatt, supra, 26 N.J. Tax at 55. “[T]he opinion of an expert
24
depends upon the facts and reasoning which form the basis of the opinion. Without explanation
as to the basis, the opinion of the expert is entitled to little weight in this regard.” Id. at 55.
Here, defendant’s appraiser failed to provide the “why and wherefore” in support of his
adjustments for location, office percentage, condition, or building coverage. Defendant’s appraiser
did not identify any market-derived data, studies, treatises, surveys or the objective data upon
which his adjustments were based. When the evidentiary foundation forming the basis of an
expert’s adjustment is not well-defined, the court cannot be expected to deduce a value therefrom.
Consequently, without an adequate understanding of the bases supporting defendant’s
appraiser’s adjustments to the comparable sales data, the court is unable to conclude that they are
reasonable and therefore, is unable to conclude a value for the subject property under the sales
comparison approach.
3. Cost approach
Although defendant’s appraisal report included a cost approach to value the subject
properties, defendant’s appraiser acknowledged during trial that “this [cost] “approach was not
taken into effect in the final reconciliation,” and the court should “disregard the cost approach.”
Accordingly, the court will not address defendant’s appraiser’s cost approach to value.
4. Subject sale
“It is well settled that a bona fide sale of property may be indicative of the true value of the
property.” Glen Wall Assocs. v. Township of Wall, 99 N.J. 265, 282 (1985). As a general rule,
the sale of a subject property may be indicative of the value of the property, but “is not dispositive
on the issue of value.” Ibid. It is for the finder of fact to weigh and appraise the sale context to
determine if “special circumstances” existed that may have affected the sales price without
25
affecting its market value. L. Bamberger & Co. v. Division of Tax Appeals, 1 N.J. 151 (1948).
The term market value has been defined as:
The most probable price, as of a specified date, in cash, or in terms
equivalent to cash, or in other precisely revealed terms, for which
the specified property rights should sell after reasonable exposure in
a competitive market under all conditions requisite to a fair sale,
with the buyer and seller each acting prudently, knowledgeably, and
for self-interest, and assuming that neither is under undue duress.
[Appraisal Institute, The Appraisal of Real Estate, 58 (14th. ed.
2013).]
In discerning whether the sale of a property is a reliable indicator of market value, our
courts have stated that the following five criteria must be satisfied:
1) buyer and seller are typically motivated and neither is under
duress;
2) buyer and seller are well informed or well advised and are acting
prudently, knowledgeably and in their respective self-interests;
3) the property has been reasonably exposed to an open, relevant and
competitive market for a reasonable period of time;
4) the purchase price is paid in cash or its equivalent; and
5) the purchase price is unaffected by special or creative financing
or by other special factors, agreements or considerations.
[Venture 17, LLC v. Hasbrouck Heights, 27 N.J. Tax 108, 126
(2013) (citing Hull Junction Holding Corp, supra, 16 N.J. Tax at 94.]
Thus, when a buyer or seller were unusually influenced or highly motivated, acting
imprudently, or suffering from duress, the sale of a property will not reflect market value. AT&T
Corp. v. Township of Morris, 19 N.J. Tax 239, 245 (Tax 2000); American Cyanamid Co. v.
Township of Wayne, 17 N.J. Tax 542, 578-580 (1998), aff'd per curiam o.b., 19 N.J. Tax 46 (App.
Div. 2000); Venture 17, LLC, supra, 27 N.J. Tax 127. “It is for the court to appraise the
26
circumstances surrounding a sale to determine if there were special factors which affected the sale
price without affecting the true value.” Glen Wall Assocs., supra, 99 N.J. at 282.
Here the relevant valuation date is October 1, 2012. Plaintiff submitted evidence that 217-
221 Highland Parkway was offered for lease and sale sometime in 2015. Moreover, plaintiff
submitted copies of SR1A forms which reflect that 217-221 Highland Parkway was sold on August
31, 2015, and 224-240 Highland Parkway was sold on February 24, 2016. No evidence was
offered regarding the motivation of defendant or the buyers, the terms of the sale, the subject
properties exposure to the marketplace, or whether any creative or special financing was involved
in the sale transactions. Additionally, the sale of 217-221 Highland Parkway took place
approximately 34 months following the October 1, 2012 valuation date, and the sale of 224-240
Highland Parkway took place approximately 40 months following the October 1, 2012 valuation
date. Therefore, the court concludes that the sale of the subject properties were too remote in time
to be a reliable indicator of market value as of the October 1, 2012 valuation date. Moreover, the
court finds that insufficient evidence was offered to support a conclusion that the sale prices of the
subject properties were indicative of market value.
5. Glen Wall
Nonetheless, the court is mindful of its obligation “to apply its own judgment to valuation
data submitted by experts in order to arrive at a true value and find an assessment for the years in
question.” Glen Wall Assocs., supra, 99 N.J. at 280 (citing New Cumberland Corp. v. Roselle
Borough, 3 N.J. Tax 345, 353 (Tax 1981)). However, to enable the court to make an independent
finding of true value, credible, and competent evidence must be offered in the trial record.
Here, plaintiff’s and defendant’s appraiser failed to produce or present the court with any
analysis, studies, surveys, or to pinpoint any market-derived data supporting their adjustments to
27
the comparable leases, or the comparable sales, rendering their conclusions and opinions of value
unreliable. Thus, as a result of the inadequacies in plaintiff’s and defendant’s appraiser’s reports
and testimony, the court concludes that the record contains insufficient credible evidence to make
an independent determination of the true market value of the subject properties by a fair
preponderance of the evidence.
III. Conclusion
For the above stated reasons, the court concludes that plaintiff has failed to prove, by a fair
preponderance of the evidence, that the market value of the subject properties, as of the October
1, 2012 valuation date, exceeded the 2013 Union County Board of Taxation Memorandum of
Judgments.
Accordingly, the court will enter judgments affirming the 2013 Union County Board of
Taxation Memorandum of Judgments.
Very truly yours,
/s/Hon. Joshua D. Novin, J.T.C.
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