Siebert v. Okun ( 2021 )

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Opinion Number: ____________________
Filing Date: March 15, 2021
NO. S-1-SC-37231
SUSAN L. SIEBERT,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
REBECCA C. OKUN, M.D.,
and WOMEN’S SPECIALISTS
OF NEW MEXICO, LTD.,
Defendants-Appellants.
CERTIFICATION FROM THE NEW MEXICO COURT OF APPEALS
Victor S. Lopez, District Judge
Hinkle Shanor, LLP
William P. Slattery
Dana Simmons Hardy
Santa Fe, NM
Dickinson Wright, PLLC
Bennett Evan Cooper
Phoenix, AZ
Lorenz Law
Alice Tomlinson Lorenz
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellants
Curtis & Co.
Lisa Curtis
Laura R. Callanan
Albuquerque, NM
The Law Office of Amalia S. Lucero, LLC
Amalia J. Skogen Lucero
Placitas, NM
for Appellee
John W. Anderson, Attorney at Law P.C.
John William Anderson
Albuquerque, NM
Shook, Hardy & Bacon, LLP
Mark A. Behrens
Cary Silverman
Washington, D.C.
for Amici Curiae New Mexico Medical Society and American Medical
Association
Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A.
Edward R. Ricco
Albuquerque, NM
for Amicus Curiae New Mexico Hospital Association
University of New Mexico School of Law
Michael B. Browde
David J. Stout
Albuquerque, NM
American Association for Justice
Elsie Sanguinetti, President
Jeffrey White, Senior Associate General Counsel
Washington, DC
for Amici Curiae New Mexico Trial Lawyers Association
and American Association for Justice
OPINION
VIGIL, Justice.
{1} This case requires us to consider whether the cap on all damages other than
medical care and punitive damages under the Medical Malpractice Act (MMA),
NMSA 1978, §§ 41-5-1 to -29 (1976, as amended through 2015), violates the right
to trial by jury guaranteed by Article II, Section 12 of the New Mexico Constitution.
Plaintiff Susan L. Siebert successfully sued her doctor, Rebecca C. Okun, M.D., and
Women’s Specialists of New Mexico, Ltd. (WSNM) for medical malpractice under
the MMA. Following the return of the jury’s verdict, Defendants Dr. Okun and
WSNM moved to reduce the jury award of $2,600,000 to conform with the $600,000
cap on all nonmedical and nonpunitive damages in MMA actions. See NMSA 1978,
§ 41-5-6(A) (1992).
{2} The district court denied Defendants’ motion, concluding that the MMA
nonmedical, nonpunitive damages cap infringed the state constitutional right to a
trial by jury. In doing so, the district court ruled in direct opposition to the Court of
Appeals’ holding in Salopek v. Friedman, 2013-NMCA-087, ¶ 58, 308 P.3d 139. In
addition, the district court suggested without deciding that the cap might implicate
the equal protection, substantive due process, and separation of powers provisions
of the New Mexico Constitution. N.M. Const. art. II, § 18; N.M. Const. art. III, § 1.
{3} We review this case upon acceptance of certification from the Court of
Appeals. Siebert v. Okun, A-1-CA-36067, Order of Certification to the New Mexico
Supreme Court (Sept. 4, 2018); Siebert v. Okun, S-1-SC-37231, Order (Sept. 24,
2018). As we explain herein, we hold that the MMA nonmedical, nonpunitive
damages cap does not violate Article II, Section 12, and we reverse the district
court’s denial of Defendants’ motion to conform the judgment in accordance with
the statutory cap. See § 41-5-6(A).
I. BACKGROUND
{4} Plaintiff suffered injuries due to perforations in her uterus and intestine after
a hysteroscopy performed by Dr. Okun, an employee of WSNM. Subsequently,
Plaintiff brought suit against Defendants. Because Defendants were “qualified”
health care providers as defined by the MMA, NMSA 1978, § 41-5-5(A) (1992), the
provisions of the MMA applied to Plaintiff’s suit for medical malpractice.
{5} The MMA statutory scheme is a quid pro quo, whereby qualified health care
providers are afforded certain legal protections only if they take financial action in
anticipation of medical negligence lawsuits. Specifically, a qualified health care
provider under the MMA must pay an annual surcharge into the statutorily-created
patient’s compensation fund and either provide proof of professional liability
insurance of at least $200,000 per occurrence or, for an individual health care
2
provider, have a continuous deposit of $600,000 with the state superintendent of
insurance. NMSA 1978, §§ 41-5-3(A) (1977), -5(A), -25 (1997). In exchange for
these financial contributions and assurances, the MMA provides qualified health
care providers with various benefits. See generally Baker v. Hedstrom, 2013-NMSC-
043, ¶ 18, 309 P.3d 1047 (reviewing the benefits provided by the MMA to qualified
health care providers). Among those benefits, the MMA caps nonmedical,
nonpunitive damages awards at $600,000 and limits the qualified health care
provider’s personal liability to $200,000. Section 41-5-6; NMSA 1978, § 41-5-7(E)
(1992). Any remaining amount of the judgment exceeding the personal liability cap
is paid out of the patient’s compensation fund. Sections 41-5-7(E), -25(G). Most
pertinent to this case is the cap on an award of nonmedical, nonpunitive damages
under Section 41-5-6(A).
{6} Section 41-5-6(A) provides that, “[e]xcept for punitive damages and medical
care and related benefits, the aggregate dollar amount recoverable by all persons for
or arising from any injury or death to a patient as a result of malpractice shall not
exceed six hundred thousand dollars ($600,000) per occurrence.” The amount
recoverable for a malpractice claim under the MMA does not include awards for
future medical expenses, but if the jury finds that a successful plaintiff is in need of
future medical care, that plaintiff may receive payment for reasonable future medical
3
expenses as they are incurred. Sections 41-5-6(C), -7(A)-(B), -(D). Awards for those
future medical expenses are not capped. Section 41-5-7(C). In other words, the jury
in an MMA action determines whether a plaintiff is entitled to future damages but
does not award a specific amount following the trial. The amount awarded for future
medical care is established in subsequent evidentiary hearings. Section 41-5-7.
{7} The jury in this case awarded Plaintiff $2,600,000 in total damages. The
damages award was not disaggregated into various categories of damages. This is
because the district court failed to give the required special interrogatory asking the
jury to state the amount of damages it awarded for past medical care and benefits.
UJI 13-1126 NMRA. In addition, the jury was incorrectly instructed to award
damages for Plaintiff’s future medical care in violation of Section 41-5-7. The jury
was not given the required special interrogatory asking if Plaintiff was in need of
future medical care, UJI 13-1125 NMRA. For these reasons, we are not certain how
much of the jury’s verdict was intended to compensate for past medical care and
nonmedical injuries, and we do not know whether any amount of the jury’s award
was intended to compensate for future medical care. However, the jury was
instructed that Plaintiff’s medical expenses totaled $935,916.15. We therefore accept
that this amount of the jury’s verdict was intended to compensate Plaintiff for her
existing medical expenses by the time of the trial. The jury was also instructed that
4
it could award compensation for various nonmedical injuries, such as pain and
suffering, loss of household services, and loss of enjoyment of life, among other
injuries. The jury was not instructed on punitive damages.
{8} The district court entered judgment against Defendants for the total amount of
the jury’s verdict. Defendants subsequently moved to amend the judgment to
conform to the damages cap of Section 41-5-6(A). Defendants argued that the total
award should be reduced to $1,535,916.15, representing the stipulated amount of
Plaintiff’s existing medical expenses ($935,916.15) plus $600,000 for Plaintiff’s
capped nonmedical damages. In response, Plaintiff argued that the MMA
nonmedical, nonpunitive damages cap was unconstitutional, specifically violating
the right to a jury trial as guaranteed by Article II, Section 12, the separation of
powers provision of Article III, Section 1, and the equal protection and substantive
due process clauses of Article II, Section 18.
{9} After an evidentiary hearing on the constitutional issues, the district court
issued its memorandum opinion and order, which concluded that Article II, Section
12 was “clearly implicated and dispositive” and that the MMA nonmedical,
nonpunitive damages cap violated Plaintiff’s right to a jury trial. The district court
stated that the constitutional separation of powers, equal protection, and due process
provisions might also be implicated but declined to decide those issues.
5
{10} Defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals. Because the Court of Appeals
had already addressed the issues presented by this case in Salopek, 2013-NMCA-
087, it certified the case to this Court pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 34-5-14(C)
(1972), and Rule 12-606 NMRA. Siebert, A-1-CA-36067, Order (Sept. 4, 2018).
II. DISCUSSION
{11} In its certification order, the Court of Appeals identified the following
significant questions of law: (1) whether the district court erred by concluding that
the MMA nonmedical, nonpunitive damages cap violates the right to a trial by jury;
(2) whether the district court erred in suggesting that the MMA nonmedical,
nonpunitive damages cap violates the separation of powers provision; and (3)
whether the district court erred in suggesting that the MMA nonmedical, nonpunitive
damages cap violates equal protection and substantive due process. Id. We accepted
certification. Siebert, S-1-SC-37231, Order (Sept. 24, 2018). With this opinion, we
answer the first question posed by the Court of Appeals—whether the MMA
nonmedical, nonpunitive damages cap violates the state constitutional right to trial
by jury. We do not address the remaining certified questions because the district
court merely suggested that the separation of powers, substantive due process, and
equal protection provisions of the New Mexico Constitution “may also be
implicated.” The district court did not definitively rule that the cap violated any
6
constitutional guarantees aside from the right to trial by jury. For that reason,
analysis of any other constitutional issues is not necessary to the disposition of the
case before us. We therefore decline to answer the second and third questions posed
by the Court of Appeals. See Schlieter v. Carlos, 1989-NMSC-037, ¶ 13, 108 N.M.
507, 775 P.2d 709 (“It is an enduring principle of constitutional jurisprudence that
courts will avoid deciding constitutional questions unless required to do so. We have
repeatedly declined to decide constitutional questions unless necessary to the
disposition of the case.”). For the reasons that follow, we hold that the MMA
nonmedical, nonpunitive damages cap does not violate Article II, Section 12.
{12} Constitutional challenges to a statute are reviewed de novo. Bounds v. State
ex rel. D’Antonio, 2013-NMSC-037, ¶ 11, 306 P.3d 457. When reviewing a statute
under a constitutional challenge, a “strong presumption in favor of constitutional
validity . . . attaches to legislative enactments.” Otto v. Buck, 1956-NMSC-040, ¶
16, 61 N.M. 123, 295 P.2d 1028.
{13} The New Mexico Constitution provides that “[t]he right of trial by jury as it
has heretofore existed shall be secured to all and remain inviolate.” N.M. Const. art.
II, § 12. This right pertains to civil causes of action that were triable by jury at the
7
time the New Mexico Constitution was adopted and took effect.1 State ex rel. Bliss
v. Greenwood, 1957-NMSC-071, ¶ 15, 63 N.M. 156, 315 P.2d 223 (“[I]n that class
of cases where the right to a trial by jury existed prior to the Constitution, it cannot
be denied by the legislature.”).
{14} Defendants bring this appeal, arguing that Plaintiff’s right to trial by jury was
not violated for two reasons. First, relying on the Court of Appeals’ holding in
Salopek, 2013-NMCA-087, ¶¶ 49-58, Defendants claim that the jury right does not
attach to medical malpractice cases under the MMA because the MMA is a statutory
cause of action that did not exist at the time the New Mexico Constitution came into
effect. Second, Defendants argue that the MMA nonmedical, nonpunitive damages
cap does not even implicate the right to a jury trial because the cap merely gives
legal effect to the jury’s damages award; the cap does not invade the jury’s role as
fact-finder. Put another way, regardless of whether the right to a jury trial attaches
1
This case implicates only the state constitutional right to a jury trial in civil
cases as the analogous federal right articulated in the Seventh Amendment applies
only to “Court[s] of the United States.” Despite this distinction, we consider federal
precedent relevant to our analysis of the state right to a jury trial in civil cases. Bd.
of Educ. of Carlsbad Mun. Schs. v. Harrell, 1994-NMSC-096, ¶ 34, 118 N.M. 470,
882 P.2d 511. This is because both constitutional provisions preserve the right to
jury trial as it existed in the jurisdiction at the time each constitution was adopted.
See id. ¶¶ 33-34 (providing that both the Seventh Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article II, Section 12 of the New Mexico Constitution “preserve[]
the common law right to jury trial and do[] not create a new or broader right”
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
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to actions brought under the MMA, the damages cap does not violate the jury right
but instead limits the scope of a plaintiff’s available legal remedy.
{15} We address each argument in turn and conclude that the MMA nonmedical,
nonpunitive damages cap does not violate the right to trial by jury. While we agree
with the outcome in Salopek, in which the Court of Appeals held that the cap did not
violate Article II, Section 12, we must overrule its conclusion that the constitutional
jury right does not attach to MMA causes of action. To the contrary, we hold that
the constitutional right to trial by jury applies in cases brought under the MMA.
Though the constitutional jury right applies in MMA cases, we further hold that the
damages cap of Section 41-5-6(A) does not violate the right to trial by jury because
the cap does not invade the province of the jury. Rather, this statutory damages cap
merely gives legal consequence to the jury’s determination of the amount of the
verdict.
A. The Constitutional Right to Trial by Jury Attaches to Causes of Action
Brought Under the MMA
{16} To determine whether the right to trial by jury extends to a specific cause of
action, we assess the general nature of the claim to determine whether the specific
cause of action would have been tried to a jury prior to the effective date of the New
Mexico Constitution. In identifying the general cause of action at issue, we “must
consider whether such an action fits within that ‘class of cases’ in which the right
9
[to a jury trial] existed either at common law or by statute at the time” the New
Mexico Constitution was adopted and took effect. See Greenwood, 1957-NMSC-
071, ¶ 15. We have explained that to determine whether the cause of action at issue
lies within the class of cases to which the jury right applied, “the relevant question
is whether the more generally described cause of action, such as breach of contract
or breach of fiduciary duty, was triable to a jury.”2 Lisanti v. Alamo Title Ins. of Tex.,
2002-NMSC-032, ¶ 13, 132 N.M. 750, 55 P.3d 962 (emphasis added). It is “the
cause of action, not its specific manifestation, [that is] dispositive.” Id. ¶ 14 (citing
Harrell, 1994-NMSC-096).
{17} When assessing the general cause of action, we must also consider whether
the requested relief is legal or equitable in nature. See Harrell, 1994-NMSC-096, ¶¶
35-37; see also Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 41 (“‘Suits at common law’ . . . refer[s]
to ‘suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and determined, in
contradistinction to those where equitable rights alone were recognized, and
2
The Lisanti rule is substantively similar to the analysis used by federal courts
to determine which cases trigger the jury right under the Seventh Amendment. In
Granfinanciera, SA v. Nordberg, the United States Supreme Court explained that the
right to a jury trial in civil cases “applies to actions brought to enforce statutory rights
that are analogous to common-law causes of action ordinarily decided in English
law courts” at the time the United States Constitution was adopted. 492 U.S. 33, 41-
42 (1989).
10
equitable remedies were administered.’” (citations omitted)). If the sought relief is
solely equitable in nature, the right to jury trial does not attach. See id. We need not
linger on this consideration because Plaintiff seeks a legal remedy in the form of
monetary damages for negligence. The critical inquiry in this case is two-fold: (a)
whether causes of action brought under the MMA can be “more generally described”
as causes of action in common-law medical negligence, see Lisanti, 2002-NMSC-
032, ¶ 13, and (b) whether claims of common-law medical negligence were triable
to a jury at the time the New Mexico Constitution was adopted and took effect. We
begin our analysis with an examination of the Court of Appeals’ opinion in Salopek,
the principal case upon which Defendants rely in bringing this appeal.
1. A claim under the MMA can be more generally described as a cause of
action in common-law medical negligence
{18} In Salopek, the Court of Appeals concluded that the MMA created a new
statutory cause of action that was distinct from a claim of common-law medical
negligence. 2013-NMCA-087, ¶ 58. In that case, the plaintiff sued his doctor for
medical malpractice under the MMA. Id. ¶ 5. The jury found that the doctor was
negligent in failing to pressurize the plaintiff’s colon in order to locate a perforation
and awarded the plaintiff $1,000,000 in damages. Id. ¶¶ 3, 5. The district court
reduced the damages award to $600,000 pursuant to the damages cap of Section 41-
5-6(A). Id. ¶ 5. On appeal, the plaintiff argued, among other things, that the cap on
11
damages violated his constitutional right to trial by jury under Article II, Section 12.
Id. ¶¶ 49, 51. The Court of Appeals disagreed and held that the constitutional jury
right did not attach in the plaintiff’s case because an action for medical malpractice
under the MMA was “an entirely new statutory cause of action that was not
recognized under the common law.” Id. ¶ 50.
{19} In support of this conclusion, the Court of Appeals described four ways in
which it considered a claim under the MMA distinct from a common-law claim of
medical negligence. Id. ¶¶ 53-58. First, under the MMA, a plaintiff must submit his
or her claim to the statutorily-created medical review commission, which assesses
the plaintiff’s likelihood of success and, upon determining that the acts complained
of “might constitute malpractice,” provides the plaintiff assistance in obtaining “a
physician qualified in the field of medicine involved” to serve as a consultant and
expert witness at trial. Id. ¶ 54; NMSA 1978, §§ 41-5-14, -15, -20, -23 (1976). No
such review of the case and conditional provision of an expert is afforded the
plaintiff in a common-law medical negligence claim. Salopek, 2013-NMCA-087,
¶ 54.
{20} Second, the MMA provides a statute of repose requiring a plaintiff to bring a
claim within three years of the act of malpractice, NMSA 1978, § 41-5-13 (1976),
as opposed to the statute of limitations for common-law medical negligence claims
12
which permits claims to be brought “within three years from the time that the patient
discovers, or with reasonable diligence should have discovered, that a claim exists.”
Salopek, 2013-NMCA-087, ¶ 55.
{21} Third, the MMA caps the defendant health care provider’s personal liability
at $200,000 for “all medical care and related benefit payments,” § 41-5-7(E), and
the MMA also created the patient’s compensation fund to cover any amount that
exceeds the personal liability cap. Salopek, 2013-NMCA-087, ¶ 56; §§ 41-5-6(D), -
25. No such cap or compensation fund exists at common law, so a defendant in a
common-law medical negligence case “is liable for all actual damages proximately
caused.” Salopek, 2013-NMCA-087, ¶ 56.
{22} Finally, under the MMA, a successful plaintiff found to be in need of future
medical care is not awarded future medical damages at trial but is instead
compensated for continuing medical care as those expenses are incurred, § 41-5-
7(B), (D), and the district court maintains continuing jurisdiction to enforce payment
to the plaintiff, NMSA 1978, §§ 41-5-9, -10 (1976). Salopek, 2013-NMCA-087, ¶
57. In contrast, a successful plaintiff in a common-law medical negligence claim
may recover only once for future medical care if the jury accounts for those expenses
within its damages award. Id.; see UJI 13-1804 NMRA. In other words, under a
13
traditional common-law medical negligence lawsuit, there is no determination of
future medical expenses beyond the jury’s award of damages at trial.
{23} In light of these distinctions and the aim of the Legislature to create a statutory
scheme for medical malpractice that would benefit patients as well as appease
insurance providers, the Court of Appeals held that the MMA was sufficiently
distinct from common-law medical negligence so as to constitute an entirely new
statutory cause of action to which the constitutional jury right did not attach.
Salopek, 2013-NMCA-087, ¶ 58 (“[W]here the Legislature creates a right of action
pursuant to a special statutory proceeding, there is no right to a jury trial under our
constitution unless the statute so provides.” (brackets omitted) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted)).
{24} We disagree with the Court of Appeals’ analysis and conclusion that an MMA
claim is a cause of action that is distinct from common-law medical negligence. In
reaching its conclusion, the Salopek Court relied on procedural distinctions between
MMA and non-MMA medical negligence cases. Id. ¶¶ 53-58. These procedural
distinctions evidence only the Legislature’s intent to alter the way in which a medical
negligence claim is brought against a qualified health care provider. Id. ¶¶ 52-53,
58. While procedural requirements dictate how a claim may be asserted, they do not
affect the general substantive nature of a cause of action. Thus, heavy reliance solely
14
on the procedural differences between MMA and non-MMA claims runs counter to
the principles we pronounced in Lisanti. Consistent with our precedent, in order to
determine whether an MMA claim can be “more generally described” as a claim of
medical negligence at common law, we must examine the core substantive elements
of each type of claim. See Lisanti, 2002-NMSC-032, ¶ 13.
{25} The substantive elements of a medical malpractice claim under the MMA and
the substantive elements of a medical negligence claim at common law are
indistinguishable. This is reflected in our jury instructions. The same jury
instructions are used for MMA and non-MMA cases alike to explain “the basic
elements of a medical negligence (malpractice) action.” Rule Set 13 (“Uniform Jury
Instructions—Civil”), Ch. 11 (“Medical Negligence”) Intro. NMRA. These
elements include duty, breach of that duty “by departing from the proper standard of
medical practice recognized in the community[,]” and proximate causation of the
plaintiff’s injuries. Diaz v. Feil, 1994-NMCA-108, ¶ 5, 118 N.M. 385, 881 P.2d 745;
see UJI 13-1101 (duty and breach of duty), -1116A (causation for failure to warn of
potential injury arising from treatment of conditions), -1116B NMRA (causation for
failure to warn of potential injury resulting from untreatment of conditions). Under
both types of claims, the jury is asked to assess damages. See Rule Set 13, Ch. 18
15
(“Damages”) Intro. NMRA (“Instructions on damages follow as a matter of course
in all cases wherein an issue is submitted to a jury on the recovery of damages.”).
{26} There are only two slight statutory differences affecting how the jury is
instructed in MMA cases and cases of common-law medical negligence, neither of
which pertain to the elements a plaintiff must prove in these types of cases. We
consider these differences procedural rather than substantive. First, in an MMA case,
the jury is not informed of the statutory damages cap. See § 41-5-6(A) (“[T]he jury
shall not be given any instructions dealing with th[e] limitation [on damages.]”).
Second, if the jury finds a health care provider negligent in an MMA case, it must
then answer whether the plaintiff is in need of future medical care and benefits as a
result of the injury. See § 41-5-7(A). However, the jury in an MMA case is not
permitted to determine “the value of future medical care and related benefits, and
evidence relating to the value of future medical care shall not be admissible.” Id.
Uniform Jury Instructions 13-1125 and -1126 provide special interrogatories for
MMA juries in accordance with these requirements. See UJI 13-1125 (“If your
verdict is for the plaintiff, do you find that plaintiff is in need of future medical care
and related benefits?”); UJI 13-1126 (“What do you find was the value or cost of
past medical care and related benefits received by the plaintiff?”). Other than these
16
differing procedural instructions, the same jury instructions are used for medical
malpractice claims under the MMA and medical negligence claims at common law.
{27} The procedural differences between MMA and non-MMA claims
demonstrate that the Legislature intended to change how the courts facilitate and
administer remedies when a plaintiff brings a medical malpractice action against a
qualified health care provider under the MMA. See Inc. Cnty. of Los Alamos v.
Johnson, 1989-NMSC-045, ¶ 4, 108 N.M. 633, 776 P.2d 1252 (“We . . . presume
that the legislature intends to change existing law when it enacts a new statute.”).
However, in passing the MMA, the Legislature did not change the essential
substantive elements that a plaintiff must prove in order to hold any health care
provider liable for medical negligence. Put differently, with respect to the required
elements a plaintiff must prove in order to succeed in either an MMA claim for
medical malpractice or a common-law claim for medical negligence, the core
substance of the causes of action is the same. The identical substantive jury
instructions for both MMA and non-MMA cases belie any argument to the contrary.
{28} In applying our approach in Lisanti, we conclude that a claim under the MMA
is “more generally described” as a cause of action in medical negligence. See 2002-
NMSC-032, ¶ 13. Our conclusion satisfies the first of our two-part inquiry to
determine whether the constitutional jury right attaches to Plaintiff’s claim under the
17
MMA. We turn now to the second question whether common-law medical
negligence claims were tried by a jury when the New Mexico Constitution took
effect.
2. Medical negligence claims were triable by jury prior to the adoption and
effective date of the New Mexico Constitution
{29} Having concluded that claims under the MMA are essentially claims of
medical negligence, we now examine whether medical negligence claims would
have been tried by juries in New Mexico at the time the New Mexico Constitution
was adopted on January 21, 1911, to become effective on January 6, 1912, when
New Mexico was admitted into the union. See N.M. Const. art. XXII, § 1 (“This
constitution shall take effect and be in full force immediately upon the admission of
New Mexico into the union as a state.”); Proclamation of President Taft, 37 Stat.
1723 (1912). The district court determined in its March 23, 2018, order that the
constitutional jury right attached to causes of action under the MMA because juries
heard medical negligence cases at American common law prior to the adoption of
the New Mexico Constitution. Based on the following historical analysis, we agree.
{30} There does not appear to have been a reported appellate opinion concerning a
claim of medical negligence prior to the effective date of the New Mexico
Constitution. See Jerrald J. Roehl, The Law of Medical Malpractice in New Mexico,
3 N.M. L. Rev. 294, 294 n.6 (1973). In fact, medical negligence as a cause of action
18
does not appear in the state appellate record until 1954. Id.; Los Alamos Med. Ctr.,
Inc. v. Coe, 1954-NMSC-090, 58 N.M. 686, 275 P.2d 175. Broadening the scope of
our review of state case law to include causes of action that are similar to medical
negligence, we find that cases of personal injury tort were tried by juries in the
Territory of New Mexico prior to statehood. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Sw. Brewery & Ice
Co., 1910-NMSC-001, ¶¶ 8-9, 15 N.M. 232, 107 P. 677. In 1876, the New Mexico
Territorial Legislature adopted “the common law as recognized in the United States
of America,” NMSA 1978, § 38-1-3 (1876), so we turn to review the common law
of other American jurisdictions, as well as that of England.
{31} The first reported case of medical negligence occurred in England in 1374.
Roehl, supra, at 294 n.2. Medical negligence claims were tried by juries in the
United States as early as 1794. See Cross v. Guthery, 2 Root 90, 91 (Conn. 1794). A
survey of these historical pieces leads us to conclude that, even though there is not
an appellate record of a medical negligence case that was tried by a jury in New
Mexico prior to the middle of the twentieth century, causes of action arising in
medical negligence would have been triable by a jury under the common law of New
Mexico at the time the New Mexico Constitution took effect.
{32} Based on these historical examples and our conclusion that causes of action
under the MMA can be more generally described as causes of action in medical
19
negligence, we hold that the constitutional right to trial by jury attaches to causes of
action brought under the MMA. To the extent that the Court of Appeals’ opinion in
Salopek differs from this conclusion, that opinion is hereby overruled. Though we
overrule Salopek on the grounds noted herein, we must address the district court’s
failure to apply Salopek in its consideration of Defendants’ motion to reduce the
judgment from the full jury award in this case.
3. The district court erred by declining to apply binding precedent
{33} In denying Defendants’ motion to conform the amount of the jury verdict with
the MMA nonmedical, nonpunitive damages cap, the district court concluded that
the Legislature did not create a wholly new statutory cause of action with the
enactment of the MMA. While we agree with this conclusion in substance, the
district court erred by failing to apply the Court of Appeals’ holding in Salopek that
the MMA nonmedical, nonpunitive damages cap did not violate Plaintiff’s state
constitutional right to a jury trial. See Salopek, 2013-NMCA-087, ¶ 58. “The general
rule is that a court lower in rank than the court which made the decision invoked as
a precedent cannot deviate therefrom and decide contrary to that precedent,
irrespective of whether it considers the rule laid down therein as correct or
incorrect.” Alexander v. Delgado, 1973-NMSC-030, ¶ 9, 84 N.M. 717, 507 P.2d 77820
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In this instance, the district court
was bound by the Court of Appeals’ opinion in Salopek.
B. The MMA Nonmedical, Nonpunitive Damages Cap Does Not Invade the
Province of the Jury
{34} Though we hold that the constitutional right to trial by jury attaches to causes
of action brought under the MMA, we must now address Defendants’ argument that
the damages cap of Section 41-5-6(A) does not infringe the right to trial by jury
because the cap merely “restricts the scope” of the remedy available to Plaintiff.
According to Defendants, the MMA nonmedical, nonpunitive damages cap does not
interfere with the jury’s duty to decide the “true issues of fact.” See Sanchez v.
Gomez, 1953-NMSC-053, ¶ 8, 57 N.M. 383, 259 P.2d 346. Rather, the damages cap
applies only after the jury has completed its role as fact-finder.
{35} Plaintiff responds that the determination of the full amount of damages
awarded a given plaintiff is “within the exclusive province of the jury,” relying on
Hood v. Fulkerson, 1985-NMSC-048, ¶ 10, 102 N.M. 677, 699 P.2d 608. Plaintiff
contends that “capping damages amounts to a partial abrogation of the jury-trial
right.” In light of the “inviolate” nature of the constitutional jury right, Amici, New
Mexico Trial Lawyers Association and American Association for Justice, assert that
outside the context of judicial remittitur, any limit on the jury-found damages award
violates the right to trial by jury.
21
{36} Plaintiff’s reliance on Hood is not dispositive of the question before us:
whether the constitutional right to trial by jury invalidates the MMA’s nonmedical,
nonpunitive damages cap and guarantees Plaintiff full recovery of the jury’s verdict.
In Hood, we concluded that the district court erred when it altered the amount of the
jury’s verdict in a negligence action based on the district court’s understanding that
the jury may have been confused. See 1985-NMSC-048, ¶¶ 2-4, 10. We explained
that “if the court felt the jury verdict was not clear or correct, it should have
instructed the jury to amend the verdict to clearly state the wishes of the jury.” Id. ¶
11. For the district court to alter the amount of the jury’s verdict was impermissible.
Id. ¶¶ 10-11. Though we stated that determining the “proper amount for damages”
was in the “exclusive province of the jury,” the holding of Hood does not answer the
question whether a jury-found damages award is immune from subsequent reduction
pursuant to a statutory damages cap. See id. ¶ 10.
{37} We agree with the Court of Appeals’ framing of this analysis: “[T]he
‘inviolate’ guarantee of a jury trial ‘simply means that the jury right is protected
absolutely in cases where it applies; the term does not establish what that right
encompasses.’” Salopek, 2013-NMCA-087, ¶ 51 (quoting Learmonth v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 710 F.3d 249, 263 (5th Cir. 2013)). However, because the Salopek
Court determined that the constitutional jury right did not apply to MMA claims, see
22
id. ¶ 50, it did not engage the second part of the inquiry: What does the constitutional
right to trial by jury encompass?
{38} To answer this question, we start with the language of Article II, Section 12
and conduct a historical review of the jury trial right as it existed in the United States
prior to the adoption and effective date of the New Mexico Constitution. We then
delineate the role of the jury based on New Mexico precedent and statutory history,
as well as the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the jury’s function.
Finally, we examine several out-of-state cases where courts were asked, as we are
today, whether statutory damages caps violate their respective constitutional
provisions guaranteeing the right to trial by jury. Following this analysis, we
conclude that the MMA nonmedical, nonpunitive damages cap merely gives legal
consequence to the jury’s finding on damages and therefore does not infringe the
guarantee of Article II, Section 12.
{39} As we have previously stated, Article II, Section 12 provides that “[t]he right
of trial by jury as it has heretofore existed shall be secured to all and remain
inviolate.” To interpret this constitutional provision, we must determine (a) the
proper definition of the term “inviolate” and (b) the scope of the right to trial by jury
in civil actions at the time the New Mexico Constitution took effect.
23
1. Interpretation of “inviolate”
{40} The Court of Appeals has stated that the constitution’s requirement that the
right to jury trial shall “remain inviolate” means that the right is “protected
absolutely” where it applies. Salopek, 2013-NMCA-087, ¶ 51 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). Similarly, Black’s Law Dictionary defines “inviolate”
as “[f]ree from violation; not broken, infringed, or impaired.” Inviolate, Black’s Law
Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Some state courts have interpreted “inviolate” to mean
“not disturbed or limited” and have used this definition to strike down statutory
damages caps. Hilburn v. Enerpipe Ltd., 442 P.3d 509, 514-16, 524 (Kan. 2019)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 771
P.2d 711, 721-22, 728 (Wash. 1989) (“Applied to the right to trial by jury, this
[constitutional] language indicates that the right must remain the essential
component of our legal system that it has always been. For such a right to remain
inviolate, it must not diminish over time and must be protected from all assaults to
its essential guarantees.”). Other courts have interpreted “inviolate” to mean
“freedom from . . . partial destruction or substantial impairment” but have
emphasized that an “inviolate” right is not “immun[e] from all regulation.”
Humphrey v. Eakley, 60 A. 1097, 1098 (N.J. 1905); see Commonwealth v. Fugmann,
24
198 A. 99, 111 (Pa. 1938) (concluding that “‘inviolate’ . . . does not import rigidity
of regulation in the manner of impaneling a jury”).
{41} Our Court of Appeals adopted this broader interpretation in concluding that
the procedural requirements to make a timely jury demand under a precursor to Rule
1-038 NMRA were “reasonable rules” that were not precluded by Article II, Section
12. Carlile v. Continental Oil Co., 1970-NMCA-051, ¶¶ 7-9, 81 N.M. 484, 468 P.2d
885 (“[R]easonable regulatory provisions, although different in form and substance
from those in effect at the adoption of the Constitution, do not abridge, limit or
modify the right which is to remain inviolate.” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)). The common thread through all these interpretations is that an inviolate
right is one that must remain intact and unbroken. We conclude that an inviolate
right is not beyond the reach of regulation, so long as that regulation does not
substantially impair the core essence of the right. We now consider how the framers
of our constitution understood the right to trial by jury so we may determine how the
core essence of that right must be protected and applied today.
2. Historical analysis of the right to jury trial
{42} The role of the jury has evolved significantly since the first jury trials were
held in colonial America. From the late-seventeenth century through the American
Revolution, juries in some of the colonies wielded broad authority over both legal
25
and factual issues. See Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from
an Unappreciated History, 44 Hastings L.J. 579, 592-93 (1993); Morton J. Horwitz,
The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 142-43 (1977). For this reason,
the colonists were “preoccupied with safeguarding the jury right, relying upon the
jury to restrain government.” Landsman, supra, at 593. For example, in
Massachusetts, juries “were the chief assessors of legal claims and the primary
enforcers of legal rights for their communities.” Id. at 592. Jury trials were conducted
before three judges, who were empowered to instruct the jury on their “divergent
view[s] of the law.” Id. In these cases, counsel was allowed to argue legal questions
to the jury during closing arguments. Id. By returning a verdict that both interpreted
the law and applied that law to the facts of the case, “the jury had broad control over
legal as well as factual issues and was therefore the ultimate authority in the
courtroom process.” Id. at 593; cf. Horwitz, supra, at 143 (“[T]he practice of
Connecticut judges was simply to submit both law and facts to the jury, without
expressing any opinion or giving them any direction on how to find their verdict.”).
{43} By way of contrast, in New York, the jury was theoretically bound to apply
the instructed law to the facts of the case. Landsman, supra, at 593. However, the
practice of jury nullification, where in some circumstances jurors reviewed and
rejected the instructed law, gave the jury tremendous power to subvert the British
26
legal system and wrest control from British judges. See id. In a prominent 1734
seditious libel case, the jury was instructed to convict the defendant journalist, John
Peter Zenger, if it found that he had in fact printed accusations of corruption and
misfeasance against the Governor of New York, William Cosby. Id. The evidence
was clear that the accusations were printed by Zenger, but Zenger’s counsel argued
that the jury could contravene the judge’s legal instructions and acquit Zenger if it
found that Zenger’s accusations were true. Id. The jury’s ultimate acquittal of Zenger
sent a message that “judges do not necessarily have absolute control over questions
they designate as ‘legal,’” and fortified the colonists’ defense of the right to trial by
jury as a means of popular control of the justice system. Id.
{44} Following the Revolution, the jury lost much of the prominence it had once
enjoyed and ceased being the primary method of asserting democratic control over
local government. Id. at 597-98. Juries were no longer required as a check on biased
British judges, and the emergence of democratically elected state legislatures meant
that “the right to jury review or nullification of laws was less important amidst
legitimately established democratic laws.” Id. at 598. Accordingly, the United States
Constitution did not include any reference to civil juries. Id. However, this exclusion
garnered significant protest led by the Antifederalists who feared an “unconstrained
federal judiciary.” Id. at 599-600. That protest resulted in the drafting of the Seventh
27
Amendment, preserving the right to a jury in civil cases where the value in
controversy exceeded twenty dollars. Id. at 600; U.S. Const. amend. VII.
{45} In the decades that followed, the power of the jury to shape the law through
jury nullification was greatly diminished. The nineteenth century saw a wave of
judicial reform intended to vest more power in judges to determine the legal outcome
in tort cases. See Landsman, supra, at 605; Horwitz, supra, at 143-44. One vehicle
for this reform was the rise of the doctrine of contributory negligence, which was
recognized in the Territory of New Mexico as early as 1884, Alexander v. Tennessee
& Los Cerrillos Gold & Silver Mining Co., 1884-NMSC-021, ¶ 19, 3 N.M. 255, 3
P. 735, and was not abandoned in our jurisprudence until 1981, Scott v. Rizzo, 1981-
NMSC-021, ¶¶ 4-5, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (replacing the doctrine of
contributory negligence with the doctrine of comparative fault) superseded in part
by statute, NMSA 1978, § 41-3A-1 (1987). See Landsman, supra, at 606. Under the
doctrine of contributory negligence, a plaintiff was completely barred from recovery
if it could be shown that the plaintiff’s own negligence contributed to his or her
injury. See Scott, 1981-NMSC-021, ¶ 11 (explaining the holding of Butterfield v.
Forrester, 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809), which is widely considered
the progenitor of the doctrine of contributory negligence). In cases where the facts
supported a plaintiff’s contributory negligence, “the judge could dismiss a case as a
28
matter of law, without ever submitting the matter to the jury.” Landsman, supra, at
606. Alternatively, the judge could instruct the jury that the plaintiff could not
recover any damages if the plaintiff acted negligently and “brought an injury on
himself[.]” Alexander, 1884-NMSC-021, ¶¶ 36-37 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). In this respect, the doctrine of contributory negligence operated to
curtail the jury’s power to award damages in tort cases. See Landsman, supra, at
606.
{46} At the same time, legislative restrictions began mandating that juries apply
the legal instructions provided by the judge. Horwitz, supra, at 142-43 (“By 1810, it
was clear that the instructions of the court, originally advisory, had become
mandatory and therefore juries no longer possessed the power to determine the
law.”). These procedural reforms worked to further limit the jury’s function to solely
that of fact-finder. See id.; Landsman, supra, at 605.
{47} The twentieth century saw a crystallization of the jury’s singular function to
resolve issues of fact. The United States Supreme Court declared that the purpose of
the jury in civil cases was “to assure a fair and equitable resolution of factual issues,”
Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 157 (1973), and clarified that the finding of
damages is one of the factual issues within the ambit of the jury, see Dimick v.
Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 480 (1935). In Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc.,
29
the United States Supreme Court reviewed the historical role of juries in determining
damages awards, concluding that it was commonplace for the jury to award damages
in civil cases at common law prior to the adoption of the United States Constitution.
See 523 U.S. 340, 353 (1998) (“[T]he common law rule as it existed at the time of
the adoption of the Constitution was that in cases where the amount of damages was
uncertain, their assessment was a matter so peculiarly within the province of the jury
that the Court should not alter it.” (brackets omitted) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)).
{48} In Feltner, the plaintiff sued for copyright infringement under the Copyright
Act of 1976. Id. at 343. In lieu of actual damages, the plaintiff sought statutory
damages under the Copyright Act, which were capped at $20,000 per instance of
infringement. Id. The district court denied the defendant’s demand for a jury trial on
statutory damages, instead ruling that statutory damages would be determined at a
bench trial. Id. at 344. The defendant asserted that a bench trial on damages violated
his right to a jury under the Seventh Amendment. See id. at 342. The United States
Supreme Court agreed, holding that “if a party so demands, a jury must determine
the actual amount of statutory damages under [the Copyright Act] in order to
preserve the substance of the common-law right of trial by jury.” Id. at 355 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Feltner stands for the proposition that the
30
right to a trial by jury includes the right to have the jury—not the judge—find the
amount of damages. New Mexico history conforms with the Feltner Court’s
determination that juries found the amount of damages at common law prior to the
adoption of both the United States and New Mexico Constitutions.
{49} During the territorial period, juries in New Mexico heard civil tort cases and
determined the amount of damages in those cases. See, e.g., Schmidt, 1910-NMSC-
001, ¶¶ 8-9 (upholding the jury’s verdict on damages in a case of employer liability
for personal injury). The territorial laws in effect at the time of the adoption of the
New Mexico Constitution instructed that “after hearing the evidence, the jury shall
be kept together . . . until they agree upon a verdict . . . , and when the jurors shall
agree upon a verdict, they shall deliver the same to the justice, who is required to
give judgment thereon and to award execution as hereinafter directed.” Section
3267, C.L. 1897. This territorial statute serves to illustrate Defendants’ argument
that a jury verdict is a resolution of fact that only becomes a legal requirement to
compensate the plaintiff once the court enters judgment on the verdict.
{50} Our historical analysis of the evolving role of the jury reveals that though the
jury may once have exercised an ability to shape the legal as well as factual
resolutions in a civil case, by the time the New Mexico Constitution took effect in
1912, the jury’s role was limited to that of fact-finder. Based on this analysis, we
31
conclude that the right to trial by jury is satisfied when evidence is presented to a
jury, which then deliberates and returns a verdict based on its factual findings. The
legal consequence of that verdict is a matter of law, which the Legislature has the
authority to shape. See Jones v. Murdoch, 2009-NMSC-002, ¶ 25, 145 N.M. 473,
200 P.3d 523 (“We have long recognized that the Legislature may exercise its
plenary power to alter the common law.”).
{51} In passing the damages cap of Section 41-5-6(A), the Legislature restricted
the scope of the available legal remedy for injury resulting from the medical
malpractice of a qualified health care provider. However, nothing in Section 41-5-6
abridges Plaintiff’s right to present evidence before a jury for “a fair and equitable
resolution” of the facts of the case. See Colgrove, 413 U.S. at 157. Therefore we
hold that the MMA nonmedical, nonpunitive damages cap of Section 41-5-6(A) does
not violate Plaintiff’s right to a jury trial under Article II, Section 12.
{52} The great weight of persuasive authority on the question whether statutory
damages caps violate the constitutional jury right supports our conclusion in this
case. In Wachocki v. Bernalillo Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, the Court of Appeals rejected
the plaintiffs’ argument that the cap on damages under the Tort Claims Act infringed
the right to trial by jury. See 2010-NMCA-021, ¶¶ 44-45, 147 N.M. 720, 228 P.3d
504, cert. quashed, 2010-NMCERT-002, 147 N.M. 705, 228 P.3d 489. Though the
32
case was decided on other grounds, the Court of Appeals stated that it failed to see
how “the right to a jury incorporate[s] a right to maximum recovery.” Id. ¶ 45. We
agree.
33
{53} Turning to out-of-state cases,3 the Oregon Supreme Court in Horton v. Oregon
Health & Sci. Univ. conducted a thorough historical analysis of the right to jury trial.
376 P.3d 998, 1036-40 (Or. 2016). That court concluded that the history of the jury
right in England and America revealed that the constitutional provision of an
“inviolate” right to jury trial does not “limit[] the legislature’s authority to define, as
a matter of law, the substantive elements of a cause of action or the extent to which
damages will be available in that action.” Id. at 1036, 1040.
{54} The Virginia Supreme Court concluded similarly, holding that the statutory
damages cap in medical malpractice actions does not violate Virginia’s
constitutional provision that a “trial by jury is preferable to any other, and ought to
be held sacred.” Pulliam v. Coast Emergency Servs. of Richmond, Inc., 509 S.E.2d
307, 312-15 (Va. 1999) (quoting Va. Const. art. I, § 11). That court reasoned that
“[i]f it is permissible for a legislature to enact a statute of limitations completely
barring recovery in a particular cause of action without impinging upon the right of
trial by jury, it should be permissible for the legislature to impose a limitation upon
the amount of recovery as well.” Id. at 314. Following this logic, since we have
upheld the New Mexico Legislature’s authority to foreclose a medical malpractice
action three years after the alleged act of malpractice under the MMA’s statute of
repose, Cummings v. X-Ray Assocs. of N.M., P.C., 1996-NMSC-035, ¶¶ 1, 39-42,
34
3
Of the thirty jurisdictions to consider whether a statutory cap on damages
violates the constitutional right to trial by jury, twenty-four have upheld such caps,
reasoning that a statutory limit on recovery is a matter of law within the purview of
the state legislature. Sixteen of these jurisdictions analyzed constitutional provisions
of an “inviolate” right to trial by jury. See Evans ex rel. Kutch v. State, 56 P.3d 1046,
1050 (Alaska 2002) (deciding in an equally divided opinion that the damages cap
does not infringe the jury right); Chan v. Curran, 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 59, 80-82 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2015) (concluding that the damages cap does not infringe the “inviolate”
jury right); Univ. of Miami v. Echarte, 618 So. 2d 189, 191 (Fla. 1993) (deciding
without discussion that damages cap does not “violate the right to trial by jury,”
which the state constitution declares “inviolate”); Kirkland v. Blaine Cnty. Med. Ctr.,
4 P.3d 1115, 1118-20 (Idaho 2000) (same); Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 404
N.E.2d 585, 601-02 (Ind. 1980) (same), overruled on other grounds by In re
Stephens, 867 N.E.2d 148, 156 (Ind. 2007); Murphy v. Edmonds, 601 A.2d 102, 106
& n.3, 118 (Md. 1992) (concluding that the damages cap does not infringe on the
jury right that must be “inviolably preserved” as stated in Article 23 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights); English v. New England Med. Ctr., 541 N.E.2d 329, 331-32
(Mass. 1989) (concluding that the damages cap for charitable institutions in medical
malpractice actions does not violate the jury right); Phillips v. Mirac, Inc., 685
N.W.2d 174, 180-83 (Mich. 2004) (concluding that the damages cap does not
infringe the “inviolate” jury right); Gourley ex rel. Gourley v. Neb. Methodist Health
Sys., Inc., 663 N.W.2d 43, 74-75 (Neb. 2003) (per curiam) (concluding that the
damages cap does not infringe the “inviolate” jury right); Tam v. Eighth Jud. Dist.
Ct., 358 P.3d 234, 238 (Nev. 2015) (same); Larimore Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 44 v.
Aamodt, 2018 ND 71 ¶¶ 24, 27-28, 908 N.W.2d 442, 453-54 (concluding that the
tort damages cap does not infringe the “inviolate” jury right); Arbino v. Johnson &
Johnson, 116 Ohio St. 3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, at ¶¶ 32, 36-42
(concluding that the general tort damages cap does not infringe the “inviolate” jury
right); Horton, 376 P.3d at 1036, 1044 (concluding that the damages cap does not
infringe the “inviolate” jury right); Zauflik v. Pennsbury Sch. Dist., 104 A.3d 1096,
1132-33 (Pa. 2014) (same); McClay v. Airport Mgmt. Servs., LLC, 596 S.W.3d 686,
690-93 (Tenn. 2020) (same); Judd v. Drezga, 2004 UT 91, ¶ 35, 103 P.3d 135(concluding that the cap on “quality of life” damages does not infringe the
“inviolate” jury right); Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525, 528-29 (Va.
1989) (concluding that the statutory limit on recovery “effects no impingement upon
the right to a jury trial”); MacDonald v. City Hosp., Inc., 715 S.E.2d 405, 414-15
(W. Va. 2011) (concluding that the legislative limit on claims for pain and suffering
35
121 N.M. 821, 918 P.2d 1321; § 41-5-13, we must also conclude that the Legislature
may impose a damages cap in such actions. Both restrictions are aimed at curtailing
the legal remedy available to redress a plaintiff’s injury and are consistent with the
constitutional jury right.
{55} Finally, in Learmonth, a case cited by the Court of Appeals in Salopek, the
Fifth Circuit concluded that a statutory noneconomic damages cap did not violate
Mississippi’s “inviolate” constitutional jury right. Learmonth, 710 F.3d at 258; Miss.
Const. art. III, § 31. Because the jury was unaware of the damages cap, the
has no impact on the constitutional right to trial by jury); Maurin v. Hall, 2004 WI
100, ¶¶ 96-100, 274 Wis. 2d 28, 682 N.W.2d 866 (concluding that the damages cap
does not infringe the “inviolate” jury right), overruled on other grounds by
Bartholomew v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund & Compcare Health Servs. Ins. Corp.,
2006 WI 91, ¶¶ 16-18, 293 Wis.2d 38, 717 N.W.2d 216; see also Davis v.
Omitowoju, 883 F.2d 1155, 1159-61 (3d Cir. 1989) (concluding that the Seventh
Amendment does not preclude the damages cap); Boyd v. Bulala, 877 F.2d 1191,
1196 (4th Cir. 1989) (same); Smith v. Botsford Gen. Hosp., 419 F.3d 513, 519 (6th
Cir. 2005) (same); Learmonth, 710 F.3d at 258-61 (concluding that the damages cap
does not infringe Mississippi’s “inviolate” jury right); Schmidt v. Ramsey, 860 F.3d
1038, 1045-46 (8th Cir. 2017) (concluding that Nebraska’s statutory damages cap
does not violate the Seventh Amendment); but see Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass’n,
592 So. 2d 156, 159-65 (Ala. 1991) (concluding that the damages cap infringes the
“inviolate” jury right); Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d
218, 221-24 (Ga. 2010) (same); Hilburn, 442 P.3d at 514-16 (same); Watts v. Lester
E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633, 640-41 (Mo. banc 2012) (same); Knowles v.
United States, 1996 SD 10, ¶¶ 9-16, 544 N.W.2d 183, 186-88 (same), superseded by
statute on other grounds as stated in Millea v. Erickson, 2014 S.D. 34, ¶ 13, 849
N.W.2d 272, 276; Sofie, 771 P.2d at 721-22 (same).
36
Learmonth Court reasoned that the statute did “not invade the jury’s factfinding
process.” Id. at 260. Section 41-5-6(A) likewise provides that the jury shall not be
informed of the damages cap, so we are further affirmed that the MMA nonmedical,
nonpunitive damages cap does not invade the jury’s role as fact-finder.
III. CONCLUSION
{56} For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the MMA nonmedical, nonpunitive
damages cap does not violate the constitutional right to trial by jury of Article II,
Section 12. We remand this case to the district court to conform the judgment in
accordance with Section 41-5-6(A).
{57} IT IS SO ORDERED.
______________________________
BARBARA J. VIGIL, Justice
WE CONCUR:
C. SHANNON BACON, Justice
DAVID K. THOMSON, Justice
37
JUDITH K. NAKAMURA, Justice, Retired
Sitting by designation
CONRAD F. PEREA, Judge
Sitting by designation
38