State v. Galindo ( 2023 )

This decision of the Supreme Court of New Mexico was not selected for publication in
the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Refer to Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the
citation of unpublished decisions. Electronic decisions may contain computer-
generated errors or other deviations from the official version filed by the Supreme Court.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Filing Date: December 4, 2023
NO. S-1-SC-38585
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
IGNACIO GALINDO,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OTERO COUNTY
Angie K. Schneider, District Judge
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
Luz C. Valverde, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellant
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
Walter M. Hart, III, Assistant Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellee
OPINION
BACON, Chief Justice.
{1} In this direct appeal, Defendant-Appellant Ignacio Galindo (Appellant) seeks
reversal of the district court’s denial of a self-defense jury instruction. Appellant claims
that the evidence introduced at trial is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to
whether he acted in self-defense, thus warranting the relevant instruction. In denying
the requested instruction, the district court pointed to acts by Appellant supporting that
he was the first aggressor. A jury found Appellant guilty of first-degree murder contrary
to NMSA 1978, Section 30-2-1(A)(1) (1994), felony murder contrary to Section 30-2-
1(A)(2), and eleven other charges.
{2} Central to this issue is whether Appellant’s firing of a gunshot through an open
window constituted an objectively reasonable response to the actions of Kristen
Rodriguez and Victim Daniel Martinez while they were inside Rodriguez’s residence.
Applying the defense-of-habitation doctrine, we conclude that Appellant’s response was
not objectively reasonable and accordingly affirm the district court’s denial of the
requested self-defense instruction.
I. BACKGROUND
{3} Appellant and Rodriguez began a relationship in 2011 and had two children
together but were living separately at the time of the relevant events, which occurred in
Alamogordo on the night of August 16-17, 2018.
{4} Appellant testified that earlier on August 16 he had learned of Rodriguez’s
relationship with Victim. Appellant admitted at trial that he sent multiple “angry” texts to
Rodriguez during that day including “Found out ur fucking Daniel..hes dead tonight.”1
Rodriguez testified that she shared that text with Victim and that they discussed its
content.
{5} It is uncontested that, just before midnight at an Allsup’s Convenience Store,
Appellant and Victim encountered one another unexpectedly and exchanged
antagonistic words, resulting in Victim striking Appellant in the face. Rodriguez testified
that Victim told her about the encounter on the phone while driving back from the
Allsup’s and told her that he would not return right away because Appellant was
following him. Rodriguez testified that she turned off the lights in her residence and hid
by the couch until Victim returned.
{6} Appellant testified to committing the following acts after driving to Rodriguez’s
residence soon after 1:00 a.m. In order to “disable” their vehicles and “just to be an
ass,” Appellant sprayed expanding foam into the tailpipe of Rodriguez’s vehicle and
onto the door handle of Victim’s vehicle. Appellant then “knock[ed]” or “pound[ed]” on
Rodriguez’s front door, followed closely by Rodriguez “yelling for [Appellant] to
leave . . . , basically screaming for [Appellant] to leave, [and that] the police [had been
called].” Appellant testified that he “just wanted to hear from [Rodriguez’s] own mouth
that she was messing around again and we were done” and that he knew Victim was
inside but “didn’t really have anything to say to him.” Appellant then moved around the
residence to Rodriguez’s master bedroom window and knocked thereon “to see if I
could get her to come out.” Appellant then went to the living room window near the front
door where he broke and removed part of the accordion-style panel of the air
1Testifying on redirect and responding to a question about the meaning of this text, Appellant stated, “To
be honest, I was just threatening [Victim] . . . just really to scare him.” Appellant then clarified that he did
not mean it literally and that his intent was not to confront and kill Victim.
conditioner in that window.2 During these events, Appellant and Rodriguez “were
arguing,” Rodriguez was “telling [Appellant] to leave,” Appellant “was just yelling back at
her that she needs to come outside and talk to [him],” and the two “were both screaming
at each other.”
{7} Appellant testified that through the opening he had just caused in the window, he
saw Rodriguez holding a handgun (Glock)3 and saw Victim take it from her and take a
step toward the door, at which point Appellant “kinda backed up [behind the] brick wall”
between the front door and the front window. Appellant testified that he “heard a ‘pop’
which sounded like a gunshot.”4 Appellant then pulled out his gun and “didn’t look into
the window but . . . reached around and . . . shot through the window inside the
apartment.” Appellant testified that he “carr[ies] a firearm all the time,” that he was
unable to see through the curtain but “kinda panicked really when [he] heard the shot,”
and that he “didn’t know whether they were shooting the gun at [him] and [so he] pulled
out [his] gun and . . . shot back.” Appellant testified that after firing the shot he left
immediately in his truck, knowing that he had “fired inside the house . . . , but [he] did
not know that anybody was hurt.”
{8} At the conference on jury instructions, the district court heard arguments
regarding Appellant’s tendered modification of UJI 14-5171 NMRA (“Justifiable
homicide; self-defense.”). Appellant’s tendered instruction included,
The killing is in self-defense if:
1. There was an appearance of immediate danger of death or great bodily
harm to [Appellant] as a result of Kristen Rodriguez arming herself with a
handgun and handing such gun to [Victim] who was heading toward the
front door as [Appellant] was right outside such front door and [Appellant]
heard what he believed to be a shot fired.
The State argued under State v. Lucero, 1998-NMSC-044, 126 N.M. 552, 972 P.2d
1143, that Appellant’s actions—his threatening text, breaching the front window, and
refusing to leave after being told to do so—established that he was the first aggressor
and thus was not entitled to a self-defense instruction. See id. ¶¶ 6-9. Defense counsel
argued that Appellant’s testimony showed he was not the first aggressor because he
arrived merely to talk and removed his holstered firearm only as a result of seeing
Rodriguez and Victim’s drawn weapon and then hearing a shot. The district court
2Additionally, Rodriguez testified and Appellant does not contest that “once [Appellant] broke the piece off
the AC unit, he reached in and pulled the curtains over.”
3Rodriguez testified that she took the Glock out of the hallway closet “[b]ecause somebody was trying to
break into my house, someone that had text me a very disturbing text, and just everything I been through
with him; I was scared, I was terrified, I was very terrified . . . [of Appellant].”
4The State argues that, apart from this testimony by Appellant, “there was no evidence any gun other
than [Appellant’s .380 handgun] had been fired that night.” In response, Appellant points to “evidence at
trial that while the Glock magazine held fifteen 9 mm rounds, only fourteen rounds were in the magazine
once it was found.”
denied the instruction in large part based on Appellant’s threatening text and his
“additional steps” after being told to leave.
{9} A jury found Appellant guilty on all charges, and he was sentenced to life plus
twenty years and six months, less three days. Appellant timely appealed to this Court,
which has exclusive jurisdiction over “[a]ppeals from a judgment of the district court
imposing a sentence of . . . life imprisonment.” N.M. Const. art. VI, § 2.
II. DISCUSSION
{10} On appeal, Appellant argues that the district court’s denial of his tendered self-
defense instruction “deprived the jury of its fact-finding function and violated [his] rights
to due process, to present a defense and to a jury determination on every element of
the offense.”
A. The Issue Was Preserved
{11} At the outset, we note the State’s assertion that Appellant did not preserve this
issue for appeal, as “[t]he self-defense instruction requested by [Appellant] . . .
contained no limiting provisions relevant to [the] right of defense of habitation of Victim
and [Rodriguez] and thus constituted an incorrect statement of the law.” In response,
Appellant argues that the court understood his position regarding self-defense and that
defense of habitation was not raised below as a requirement to be included in the
instruction.
{12} On this point we agree with Appellant’s citation of Gallegos v. State, in which this
Court held that a flawed but minor modification of an otherwise correct uniform jury
instruction was sufficient for preservation purposes where it “alert[ed] the mind of the
court” to the challenged question of law. 1992-NMSC-014, ¶¶ 3-6, 113 N.M. 339, 825
P.2d 1249 (citing “SCRA 1986, 5-608(D)”⸻the 1975 amendment, identical to the
current Rule 5-608(D) NMRA). The Gallegos Court concluded that the “‘correct written
instruction’” requirement of Rule 5-608(D) “must be read in light of the purpose of the
Rule, which is to allow the court an opportunity to decide a question whose dimensions
are not open to conjecture or after-the-fact interpretation.” 1992-NMSC-014, ¶ 6.
Applying Gallegos here, the record is clear that for preservation purposes, the mind of
the district court was sufficiently alerted to Appellant’s claim of error by the tendered
self-defense instruction, and we do not address this issue further.
B. Standard of Review and the Law of Self-Defense
{13} In State v. Baroz, this Court provided the following statements of law regarding
the denial of a self-defense instruction:
The propriety of denying a jury instruction is a mixed question of
law and fact that we review de novo. When, as in this case, a challenge to
the jury instructions has been preserved, we review for reversible error.
Failure to instruct on self-defense when there is a sufficient quantum of
proof to warrant it is reversible error. We do not weigh the evidence but
rather determine whether there is sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable
doubt about self-defense.
A defendant is only entitled to jury instructions on a self-defense
theory if there is evidence presented to support every element of that
theory. An instruction on self-defense requires evidence that (1) the
defendant was put in fear by an apparent danger of immediate death or
great bodily harm, (2) the killing resulted from that fear, and (3) the
defendant acted reasonably when he or she killed. We have described the
first two requirements as subjective in that they focus on the perception of
the defendant at the time of the incident. In contrast, the third requirement
is objective in that it focuses on the hypothetical behavior of a reasonable
person acting under the same circumstances as the defendant.
Where there is enough evidence to raise a reasonable doubt in the
mind of a juror about whether the defendant lawfully acted in self-defense
such that reasonable minds could differ, the instruction should be given.
When considering a defendant’s requested instructions, we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the giving of the requested
instructions.
2017-NMSC-030, ¶¶ 13-15, 404 P.3d 769 (text only)5 (citations omitted). Regarding the
objective, third required element of self-defense, “[t]he law simply does not recognize
any right to an acquittal based on a wholly unreasonable claim of a self-defense
justification for taking the life of another.” State v. Rudolfo, 2008-NMSC-036, ¶ 20, 144
N.M. 305, 187 P.3d 170.
C. Under the Defense-of-Habitation Doctrine, Rodriguez’s and Victim’s
Conduct Was Lawful and Thus Appellant’s Responsive Use of Deadly
Force Was Not Objectively Reasonable
{14} Appellant argues that the relevant instruction was warranted because he
presented sufficient evidence of each of the three elements of self-defense to raise a
reasonable doubt thereof. First, regarding his subjective fear, Appellant points to his
testimony that when “[l]ooking through the window, he saw [Rodriguez] pull the Glock,
he then saw [Victim] reach for it and [in response Appellant] stepped back [behind the
brick wall]. Hearing what he believed to be a shot, he panicked and pulled his gun from
its holster.” Second, regarding the killing resulting from his subjective fear, Appellant
points to his testimony “that when he heard the shot, he panicked and fired through the
[partially obscured] window.”
5The “text only” parenthetical as used in this opinion indicates omission (for enhanced readability) of all of
the following nontextual marks that may be present in the source text: brackets, ellipses, and internal
quotation marks.
{15} Third, regarding whether his use of deadly force was objectively reasonable,
Appellant argues that “[t]here was sufficient evidence from which a properly instructed
jury could have found [Appellant] acted reasonably when he fired his gun.” He argues
that his actions before Rodriguez armed herself—going “to the house to ‘mess with’”
Rodriguez, vandalizing the vehicles, and “bang[ing] on the windows yelling for
[Rodriguez] to come out and talk with him”—did not rise “to the level of deadly force.”
Appellant points to “the defense evidence in support of the instruction”—seeing
Rodriguez “pull the Glock,” seeing Victim “take it from her and step toward the front
door,” and hearing a shot—as “sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether
using deadly force was reasonable under the circumstances.”
{16} Based on the foregoing, Appellant argues that “it was for the jury to decide
whether . . . his actions were reasonable under the circumstances” and that “the court’s
failure to instruct the jury on . . . in essence, the only contested question . . . violated
[Appellant’s] Sixth Amendment rights to present a defense.”
{17} In response, the State argues that the two subjective elements of self-defense
are not sufficiently supported by Appellant’s “mere belief [that] he heard a ‘pop’ that
sounded like a shot.” Without citing the record, the State further asserts that Appellant’s
“testimony reflected his own uncertainty as to [who] had fired the alleged shot, . . . did
not [include] anyone having pointed the gun at him . . . [, and] indicate[d] that his action
was fueled by reasons and emotions other than fear.” However, these allegations do not
demonstrate that Appellant lacked fear or that Appellant did not fire the fatal shot in
response to that fear. We conclude that the evidence of Appellant’s testimony was
sufficient to support the two subjective elements of self-defense.
{18} Regarding the objective third element, the State argues that no reasonable juror
could have concluded under the defense-of-habitation doctrine that the conduct of
Victim and Rodriguez to which Appellant testified was unlawful, and thus the State
maintains that Appellant was not entitled to a self-defense instruction. The State argues,
“Under the evidence presented, Victim and [Rodriguez] reasonably believed that
[Appellant’s] intention in pursuing an assault upon [Rodriguez’s] residence was to
commit a violent felony upon one or more occupants of that residence[, and therefore]
even potentially deadly conduct on the[ir] part . . . was lawful as defense of habitation.”
The State quotes State v. Boyette, 2008-NMSC-030, ¶ 15, 144 N.M. 184, 185 P.3d 355,
for the proposition that defense of habitation “‘gives a person the right to use lethal force
against an intruder when such force is necessary to prevent the commission of a felony
in [that person’s] home.’” See also id. ¶ 21 (clarifying that “the term ‘felony’ in the
defense of habitation context is properly limited to those felonies involving violence”).
The State also cites persuasive sources for the proposition that, relevant to Victim’s
status in Rodriguez’s residence, the “right of defense of habitation extends to guests.”
{19} The State cites State v. Southworth, 2002-NMCA-091, 132 N.M. 615, 52 P.3d
987, as a case involving comparable circumstances that “addressed the role of the
lawfulness of a victim’s conduct in relation to a claim of self-defense.” In Southworth, the
victim came out of her house and fired a shotgun over the defendant’s head in
conjunction with yelling at him to leave her property. Id. ¶ 4. The defendant took the
shotgun from the victim, and the victim testified that the defendant then beat her with
the weapon. Id. The two had previously been involved in a romantic relationship, and
the victim testified that she was afraid of the defendant, who had been drinking prior to
arriving. Id. ¶¶ 3-4. The defendant claimed self-defense predicated on a right to stand
his ground but was convicted of aggravated battery and criminal trespass. Id. ¶¶ 6-9.
{20} The State points to Southworth’s proposition, id. ¶ 14, that the self-defense
privilege only applies where a defendant’s use of force is in response to unlawful force.
The State quotes the Southworth Court’s related conclusion, id. ¶ 15, that a separate
jury instruction was required regarding “whether [the victim] ‘was entitled to use
potentially deadly force against [the defendant] because, if [the victim] was justified in
using potentially deadly force against [the defendant], [the defendant] had no right to
stand his ground.’”
{21} As discussed next, we agree with the State’s reading of our defense-of-habitation
precedent, approve the Southworth Court’s application thereof to the lawfulness of the
use of force by the owner or householder of a residence, and confirm that the
lawfulness of such use of force extends as well to a guest.
{22} New Mexico caselaw is clear that an inhabitant of a dwelling is entitled to
significant latitude in the use of force in defense of habitation. Boyette, 2008-NMSC-
030, ¶¶ 17-21 (“[D]efense of habitation justifies killing an intruder who is assaulting the
defendant’s home with the intent of reaching its occupants and committing a felony
against them . . . [and] allows one to kill to prevent an intruder’s forced entry.”); State v.
Couch, 1946-NMSC-047, ¶¶ 28-30, 52 N.M. 127, 193 P.2d 405 (Defense-of-habitation
doctrine “gives the householder the right to kill the aggressor, if such killing is necessary
or apparently necessary to prevent or repel the felonious aggression . . . [and] gives the
householder the right to meet force with force, [where] an attack upon a dwelling, and
especially in the night, the law regards as equivalent to an assault on a . . . person.”
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); State v. Bailey, 1921-NMSC-009, ¶ 30,
27 N.M. 145, 198 P. 529 (“[I]f the assault upon the habitation is for the purpose of
reaching and committing a felony upon the dweller therein, or [a family member], this
justifies resistance to the extent of killing, if necessary to prevent the felony.”).
{23} The Southworth Court correctly applied our precedent and the uniform jury
instructions on defense of habitation in reaching the conclusion that a householder is
“entitled to use deadly force” if the householder “ha[s] a reasonable fear” that a
trespasser intends to commit a felony at that home “and if a reasonable person would
have used such force.”6 2002-NMCA-091, ¶ 16; see UJI 14-5170 NMRA (instructing
that killing in an attempt to prevent a felony in the householder’s home is justified if “[a]
reasonable person in the same circumstances as the [householder] would have acted
as the [householder] did”); Couch, 1946-NMSC-047, ¶ 28 (“[T]he law of defense of
6We note that, notwithstanding this conclusion, the relevant question in Southworth was properly
submitted to the jury where facts essential to determining the lawfulness of a householder’s use of deadly
force were disputed. See 2002-NMCA-091, ¶¶ 15, 19. Here, in contrast, the facts necessary for
determining the lawfulness of Rodriguez’s and Victim’s actions are uncontested or were provided by
Appellant’s own testimony.
habitation and the resistance to the commission of a felony thereon . . . gives the
householder the right to kill the aggressor, if such killing is necessary or apparently
necessary to prevent or repel the felonious aggression.”). In addition, we recognize and
approve the proposition that “[t]he defense-of-habitation privilege may be invoked by a
servant or guest of the owner as well as by the owner.” 1 Jens David Ohlin, Wharton’s
Criminal Law § 14:12 (16th ed. 2021).
{24} It follows logically that if a householder or a guest of the householder was entitled
to use deadly force under such circumstances, the trespasser’s use of deadly force in
response to that lawful conduct cannot be objectively reasonable.
{25} Under uncontested evidence and his own testimony, Appellant committed
provocative acts that constituted a basis for Rodriguez as the householder and Victim
as her guest to reasonably believe that Appellant intended to commit a violent felony
upon one or more of the dwellers in the habitation. See Bailey, 1921-NMSC-009, ¶ 30.
These acts include his threatening text of which both Rodriguez and Victim were aware,
knocking or pounding on the front door after 1:00 a.m., yelling in argument with
Rodriguez even after being told to leave and that the police had been called, knocking
on the master bedroom window, and forcibly breaking and reaching through the living
room window. Relevantly, this Court has “determine[d] that putting one’s fingers behind
a window screen affixed to a residential dwelling is an intrusion into an enclosed,
private, prohibited space and constitutes an ‘entry’ for the purposes of New Mexico’s
breaking-and-entering statute.” State v. Holt, 2016-NMSC-011, ¶ 18, 368 P.3d 409(citing NMSA 1978, § 30-14-8(A) (1981)). Appellant’s own testimony established that he
“entered” the home, which further supports the reasonableness of a belief by Rodriguez
or Victim that Appellant intended to commit a violent felony upon one or both of them.
{26} Under these circumstances, Rodriguez and Victim were legally justified in their
conduct that Appellant alleges. Because their actions were lawful, Appellant’s
responsive use of force in firing a gunshot into the residence cannot constitute an
objectively reasonable act of self-defense. Consequently, evidence was not presented
to satisfy the objective element of self-defense, and the district court properly denied the
self-defense jury instruction. See State v. Gaines, 2001-NMSC-036, ¶ 5, 131 N.M. 347,
36 P.3d 438 (“[W]hile an accused is entitled to instruction on [the accused’s] theory of
the case if evidence exists to support it, the court need not instruct if there is absence of
such evidence.” (emphasis, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)).
{27} We recognize that the defense-of-habitation doctrine was not raised below.
However, under the “right-for-any-reason” doctrine, the district court was nonetheless
correct to deny the instruction despite not weighing the defense-of-habitation doctrine in
its determination. See State v. Vargas, 2008-NMSC-019, ¶ 8, 143 N.M. 692, 181 P.3d
684 (“Under the [right-for-any-reason] doctrine, we may affirm the district court’s order
on grounds not relied upon by the district court if those grounds do not require us to look
beyond the factual allegations that were raised and considered below.” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)). Affirming the district court’s decision on defense-
of-habitation grounds does not require us to look beyond the factual allegations
considered by the district court when it considered the self-defense jury instruction and
whether Appellant was the first aggressor. Therefore, it is not unfair to Appellant to
apply the right-for-any-reason doctrine here. See State v. Gomez, 2003-NMSC-012, ¶
7, 133 N.M. 763, 70 P.3d 753 (“While a decision of the trial court will be upheld if it is
right for any reason, we will not rely on this doctrine if doing so would be unfair to the
appellant.” (text only) (citations omitted)).
{28} Because we conclude that Appellant was not entitled to a self-defense instruction
based on the defense-of-habitation doctrine, we do not consider the parties’ arguments
concerning Appellant’s status as first aggressor.
D. Appellant’s Other Arguments Are Without Merit
{29} Appellant also argues that his earlier altercation with Victim at Allsup’s supports a
finding of reasonableness of Appellant’s fear of Victim by a properly instructed jury,
“since [Victim] had recently demonstrated he was willing to use force.” Appellant cites
State v. Branchal, 1984-NMCA-063, ¶ 24, 101 N.M. 498, 684 P.2d 1163, for the
proposition that courts may consider, in addition to events at the time of the incident,
“history between a defendant and the victim which raises a reasonable doubt about
whether a victim’s actions placed a defendant in fear of imminent great bodily harm at
the time of the alleged self-defense.” However, Appellant overstates the similarity
between this case and Branchal in which an extensive history of violent and threatening
conduct by the victim “was sufficient to raise an issue of fact with respect to the
elements of a self-defense claim.” Id. ¶¶ 22, 24. Here, in contrast, the record reflects a
mutual altercation between Appellant and Victim that resulted in a single punch—a very
different degree of contextual history that is not sufficient to transform Appellant’s later
use of deadly force into objectively reasonable conduct.
{30} Appellant also argues, quoting State v. Coffin, 1999-NMSC-038, ¶ 12, 128 N.M.
192, 991 P.2d 477, that “‘[a] person may act in self-defense against multiple attackers
acting in concert . . . to the extent that each accomplice poses an immediate danger of
death or great bodily harm.’” In Coffin, the defendant asserted a theory of self-defense
that both alleged assailants in a liquor store parking lot “posed an immediate threat of
death or great bodily harm, that he feared death or great bodily harm and shot them as
a result, and that he acted as a reasonable person would have acted in the same
circumstances.” Id. ¶ 13. However, we conclude that Coffin is inapposite, as the issue
here is whether a reasonable person would act as Appellant did in the same
circumstances, regardless of whether that conduct responded to a single threat or
“alleged concerted action.” See id. Lawful conduct by Rodriguez or Victim is not
transformed into illegal use of force by virtue of their acting together. Accordingly, this
argument fails.
III. CONCLUSION
{31} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
{32} IT IS SO ORDERED.
C. SHANNON BACON, Chief Justice
WE CONCUR:
MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Justice
DAVID K. THOMSON, Justice
JULIE J. VARGAS, Justice
BRIANA H. ZAMORA, Justice