United States v. McMULLEN ( 2018 )


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  •          U NITED S TATES N AVY –M ARINE C ORPS
    C OURT OF C RIMINAL A PPEALS
    _________________________
    No. 201700371
    _________________________
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    Appellee
    v.
    BRET D. McMULLEN
    Lance Corporal (E-3) U.S. Marine Corps
    Appellant
    _________________________
    Appeal from the United States Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary
    Military Judge: Commander Shane E. Johnson, JAGC, USN.
    Convening Authority: Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft
    Wing, Okinawa, Japan.
    Staff Judge Advocate’s Recommendation: Lieutenant Colonel
    Melanie J. Mann, USMC.
    For Appellant: Commander R.D. Evans, Jr., JAGC, USN.
    For Appellee: Major Kelli A. O’Neil, USMC; Captain Luke Huisenga,
    USMC.
    _________________________
    Decided 17 July 2018
    ______________________
    Before H UTCHISON , P RICE , and H INES , Appellate Military Judges
    _________________________
    This opinion does not serve as binding precedent but may be cited as
    persuasive authority under NMCCA Rule of Practice and Procedure
    18.2.
    _________________________
    PER CURIAM:
    A military judge sitting as a general court-martial convicted the
    appellant, pursuant to his pleas, of one specification of sexual assault of a
    child in violation of Article 120b, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ),
    10 U.S.C. § 920b (2016). The military judge sentenced the appellant to 24
    months’ confinement, reduction to paygrade E-1, and a dishonorable
    United States v. McMullen, No. 201700371
    discharge. The convening authority approved the sentence as adjudged, but
    pursuant to a pretrial agreement, suspended all confinement in excess of 10
    months.
    In a combined assignment of error raised pursuant to United States v.
    Grostefon, 
    12 M.J. 431
    (C.M.A. 1982), the appellant contends the trial counsel
    made improper argument during presentencing by mischaracterizing his
    mother’s testimony and that the record of trial is inaccurate in that it fails to
    specifically reflect the trial counsel’s mischaracterization of that testimony.
    After careful consideration of the record of trial and the pleadings of the
    parties, we conclude the findings and sentence are correct in law and fact,
    and that no error materially prejudicial to the substantial rights of the
    appellant occurred. Arts. 59(a) and 66(c), UCMJ.
    I. BACKGROUND
    At the time of the offense to which he pleaded guilty, the appellant was a
    20-year-old Lance Corporal in the Marine Corps. In the fall of 2016, he met
    the victim, N.S., through a dating application on his phone. When they
    initially met in person, N.S. told the appellant she was 17 years old, but as
    their relationship progressed, N.S. eventually told the appellant she was 15
    years old. After N.S. told the appellant she was 15, the appellant engaged in
    sexual intercourse with her on divers occasions.
    During the providence inquiry, the appellant told the military judge he
    ultimately learned that N.S. was only 14 at the time of the offense. He also
    admitted that at the time he engaged in sexual intercourse with N.S., he both
    knew she was under the age of 16 and knew that it was illegal for him to
    engage in sexual intercourse with her because she was under the age of 16.
    During the presentencing hearing, the appellant called his mother, B.M.,
    as a witness. She testified generally regarding the appellant’s upbringing,
    abuse she and the appellant suffered at the hands of the appellant’s father,
    their struggles to make a new home for themselves after she left the
    appellant’s father, the circumstances of the appellant’s enlistment in the
    Marine Corps, the positive effects it had on him, and her pride in his military
    service. Eventually, B.M. testified that she had been contacted by N.S., as
    well as N.S.’s father and mother. She recounted two messages in which N.S.’s
    father texted, “I hope everything works out for [the appellant]”; and “[l]et me
    know if there is anything me or my family can do to help.”1 B.M. also testified
    that N.S.’s mother:
    1   Record at 86.
    2
    United States v. McMullen, No. 201700371
    [h]as called me I think about three times. She just wanted me to
    know that if I needed to talk to somebody that I could call her, that
    she could not have asked for a better boyfriend for her daughter, he
    kept her safe because they were working a lot.2
    B.M. further testified that both of N.S.’s parents knew that the appellant had
    engaged in sexual intercourse with their daughter.
    On cross-examination, B.M. admitted that in her discussions with N.S.,
    N.S. made it clear that she was still in love with the appellant, and B.M.
    believed N.S. was obsessed with him. B.M. also spoke with the appellant on
    several occasions and opined the appellant was “committed” to N.S.3 Lastly,
    N.S.’s parents communicated to B.M. that they both “condoned” the
    relationship between the 20-year-old appellant and their 14-year-old
    daughter.4
    In his argument on sentencing, the trial counsel referenced B.M.’s
    testimony several times, pointing out that N.S.’s parents condoned the
    appellant’s misconduct, and as a result a sentence of confinement should be
    adjudged in order to sufficiently protect N.S. from the appellant having any
    ability to rekindle their relationship prior to N.S. turning 16.5 The appellant
    did not object to the trial counsel’s arguments.
    II. DISCUSSION
    A. Improper argument
    “Improper argument involves a question of law that this Court reviews de
    novo.” United States v. Pabelona, 
    76 M.J. 9
    , 11 (C.A.A.F. 2011) (quoting
    United States v. Frey, 
    73 M.J. 245
    , 248 (C.A.A.F. 2014)). “The legal test for
    improper argument is whether the argument was erroneous and whether it
    materially prejudiced the substantial rights of the accused.” 
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks omitted) (citation omitted). Because the defense counsel
    failed to object to the arguments at the time of trial, we review for plain
    error. United States v. Andrews, 
    77 M.J. 393
    , 2018 CAAF LEXIS 294, at *10
    (C.A.A.F. May 22, 2018). The standard for plain error review requires that:
    “(1) an error was committed; (2) the error was plain, or clear, or obvious; and
    (3) the error resulted in material prejudice to substantial rights.” United
    States v. Maynard, 
    66 M.J. 242
    , 244 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (internal quotation
    2   
    Id. at 87.
       3   
    Id. at 99.
       4   
    Id. at 100.
       5   
    Id. at 119-21.
    3
    United States v. McMullen, No. 201700371
    marks omitted) (citation omitted). The appellant has the burden to establish
    plain error. 
    Id. The appellant
    avers that the trial counsel “mischaracterized [B.M.]’s
    testimony.”6 Specifically, the appellant contends that the trial counsel argued
    that B.M.—the appellant’s mother—approved of his relationship with N.S.
    We disagree. Such a statement does not appear in the record. Rather, the
    trial counsel’s argument focused on N.S.’s parents’ approval of their
    daughter’s relationship with the appellant. Indeed, the trial counsel’s
    argument was based on the record evidence and all reasonable inferences
    derived therefrom. The appellant therefore fails to establish error, let alone
    an error that is plain or obvious. We find no merit in this assigned error.
    B. Inaccurate record of trial
    We similarly find no merit in the appellant’s argument that the record of
    trial is inaccurate and does not properly reflect the trial counsel’s sentencing
    argument. We apply a presumption of regularity to the creation,
    authentication, and distribution of the record of trial. United States v.
    Godbee, 
    67 M.J. 532
    , 533 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2008). In view of this
    presumption of regularity inherent in court proceedings, the initial burden of
    impeaching an official record is on the party seeking to attack it. United
    States v. Weaver, 
    1 M.J. 111
    , 115 (C.M.A. 1975).
    The appellant has offered nothing to undercut our presumption of
    regularity in the completeness, accuracy, or authenticity of the record of trial
    submitted for appellate review. Here, the military judge properly
    authenticated the record of trial in accordance with RULE FOR COURTS-
    MARTIAL 1104(a), MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (2016 ed.).
    The appellant made no objection to the accuracy of the record prior to it being
    forwarded to this court for appellate review. The appellant has failed to
    establish that we should not apply the presumption of regularity normally
    applied under such circumstances. Accordingly, applying the presumption of
    regularity here, we find no error regarding the accuracy of the record of trial.
    6   Appellant’s Brief of 20 Feb 18 at 6.
    4
    United States v. McMullen, No. 201700371
    III. CONCLUSION
    The findings and sentence are affirmed.
    For the Court
    R.H. TROIDL
    Clerk of Court
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 201700371

Filed Date: 7/17/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 7/18/2018