Holland v. City of Albuquerque , 2015 NMCA 14 ( 2014 )


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    New Mexico Compilation
    Commission, Santa Fe, NM
    '00'05- 09:38:51 2015.02.25
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
    Opinion Number: 
    2015-NMCA-014
    Filing Date: October 29, 2014
    Docket No. 33,171
    KIM HOLLAND and KRQE NEWS 13,
    Petitioners-Appellants,
    v.
    CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE and Deputy
    Police Chief ALLEN BANKS,
    Respondents-Appellees.
    APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY
    C. Shannon Bacon, District Judge
    Esquivel Law Firm, LLC
    Martin R. Esquivel
    Albuquerque, NM
    for Appellants
    David Tourek, City Attorney
    Jeffrey Driggers, Assistant City Attorney
    Gregory S. Wheeler, Managing Assistant City Attorney
    Albuquerque, NM
    for Appellees
    OPINION
    SUTIN, Judge.
    {1}     Petitioners KRQE News 13 and its reporter Kim Holland appeal from an adverse
    summary judgment dismissing their claims against Respondents City of Albuquerque and
    Albuquerque Police Department (APD) Deputy Chief Allen Banks for penalties for violation
    of the New Mexico Inspection of Public Records Act (the IPRA), NMSA 1978, §§ 14-2-1
    to -12 (1947, as amended through 2013). The claims arose from a request by Ms. Holland
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    for lapel videos relating to certain arrests. The issue is whether Ms. Holland’s request was
    verbal, in which case penalties are unavailable under the Act, or written, in which case
    penalties are available. See § 14-2-8(A), (D). We hold that the request was verbal and that
    Respondents did not violate the Act, and we affirm the summary judgment.
    BACKGROUND
    {2}     On July 10, 2012, Ms. Holland spoke to APD public information officer, Marie A.
    Martinez, on the telephone and requested lapel videos. Ms. Martinez emailed APD records
    custodian, Reynaldo L. Chavez, asking Mr. Chavez to treat the email as a request from
    Petitioners for the lapel videos. The lapel videos were not made available to Petitioners
    within the time required under the IPRA were the request to have been written. See § 14-2-
    8(D). It was not until August 16, 2012, when the City held a press conference with all local
    media outlets, that the City released the lapel videos. Petitioners sued Respondents for
    violation of the IPRA based on the time delay and that the delay was illegitimate in that “the
    request caught APD off guard and it was scrambling to keep the lapel videos from going to
    the public.”
    DISCUSSION
    {3}    The applicable section of the IPRA states:
    Any person wishing to inspect the public records may submit an oral
    or written request to the custodian. However, the procedures set forth in this
    section shall be in response to a written request. The failure to respond to an
    oral request shall not subject the custodian to any penalty.
    Section 14-2-8(A). Petitioners contend that Ms. Martinez’s email to Mr. Chavez turned the
    oral request made by Ms. Holland into a written request made by Ms. Holland. Petitioners
    also contend that Ms. Martinez was Ms. Holland’s agent, thereby making the email that of
    Ms. Holland. We reject these contentions.
    {4}     That Ms. Martinez then emailed the request to Mr. Chavez did not convert Ms.
    Holland’s oral request into a written request made by Ms. Holland. Petitioners provide no
    authority supporting this argument. We see no reason to hold that an APD information
    officer’s documenting an oral request, which would appear to be a good practice, should
    constitute transformation of an oral request into a written request for the purposes of the
    IPRA.
    {5}     Ms. Martinez was not acting as an agent of Ms. Holland such that Ms. Martinez’s
    email constituted a written request by Ms. Holland. There exists no evidence supporting
    such a legal relationship, and in addition to lack of evidence, Petitioners provide no authority
    that supports it. In particular, other than that the circumstances are obviously outside the
    scope of agency, there exists no evidence that Ms. Martinez consented to or acted in a
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    manner to create an agency relationship, nor is there any evidence that Ms. Holland agreed
    to or acted in any manner to create an agency relationship. See Maes v. Audubon Indem. Ins.
    Grp., 
    2007-NMSC-046
    , ¶ 17, 
    142 N.M. 235
    , 
    164 P.3d 934
     (stating that an agency
    relationship does not arise until the principal “manifests assent to [the agent] that the agent
    shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent
    manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act” (internal quotation marks and citation
    omitted)); Freeman v. Fairchild, 2014-NMCA-___, ¶ 22, ___ P.3d ___ (No. 32,542, Sept.
    10, 2014) (recognizing that the existence of an agency relationship is a question of fact that
    requires evidence that the principal manifested assent to the agent and the agent manifested
    assent or otherwise consented so to act). Ms. Martinez’s request to Mr. Chavez that Ms.
    Holland’s request be treated as an IPRA request on Ms. Holland’s behalf constituted nothing
    more than documenting Ms. Holland’s verbal request and bringing it to the attention of the
    proper IPRA person in the APD. See § 14-2-8(E).
    {6}     We agree with Respondents’ concern that to accept Petitioners’ agency theory would
    mean that every oral request documented by the APD would automatically, upon
    documentation, constitute a written request emanating from the requester. We also agree
    with the concern that oral requests can be fraught with potential for misunderstanding and
    misinterpretation. Petitioners’ reliance on San Juan Agric. Water Users Ass’n v. KNME-TV,
    
    2011-NMSC-011
    , 
    150 N.M. 64
    , 
    257 P.3d 884
    , is of no assistance to Petitioners. In that case,
    the person who requested information was an attorney who was acting as the attorney, and
    therefore, the agent of his client, when the requester was the client who sought the
    information, using his attorney-agent to obtain it. Id. ¶¶ 1-7, 19, 43, 45. This is not the
    situation before us.
    CONCLUSION
    {7}    We affirm the district court’s summary judgment granted in favor of Respondents.
    {8}    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    ____________________________________
    JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge
    WE CONCUR:
    ____________________________________
    JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge
    ____________________________________
    MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge
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Document Info

Docket Number: 33,171

Citation Numbers: 2015 NMCA 14

Filed Date: 10/29/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/4/2015