Sonida, LLC v. Spoverlook, LLC ( 2015 )


Menu:
  •      IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
    Opinion Number: ___________
    Filing Date: December 8, 2015
    NO. 32,661
    SONIDA, LLC,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    SPOVERLOOK, LLC,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANDOVAL COUNTY
    Violet C. Otero, District Judge
    Sommer, Karnes & Associates, LLP
    Karl H. Sommer
    James R. Hawley
    Santa Fe, NM
    for Appellee
    Keleher & McLeod, P.A.
    W. Spencer Reid
    Thomas C. Bird
    Justin B. Breen
    Albuquerque, NM
    for Appellant
    OPINION
    KENNEDY, Judge.
    {1}   Defendant SPOverlook, LLC, (SPO) appeals an award of attorney fees to
    Plaintiff Sonida, LLC (Sonida), whom the district court found to be the prevailing
    party in a “dispute arising out of or relating to a lien action” under NMSA 1978,
    Section 48-2-14 (2007). The award of attorney fees was made following a jury trial
    that awarded money to both parties following a dispute over construction of a house.
    SPO asserts that Sonida’s lien was invalid, that the district court’s denial of its motion
    for summary judgment based on the invalidity of Sonida’s lien was erroneous, and
    that an invalid lien cannot support the award of fees.
    {2}   The contents of mechanics’ and materialmen’s liens are prescribed by statute,
    NMSA 1978, §§ 48-2-1 to -17 (1880, as amended through 2015), and require
    specifically that any claim “must be verified by the oath of [the claimant] or of some
    other person.” Section 48-2-6. We face two questions in this case: can Sonida prevail
    on a claim to foreclose an unverified materialmen’s lien, and was the district court’s
    award of attorney fees based on work performed in conjunction with “contract and
    lien claims” sufficiently justified as a “dispute arising out of or relating to a lien
    action” to permit the award? Section 48-2-14.
    {3}   We hold that even in light of decades of liberal construction and permitting
    substantial compliance in drafting lien claims, Sonida’s unverified lien was void ab
    initio. To the extent that no valid lien existed, nothing supported an award of attorney
    fees predicated on a claim “arising out of or related to a lien[.]” Section 48-2-14.
    Since the district court’s sole justification for the award was Section 48-2-14, we
    conclude that the award of attorney fees to Sonida was erroneous, and we reverse the
    district court, remanding for entry of an amended judgment.
    BACKGROUND
    {4}   The parties do not dispute the facts underlying this appeal. Real estate
    developer SPO contracted with New Mexico Dream Home, LLC (NMDH) to
    construct a house in Sandoval County for a television show. SPO in turn
    subcontracted with home-builder Sonida to build the home, agreeing to pay Sonida
    approximately one million dollars for the job. Before construction began, SPO and
    Sonida did not have a written agreement between them, although subsequent
    arrangements were reached, and Sonida began construction of the home. As
    construction went forward, NMDH issued three payments of approximately $250,000
    each to SPO. SPO forwarded two payments to Sonida. A dispute arose when SPO did
    not forward a third payment to Sonida.
    2
    {5}    Sonida filed a claim of lien against the home to protect its interests, and then
    amended it twice; all of which were recorded in the Sandoval County Clerk’s office.
    All three lien documents were signed by a Sonida representative and acknowledged
    before Sonida’s attorney, who notarized them. However, none of Sonida’s lien
    documents included any language verifying upon oath the truth of its contents.
    {6}    Sonida then brought suit in the district court against SPO and NMDH for the
    money it maintained it was owed. In Count 4 of Sonida’s complaint, Sonida sought
    foreclosure of its lien. SPO’s answer denied that Sonida was entitled to file a claim
    of lien, foreclose on the lien that it had filed, or collect attorney fees for litigating its
    foreclosure. SPO thereafter filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that the
    lien claim was invalid and unenforceable because it was not verified pursuant to
    Home Plumbing & Contracting Co. v. Pruitt, 1962-NMSC-075, 
    70 N.M. 182
    , 
    372 P.2d 378
    . In its response to SPO’s motion, Sonida argued that SPO had waived its
    ‘void for lack of verification’ argument because SPO had not raised it as an
    affirmative defense in the its answer. The district court denied SPO’s motion without
    explanation, and the case proceeded to trial.
    {7}    Following a jury trial in which both parties received awards, Sonida moved for
    an award of attorney fees claiming it was the prevailing party in a lien action under
    Section 48-2-14. The parties submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
    3
    law, including SPO’s renewed assertion that Sonida was not the prevailing party in
    a lien action. The district court entered its final judgment granting Sonida’s request
    for attorney fees. In separate findings and conclusions, the district court found that
    “Sonida prevailed on its lien claim against . . . Defendant SPO” and concluded that
    “[a] prevailing party in a dispute arising out of or relating to a lien action is entitled
    to recover from the other party the reasonable attorney fees, costs and expenses
    incurred by the prevailing party.” Section 48-2-14. SPO now appeals the district court
    award to Sonida of $136,375.75 in attorney fees.
    DISCUSSION
    Standard of Review
    {8}   Ordinarily, we review an award of attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. Rio
    Grande Sun v. Jemez Mountains Pub. Sch. Dist., 2012-NMCA-091, ¶ 10, 
    287 P.3d 318
    . “Section 48-2-14 empowers the court to award reasonable attorney fees in the
    district and supreme courts in actions to enforce mechanics’ and materialmen’s liens.”
    Lenz v. Chalamidas, 1991-NMSC-099, ¶ 2, 
    113 N.M. 17
    , 
    821 P.2d 355
    (emphasis
    omitted). However, our determination of whether an unverified lien satisfies the
    requirements of Section 48-2-6 involves the interpretation of a statute that we review
    de novo. State ex. rel. Madrid v. UU Bar Ranch Ltd. P’ship, 2005-NMCA-079, ¶ 11,
    
    137 N.M. 719
    , 
    114 P.3d 399
    . With regard to SPO’s motion for summary judgment,
    4
    where there are no genuine issues of material fact, and the movant may be entitled to
    judgment as a matter of law, our review is also de novo. Self v. United Parcel Serv.,
    Inc., 1998-NMSC-046, ¶ 6, 
    126 N.M. 396
    , 
    970 P.2d 582
    .
    I.     Sonida Did Not File Valid Claims of Lien
    {9}    We begin by addressing SPO’s argument that the district court erred by failing
    to reject as a matter of law Sonida’s unverified claim of lien. In order to analyze this
    issue, we must discuss the requirements for a claim of lien to be valid.
    {10}   Section 48-2-61 generally sets out two requirements for the contents of a valid
    lien: a statement of the nature of the claim against the property owner, and a
    verification by oath. The purpose of the former is to “give notice [to all interested
    parties] of the extent and nature of the lienor’s claim.” Garrett Bldg. Ctrs., Inc. v.
    Hale, 1981-NMSC-009, ¶ 10, 
    95 N.M. 450
    , 
    623 P.2d 570
    (internal quotation marks
    1
    “Every original contractor, within one hundred and twenty days after the
    completion of his contract, and every person, except the original contractor, desiring
    to claim a lien pursuant to Sections 48-2-1 through 48-2-19 NMSA 1978, must,
    within ninety days after the completion of any building, improvement or structure, or
    after the completion of the alteration or repair thereof, or the performance of any
    labor in a mining claim, file for record with the county clerk of the county in which
    such property or some part thereof is situated, a claim containing a statement of his
    demands, after deducting all just credits and offsets. The claim shall state the name
    of the owner or reputed owner, if known, and also the name of the person by whom
    he was employed, or to whom he furnished the materials, and shall include a
    statement of the terms, time given and the conditions of the contract, and also a
    description of the property to be charged with the lien, sufficient for identification.
    The claim must be verified by the oath of himself or of some other person.”
    (Emphasis added.)
    5
    and citation omitted). Since they are not in dispute in this case, we are not concerned
    with the sufficiency of Sonida’s statement of the debt and terms of the claim.
    {11}   As to the verification requirement, we first observe that the use of the word
    “must” in the statute requiring verification by oath conveys the Legislature’s setting
    a mandatory precondition to the lien’s validity. The Uniform Statute and Rule
    Construction Act compels us to regard the word “must” as expressing “a duty,
    obligation, requirement or condition precedent.” NMSA 1978, § 12-2A-4(A) (1997);
    see also, State v. Lujan, 1977-NMSC-010, ¶ 4, 
    90 N.M. 103
    , 
    560 P.2d 167
    (holding
    that the word “must” in the statute indicates “that the provisions of a statute are
    mandatory and not discretionary”).
    {12}   It is undisputed that the claims of lien filed in this case were not verified.
    Sonida attempts to address this “technical defect” by arguing that the claim as filed
    satisfied the purposes of the statute, which should be “liberally construed,” and by
    implication, permits “substantial compliance” by the claimant. New Mexico is a state
    that affords liberal construction to the drafting of lien notices, and permits substantial
    compliance with Section 48-2-6. Chavez v. Sedillo, 1955-NMSC-039, ¶ 17, 
    59 N.M. 357
    , 
    284 P.2d 1026
    . To a point. “[T]he reason which underlies the [liberal
    construction rule] is that the claim of lien must not only contain a statement of the
    terms, time given and conditions of the contract, but such statement must be true.” 
    Id. 6 (emphasis
    omitted). However, no New Mexico case has yet made the verification
    requirement superfluous. For reasons that follow, we conclude that even in a common
    law atmosphere with plenty of slack for drafting liens, there are requirements that are
    immutable, particularly a verification upon oath of the underlying claim that must be
    set out in the lien notice. Sonida misapprehends the latitude our courts have provided
    claims of lien as affording sanction to their total lack of compliance with the
    verification requirement of the statute.
    A.     Verification Requires a Formal Assertion of the Truth of the Lien’s
    Contents
    {13}   By definition, “verification” is “confirmation of correctness, truth, or
    authenticity by affidavit, oath, or deposition.” Black’s Law Dictionary, 1732 (1968
    4th ed). Our courts’ construction of what it means for a lien to “be verified by the oath
    of [the claimant] or of some other person” is of long standing. Section 48-2-6. “In the
    early days of our history, [our Supreme Court] was disposed to hold that the
    mechanics lien law was in derogation of the common law and should be strictly
    construed[.]” Home Plumbing, 1962-NMSC-075, ¶¶ 6-7 (internal quotation marks
    and citation omitted). This construction applied to the verification requirement.
    Finane v. Las Vegas Hotel & Improvement Co., 1885-NMSC-023, ¶ 13, 
    3 N.M. 411
    ,
    
    5 P. 725
    (“[Verification] is a substantial and necessary requirement, and must be
    complied with in order to make the claim of lien effectual. The statute makes it
    7
    obligatory by the use of the word ‘must,’ and we think it was error for the court below
    to have admitted the [unverified] paper in evidence.”), overruled on other grounds
    by Ford v. Springer Land Ass’n, 1895-NMSC-011, 
    8 N.M. 37
    , 
    41 P. 541
    .2
    {14}   In Minor v. Marshall, 1891-NMSC-029, 
    6 N.M. 194
    , 
    27 P. 481
    , the Supreme
    Court of the Territory New Mexico loosened the requirements for stating the claim
    itself under the statute, permitting substantial compliance to suffice in alleging its five
    factual requirements. 
    Id. ¶ 6.
    With regard to the requirement that the claim be
    “verified by the oath of himself, or of some other person[,]” it held “if such claim is
    not verified, it is no notice, and binds no one; it raises no lien whatever.” 
    Id. ¶ 7
    (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Although the strict view as to a lien’s
    factual claims was repudiated in Ford, as noted above, this was only to the extent that
    the statements covered by the claimant’s oath be liberally construed. Ford went on
    to explain that “the notice of claim of lien, being the foundation of the action, must
    contain all the essential requirements of the statute, and the failure or omission on the
    part of the person claiming the lien of any of the substantial requisites of the statute
    is fatal, and will defeat the action.” 1895-NMSC-011, ¶ 7. The verification
    requirement has always been regarded as a requisite element of compliance with the
    2
    Although Ford is generally recognized as overruling Finane, and instituting
    the “liberal construction,” we note that the claim of lien in Ford was properly
    verified, and the issue of verification was not raised. 1895-NMSC-011, ¶ 9. Ford
    applied solely to the description of the claim. 
    Id. ¶ 8.
    8
    statute. Hot Springs Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Wallace, 1933-NMSC-092, ¶ 40, 
    38 N.M. 3
    , 
    27 P.2d 984
    (citing Lyons v. Howard, 1911-NMSC-039, 
    16 N.M. 327
    , 
    117 P. 842
    ), held that notwithstanding liberal construction, and substantial compliance
    with verification, the claimant must still “verify [the] same on his own oath, or the
    oath of some other person” to verify the good faith of his claim of right to a lien. 
    Id. {15} Although
    the requirement of verification on oath has not changed, there has
    been some “liberal construction” permitted with regard to verification. Under Lyons,
    “[n]o particular form of verification is required by our statute, nor is it specifically
    required thereby that the verification shall be true to the knowledge of affiant.”
    Lyons, 1911-NMSC-039, ¶ 5 (emphasis added). Neither is it required that the affiant
    has personal knowledge of the claim’s truth. 
    Id. ¶ 6.
    This is, however, the extent of
    “liberal construction” permitted a lienor’s verification of good faith under Section 48-
    2-6. However liberally the contents of a notice of lien might be construed, no case to
    date obviates the specific requirement for a positive verification upon oath of the
    contents of a notice of lien, and Sonida directs us to none. See, e.g., ITT Educ. Servs.,
    Inc. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep’t, 1998-NMCA-078, ¶ 10, 
    125 N.M. 244
    , 
    959 P.2d 969
    (holding that this court does not consider arguments not supported by citation to
    authority).
    9
    B.     Home Plumbing and Garrett Affirm the Requirement of Verification
    {16}   Liberal construction of the lien statute cannot reach so far as to rescue an
    unverified lien. In Home Plumbing, two related but separate businesses sought to
    foreclose on their respective claims of lien against property owned by the defendant.
    1962-NMSC-075, ¶ 1. Both claims of lien were signed by the same person. On the the
    first claim of lien, as in this case, the signature was only followed by “an
    acknowledgment in the form generally provided by § 43-1-9, N.M.S.A.1953, for
    acknowledging instruments affecting real estate.” Home Plumbing, 1962-NMSC-075,
    ¶ 4. The second indicated that the person who signed it, “[b]eing duly sworn . . . has
    read said claim and knows the contents thereof; and that the matters and facts therein
    started (sic) are true and correct.” 
    Id. ¶ 5
    (internal quotation marks and citation
    omitted). Because the question in the case was “if the two claims here in issue are
    verified by oath” as required by the statute, 
    id. ¶ 6,
    the court concluded that the latter
    claim was verified. 
    Id. ¶ 9.
    The Court stated that, owing to the absence of “any words
    whatsoever which by intendment, plain, or otherwise, ‘were designed to operate as
    a verification,’ ” it did not “find where the statement of claim was in any manner
    sworn to.” 
    Id. ¶ 10
    (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court held that liberal
    construction did not apply:
    While reiterating our adherence to the rule of liberal construction, we
    are convinced that with a total absence of any words confirming
    10
    correctness, truth or authenticity by affidavit, oath, deposition or
    otherwise, to conclude that the acknowledgment to the instant claim of
    lien was a sufficient compliance with the requirements of a verification
    would be stretching the rule of liberal construction beyond recognition,
    and would approach judicial repeal of the legislative mandate that
    claims should be verified by oath.
    
    Id. ¶12. Garrett
    also recognizes that Section 48-2-6 requires “that a materialman’s
    claim of lien must be verified by the oath of the party or some other person.” 1981-
    NMSC-009, ¶ 3.
    {17}   Because the ultimate goal in statutory construction “is to ascertain and give
    effect to the intent of the Legislature[,]” State v. Cleve, 1999-NMSC-017, ¶ 8, 
    127 N.M. 240
    , 
    980 P.2d 23
    , we hold that the intent of the Legislature in enacting Section
    48-2-6 is to require some positive affirmation of good faith undertaken upon oath as
    to the contents of a notice of lien to render any claim thereof valid. Following Home
    Plumbing and Garrett, the absence of some discernable and formal confirmation of
    the truth, correctness, or authenticity of a claim of lien by the claimant or another
    person constitutes no verification, and any claim of lien that fails in that regard
    creates no lien.
    C.     Sonida’s Concept of “Substantial Compliance” Is Unavailing
    {18}   According to Sonida, in Garrett, our “Supreme Court recognized that the liens
    at issue, even though they did not meet the statutory requirements, were filed and
    recorded and were sufficient notice to the parties that the liens existed.” (Emphasis
    11
    omitted.) It seems Sonida urges us to adopt a liberal construction rule to obviate
    verification entirely, as they suppose the Supreme Court applied it in that case.
    Sonida is not specific in its brief as to which “statutory requirements” Garrett dealt
    with, but Sonida immediately quotes New Mexico Properties, Inc. v. Lennox
    Industries, Inc. (Lennox), 1980-NMSC-087, 
    95 N.M. 64
    , 
    618 P.2d 1228
    , holding that
    the lack of an acknowledgment does not defeat “an otherwise valid lien” that had
    been filed and recorded between the parties to the action. We take this as an
    indication that perhaps Sonida believes that since Garrett permitted unrecorded
    notices to give effect to notice between “parties to the action,” 1981-NMSC-009, ¶ 9,
    its acknowledgments will carry the day. However in both Garrett and Lennox, the
    liens were properly verified. Lennox, 1980-NMSC-087, ¶¶ 2, 7; Garrett, 1981-
    NMSC-009, ¶ 5. Both cases specifically recognized that verification was a mandatory
    requirement of the lien statute. Lennox, 1980-NMSC-087, ¶ 6; Garrett, 1981-NMSC-
    009, ¶ 5. Sonida’s reliance on both cases fails because the liens it filed were not
    “otherwise valid” under Section 48-2-6, whatever the status of a lien’s
    acknowledgments. Thus, Sonida’s briefing misstates the law in two important
    respects. First, both Lennox and Garrett specifically affirmed “the statutory
    requirement that the lien must be verified by oath of a party.” Garrett, 1981-NMSC-
    009, ¶ 5. Second, in Lennox, our Supreme Court specifically recognized that an
    12
    acknowledgment is “insufficient to comply with the verification requirement of
    Section 48-2-6.” Lennox, 1980-NMSC-087, ¶ 6. Without compliance with the
    verification to establish the lienor’s good faith in attaching its claim to the property
    of another, and thereby putting the claimant’s “skin in the game” so to speak,
    Sonida’s acknowledgments cannot in any way validate its claims of lien.
    D.     Acknowledgments Do Not Substitute For Verification
    {19}   Home Plumbing clearly establishes that the total absence of words of
    verification in a claim of lien renders it “unenforceable.” 1962-NMSC-075, ¶ 12. “It
    is established in law that a verification is a sworn statement of the truth of the facts
    stated in the instrument which is verified. A verification differs from an
    acknowledgment in that the latter is a method of authenticating an instrument by
    showing that it was the act of the person executing it.” H.A.M.S. Co. v. Elec.
    Contractors of Alaska, Inc., 
    563 P.2d 258
    , 260 (Alaska 1977). Section 48-2-6 does
    not require that liens contain an acknowledgment, and a lien’s validity is not affected
    by the lack of acknowledgment under NMSA 1978, Section 14-8-4 (2013). See § 14-
    8-4 (“Acknowledgment necessary for recording; exceptions.”); Lennox, 1980-NMSC-
    087, ¶ 7 (“Absent a valid acknowledgment, an instrument may not be treated as a
    recorded instrument.”). Our Supreme Court has stated that although the lien statute
    is remedial in nature and liberally construed, our appellate courts “will not apply
    13
    liberal construction to create a lien where none is authorized.” Vulcraft v. Midtown
    Bus. Park, Ltd., 1990-NMSC-095, ¶ 12, 
    110 N.M. 761
    , 
    800 P.2d 195
    . As in Home
    Plumbing, we cannot take up Sonida’s invitation to write out of existence even a
    liberally-construed verification requirement. We know from Lennox, 1980-NMSC-
    087, ¶ 2, that pre-printed lien forms with sufficient verifications are available for sale.
    Had Sonida’s attorney verified the liens, rather than only notarized their
    acknowledgments, the lien would have been valid. See Marsh v. Coleman,
    1979-NMSC-067, ¶ 23, 
    93 N.M. 325
    , 
    600 P.2d 271
    (holding that an attorney can
    verify a lien stating a belief that the claims were true); but see, In re Reif,
    1996-NMSC-026, ¶ 10, 
    121 N.M. 758
    , 
    918 P.2d 344
    (holding that a verification
    signed “for” the client “by” the attorney was “a nullity, being neither the oath [of the
    client] nor [the attorney]”).
    E.     Sonida’s Lien Was Void Ab Initio
    {20}   We are not alone in our view that these New Mexico cases uphold the
    verification requirement. Both Home Plumbing and Garrett were recognized by the
    Wyoming Supreme Court as demonstrating that, even under a liberal construction and
    substantial compliance rule, “the courts require some language in the lien statement
    which indicates the subscriber swears to the truth of the materials contained therein
    in order to comply with the verification requirement.” White v. Diamond Int’l Corp.,
    14
    
    665 P.2d 463
    , 468 (Wyo. 1983). Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court cited Home
    Plumbing as one of a number of cases holding that, although inclusion of sufficient
    specified facts can constitute substantial compliance with a lien statute, the
    verification requirement was a separate portion of the statute that articulates
    “mandatory conditions precedent to the very creation and existence of the lien[,]”
    without which “no lien is created.” First Sec. Mortg. Co. v. Hansen, 
    631 P.2d 919
    ,
    922 (Utah 1981) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Home Plumbing,
    1962-NMSC-075, ¶ 12 (“[T]he court erred in its conclusion that the [unverified lien]
    . . . was enforceable.”). Put another way in First Security Mortgage, “Verification is
    not a hypertechnicality that we can discount. Without verification, no lien is created.
    Our statute leaves no room for doubt as to the requirement of a verified notice of
    claim . . . . [S]ince a mechanic’s lien is statutory and not contractual, a lien cannot be
    acquired unless the claimant complies with the statutory 
    provisions.” 631 P.2d at 922
    .
    “The simple and conclusive answer to the suggestion is that a mechanic’s lien never
    comes into existence unless the notice upon which it is founded substantially
    complies with the statute which authorizes the creation of such liens.” Toop v. Smith,
    
    73 N.E. 1113
    , 1115 (N.Y. 1905).
    {21}   Irrespective of any latitude permitted in its form, the absence of a lien
    claimant’s verification upon oath defeats an immutable requirement under Section 48-
    15
    2-6. Sonida’s failure to verify the claims of lien that it filed thus caused no valid lien
    to be created. We hold that because, according to Sonida, “the Claims of Lien lack
    the verification,” they are void ab initio, because no valid lien was created. They
    could not therefore support a foreclosure action on the lien as a matter of law, State
    ex rel. Madrid v. UU Bar Ranch Ltd. P’ship, 2005-NMCA-079, ¶ 19, 
    137 N.M. 719
    ,
    
    114 P.3d 399
    (holding that failure to comply with a clear, unambiguous and
    mandatory statutory requirement or condition precedent invalidated the subsequent
    action), or provide any basis for action under Section 48-2-14 or attorney fees to be
    awarded under that statute.
    Sufficiency of a Lien Is Not an Affirmative Defense That Must Be Raised In the
    Complaint
    {22}   SPO specifically denied in its answer that the lien(s) filed entitled Sonida either
    to foreclose on them, or to any award of attorney fees in an action based upon them.
    It followed up its averments by filing a motion for summary judgment on Sonida’s
    foreclosure claim, requesting that the district court declare the “Claims of Lien to be
    void ab initio” based specifically on Home Plumbing, as well as failure to comply
    with Section 48-2-6, even by substantial compliance. Sonida’s response to the motion
    conceded that “as to the form of the Claims of Lien there is no disputed fact[,]” yet
    asserted that SPO was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law for failure to plead
    16
    a fatal defect in the liens as an affirmative defense. The district court denied SPO’s
    motion.
    {23}   Both the district court and Sonida seem to be laboring under a misconception.
    SPO’s pleading that Sonida’s lien was void ab initio for failure to comply with the
    statute (both with regard to its factual contents and its verification) is a purely legal
    question directed to an essential element of Sonida’s foreclosure action. Sonida’s
    response averred that it had no obligation to “specifically plead the verification or
    other specific contents of the Claims of Lien, even though those elements might form
    a condition precedent to recovery on the Claims of Lien.” This is incorrect as a matter
    of law. “A lienholder must . . . prove compliance with the Act’s provisions to
    establish his right to the statutory remedy and cannot claim surprise when a defendant
    attempts to defeat his claim by proof of noncompliance.” Cordeck Sales, Inc., v.
    Constr. Sys., Inc., 
    917 N.E.2d 536
    , 541 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009). Our courts have always
    held that when a lien is specifically created by statute, the lien must comply with the
    requirements of the statute. Air Ruidoso, Ltd. v. Exec. Aviation Ctr., Inc., 1996-
    NMSC-042, ¶ 6, 
    122 N.M. 71
    , 
    920 P.2d 1025
    (holding that “[a] lienor who seeks to
    enforce a statutory lien must comply with any statutory requirement with respect to
    enforcement of such a lien” (quoting Unger v. Checker Taxi Co., 
    174 N.E.2d 219
    ,
    221 (Ill. App. Ct. 1961)).
    17
    {24}   The proper verification of a lien is a mandatory predicate to its validity, and the
    existence of a valid lien is an element of a cause of action in foreclosure of it. Sonida
    is obligated to affirmatively demonstrate its compliance with Section 48-2-6 to plead
    a prima facie case in its complaint. Sonida’s complaint alleged nothing more than it
    was “entitled to claim” a lien. SPO’s raising the lien’s validity is not an affirmative
    defense if based on Sonida’s failure to comply with the statute’s requirements. See
    
    Cordeck, 917 N.E.2d at 541
    (holding that the assertion of statutory non-compliance
    is no surprise to the plaintiff, for whom compliance is an element of his cause of
    action, and cannot be held to be an affirmative defense); Sullivan Contracting, Inc.
    v. Turner Constr. Co., 
    875 N.Y.S.2d 695
    , 697 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009).
    {25}   Sonida’s reliance on Beyale v. Arizona Public Service Co., 1986-NMCA-071,
    
    105 N.M. 112
    , 
    729 P.2d 1366
    , to defeat SPO’s motion as an affirmative defense “that
    was not pled in their answer” is of no avail. In Beyale, we clearly stated that an
    affirmative defense is a “state of facts provable by [a] defendant that will bar [a]
    plaintiff’s recovery once a right to recover is established.” 
    Id. ¶ 13.
    The invalidity of
    the lien in this case is based in a defect barring the very right to recover on the
    elements of the claim as a matter of law, not facts. As such, it is not an affirmative
    defense. We have already held that a right to recovery cannot be established based on
    an invalid lien. There is no virtue in Sonida’s assertion that it is not obligated to
    18
    plead as part of its complaint those elements of the lien under Section 48-2-6 as a
    predicate for recovery; regardless of its pleading, it had the obligation to meet its
    burden of proof.
    {26}   Further, in Beyale, a workers’ compensation case, we held that because a
    failure to give notice of an injury had not been raised by the defense until a motion
    for a new trial, it was fairly denied by the trial court. We specifically stated that
    although the defense must have been pled, it did not have to be specifically pled in
    the defendant’s answer, as would an affirmative defense. 1986-NMCA-071, ¶ 24. In
    this case, SPO raised the issue of the defect in the lien in its motion for summary
    judgment, and Sonida conceded in its response that there were no material facts in
    dispute concerning the form of the liens. From both parties’ pleadings regarding the
    issue, we cannot but conclude that Sonida was aware of its obligations regarding
    compliance with the statute.
    CONCLUSION
    {27}   Because no lien was created, no award of attorney fees can be “related to” or
    “arise out of” an action based upon a nullity. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse
    the district court’s award of attorney fees and remand for proceedings consistent with
    this Opinion.
    19
    {27} IT IS SO ORDERED.
    RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge
    WE CONCUR:
    __________________________________
    JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge
    __________________________________
    MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge
    20