State v. Parrish , 2013 NMCA 66 ( 2013 )


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    New Mexico Compilation
    Commission, Santa Fe, NM
    '00'04- 17:04:22 2013.06.17
    Certiorari Denied, April 24, 2013, No. 34,081
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
    Opinion Number: 2013-NMCA-066
    Filing Date: March 6, 2013
    Docket No. 31,701
    STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    ALEXIS PARRISH,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY
    Thomas J. Hynes, District Judge
    Gary K. King, Attorney General
    Santa Fe, NM
    Jacqueline R. Medina, Assistant Attorney General
    Albuquerque, NM
    for Appellee
    Bennett J. Baur, Acting Chief Public Defender
    Allison H. Jaramillo, Assistant Appellate Defender
    Santa Fe, NM
    for Appellant
    OPINION
    ZAMORA, Judge.
    {1}    Defendant Alexis Parrish appeals his conviction for failure to register as a sex
    offender in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 29-11A-4 (2005). The sole issue on appeal
    is whether the New Mexico Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA),
    NMSA 1978, §§ 29-11A-1 to -10 (1995, as amended through 2007), requires a registered sex
    1
    offender to renew his registration upon his release from custody of the corrections
    department on unrelated charges if he returns to his previously registered residence. We
    hold that the plain meaning of Section 29-11A-4(B) required Defendant to “register with the
    county sheriff no later than ten days after being released from the custody of the corrections
    department[.]” Accordingly, we affirm Defendant’s conviction for failure to register as a sex
    offender.
    BACKGROUND
    {2}    The relevant facts are undisputed. Defendant is a convicted sex offender and was
    properly registered in San Juan County on February 17, 2011. Subsequently, Defendant was
    incarcerated in the Department of Corrections Central New Mexico Correctional Facility
    (CNMCF), in Valencia County, on another matter. On August 2, 2011, one day before his
    release from CNMCF, Defendant received a copy of the New Mexico Corrections
    Department Notice to Register form, which stated:
    Pursuant to [Section] 29-11A-4, a convicted sex offender is required to
    register with the Sheriff’s Office in the County where he/she will reside.
    Registration must take place no later than ten (10) days after being released
    from the custody of the Corrections Department[] or registration must take
    place no later than ten (10) days after being placed on probation or parole.
    Registration requirements are summarized more specifically below.
    Willful or knowing failure to comply or willfully or knowingly providing
    false information is a Fourth Degree Felony Offense.
    Defendant initialed each of the requirements set forth in the notice and signed the last page
    acknowledging that a corrections department official or employee had explained the notice
    to him, he had read the notice, and he was given a copy of the notice. A copy of the signed
    notice was also sent to the San Juan County Sheriff’s Office.
    {3}     Defendant was released from CNMCF on August 3, 2011, and he returned to his
    registered address in San Juan County. However, he did not renew his registration with the
    county sheriff within ten days of his release. On August 30, 2011, a deputy from the San
    Juan County Sheriff’s Office called the telephone number that was previously provided by
    Defendant. A female answered and advised that she did not know Defendant and that the
    telephone number was for another residence.
    {4}     Defendant was charged with failure to register as a sex offender, contrary to Section
    29-11A-4. Defense counsel filed a motion to dismiss the charge and argued that Defendant
    was not required to register upon release from the corrections department because he had
    registered prior to being incarcerated on the new offense, which was not a sex offense, and
    he returned to his properly registered residence upon release. The State filed a response and
    argued that Defendant was required to renew his registration, pursuant to the mandate of
    2
    Section 29-11A-4(B), because Defendant was a sex offender, a resident of New Mexico, and
    was released from the custody of the corrections department. During the hearing on
    Defendant’s motion to dismiss, the district court asked the parties if Defendant had to
    register when he was incarcerated at CNMCF. The prosecutor informed the district court
    that the corrections department registered Defendant while he was an inmate at CNMCF.
    The district court found that Defendant was living in San Juan County, changed his residence
    to Valencia County, and then changed his residence again when he returned to San Juan
    County. Therefore, the district court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss and concluded
    that Defendant was required to register upon his release from CNMCF.
    {5}      Defendant entered into a conditional plea agreement, wherein he pled guilty to
    “[f]ailure to comply with requirements of SORNA § 29-11A-4.” Defendant “reserve[d] the
    right to appeal on the issue of whether SORNA requires a registered sex offender to register
    upon a subsequent release from incarceration, when the offender’s registration is otherwise
    current.”
    DISCUSSION
    {6}     We must determine whether SORNA requires a registered sex offender to register
    upon release from custody when he returns to a properly registered residence. “Statutory
    interpretation is an issue of law, which we review de novo.” State v. Duhon, 2005-NMCA-
    120, ¶ 10, 
    138 N.M. 466
    , 
    122 P.3d 50
    . Our primary goal when interpreting a statute is to
    give effect to the Legislature’s intent, which is determined by looking at the plain language
    used in the statute, as well as the purpose of the underlying statute. State v. Johnson, 2001-
    NMSC-001, ¶ 6, 
    130 N.M. 6
    , 
    15 P.3d 1233
    ; State v. Torres, 2006-NMCA-106, ¶ 8, 
    140 N.M. 230
    , 
    141 P.3d 1284
    . “When the words used are plain and unambiguous, we give a
    statute its literal reading, unless that reading would lead to an injustice, absurdity, or
    contradiction.” 
    Id. I. SORNA
    {7}      The Legislature found that “sex offenders pose a significant risk of recidivism[,]” and
    “the efforts of law enforcement agencies to protect their communities from sex offenders are
    impaired by the lack of information available concerning convicted sex offenders who live
    within the agencies’ jurisdictions.” Section 29-11A-2(A). The explicit purpose of SORNA
    “is to assist law enforcement agencies’ efforts to protect their communities” by requiring sex
    offenders who reside, work, or attend school in New Mexico, to register with the county
    sheriff. Section 29-11A-2(B)(1)-(2); see also State v. Hall, 2013-NMSC-001, ¶¶ 10-17, 
    294 P.3d 1235
    (discussing the purpose and history of SORNA); State v. Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-
    032, ¶¶ 17-24, 
    135 N.M. 223
    , 
    86 P.3d 1050
    (same). “The [L]egislature enacted SORNA to
    protect communities through the registration of and dissemination of information about sex
    offenders.” State v. Williams, 2006-NMCA-092, ¶ 6, 
    140 N.M. 194
    , 
    141 P.3d 538
    . The
    legislative history and intent of SORNA suggests a broad application. Hall, 2013-NMSC-
    001, ¶16 (“In the seventeen-year history of SORNA, the Legislature has continually
    3
    amended the law to make it more expansive—that is, to register more people for more
    offenses, to make information more accessible to the public, and to increase penalties for
    failing to comply. In this way, the Legislature has demonstrated its preference for a broad
    registry law that provides more, rather than less, protection for the community.”).
    {8}     Section 29-11A-4 sets forth SORNA’s registration requirements. See generally § 29-
    11A-4; see also § 29-11A-3(C) (defining “registration requirement” as “any requirement set
    forth in Section 29-11A-4”). The State argues that the plain and unambiguous language of
    Section 29-11A-4(B) required Defendant to register as a sex offender with the county sheriff
    no later then ten days after he was released from CNMCF. Section 29-11A-4(B) provides
    in pertinent part:
    A sex offender who is a resident of New Mexico shall register with the
    county sheriff no later than ten days after being released from the custody of
    the corrections department, a municipal or county jail[,] or a federal,
    military[,] or tribal correctional facility or detention center or being placed
    on probation or parole.
    {9}     Defendant, on the other hand, focuses his argument on Section 29-11A-4(G), which
    states:
    When a sex offender who is registered changes his residence to a new county
    in New Mexico, the sex offender shall register with the county sheriff of the
    new county no later than ten days after establishing his new residence. The
    sex offender shall also send written notice of the change in residence to the
    county sheriff with whom he last registered no later than ten days after
    establishing his new residence.
    Defendant argues that he did not change his residence when he was incarcerated at CNMCF;
    therefore, he was only required to renew his registration annually pursuant to Section 29-
    11A-4(L)(2).
    {10} Even though the district court found that Defendant changed his residence from San
    Juan County, to Valencia County, and then back to San Juan County, Section 29-11A-4(G)
    is not the subsection of SORNA that the State accused Defendant of violating. On appeal,
    we may affirm the district court’s ruling if it was right for any reason. State v. Boyett, 2008-
    NMSC-030, ¶ 25, 
    144 N.M. 184
    , 
    185 P.3d 355
    . Defendant’s written motion to dismiss
    clearly stated that the State accused Defendant of violating Section 29-11A-4(B). Likewise,
    the State’s written response, as well as the parties’ oral arguments before the district court,
    centered around the application of Section 29-11A-4(B).
    {11} Indeed, Defendant argued before the district court and now on appeal, that
    Subsection (B) of Section 29-11A-4 only applies to the “initial registration.” Defendant
    relies on Section 29-11A-4(L) to support this assertion. However, Section 29-11A-4(L)
    4
    simply states how often a sex offender is required to renew his registration after his “initial
    registration.” Neither Subsection (B) nor (L) of Section 29-11A-4 indicates that the
    Legislature intended to limit the reporting requirement set forth in Section 29-11A-4(B) to
    a sex offender’s “initial registration.” See Torres, 2006-NMCA-106, ¶ 8 (“When a statute
    makes sense as written, we will not read in language that is not there.”).
    {12} On appeal, Defendant claims that a literal interpretation of Section 29-11A-4(B) will
    lead to an absurd and unreasonable result because it would require a sex offender
    incarcerated for any period of time to renew his registration upon release from custody, even
    if the sex offender returns to his properly registered address. Defendant further argues that
    the purpose of SORNA was fulfilled because the State knew that Defendant was in custody
    or at the registered address. Defendant’s argument is erroneous because it makes several
    baseless assumptions. First, it would mean that the State, Valencia County, and San Juan
    County should assume that Defendant would automatically return to San Juan County upon
    his release from the corrections department. Second, San Juan County would be expected
    to assume that Defendant would not only return to San Juan County but also that he would
    return to his previously registered address with all of his contact information being the same
    and current. Defendant’s argument places the burden on everyone else but him.
    {13} SORNA is clear that the burden is on Defendant to let the local law enforcement
    agency know that he will be living within the agency’s jurisdiction. See §§ 29-11A-2(B)(1)
    and -7(A)(2). Asking the State to assume that all previously registered sex offenders
    released from the custody of the corrections department will automatically return to their
    previously registered addresses is unreasonable. It was not the San Juan County Sheriff’s
    duty to confirm where Defendant will be living upon his release from CNMCF. SORNA
    requires the county sheriff to maintain a local registry of sex offenders and to forward the
    registration information “obtained from sex offenders” to the New Mexico Department of
    Public Safety (DPS). Section 29-11A-5(A)-(B); see Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, ¶ 21.
    DPS is required to maintain a central registry of sex offenders and to participate in the
    national sex offender registry administered by the United States Department of Justice.
    Section 29-11A-5(C); see Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032, ¶ 21. DPS has created and
    maintains a website that provides information to the public regarding the location of sex
    offenders residing in New Mexico. The website allows the public to search for sex offenders
    by name, ZIP code, city, county, or street. The website also provides information for sex
    offenders who are incarcerated or who have absconded.
    {14} In this case, the prosecutor informed the district court that the corrections department
    registered Defendant while he was incarcerated at CNMCF. The Valencia County Sheriff’s
    office had notice that Defendant was living within its jurisdiction. Upon his release,
    Defendant returned to San Juan County. It was Defendant’s duty to update his registration
    information within ten days of his release from custody of the corrections department and
    inform the San Juan County Sheriff that he was moving from Valencia County back to San
    Juan County. See § 29-11A-7(B) (“The corrections department, a municipal or county jail[,]
    or a detention center at the time of release of a sex offender in its custody, shall provide a
    5
    written notice to the sex offender of his duty to register, pursuant to the provisions of the
    [SORNA].”).
    {15} It is critical for law enforcement agencies to have current information about sex
    offenders in order to protect their communities. The inability of the San Juan County
    Sheriff’s office to contact Defendant because of the outdated telephone number provided by
    Defendant is a perfect example of the reason behind the legislative intent and purpose of
    maintaining current information on a sex offender. A literal reading of Section 29-11A-4(B)
    is consistent with the Legislature’s demonstrated “preference for a broad registry law that
    provides more, rather than less, protection for the community.” Hall, 2013-NMSC-001, ¶
    16. We conclude that Defendant was required to register upon his release from CNMCF,
    pursuant to the clear and unambiguous language of Section 29-11A-4(B). It is not absurd
    or unreasonable to require sex offenders to register with the county sheriff within ten days
    of their release from custody, regardless of whether they had registered before their
    incarceration. In light of this conclusion, we do not need to determine whether Defendant
    had to register pursuant to Section 29-11A-4(G).
    II.    Rule of Lenity
    {16} Defendant asks this Court to apply the rule of lenity if we determine Section 29-11A-
    4 to be ambiguous. The rule of lenity is not applicable, because Section 29-11A-4 is not
    ambiguous. Cf. State v. Davis, 2003-NMSC-022, ¶ 14, 
    134 N.M. 172
    , 
    74 P.3d 1064
    (“The
    rule of lenity counsels that criminal statutes should be interpreted in a defendant’s favor
    when insurmountable ambiguity persists regarding the intended scope of a criminal
    statute.”).
    CONCLUSION
    {17}   For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
    {18}   IT IS SO ORDERED.
    ____________________________________
    M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge
    WE CONCUR:
    ____________________________________
    RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Chief Judge
    ____________________________________
    JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge
    Topic Index for State v. Parrish, No. 31,701
    6
    CRIMINAL LAW
    Sexual Offenses
    MISCELLANEOUS STATUTES
    SORNA (Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act)
    STATUTES
    Interpretation
    Legislative Intent
    Rules of Construction
    7