State v. F Dixon ( 2009 )

1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
2 STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
3 Plaintiff-Appellee,
4 v. NO. 28,913
5 FLORINDA DIXON,
6 Defendant-Appellant.
7 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF DOÑA ANA COUNTY
8 Stephen Bridgforth, District Judge
9 Gary K. King, Attorney General
10 Santa Fe, NM
11 for Appellee
12 Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender
13 Kathleen T. Baldridge, Assistant Appellate Defender
14 Santa Fe, NM
15 for Appellant
16 MEMORANDUM OPINION
17 CASTILLO, Judge.
18 Defendant entered a conditional plea of no contest to shoplifting over $500,
19 reserving the right to appeal an evidentiary ruling of the court, and the court’s ruling
1 that she would not be allowed lesser-included offense instructions. [RP 65, 70, 74-76;
2 DS 4] Our notice proposed to affirm. Defendant responded with a memorandum in
3 opposition. We have considered Defendant’s arguments, but are not persuaded by
4 them. We affirm.
5 BACKGROUND
6 During opening statement, defense counsel presented Defendant’s theory of
7 defense. She informed the jury that Defendant went with Defendant’s friend Leslie
8 to Dillard’s and knew that Leslie often shoplifted. [DS 3] At Dillard’s, Defendant
9 knew Leslie was shoplifting. Defendant also decided that she would shoplift and
10 concealed some items, apparently clothes, in her empty baby stroller. At that point
11 Leslie, without Defendant’s consent, also placed some clothes in Defendant’s stroller.
12 [DS 3-4] Defendant expressed some concern, but Leslie gave her a look that
13 Defendant interpreted to mean that she should just go along with it. Defendant was
14 unsure what to do, but she decided to leave the store with all of the items in the stroller
15 because she was afraid to be seen taking items out of the cart. She decided to leave
16 the store because she was “confused and unsure of exactly what Leslie was thinking.”
17 [DS 3] Defendant told the jury that the State would not provide any evidence about
18 what Defendant took and what Leslie took. [DS 3-4] Defense counsel asked the jury
19 to convict Defendant only for the items she willfully took—not for what Leslie took.
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1 [DS 4] Defendant did not concede that she aided and abetted Leslie. [DS 4]
2 After hearing Defendant’s opening statement, the court informed Defendant that
3 it would uphold all objections from the State relating to which goods were placed in
4 the stroller by which woman. [DS 4-5] The court also stated that it would not submit
5 Defendant’s lesser-included offense instructions of shoplifting under $250 or
6 shoplifting more than $250 but less than $500. [DS 4-5] After these rulings,
7 Defendant entered a conditional plea of no contest, reserving the right to appeal them.
8 DISCUSSION
9 A. Evidentiary Ruling
10 We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. See State v.
11 Sarracino, 1998-NMSC-022, ¶ 20, 125 N.M. 511, 964 P.2d 72. We review the court’s
12 ruling on lesser-included offense instructions as a mixed question of law and fact.
13 State v. Salazar, 1997-NMSC-044, ¶ 49, 123 N.M. 778, 945 P.2d 996 (“The propriety
14 of jury instructions given or denied is a mixed question of law and fact. Mixed
15 questions of law and fact are reviewed de novo.”). “In order to obtain an instruction
16 on a lesser included offense, ‘[t]here must be some view of the evidence pursuant to
17 which the lesser offense is the highest degree of crime committed, and that view must
18 be reasonable.’” State v. Brown, 1998-NMSC-037, ¶ 12, 126 N.M. 338, 969 P.2d 31319 (quoting State v. Curley, 1997-NMCA-038, ¶ 5, 123 N.M. 295, 939 P.2d 1103).
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1 Defendant argued below that Defendant and Leslie shoplifted separately, thereby
2 making relevant any evidence regarding who took what items. [DS 5] In her docketing
3 statement and memorandum in opposition, Defendant characterizes the court’s rulings
4 as denying her the right to present a defense. [DS 6; MIO 4-8] She argues that evidence
5 excluded by the court goes to “the heart of the defense’s case.” [MIO 8]
6 Shoplifting consists of willfully taking possession of merchandise with the
7 intention of converting it without paying for it, or concealing merchandise with the
8 intention of converting it without paying for it. See NMSA 1978, § 30-16-20(A)
9 (2006). We interpret “willfully” as connoting knowledge. See State v. Padilla, 2006-
10 NMCA-107, ¶ 34, 140 N.M. 333, 142 P.3d 921 (stating that “willfully” implies
11 knowledge), reversed on other grounds, 2008-NMSC-006, 143 N.M. 310, 176 P.3d
12 299; State v. Elmquist, 114 N.M. 551, 552, 844 P.2d 131, 132 (Ct. App. 1992) (stating
13 that the term “willful” has been defined as “requiring proof the person acted
14 intentionally in the sense that he was aware of what he was doing”).
15 Under State v. Armijo, 120 N.M. 702, 703, 905 P.2d 740, 741 (Ct. App. 1995),
16 where defendants are shoplifting and working together, each is responsible for the
17 total of all of the merchandise taken, regardless of whose bag the merchandise was in.
18 Armijo announces the principle that codefendants are responsible for the aggregate of
19 merchandise taken; their liability is not lessened by dividing up who took what item.
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1 This is the principle underlying the court’s ruling.
2 On the facts, as admitted by Defendant, we hold that the court correctly applied
3 the principle established by Armijo. Defendant admitted that she herself was
4 shoplifting, admitted knowledge that Leslie was shoplifting, admitted knowledge that
5 Leslie had placed the additional items in her stroller, and admitted trying to leave the
6 store with all of the items without paying for them. Thus, under Armijo, she would
7 be responsible for all items. Evidence separating who took what is not relevant and
8 does not provide a valid defense.
9 If Defendant had claimed she did not know that Leslie placed the items in her
10 stroller, then Defendant’s argument separating who took what would appear to be
11 relevant because then it would relate to Defendant’s knowledge and whether she acted
12 willfully. On these facts, however, Defendant admitted that she acted with
13 knowledge. Her claims that she was “confused and unsure of exactly what Leslie was
14 thinking” and afraid to take items out of her stroller because she might be observed
15 do not negate the element of knowledge when she admitted that she knew all of the
16 items were in her stroller when she attempted to leave the store.
17 As a general matter, we agree with Defendant that the right to present a defense
18 is fundamental. [MIO 4-8] But on these facts, the principle underlying Defendant’s
19 defense—that she was responsible only for the items she placed in the stroller—was
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1 an incorrect statement of law and presented an invalid theory of defense. Therefore,
2 the court correctly limited evidence relating to an incorrect statement of law and to an
3 invalid theory of defense. The right to present a defense does not include the right to
4 rely on an incorrect legal theory. Cf. State v. Nieto, 2000-NMSC-031, ¶ 17, 129 N.M.
5 688, 12 P.3d 442 (holding that a defendant has no right to have a legally incorrect jury
6 instruction read to the jury or to mislead the jury through a misstatement of the law).
7 Consequently, the trial court’s limitation on Defendant’s presentation of evidence was
8 correct, and we find no error.
9 B. Right to a Lesser-Included Offense Instruction
10 Defendant argues that because she only took some of the items amounting to
11 less than $500, she was entitled to two lesser-included offense instructions—one for
12 shoplifting $250 to $500 and one for shoplifting under $250. [MIO 9-11] We review
13 the propriety of jury instructions as a mixed question of law and fact. See State v.
14 Gaitan, 2002-NMSC-007, ¶ 10, 131 N.M. 758, 42 P.3d 1207. In deciding this issue
15 we consider the facts in the light most favorable to Defendant. See State v. Hill, 2001-
16 NMCA-094, ¶ 5, 131 N.M. 195, 34 P.3d 139.
17 Defendant’s argument is inextricably linked to the evidentiary claim we have
18 just addressed. For the same reasons, Defendant’s claim that she only took some of
19 the items, thereby reducing the value of the items taken, did not entitle her to lesser-
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1 included offense instructions. On the facts, as admitted, she was liable for the
2 aggregate amount of the items. As we have mentioned, our conclusion might be
3 different if Defendant had claimed she did not know Leslie had placed the items in her
4 stroller, but that was not Defendant’s claim. Because Defendant admitted that she was
5 shoplifting herself, admitted that she knew about all of the items, and admitted that
6 she tried to leave the store with them, the court was correct in concluding that her
7 argument that she only took some of the items did not entitle her to lesser-included
8 offense instructions. Under the circumstances, there was no view of the evidence to
9 support a conclusion that the lesser offenses were the highest degree of crime
10 committed, and Defendant’s position, which relied on an incorrect legal theory, was
11 not reasonable. See Brown, 1998-NMSC-037, ¶ 12; Nieto, 2000-NMSC-031, ¶ 17
12 (stating that a trial court’s refusal to submit an instruction that promotes a
13 misstatement of law is not error).
14 For these reasons, we affirm.
15 IT IS SO ORDERED.
16 ________________________________
17 CELIA FOY CASTILLO, Judge
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1 WE CONCUR:
2 ________________________________
3 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge
4 ________________________________
5 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge
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