Christus St. Vincent Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Duarte-Afar , 1 N.M. Ct. App. 34 ( 2011 )


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    integrity of this document
    New Mexico Compilation
    Commission, Santa Fe, NM
    '00'05- 14:12:54 2011.11.23
    Certiorari Granted, October 12, 2011, No. 33,166
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
    Opinion Number: 
    2011-NMCA-112
    Filing Date: May 9, 2011
    Docket No. 30,343
    CHRISTUS ST. VINCENT REGIONAL
    MEDICAL CENTER,
    Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    RAMON DUARTE-AFARA, M.D., and
    MARK WADE DICKINSON, M.D.,
    Third-Party Defendants-Appellants.
    APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANTA FE COUNTY
    Barbara J. Vigil, District Judge
    Hinkle, Hensley, Shanor & Martin, L.L.P.
    William P. Slattery
    David B. Lawrenz
    Santa Fe, NM
    for Appellee
    Allen, Shepherd, Lewis, Syra & Chapman, P.A.
    E.W. Shepherd
    J. Adam Tate
    Albuquerque, NM
    for Appellant Duarte-Afara, M.D.
    Butt, Thornton & Baehr, P.C.
    W. Ann Maggiore
    Emily A. Franke
    Albuquerque, NM
    1
    for Appellant Dickinson, M.D.
    OPINION
    CASTILLO, Chief Judge.
    {1}    The primary issue before us is whether the claim of Christus St. Vincent Regional
    Medical Center (Medical Center) for equitable indemnification is a malpractice claim
    governed by the Medical Malpractice Act (MMA), NMSA 1978, §§ 41-5-1 to -29 (1976, as
    amended through 2008), and subject to the three-year statute of repose provided by Section
    41-5-13 of the MMA. We hold that Medical Center’s claim is governed by the MMA and
    subject to Section 41-5-13. We also consider whether due process and equal protection
    concerns preclude application of Section 41-5-13 and conclude that they do not.
    Accordingly, we reverse.
    BACKGROUND
    {2}     On December 6, 2004, Lillian Martinez (Martinez) received a hysterectomy at
    Medical Center. Several days later, on December 9 and 10, she developed respiratory
    problems and ultimately suffered brain damage. On December 4, 2007, almost three years
    later, Martinez filed a complaint against Medical Center under the MMA alleging medical
    malpractice. Specifically, Martinez alleged that Medical Center failed to adequately monitor
    her after surgery, administered inappropriate and/or excessive medications, failed to timely
    and properly diagnose and treat her respiratory problems, and failed to timely diagnose and
    treat her while she was experiencing a significant life-threatening medical emergency.
    {3}    Martinez filed an application for panel review with the New Mexico Medical Review
    Commission on March 6, 2008, asking the commission to, in part, review the conduct of Dr.
    Duarte-Afara and Dr. Dickinson (Doctors), the physicians who treated her at Medical Center
    and Appellants in this case. On March 12, 2008, Martinez amended her December 4, 2004
    complaint against Medical Center to include Doctors.
    {4}    In response to Martinez’s amended complaint, Doctors filed motions for summary
    judgment in June 2008 asserting that Martinez’s claims against them were barred by the
    three-year time period set forth in Section 41-5-13 of the MMA. Id. (stating that “[n]o claim
    for malpractice arising out of an act of malpractice . . . may be brought against a health care
    provider unless filed within three years after the date that the act of malpractice occurred”).
    The district court agreed with Doctors and dismissed Martinez’s claims against Doctors with
    prejudice.
    {5}     On December 22, 2008, Medical Center filed a third-party complaint for
    indemnification against Dr. Duarte-Afara in which Medical Center sought indemnification
    in the amount, if any, for which it may be found vicariously liable for Dr. Duarte-Afara’s
    malpractice. On March 19, 2009, Medical Center amended its third-party complaint to
    2
    include an indemnification claim against Dr. Dickinson.
    {6}     In response to Medical Center’s amended third-party complaint, Doctors filed a
    motion to dismiss, arguing that Medical Center’s indemnification claim was also barred by
    Section 41-5-13. Medical Center countered that Section 41-5-13 is not controlling, claimed
    that the four-year statute of limitations provided in NMSA 1978, Section 37-1-4 (1929)
    governed their amended third-party complaint, and asserted that its indemnification claim
    could proceed. The district court agreed with Doctors and granted their motion to dismiss.
    {7}     In March 2010, the district court granted Medical Center’s motion to reconsider the
    court’s dismissal of its claims against the Doctors. The court determined that “[b]ecause this
    matter is a claim for indemnification rather than malpractice . . . Section 41-5-13 . . . is
    inapplicable[,]” and further determined that “[t]he statutory time limit for the third-party
    claims for indemnification in this matter does not begin to run until the claim of indemnity
    accrues, which is at the time of payment of the underlying claim, judgment, or settlement,
    and not from the time that the underlying damage occurred to [Martinez].” We accepted
    Doctors’ request for interlocutory review on the issue of the applicability of the MMA and
    Section 41-5-13 to Medical Center’s indemnification claim against Doctors.
    DISCUSSION
    {8}     On appeal, Doctors argue, as they did below, that Medical Center’s indemnification
    claim is governed by the MMA and subject to Section 41-5-13. Because, as explained
    below, we agree with this argument, we also address Medical Center’s contention that
    application of Section 41-5-13 would deprive them of their due process and equal protections
    rights.
    Applicability of the MMA and Section 41-5-13
    {9}      To address Medical Center’s indemnification claim, we must construe Section 41-5-
    13 as it applies to the facts of this case. We review such matters de novo. Bd. of Comm’rs
    of Rio Arriba Cnty. v. Greacen, 
    2000-NMSC-016
    , ¶ 4, 
    129 N.M. 177
    , 
    3 P.3d 672
     (“This is
    primarily a matter of statutory construction and thereby concerns a pure question of law,
    subject to de novo review.”); Ponder v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
    2000-NMSC-033
    ,
    ¶ 7, 
    129 N.M. 698
    , 
    12 P.3d 960
     (“We review de novo the [district] court’s application of the
    law to the facts in arriving at its legal conclusions.”). “This Court’s primary goal when
    interpreting statutes is to further legislative intent.” Jordan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2010-
    NMSC-051, ¶ 15, 
    149 N.M. 162
    , 
    245 P.3d 1214
    . To determine legislative intent, “we look
    to the language used and consider the statute’s history and background.” Key v. Chrysler
    Motors Corp., 
    121 N.M. 764
    , 768-69, 
    918 P.2d 350
    , 354-55 (1996). We begin by examining
    the history and purpose behind the MMA and Section 41-5-13.
    {10} The MMA was enacted in response to a perceived malpractice insurance crisis in
    New Mexico. Roberts v. Sw. Cmty. Health Servs., 
    114 N.M. 248
    , 251-52, 
    837 P.2d 442
    ,
    445-46 (1992). Through the MMA, the Legislature made professional liability insurance
    available to health care providers but conditioned availability to that insurance on a quid pro
    3
    quo: health care providers could receive the benefits of the MMA only if they became
    qualified health care providers under the MMA and accepted the burdens of doing so. Id.;
    see also Cummings v. X-Ray Assocs. of N.M., P.C., 
    1996-NMSC-035
    , ¶¶ 27-29, 
    121 N.M. 821
    , 
    918 P.2d 1321
     (discussing the benefits and burdens of participation in the MMA).
    {11} Section 41-5-13 is one benefit health care providers receive in accepting the burdens
    of the MMA. See Cummings, 
    1996-NMSC-035
    , ¶ 29 (describing the Legislature’s decision
    to enact Section 41-5-13 as one of the “[t]he most notable” benefits under the MMA);
    Roberts, 114 N.M. at 252-53, 837 P.2d at 446-47 (identifying Section 41-5-13 as one of the
    benefits inuring to qualified health care providers under the MMA). This provision provides
    the following:
    No claim for malpractice arising out of an act of malpractice which
    occurred subsequent to the effective date of the [MMA] may be brought
    against a health care provider unless filed within three years after the date
    that the act of malpractice occurred except that a minor under the full age of
    six years shall have until his ninth birthday in which to file. This section
    applies to all persons regardless of minority or other legal disability.
    Section 41-5-13 (alteration omitted).
    {12} Section 41-5-13 addressed one of the reasons insurance carriers were withdrawing
    from medical malpractice: the potential for malpractice liability coverage suits being filed
    long after the act of malpractice. Cummings, 
    1996-NMSC-035
    , ¶ 40. Our Supreme Court
    has previously concluded that the plain language of Section 41-5-13 demonstrates that the
    Legislature intended the “occurrence rule” to govern claims controlled by the MMA.
    Cummings, 
    1996-NMSC-035
    , ¶¶ 47-48. The occurrence rule fixes the accrual date in which
    a patient must file a claim for medical malpractice at the time of the act or occurrence of
    medical malpractice even if the patient is oblivious of any harm. See id. ¶ 47. As such,
    Section 41-5-13 will function, under certain circumstances, as a statute of repose. See
    Cummings, 
    1996-NMSC-035
    , ¶¶ 48-50 (describing the circumstances under which Section
    41-5-13 may function either as a statute of limitations or as a statute of repose and explaining
    that “a statute of repose terminates the right to any action after a specific time has elapsed,
    even though no injury has yet manifested itself”). Having established the general principles
    that guide our analysis, we turn now to the more specific question of whether Medical
    Center’s indemnification claim is governed by the MMA and thus subject to Section 41-5-
    13.
    {13} The MMA comprehensively defines what constitutes a “malpractice claim.” See §
    41-5-3(C).
    “[M]alpractice claim” includes any cause of action arising in this state
    against a health care provider for medical treatment, lack of medical
    treatment or other claimed departure from accepted standards of health care
    which proximately results in injury to the patient, whether the patient’s claim
    or cause of action sounds in tort or contract, and includes but is not limited
    4
    to actions based on battery or wrongful death; “malpractice claim” does not
    include a cause of action arising out of the driving, flying or nonmedical acts
    involved in the operation, use or maintenance of a vehicular or aircraft
    ambulance[.]
    Id. Our Supreme Court has observed that the breadth of this language indicates that “[t]he
    [L]egislature foresaw and intended broad application of the concept of a ‘malpractice
    claim.’” Wilschinsky v. Medina, 
    108 N.M. 511
    , 517, 
    775 P.2d 713
    , 719 (1989). The
    question we must answer is whether an equitable indemnification claim falls within the
    ambit of this broadly defined concept. To answer that question we must examine the nature
    of a claim for indemnification.
    {14} New Mexico recognizes “both traditional and proportional equitable
    indemnification.” N.M. Pub. Schs. Ins. Auth. v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., 2008-NMSC-
    067, ¶ 23, 
    145 N.M. 316
    , 
    198 P.3d 342
    . “Traditional indemnification grants the person who
    has been held liable for another’s wrongdoing an all-or-nothing right of recovery from a
    third party, such as the primary wrongdoer.” 
    Id.
     “[P]roportional indemnification allows a
    defendant to seek partial recovery from another for his or her fault.” 
    Id.
     Medical Center has
    not specified which of these two theories of indemnification it has invoked. Nevertheless,
    our Supreme Court has explained that, under either theory, “to state a claim for equitable
    indemnification, the indemnitor must be at least partly liable to the original plaintiff for his
    or her injuries.” Id. ¶ 28 (emphasis omitted). In other words, “[a] properly pled indemnity
    claim must allege that the defendant [or indemnitor] caused some direct harm to a third party
    and that the plaintiff or [indemnitee] discharged the resulting liability from this harm.” Id.
    ¶ 30. This doctrinal point is, in our view, determinative.
    {15} As discussed above, the Legislature intended that the term “malpractice claim” be
    construed broadly. Wilschinsky, 
    108 N.M. at 517
    , 
    775 P.2d at 719
    . Indeed, a claim may be
    construed as a malpractice claim within the meaning of the MMA if “the gravamen of the
    third-party action is predicated upon the allegation of professional negligence by a practicing
    physician.” 
    Id. at 517-18
    , 
    775 P.2d at 719-20
     (internal quotation marks and citation
    omitted). We discern from Gallagher that the gravamen of Medical Center’s equitable
    indemnification claim is predicated upon the allegation that Doctors negligently caused, and
    were partly liable for, Martinez’s injuries. As such, we hold that Medical Center’s equitable
    indemnification claim is a malpractice claim as that term is used in the MMA and is,
    therefore, subject to Section 41-5-13.
    {16} We reach this conclusion, in part, so as to carry out the policy goals the Legislature
    intended by enacting the MMA and Section 41-5-13. See C. de Baca v. Baca, 
    73 N.M. 387
    ,
    392, 
    388 P.2d 392
    , 396 (1964) (“It accordingly devolves upon us to interpret the statute so
    as to accomplish the ends sought by the [L]egislature.”). In effect, Medical Center’s
    equitable indemnification claim exposes Doctors to the identical liability to which they were
    subject under Martinez’s claims. Martinez’s claims were properly dismissed as untimely.
    To permit Medical Center’s claim to proceed where Martinez’s claim could not, would, in
    our view, elevate form over substance and frustrate the underlying concerns which motivated
    our Legislature to enact the MMA and Section 41-5-13—that is, relieving insurers and health
    5
    care providers from the uncertainty posed by stale malpractice claims. Cummings, 1996-
    NMSC-035, ¶ 40.
    {17} We are unpersuaded by Medical Center’s varying arguments that its indemnification
    claim is not governed by the MMA. Citing Budget Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc. v. Bridgestone
    Firestone N. Am. Tire, LLC, 
    2009-NMCA-013
    , ¶ 21, 
    145 N.M. 623
    , 
    203 P.3d 154
    , Medical
    Center first argues that the limitation period for an indemnification claim begins to run “at
    the time of payment of the underlying claim, payment of a judgment, or payment of a
    settlement.” Medical Center further contends that “a third-party plaintiff’s cause of action
    for indemnification or contribution is distinct from the tort claim asserted by the plaintiff
    against the defendant in the underlying suit.” Medical Center cites a variety of out-of- state
    authority for this proposition, see State ex rel. General Electric Co. v. Gaertner, 
    666 S.W.2d 764
    , 766 (Mo. 1984) (en banc); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Schara, 
    201 N.W.2d 758
    ,
    759 (Wis. 1972); Duncan v. Beres, 
    166 N.W.2d 678
    , 687 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968), which we
    have duly considered.
    {18} These cases all point to the well-settled proposition that a cause of action for
    indemnification is separate and distinct from the underlying tort. See Maurice T. Brunner,
    When Statute of Limitations Commences to Run Against Claim for Contribution or Indemnity
    Based on Tort, 
    57 A.L.R.3d 867
    , § 4[a] (1974) (“The cause of action for indemnity of one
    whose liability for a tort is secondary or constructive, against one whose liability for the tort
    is primary, is separate and distinct from the injured person’s cause of action for the tort, and
    is generally recognized not to be a mere species of subrogation to the tort cause of action.
    It is inchoate until judgment is rendered or the claim is settled.” (footnotes omitted)). We
    do not dispute this point of law. However, this point does not undermine our confidence in
    the conclusion that Medical Center’s indemnification claim does fall within the ambit of the
    term “malpractice claim” as that term is used in the MMA. As discussed above, the
    controlling inquiry in determining whether a claim constitutes a “malpractice claim” under
    the MMA is merely whether the gravamen of the claim is predicated upon the allegation of
    professional negligence. We have concluded that this is the case. As such, Medical Center’s
    claim is governed by the MMA and is subject to Section 41-5-13.
    {19} Medical Center devotes considerable attention to two Missouri cases, Rowland v.
    Skaggs Companies, Inc., 
    666 S.W.2d 770
     (Mo. 1984) (en banc), and Aherron v. St. John’s
    Mercy Medical Center, 
    713 S.W.2d 498
     (Mo. 1986) (en banc), and argues that the reasoning
    and conclusions in these cases should apply here. In these cases, the Missouri Supreme
    Court addressed whether the two-year statute of limitations governing medical malpractice
    claims in Missouri applied to claims for contribution or indemnification. Rowland, 666
    S.W.2d at 772; Aherron, 713 S.W.2d at 499-500. In Rowland, the court observed that the
    language of the statute of limitations at issue revealed “an unequivocal legislative intent to
    make only a specified class of suits brought against health care providers subject to” the two-
    year statute of limitations, and concluded that their legislature did not include suits for
    contribution in that limited class. 666 S.W.2d at 772. Aherron relied almost exclusively on
    Rowland to reach the same conclusion as to claims for indemnification. Aherron, 713
    S.W.2d at 499-500. We distinguish these cases from New Mexico law based on policy
    considerations. Our Legislature intended to define the term “malpractice claim” in the
    6
    MMA broadly. Wilschinsky, 
    108 N.M. at 517
    , 
    775 P.2d at 719
    . Thus, New Mexico law is
    based on the converse of the policy concerns articulated and acted upon in Rowland and
    Aherron.
    {20} In conclusion, we hold that Medical Center’s claim for equitable indemnification is
    governed by the MMA and subject to Section 41-5-13. Because Medical Center’s claim was
    filed outside the three-year limitations period, Section 41-5-13, if applied, would bar
    Medical Center’s amended third-party complaint. We proceed to address Medical Center’s
    argument that application of Section 41-5-13 is impermissible as its application would
    violate Medical Center’s due process and equal protection rights.
    Due Process and Equal Protection
    {21} Medical Center asserts that, given the timing of Martinez’s claim, it had only six days
    to file its equitable indemnification claim in order to comply with Section 41-5-13 and that
    this is an unreasonably short period of time. Citing due process and equal protection
    concerns, Medical Center argues that application of Section 41-5-13 is impermissible. We
    review constitutional arguments de novo. Gomez v. Chavarria, 
    2009-NMCA-035
    , ¶ 6, 
    146 N.M. 46
    , 
    206 P.3d 157
    , cert. quashed, 
    2009-NMCERT-012
    , 
    147 N.M. 601
    , 
    227 P.3d 91
    .
    We begin with due process.
    {22} “[T]he [L]egislature may, consistent with due process, impose a statutory time
    deadline for commencing an accrued action where no limit existed before, and may,
    consistent with due process, shorten the time period within which existing claims may be
    brought as long as a reasonable time is provided for commencing suit.” Garcia ex rel.
    Garcia v. La Farge, 
    119 N.M. 532
    , 541, 
    893 P.2d 428
    , 437 (1995) (citations omitted). Thus,
    “considerations of fairness implicit in the Due Process Clauses of the United States and New
    Mexico Constitutions dictate that when the [L]egislature enacts a limitations period it must
    allow a reasonable time within which existing or accruing causes of action may be brought.”
    
    Id.
     Our Supreme Court has applied these principles in the context of the MMA and has, on
    three separate occasions, specifically inquired whether application of Section 41-5-13 would
    violate due process. We review those cases below.
    {23} In La Farge, a young boy suffered a fainting spell and was treated by a heart
    specialist. 
    119 N.M. at 534-35
    , 
    893 P.2d at 430-31
    . The specialist misdiagnosed the boy’s
    symptoms, but this was not discovered until a subsequent fainting episode. 
    Id. at 535
    , 
    893 P.2d at 431
    . The subsequent episode occurred only eighty-five days before the expiration
    of the limitations period in Section 41-5-13. La Farge, 
    119 N.M. at 542
    , 
    893 P.2d at 438
    .
    The boy filed a malpractice claim approximately seven months after the Section 41-5-13 date
    had run. La Farge, 
    119 N.M. at 535
    , 
    893 P.2d at 431
    . Although filed outside the allowable
    window, our Supreme Court concluded that the boy’s due process rights would be violated
    if Section 41-5-13 was applied to preclude his claim. La Farge, 
    119 N.M. at 542
    , 
    893 P.2d at 438
    . The Court focused on the fact that the boy learned of the malpractice only eighty-
    five days before the Section 41-5-13 expiration date. La Farge, 
    119 N.M. at 542
    , 
    893 P.2d at 438
    . Eighty-five days, the Court determined, was an unreasonably short period of time
    within which the boy could exercise his rights. 
    Id.
     Accordingly, the Court concluded that
    7
    Section 41-5-13 was inapplicable and instead applied the accrual based statute of limitations
    in NMSA 1978, Section 37-1-8 (1976). La Farge, 
    119 N.M. at 542
    , 
    893 P.2d at 438
    . As the
    boy had filed suit within three years of the date of accrual—the date the boy discovered the
    malpractice—his claim could proceed. 
    Id.
    {24} In Cummings, 
    1996-NMSC-035
    , ¶¶ 2, 6, a patient received x-rays, and the medical
    provider identified certain abnormalities, but then failed to properly diagnose those
    abnormalities. The patient later discovered that the abnormalities were cancerous masses.
    
    Id.
     The date of malpractice was identified as August 1988 and the date the patient
    discovered the malpractice as February 1990, roughly one and one-half years before the
    Section 41-5-13 limitation period expired in August 1991. Cummings, 
    1996-NMSC-035
    ,
    ¶ 57. The patient filed her malpractice claim in July 1992, approximately eleven months
    after the Section 41-5-13 expiration date. Cummings, 
    1996-NMSC-035
    , ¶ 57. Our Supreme
    Court declined to extend the conclusion in La Farge to the patient’s case and determined that
    her claim was barred by Section 41-5-13. Cummings, 
    1996-NMSC-035
    , ¶¶ 57-58. The
    Court reasoned that the patient knew of the malpractice a year and a half before the Section
    41-5-13 expiration date, but failed to file her claim. Cummings, 
    1996-NMSC-035
    , ¶¶ 57-58.
    Accordingly, the patient could not complain that her due process rights were violated by the
    preclusive effect of Section 41-5-13. Cummings, 
    1996-NMSC-035
    , ¶¶ 57-58. She had more
    than adequate time to take action, but failed to do so. 
    Id.
    {25} Finally, in Tomlinson v. George, 
    2005-NMSC-020
    , ¶ 4, 
    138 N.M. 34
    , 
    116 P.3d 105
    ,
    a patient had wrist surgery in August 1996 that was ineffective and, when the patient saw
    another specialist only a few months later, was informed that the initial surgeon had been
    negligent. The patient filed a claim for malpractice in March 2000, roughly seven months
    after the Section 41-5-13 limitations period expired. Tomlinson, 
    2005-NMSC-020
    , ¶¶ 5, 10.
    Again, our Supreme Court declined to apply the result reached in La Farge. Tomlinson,
    
    2005-NMSC-020
    , ¶¶ 23-24. The Court observed that the patient learned of the malpractice
    only a few months after it occurred, but failed to act on this information for most of the
    Section 41-5-13 period. Tomlinson, 
    2005-NMSC-020
    , ¶¶ 23-24. As in Cummings, the Court
    concluded that the patient’s due process rights were not violated by the preclusive effect of
    Section 41-5-13. Tomlinson, 
    2005-NMSC-020
    , ¶¶ 23-24.
    {26} Because we have concluded that Medical Center’s equitable indemnification claim
    is a “malpractice claim” under the MMA and subject to Section 41-5-13, we apply the due
    process analysis developed in the cases above. We do so despite the fact that the issue in
    those cases was the due process rights of patients/plaintiffs whereas here we are concerned
    with the rights of a third-party. Conceptually, these seem like different matters and would,
    perhaps, implicate a different analysis. The parties do not address that issue.
    {27} La Farge, Cummings, and Tomlinson make clear that the due process analysis in the
    Section 41-5-13 context requires us to identify three dates: (1) the occurrence date, i.e., the
    date the malpractice occurred; (2) the discovery date, i.e., the date the existence of the
    malpractice is discovered; and (3) the Section 41-5-13 expiration date. Here, the occurrence
    date and the Section 41-5-13 expiration date are clear and there is no dispute between the
    parties as to these dates.        The malpractice at issue in this case—Martinez’s
    8
    injuries—occurred on December 9-10, 2004, and thus the three-year limitations period
    expired on December 10, 2007.
    {28} The parties disagree about the date of discovery. Medical Center claims that the
    discovery date is December 4, 2007, the date Martinez filed her complaint against Doctors,
    which was six days before the Section 41-5-13 expiration date. Doctors counter that the
    discovery date is either December 9 or 10, 2004, the date the malpractice committed against
    Martinez occurred, or December 11, 2007, the date Martinez’s complaint was served on
    counsel for Medical Center. As explained below, we agree with Doctors that the date of
    discovery is December 11, 2007, the date Medical Center received service or, alternatively,
    at some point thereafter.
    {29} “The key consideration under the discovery rule is the factual, not the legal, basis for
    the cause of action. The action accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know the relevant
    facts, whether or not the plaintiff also knows that these facts are enough to establish a legal
    cause of action.” Coslett v. Third St. Grocery, 
    117 N.M. 727
    , 735, 
    876 P.2d 656
    , 664 (Ct.
    App. 1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Medical Center concedes that
    it did not have knowledge that Martinez had suffered an injury until the date her complaint
    was filed—December 4, 2007. We accept this statement as an admission on Medical
    Center’s part that it did not have knowledge that Martinez suffered injuries prior to
    Martinez’s decision to file suit. We do not, however, accept the legal conclusion implicit
    in Medical Center’s concession, i.e., that Medical Center knew Martinez filed suit merely
    because Martinez filed a complaint in district court. Medical Center could only discover that
    Martinez had filed a claim upon receiving service of process. Medical Center received
    service on December 11, 2007, one day after the three-year limitation period provided by
    Section 41-5-13 expired. Accordingly, we conclude that the earliest possible discovery date
    is December 11, 2007. We observe that Medical Center did not file its indemnification claim
    against Doctors until December 2008. This suggests that the discovery date could be well
    after December 11, 2007. We need not, however, conclusively decide the issue.
    {30} As described above, Section 41-5-13 is a statute of repose and terminates the right
    to any action after a specific time has elapsed. Cummings, 
    1996-NMSC-035
    , ¶ 50. Our
    Supreme Court has clearly stated that the due process analysis first established in La Farge,
    and further developed in Cummings and Tomlinson, applies “only to claims discovered
    within the statutory period; if a claim is discovered after the statute has run, Section 41-5-13
    is an explicit bar.” Tomlinson, 
    2005-NMSC-020
    , ¶ 23. The discovery date in the present
    matter was one day beyond the end of the three-year limitations period provided by Section
    41-5-13. As such, we hold that Section 41-5-13 bars Medical Center’s claim and further
    conclude that the preclusive effect of Section 41-5-13 does no harm to Medical Center’s due
    process rights. We conclude this opinion by briefly addressing Medical Center’s equal
    protection arguments.
    {31} At the end of Medical Center’s discussion of the due process issue, Medical Center
    contends that its equal protection rights would also be violated if we conclude that Section
    41-5-13 applies. This claim appears to be premised on two points. First, Medical Center
    contends that, if its claim for indemnification is dismissed as untimely, it will be solely
    9
    responsible for the Martinez liabilities. Medical Center then argues that “the New Mexico
    [L]egislature did not include third[-]party claims, including indemnity claims, in the
    [MMA’s] definition of ‘malpractice claim.’” It is not clear to us how this implicates equal
    protection and it is well settled that we do not review unclear arguments. See Headley v.
    Morgan Mgmt. Corp., 
    2005-NMCA-045
    , ¶ 15, 
    137 N.M. 339
    , 
    110 P.3d 1076
    . Moreover,
    this claim seems merely a variation of Medical Center’s contention that indemnification
    claims are not governed by the MMA or subject to Section 41-5-13. We rejected this claim
    above.
    CONCLUSION
    {32} The district court’s determination that Medical Center’s amended third-party
    complaint and the claim for indemnification therein was not governed by the MMA and not
    subject to Section 41-5-13 is reversed. We reach the opposite conclusion and reject Medical
    Center’s contention that doing so violates its due process and equal protection rights. We
    remand this matter to the district court with instructions to dismiss Medical Center’s
    amended third-party complaint and for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
    {33}    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    ______________________________________
    CELIA FOY CASTILLO, Chief Judge
    WE CONCUR:
    ______________________________________
    MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge
    ______________________________________
    MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge
    Topic Index for Christus St. Vincent v. Duarte-Afar, No. 30,343
    AE                    APPEAL AND ERROR
    AE-SR                 Standard of Review
    CP                    CIVIL PROCEDURE
    CP-MD                 Motion to Dismiss
    CP-SL                 Statute of Limitations
    CT                    CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
    CT-DP                 Due Process
    CT-EP                 Equal Protection
    IN                    INSURANCE
    IN-IY                 Indemnity
    10
    ST      STATUTES
    ST-LI   Legislative Intent
    TR      TORTS
    TR-MM   Medical Malpractice
    TR-SA   Statute of Limitations
    11