Hicks v. Kollar Construction ( 2012 )


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  •      This memorandum opinion was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Reports. Please see
    Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please
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    filing date.
    1        IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
    2 PAUL EDDIE HICKS,
    3          Plaintiff-Appellant,
    4 vs.                                                                         NO. 31,740
    5   KOLLAR CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
    6   a New Mexico Corporation, and MARK
    7   KOLLAR, individually and d/b/a KOLLAR
    8   CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, and
    9   KOLLAR ENTERPRISES; DARYL R. HARRELL
    10   and SUE B. HARRELL, his wife,
    11          Defendants-Appellees.
    12 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY
    13 Theodore C. Baca, District Judge
    14   Behles Law Firm, P.C.
    15   Eric N. Ortiz
    16   Deborah Moore
    17   Jennie Deden Behles
    18   Albuquerque, NM
    19 for Appellants
    20 Madison, Harbour & Mroz, P.A.
    21 Michael J. Dekleva
    22 Jacqueline Olexy
    1 Albuquerque, NM
    2 for Appellees
    3                            MEMORANDUM OPINION
    4 GARCIA, Judge.
    5        Plaintiff appeals from a district court order granting Defendant Susan B.
    6 Harrell’s motion for summary judgment. We issued a calendar notice proposing to
    7 affirm. Plaintiff has filed a memorandum in opposition. We affirm.
    8        “Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of
    9 material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Self v. United
    10 Parcel Serv., Inc., 1998-NMSC-046, ¶ 6, 
    126 N.M. 396
    , 
    970 P.2d 582
    . “We review
    11 these legal questions de novo.” 
    Id. 12 In this
    case, there is no dispute that Defendant Harrell hired Defendant Kollar
    13 Construction to paint her house. [MIO 1] Plaintiff, working for Kollar, was assigned
    14 the work and was injured when he fell off a ladder. [MIO 1-2] Plaintiff sued
    15 Defendant Harrell under a premises liability theory, and asserted that she (by way of
    16 her boyfriend) exercised a sufficient degree of control over the work that a separate
    17 duty of care was created. [RP 1] The central claim by Plaintiff related to the
    18 imposition of this additional duty by way of a “right to control” analysis. However,
    19 even if we assume that Defendant exercised a sufficient degree of control to satisfy
    2
    1 this test, “[p]laintiff must also show that his injury was proximately caused by the
    2 owner's failure to exercise that control in a reasonable manner, that the owner knew
    3 or by the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered the dangerous condition,
    4 that such hazard involved an unreasonable risk of harm to plaintiff, and the landowner
    5 should have expected that the employee would not discover or realize the danger[.]”
    6 Requarth v. Brophy, 
    111 N.M. 51
    , 54-55, 
    801 P.2d 121
    , 124-25 (Ct. App. 1990).
    7        In our calendar notice, we noted that it was undisputed that Defendant Kollar
    8 instructed Plaintiff to retrieve a Kollar Construction ladder from the back of his truck
    9 for use in the painting work. [RP 62-63] Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that he fell
    10 because this ladder “was either defective or in a poor state of repair and thereby
    11 defective and the ladder simply broke and gave way.” [RP 2, ¶ 4.] Plaintiff appears
    12 to be trying to impose liability by showing that Defendant exercised control by
    13 requiring the use of a brush, necessitating the use of a ladder. However, there is
    14 nothing inherently negligent in requesting that a home be painted by brush, and we
    15 proposed to hold that Defendant was not required to inspect the soundness of the
    16 Kollar tools used to perform that job. Also, contrary to Plaintiff’s contentions, there
    17 is nothing unusual or inherently dangerous in the type of method employed here that
    18 would by itself raise questions of negligence. To the extent that Plaintiff believed that
    19 the ground was uneven, or that the height of the ladder was not sufficient, these were
    3
    1 risks that Plaintiff knew about at the time, and therefore these facts did not satisfy the
    2 test for liability (lack of disclosure) set forth above.
    3         Accordingly, we affirm the district court.
    4        IT IS SO ORDERED.
    5                                                  _______________________________
    6                                                  TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge
    7 WE CONCUR:
    8
    9 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge
    10
    11 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 31,740

Filed Date: 4/19/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021