Purple Lupine LLC v. Sherman & Sherman ( 2014 )


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    Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum
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    1        IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
    2 PURPLE LUPINE LLC.,
    3 a New Mexico Limited
    4 Liability Company,
    5          Plaintiff-Appellee,
    6 v.                                                                                    NO. 32,533
    7 SHERMAN & SHERMAN, PC.,
    8          Defendant-Appellant,
    9 and
    10   CITY OF DEMING, a municipal
    11   corporation of the State of New
    12   Mexico, SOUTHWEST LOAN &
    13   INVESTMENT CORP., SUNBELT
    14   ANDERSON OIL COMPANY., a
    15   Texas corporation, and MINNIE
    16   LUJAN, if living, and if deceased,
    17   Minnie Lujan’s unknown heirs,
    18          Defendants.
    19 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF LUNA COUNTY
    20 Henry R. Quintero, District Judge
    21 Segal & Whittaker, LLP
    1 Jeannette Martinez Whittaker
    2 Albuquerque, NM
    3 for Appellee
    4 Jakub F. Sherman
    5 Deming, NM
    6 for Appellant
    7                            MEMORANDUM OPINION
    8 GARCIA, Judge.
    9   {1}   Defendant, Sherman & Sherman, PC, appeals from the district court’s order
    10 denying Defendant’s motion to enforce a settlement reached by the parties. The
    11 district court denied Defendant’s motion because Defendant “did not put the [district]
    12 court on notice of the purported settlement” before the district court entered an order
    13 dismissing Defendant’s counterclaim. We conclude that the district court erred in
    14 refusing to consider and address Defendant’s motion to enforce settlement. We thus
    15 reverse the district court’s order denying Defendant’s motion to enforce settlement
    16 and remand for consideration of the merits of Defendant’s motion.
    17 BACKGROUND
    18   {2}   On August 31, 2011, Plaintiff, Purple Lupine, LLC, filed a complaint to quiet
    19 title and extinguish liens on several tracts of land located in Luna County, New
    20 Mexico. Defendant filed an answer and counterclaim, asserting it had a mortgage lien
    2
    1 on two of the tracts of land based on a mortgage document executed in 1979. Plaintiff
    2 filed a motion to dismiss Defendant’s counterclaim based on the statute of limitations.
    3 Defendant filed a response in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion; Plaintiff filed a reply;
    4 and Defendant filed a surreply. Before the district court ruled on the motion, the
    5 parties entered into settlement discussions.
    6   {3}   On August 22, 2012, at 9:12 a.m., counsel for Defendant sent an email to
    7 counsel for Plaintiff stating, in pertinent part:
    8         Sherman & Sherman P.C. through their assignee Frederick Sherman
    9         would execute a full release on the Mortgage from Minnie Lujan, in
    10         exchange for the execution of a new Mortgage by your client in the
    11         amount of $4,500 at 6% interest, payable in 1 year upon sale. With the
    12         additional term that in the event that the property is not sold within 1
    13         year, or the Mortgage is not paid off within 1 year, then a full interest
    14         payment is due annually until such time as the property is sold or the
    15         Mortgage is paid off in full.
    16 Counsel for Plaintiff sent an email back at 10:29 a.m., stating:
    17         My client is agreeable to settling on the terms set out below. I will draft
    18         the Release of Mortgage, a new Mortgage, an Order of Dismissal of
    19         Counterclaim with Prejudice and a Stipulated and Default Quiet Title
    20         Judgment for Mr. Sherman’s review and approval. If there is another
    21         document that should accompany these pleadings, I will let you know.
    22   {4}   Defendant’s counsel sent another email to Plaintiff’s counsel on September 7,
    23 2012, at 12:39 p.m., stating:
    24         If there is a settlement, it appears it has been abandoned as nothing has
    25         been done to complete it. I expect the delay is so interest doesn’t begin
    26         to accrue. If you believe we have a settlement, I need the paperwork by
    3
    1         next Wednesday with interest starting the date you feel the settlement
    2         was complete.
    3 Counsel for Plaintiff sent an email back at 3:29 p.m., stating, “We do have an
    4 agreement. I will do my best to get the paperwork to you on Monday but no later than
    5 Wednesday.”
    6   {5}   On September 28, 2012, the district court issued an order dismissing
    7 Defendant’s counterclaim, concluding it was time-barred. The district court issued an
    8 amended order on October 3, 2012.
    9   {6}   On October 4, 2012, Defendant filed a motion to enforce settlement, arguing
    10 that the parties had entered into a binding settlement agreement on August 22, 2012.
    11 Defendant relied upon the emails set forth above. Plaintiff filed a response in
    12 opposition to Defendant’s motion. The district court held a hearing on October 26,
    13 2012. At the hearing, counsel for Plaintiff argued that the settlement agreement was
    14 not binding because the attorneys had not reached an agreement on the issue of
    15 attorney fees and on the terms of the new mortgage.
    16   {7}   The district court stated it intended to deny Defendant’s motion because it was
    17 not informed of the settlement negotiations. The court explained:
    18                I feel bound by the sequence of the orders that were entered in this
    19         case. The [c]ourt was not even given a hint that there were negotiations
    20         to settle this case, and had there been, perhaps that should have been
    21         brought before the [c]ourt before the [c]ourt’s order dismissing the
    22         counterclaim.
    4
    1               And I think that once the dismissal of the counterclaim was
    2         entered in late September, then Mr. Sherman woke up and decided that
    3         he had an agreement he wanted to enforce but, by then, it’s too late. He’s
    4         bound by the sequence of the orders of dismissing the counterclaim.
    5               I think either or both of you may have something to argue before
    6         the Court of Appeals but, as far as I was concerned, the case was closed
    7         when I dismissed the counterclaim.
    8   {8}   The district court entered an order denying Defendant’s motion to enforce
    9 settlement solely on the basis that Defendant “did not put the court on notice of the
    10 purported settlement . . . prior to entry of the Order Granting Motion to Dismiss
    11 Counterclaim . . . .” The district court issued an amended order on November 26,
    12 2012. The district court subsequently entered default judgment and final decree to
    13 quiet title, concluding Plaintiff is the owner in fee simple of the tracts of land at issue
    14 and Defendant is barred and estopped from having or claiming any lien upon, or right,
    15 title, or interest in the land.
    16 DISCUSSION
    17   {9}   Defendant contends the district court erred in denying its motion to enforce
    18 settlement. The district court concluded that it was bound by the procedural history
    19 of this case—specifically, the fact that it entered an order dismissing Defendant’s
    20 counterclaim before it was notified of the purported settlement agreement. The parties
    21 do not dispute the facts and the procedural history in this case, thus we are presented
    5
    1 with a question of law that will be reviewed de novo. See Ponder v. State Farm Mut.
    2 Auto. Ins. Co., 2000-NMSC-033, ¶ 7, 
    129 N.M. 698
    , 
    12 P.3d 960
    (applying a de novo
    3 standard of review to the district court’s application of the law to the facts).
    4   {10}   New Mexico has a strong policy of favoring settlement agreements. See
    5 Builders Contract Interiors, Inc. v. Hi-Lo Indus., Inc., 2006-NMCA-053, ¶ 7, 139
    
    6 N.M. 508
    , 
    134 P.3d 795
    ; see also Navajo Tribe of Indians v. Hanosh Chevrolet-Buick,
    7 Inc., 1988-NMSC-010, ¶ 3, 
    106 N.M. 705
    , 
    749 P.2d 90
    (“It is the policy of the law
    8 and of the State of New Mexico to favor settlement agreements.”). Consistent with
    9 this policy, “this Court generally enforces settlement agreements.” Montano v. N.M.
    10 Real Estate Appraiser’s Bd., 2009-NMCA-009, ¶ 12, 
    145 N.M. 494
    , 
    200 P.3d 544
    .
    11   {11}   Here, the district court did not consider whether the settlement agreement
    12 entered into by the parties was valid and enforceable. Instead, the district court
    13 concluded that review was not allowed because it was “bound by the sequence of the
    14 orders” that were entered in this case. Plaintiff does not cite any authority supporting
    15 this position regarding a priority of sequencing that overrides a valid settlement
    16 agreement. See In re Adoption of Doe, 1984-NMSC-024, ¶ 2, 
    100 N.M. 764
    , 
    676 P.2d 17
    1329 (“[Our appellate courts will] assume where arguments in briefs are unsupported
    18 by cited authority, counsel after diligent search, was unable to find any supporting
    19 authority.”). The district court was simply unaware of the purported settlement before
    6
    1 its order addressing the motion to dismiss Defendant’s counterclaim was entered. In
    2 light of the strong policy favoring settlement and absent any authority to the contrary,
    3 we conclude that the district court erred in refusing to consider Defendant’s motion
    4 to enforce a settlement agreement.
    5   {12}   On appeal, the parties make various arguments concerning the validity of the
    6 settlement agreement. Defendant contends the parties entered into a valid and
    7 enforceable settlement agreement while Plaintiff contends they entered into only a
    8 “non-binding agreement to agree.” See Jones v. United Minerals Corp.,
    9 1979-NMSC-103, ¶ 13, 
    93 N.M. 706
    , 
    604 P.2d 1240
    (discussing whether the parties
    10 can be bound by a settlement depending upon various factors to be considered). We
    11 will not decide this unresolved issue in the first instance and we remand this matter
    12 to the district court for a proper consideration of the parties’ evidence, arguments, and
    13 the entry of appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law for further review.
    14 CONCLUSION
    15   {13}   For the reasons stated above, we reverse the district court’s denial of
    16 Defendant’s motion to enforce the alleged settlement and remand for the district court
    17 to address whether the settlement agreement allegedly entered into by the parties was
    18 valid and enforceable.
    19   {14}   IT IS SO ORDERED.
    7
    1                               ________________________________
    2                               TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge
    3 WE CONCUR:
    4 __________________________________
    5 JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge
    6 __________________________________
    7 LINDA M. VANZI, Judge
    8