Butkus v. Pub. Emp. Ret. Ass'n ( 2024 )

The slip opinion is the first version of an opinion released by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals.
Once an opinion is selected for publication by the Court, it is assigned a vendor-neutral citation by
the Clerk of the Court for compliance with Rule 23-112 NMRA, authenticated and formally
published. The slip opinion may contain deviations from the formal authenticated opinion.
1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
2 Opinion Number: _____________
3 Filing Date: January 16, 2024
4 No. A-1-CA-40561
5 CARL J. BUTKUS,
6 Plaintiff-Appellant,
7 v.
8 PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT
9 ASSOCIATION; PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
10 RETIREMENT BOARD; and their members
11 in their official capacities, FRANCIS PAGE;
12 STEPHEN J. NEEL; PAULA FISHER;
13 DIANA ROSALES-ORTIZ; CLAUDIA ARMIJO;
14 JOHN MELIA; LAWRENCE L. DAVIS;
15 SHIRLEY M. RAGIN; ROBERTO RAMIREZ;
16 LORETTA NARANJO-LOPEZ; MAGGIE
17 TOULOUSE OLIVER; and TIM EICHENBERG,
18 Defendants-Appellees.
19 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANTA FE COUNTY
20 Maria Sanchez-Gagne, District Court Judge
21 Giddens & Gatton Law, P.C.
22 George Dave Giddens
23 Albuquerque, NM
24 Carl J. Butkus
25 Albuquerque, NM
26 for Appellant
1 NM Local Government Law, LLC
2 Charles Rennick
3 Albuquerque, NM
4 for Appellees
1 OPINION
2 BUSTAMANTE, Judge, retired, sitting by designation.
3 {1} This case—certified to this Court by the district court—requires this Court to
4 interpret the Judicial Retirement Act (JRA), NMSA 1978, §§ 10-12B-1 to -19 (1992,
5 as amended through 2023), and resolve a single question about retirement benefits
6 for a group of judges and justices who initially became members of the Judicial
7 Retirement Fund (the Fund) after June 30, 2005, but on or before June 30, 2014.
8 Plaintiff Carl Butkus, a retired district court judge, argues the Public Employees
9 Retirement Board (the Board) miscalculated his pension when it determined that
10 “years of service” in Section 10-12B-9(C)(1) refers to a member’s years of service
11 between June 30, 2005 and June 30, 2014, instead of the retiree’s full tenure as a
12 judge or justice in the two pronged calculation required by Section 10-12B-9(C). For
13 the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
14 BACKGROUND
15 {2} The facts of this case are undisputed. Plaintiff started his tenure as a judge on
16 December 16, 2005. Plaintiff retired as a judge under the JRA effective January 1,
17 2021. Plaintiff retired with a total service credit of fifteen years and one month.
18 {3} Upon his retirement and submitting the necessary paperwork, the Public
19 Employees Retirement Association of New Mexico (PERA) calculated Plaintiff’s
20 pension. Plaintiff disagreed with PERA’s calculation and appealed the action to the
1 Board. After PERA provided a written response to Plaintiff’s notice of appeal, the
2 administrative hearing officer (AHO) held a video conference hearing. The AHO
3 issued a recommended decision. Plaintiff responded to the recommendation and the
4 AHO replied with her own written response. The Board issued a final order adopting
5 the AHO’s recommended decision.
6 {4} Plaintiff appealed the Board’s decision to the district court, pursuant to Rule
7 1-074(A) NMRA. After briefing and a video hearing, the district court certified the
8 matter to this Court pursuant to Rule 1-074(S). After certification was accepted, this
9 appeal followed.
10 DISCUSSION
11 {5} In reviewing an administrative agency’s decision, this Court is “limited to
12 determining whether the administrative agency acted fraudulently, arbitrarily or
13 capriciously; whether the agency’s decision is supported by substantial evidence; or
14 whether the agency acted in accordance with the law.” Paule v. Santa Fe Cnty. Bd.
15 of Cnty. Comm’rs, 2005-NMSC-021, ¶ 26, 138 N.M. 82, 117 P.3d 240; see NMSA
16 1978, § 39-3-1.1(D) (1999); see also Rule 1-074(R). The question before us is a legal
17 question 1 that requires us to interpret a statute, which we review de novo. See Rio
Plaintiff argues that the Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious, not
1
supported by substantial evidence, outside of the scope of the Board’s authority, and
otherwise not in accordance with the law. These arguments all amount to the same
claim—that the Board erred as a matter of law in its interpretation of Section 10-
12B-9(C)(1). Thus, we need not address each assertion individually.
2
1 Grande Chapter of Sierra Club v. N.M. Mining Comm’n, 2003-NMSC-005, ¶¶ 16,
2 17, 133 N.M. 97, 61 P.3d 806.
3 {6} Generally, “[i]n construing the language of a statute, our goal and guiding
4 principle is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature.” Lujan Grisham v. Romero,
5 2021-NMSC-009, ¶ 23, 483 P.3d 545. “In determining legislative intent, [appellate
6 courts] look to the plain language of the statute and the context in which it was
7 enacted, taking into account its history and background.” Pirtle v. Legis. Council
8 Comm. of N.M. Legislature, 2021-NMSC-026, ¶ 14, 492 P.3d 586. “[W]here the
9 language of the legislative act is doubtful or an adherence to the literal use of words
10 would lead to injustice, absurdity or contradiction, the statute will be construed
11 according to its obvious spirit or reason, even though this requires the rejection of
12 words or the substitution of others.” N.M. Real Estate Comm’n v. Barger, 2012-
13 NMCA-081, ¶ 7, 284 P.3d 1112 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
14 Moreover, “[w]e consider all parts of the statute together, reading the statute in its
15 entirety and construing each part in connection with every other part to produce a
16 harmonious whole.” Dep’t of Game & Fish v. Rawlings, 2019-NMCA-018, ¶ 6, 436
17 P.3d 741 (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).
18 {7} Section 10-12B-9(C) states,
19 C. For a judge or justice who initially became a member after
20 June 30, 2005 but on or before June 30, 2014, the amount of monthly
21 pension is an amount equal to the sum of:
3
1 (1) for service credit earned on or before June 30, 2014,
2 an amount equal to one-twelfth of the salary received during the last
3 year in office prior to retirement multiplied by the product of three and
4 seventy-five hundredths percent times the sum of the number of years
5 of service; and
6 (2) for service credit earned on and after July 1, 2014,
7 an amount equal to one-sixtieth of the greatest aggregate amount of
8 salary received for sixty consecutive, but not necessarily continuous,
9 months in office multiplied by the product of three and one-half percent
10 times the number of years of service credit.
11 (Emphasis added.) It is the meaning of “years of service” in the first subsection of
12 the calculation that represents a member’s service that is at issue in this appeal.
13 “Years of service” is defined in the JRA as
14 a period of time beginning on the date a person commences to hold
15 office as a judge or justice because of appointment or election and
16 ending on the date a person ceases to hold office as a judge or justice
17 because of expiration of the judge’s or justice’s term, voluntary
18 resignation, death or disability and shall include any fractions of years
19 of service.
20 Section 10-12B-2(W). 2
21 {8} The crux of Plaintiff’s argument is that because the JRA provides a definition
22 of “years of service” in Section 10-12B-2(W), we must plunk that definition into
23 Section 10-12B-9(C)(1) so that the entire tenure of a member’s service is taken into
2
The 2014 version of Section 10-12B-2 was in effect when Plaintiff filed his
claim for benefits. The 2023 amendment of Section 10-12B-2 renumbered the “years
of service” subsection, but the definition remains the same. Compare § 10-12B-2(V)
(2014), with § 10-12B-2(W). We reference the most recent version of the statute for
clarity.
4
1 account for the first prong of the calculation. See High Ridge Hinkle Joint Venture
2 v. City of Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-050, ¶ 5, 126 N.M. 413, 970 P.2d 599 (noting
3 “the plain language of a statute is the primary indicator of legislative intent” and
4 “where several sections of a statute are involved, they must be read together so that
5 all parts are given effect”); Cadena v. Bernalillo Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 2006-
6 NMCA-036, ¶ 15, 139 N.M. 300, 131 P.3d 687 (“When words are defined in the
7 statute, we must interpret the statute according to those definitions, because those
8 definitions reflect what the legislative intent is.”).
9 {9} PERA argues that to give effect to the intent of the Legislature we must go
10 beyond the plain language of the statute and conclude that “years of service” in
11 Section 10-12B-9(C)(1) refers to the years of service credit the member has
12 accumulated between July 1, 2005 and June 30, 2014. We agree with PERA and
13 explain.
14 {10} We start by providing an overview of the relevant statute. Section 10-12B-
15 9(C) provides a pension calculation that requires the sum of two figures. The first
16 figure reflects payment for a member’s service between July 1, 2005 and June 30,
17 2014. Section 10-12B-9(C)(1). The second represents payment for a member’s
18 service from July 1, 2014 onward. Section 10-12B-9(C)(2). A 2014 amendment to
19 Section 10-12B-9 created this two-step pension calculation, and therefore we turn to
20 the history and background of the amendment to determine the Legislature’s intent.
5
1 See Key v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 1996-NMSC-038, ¶ 13, 121 N.M. 764, 918 P.2d
2 350 (“In interpreting statutes, we seek to give effect to the Legislature’s intent, and
3 in determining intent we look to the language used and consider the statute’s history
4 and background.”).
5 {11} Before 2014, NMSA 1978, Section 10-12B-9(C) (2005) read: “In the case of
6 a new judge or justice who initially became a member on or after July 1, 2005, an
7 amount equal to one-twelfth of the salary received during the last year in office prior
8 to retirement multiplied by the product of three and seventy-five hundredths percent
9 times the sum of the number of years of service.” In 2014, the calculation was
10 amended so that members who started their service between the 2005 and 2014
11 amendments, the 2005 calculation’s pension factor remained for the calculation of
12 benefits for that period, but a new calculation with a lesser pension factor was
13 enacted for the time period going forward. Compare § 10-12B-9(C) (2005) (pension
14 factor of 3.75 percent), with § 10-12B-9(C)(1) (pension factor of 3.75 percent), and
15 § 10-12B-9(C)(2) (pension factor of 3.5 percent). An even lesser pension factor was
16 adopted to calculate the total benefits for members who initially became members
17 on or after July 1, 2014. Compare § 10-12B-9(D) (pension factor of 3.25 percent),
18 with § 10-12B-9(C)(2) (pension factor of 3.5 percent).
19 {12} The decrease in the pension factor for the second prong of the equation in
20 Section 10-12B-9(C)(2) and for members who start their tenure after June 30, 2014,
6
1 see § 10-12B-9(D), demonstrates a legislative intent to decrease the amount of
2 benefits paid out to the relevant members. The Legislative history, found here in
3 fiscal impact reports, confirms this. It reveals that the newer, lesser pension factor
4 increases the solvency of the Fund while not decreasing any retirement benefits the
5 members earned between 2005 and 2014. See Draft Fiscal Impact Report House
6 Judicial Committee Substitute for H.B. 33 (Draft FIR H.B. 33), Fiscal Implications,
7 at 2 (N.M. Feb. 11, 2014), https://www.nmlegis.gov/Sessions/14%20Regular/firs/HB0033.PDF
8 (noting that “[t]he bill has a positive fiscal impact on the . . . Fund”); Draft FIR H.B.
9 33, Significant Issues, at 3 (“The proposed changes to the benefit structure will
10 enable the . . . Fund to reach a 100 percent funded ratio in 30 years. According to the
11 American Academy of Actuaries, plans should have the objective of accumulating
12 assets equal to 100 percent of a relevant pension obligation.”); Draft FIR H.B. 33,
13 Alternatives, at 3 (“The [L]egislature may want to consider requiring working retiree
14 judges to comply with PERA’s return-to-work rules for state employees that include
15 nonrefundable employee contributions.”); Draft FIR H.B. 33, What Will Be the
16 Consequences of Not Enacting this Bill, at 3 (“The judicial retirement plans will
17 continue to provide a more generous pension benefit than what is currently provided
18 to public employees, public safety employees and teachers. As the Fund continues
19 to decline, more severe benefit cuts and cash infusions may be required in the
20 future.”).
7
1 {13} Plaintiff argues against this Court using fiscal impact reports to determine
2 legislative intent because the fiscal impact reports were not reviewed by the Board
3 when making its decision. However, our review is de novo, so the Board’s failure to
4 review the authority does not affect on our review. See Rio Grande Chapter of Sierra
5 Club, 2003-NMSC-005, ¶ 17 (noting our review is de novo); Archuleta v. Santa Fe
6 Police Dep’t, ex rel. City of Santa Fe, 2005-NMSC-006, ¶ 31, 137 N.M. 161, 108
7 P.3d 1019 (determining that a de novo standard of review “means that appellate
8 courts can and must apply the appropriate law”).
9 {14} Plaintiff further argues fiscal impact reports are not persuasive authority. See
10 Lujan Grisham v. Reeb, 2021-NMSC-006, ¶ 33, 480 P.3d 852 (“Furthermore, the
11 [fiscal impact report] was authored by the Legislative Finance Committee; it is not
12 an authoritative source of legislative history, but only a forecast of the fiscal impact
13 of the proposed bill.”). The appellate authority on this issue is mixed. Compare State
14 ex rel. Helman v. Gallegos, 1994-NMSC-023, ¶¶ 34-36, 117 N.M. 346, 871 P.2d
15 1352 (using fiscal impact reports as persuasive authority), and State v. Montano,
16 2022-NMCA-049, ¶¶ 15, 16, 517 P.3d 267 (using fiscal impact reports as persuasive
17 authority), with Reeb, 2021-NMSC-006, ¶ 33 (refusing to use fiscal impact reports
18 as persuasive authority). However, Gallegos analyzes the issue with the most
19 specificity. 1994-NMSC-023, ¶¶ 34-36. Gallegos compared “contemporaneous
20 documents, presented to and presumably considered by the legislature during the
8
1 course of enactment of a statute” with “[s]tatements of legislators, after the passage
2 of the legislation,” determining the first was authoritative and the second was not.
3 Id. ¶ 35 (emphasis, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). In doing so, our
4 Supreme Court “expressly restrict[ed] consideration” of such materials “to cases in
5 which the statutory meaning is unclear.” Id. ¶ 36. In contrast, Reeb, does not address
6 Gallegos and cites no authority for its refusal to consider fiscal impact reports. Reeb,
7 2021-NMSC-006, ¶¶ 32, 33. Reeb also concludes the argument supported by the
8 fiscal impact report would be an “absurd” interpretation of the statutes at issue, id.9 ¶ 32, a circumstance not present in Gallegos, 1994-NMSC-023, ¶ 36, or this case.
10 Thus, we determine fiscal impact reports, which are “contemporaneous documents,
11 presented to and presumably considered by the [L]egislature during the course of
12 enactment of a statute,” may be used to determine legislative intent in this case. See
13 id. ¶ 35. We now return to Section 10-12B-9(C)(1) and to our interpretation of its
14 history.
15 {15} The 2014 amendment to Section 10-12B-9 increased the maximum judicial
16 pension benefit from 75 percent to 85 percent. Compare § 10-12B-9(C) (2005) (75
17 percent cap), with § 10-12B-9(F) (85 percent cap). Plaintiff also claims that Section
18 10-12B-5(G) and (H)(5) increased the potential pension for members. Plaintiff
19 argues these parts of the statute demonstrate a “balancing act” wherein the
20 Legislature was both attempting to increase the amount in the Fund while also
9
1 increasing the potential available amount of judicial retirement pension. We disagree
2 that the JRA demonstrates such a “balancing act.”
3 {16} First, as PERA notes, an increase in the cap “may create an incentive to work
4 longer and decrease the time the employee is collecting a pension.” See Fiscal Impact
5 Report for Senate Finance Committee Substitute for S.B. 27, Significant Issues, at 3
6 (Mar. 9, 2013), https://www.nmlegis.gov/Sessions/13%20Regular/firs/SB0027.pdf. Thus, the
7 increased cap demonstrates an intent to increase the Fund rather than an intent to
8 provide increased benefits to members.
9 {17} Second, we turn to Section 10-12B-5(G) and (H)(5), which both deal with the
10 purchase of service credit. Section 10-12B-5(B) allows members who have
11 previously withdrawn contributions to purchase them back. Section 10-12B-5(G)
12 provides that “[a] member shall be refunded, after retirement and upon written
13 request filed with the association, the portion of the purchase cost of service credit
14 purchased pursuant to the provisions of this section that the association determines
15 to have been unnecessary to provide the member with the maximum pension
16 applicable to the member.” Section 10-12B-5(H)(5) states that “a member may
17 purchase service credit in monthly increments,” but “the purchase of service credit
18 . . . cannot be used to exceed the pension maximum.” Both of Subsections (G) and
19 (H)(5) assure that the purchase of service credit is not out of step with the pension
10
1 the member has earned. They do not demonstrate an intent to provide increased
2 benefits to the members of the Fund.
3 {18} Plaintiff next argues that a bill substitution of the 2014 amendment to Section
4 10-12B-9 is persuasive authority. In the 2014, House Bill 33 was replaced by a
5 House Judiciary Committee (HJC) substitute to House Bill 33, which became the
6 final version of the bill signed into law. Compare H.B. 33, 51st Leg., 2nd Sess., § 5(C), at
7 16 (N.M. 2014), https://www.nmlegis.gov/Sessions/14%20Regular/bills/house/HB0033.pdf,
8 with House Judiciary Committee Substitute for H.B. 33, 51st Leg., 2nd Sess., § 6(C), at 23-24 (N.M.
9 2014), https://www.nmlegis.gov/Sessions/14%20Regular/bills/house/HB0033JCS.pdf, and § 10-
10 12B-9. The HJC substitute included no relevant change to Section 10-12B-9(C)(1).
11 Compare H.B. 33, § 5(C), at 16, with House Judiciary Committee Substitute for H.B.
12 33, § 6(C), at 23-24. However, Section 10-12B-9(C)(2) was amended from “for
13 service credit earned on and after July 1, 2014, an amount equal to one-twelfth of
14 the salary received during the last year in office prior to retirement multiplied by the
15 product of three and one-half percent times the sum of the number of years of
16 service,” H.B. 33, § 5(C)(2), at 16 (emphasis added), to change the calculation to
17 “for service credit earned on and after July 1, 2014, an amount equal to one-sixtieth
18 of the greatest aggregate amount of salary received for sixty consecutive, but not
19 necessarily continuous, months in office multiplied by the product of three and one-
20 half percent times the number of years of service credit.” House Judiciary
11
1 Committee Substitute for H.B. 33, § 6(C)(2), at 24 (emphasis added). Plaintiff
2 argues that the change from “years of service” to “years of service credit” in Section
3 10-12B-9(C)(2) demonstrates the Legislature knew the difference and intentionally
4 included “years of service” in Section 10-12B-9(C)(1). This assertion goes against
5 the grain of the legislative intent identified in this opinion, and indicates a drafting
6 error wherein the Legislature caught a mistake in Section 10-12B-9(C)(2) that it did
7 not fix in 10-12B-9(C)(1).
8 {19} Plaintiff also claims that to accept the construct provided by PERA would read
9 the defined term “years of service” out of existence contrary to Cobb v. State
10 Canvassing Board, 2006-NMSC-034, 140 N.M. 77, 140 P.3d 498. [BIC 14-15]
11 However, Cobb states, “We will not depart from the plain wording of a statute,
12 unless it is necessary to resolve an ambiguity, [or] correct a mistake or an absurdity
13 that the Legislature could not have intended.” Id. ¶ 34 (internal quotation marks and
14 citation omitted). The effect of the plain language interpretation Plaintiff argues for
15 would result in an absurdity. Plaintiff claims that he—and other members in his
16 position—are entitled to a monthly pension that includes double payment for his
17 service from July 1, 2014, onward. This is because they would be entitled to payment
18 that includes a multiplier that represents their service from July 1, 2005 to June 30,
19 2014, for both the first part of the calculation, § 10-12B-9(C)(1), and the second part
20 of the calculation, § 10-12B-9(C)(2). Plaintiff would be entitled to almost $3,000
12
1 more a month in benefits if we were to interpret the statute as he argues. We will not
2 interpret the statute in such a way because it would significantly increase benefits
3 contrary to the Legislature’s clear intent to increase the solvency of the Fund. See
4 Bishop v. Evangelical Good Samaritan Soc’y, 2009-NMSC-036, ¶ 11, 146 N.M.
5 473, 212 P.3d 361 (“We must also consider the practical implications and the
6 legislative purpose of a statute, and when the literal meaning of a statute would be
7 absurd, unreasonable, or otherwise inappropriate in application, we go beyond the
8 mere text of the statute.”).
9 {20} Plaintiff acknowledges that this Court has the authority to look beyond the
10 plain language of the statute when adhering to the plain language would lead to an
11 unreasonable result, but contends the plain language of the statute is reasonable and
12 clear, so we do not have such authority in this case. Plaintiff argues that Gallegos,
13 “states a limited exception as opposed to a general rule,” regarding departing from
14 the plain language of a statute. Plaintiff is correct that the opinion states, “[I]f the
15 meaning of a statute is truly clear—not vague, uncertain, ambiguous, or otherwise
16 doubtful—it is of course the responsibility of the judiciary to apply the statute as
17 written and not to second-guess the [L]egislature’s selection from among competing
18 policies or adoption of one of perhaps several ways of effectuating a particular
19 legislative objective.” Gallegos, 1994-NMSC-023, ¶ 22.
13
1 {21} However, Gallegos also states, “[C]ourts must exercise caution in applying
2 the plain meaning rule. Its beguiling simplicity may mask a host of reasons why a
3 statute, apparently clear and unambiguous on its face, may for one reason or another
4 give rise to legitimate (i.e., nonfrivolous) differences of opinion concerning the
5 statute’s meaning. In such a case, it can rarely be said that the legislation is indeed
6 free from all ambiguity and is crystal clear in its meaning.” Id. ¶ 23. This is the case
7 here. A plain reading of the statute negates the legislative intent to increase the
8 longevity of the Fund. It also is in contrast to the structure of the statute, which
9 includes a calculation that separately addresses the time a relevant member has
10 served between July 1, 2005 and June 30, 2014, in Section 10-12B-9(C)(1), and the
11 time they have served July 1, 2014, and beyond in Section 10-12B-9(C)(2). Further,
12 it can be explained by a drafting error when amending the statute to provide members
13 the benefits they earned from 2005 to 2014 while decreasing their benefits going
14 forward.
15 {22} Interpretation of Section 10-12B-9(C)(1) also implicates Section 10-12B-
16 5(A) of the JRA, which states, “In no case shall any member be credited with a year
17 of service for less than twelve months of service in any calendar year or more than
18 a month of service for all service in any calendar month or more than a year of
19 service for all service in any calendar year.” This subsection indicates that the
20 Legislature was focused on members being given credit for only the time they
14
1 actually worked; surely it did not intend to give members double credit, as Plaintiff
2 suggests. Plaintiff argues that since Section 10-12B-5(A) deals with the
3 accumulation or loss of service credit, it does not address employees’ receipt of
4 compensation and is not in conflict with Section 10-12B-9(C). This argument
5 ignores our edict to give effect to the Legislature’s intent. See Valenzuela v. Snyder,
6 2014-NMCA-061, ¶ 16, 326 P.3d 1120. In referencing “for service credit earned” in
7 both Section 10-12B-9(C)(1) and (C)(2), the Legislature indicated the calculation of
8 benefits was based on the actual service the members provided.
9 {23} Plaintiff finally notes that the term “years of service” appears in four locations
10 in Section 10-12B-9, and not following the plain language “would result in the
11 patently illogical situation wherein the same defined term would mean one thing in
12 the single prong calculations and another different thing in the two-prong
13 calculations.” We disagree that this is patently illogical. As we noted above, our
14 analysis indicates that the Legislature simply made a drafting error when amending
15 the statute in order to provide members the benefits they earned from 2005 to 2014
16 while decreasing their benefits going forward. It is reasonable to use the term
17 differently in enacting a single prong calculation and the subsequent two prong
18 calculation.
19 {24} In going beyond the plain language, and reading Section 10-12B-9(C)(1) and
20 (C)(2) together and in the context of the statutory scheme as a whole, we conclude
15
1 that “years of service” in Section 10-12B-9(C)(1) refers to the members’ years of
2 service credit earned between July 1, 2005 and June 30, 2014. In interpreting the
3 statute this way, a member is given credit for their service between July 1, 2005 and
4 June 30, 2014, via Section 10-12B-9(C)(1); given credit for their service from July
5 1, 2014, forward via Section 10-12B-9(C)(2); and not given double credit for any
6 service.
7 CONCLUSION
8 {25} We affirm the Board’s conclusion.
9 {26} IT IS SO ORDERED.
10 ____________________________________
11 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge,
12 retired, Sitting by designation
13 WE CONCUR:
14 _____________________________
15 KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge
16 _____________________________
17 ZACHARY A. IVES, Judge
16