State v. Groves ( 2023 )

This decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was not selected for publication in
the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Refer to Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the
citation of unpublished decisions. Electronic decisions may contain computer-
generated errors or other deviations from the official version filed by the Court of
Appeals.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
No. A-1-CA-40176
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ELEXUS JOLAINE GROVES,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY
Brett Loveless, District Court Judge
Raúl Torrez, Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
Meryl E. Francolini, Assistant Attorney General
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellee
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
Allison H. Jaramillo, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellant
MEMORANDUM OPINION
YOHALEM, Judge.
{1} Defendant Elexus Jolaine Groves appeals her convictions for seven offenses
arising from the death of two persons and the serious injury of a third in an automobile
collision, which occurred as Defendant fled law enforcement officers who had signaled
her to stop. Defendant continued to flee after the collision, without assisting the victims.
On appeal, Defendant raises nine issues (two of which we consider together): (1)
whether there was a striking violation of Defendant’s speedy trial right justifying review
for fundamental error; (2) whether the district court properly instructed the jury on the
elements of aggravated fleeing and whether there was sufficient evidence to support
Defendant’s conviction for aggravated fleeing; (3) whether the district court abused its
discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to exclude a witness; (4) whether the district
court abused its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for a change of venue based
on pretrial publicity; (5) whether the district court judge was biased against Defendant;
(6) whether the district court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress a
statement that she made to police on the date of her arrest; (7) whether the district court
erred in imposing six-year sentences for Defendant’s convictions for reckless vehicular
homicide and knowingly leaving the scene of an accident resulting in great bodily harm
or death; and (8) whether the district court abused its discretion in designating
Defendant’s convictions for reckless vehicular homicide and great bodily injury by
vehicle as serious violent offenses for purposes of the Earned Meritorious Deductions
Act (EMDA). For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
{2} On January 18, 2017, Defendant and another individual, Paul Garcia (“Mr.
Garcia”), ingested methamphetamine and then stole a van. The van was reported stolen
and law enforcement officers located the van in traffic on a city street. Defendant was
driving and Mr. Garcia was sitting in the passenger seat. Officers followed Defendant
and engaged their emergency lights, signaling Defendant to stop. Defendant ignored
the officers’ signals and continued driving with officers in pursuit. As the pursuit
continued, Defendant increased the speed of the van. The officers, pursuant to law
enforcement policy, eventually disengaged their emergency lights and stopped pursuing
Defendant. Defendant continued at a high rate of speed, running a stop sign and
colliding with another vehicle. The collision resulted in the death of two individuals and
injury to a third person. Defendant and Mr. Garcia fled the scene on foot without
assisting the victims. The pair stole another truck and eluded officers.
{3} Two days after the collision, law enforcement officers located and arrested
Defendant. At the police station, Defendant made a statement to detectives regarding a
letter of remorse that she had written to the family of the victims of the collision.
{4} Defendant was indicted on the following counts: (1) two counts of first degree
felony murder, or in the alternative, reckless vehicular homicide; (2) two counts of
unlawful taking of a motor vehicle; (3) two counts of conspiracy to commit an unlawful
taking of a motor vehicle; (4) knowingly leaving the scene of an accident resulting in
great bodily harm or death; (5) great bodily injury by vehicle; and (6) aggravated fleeing
of a law enforcement officer. Mr. Garcia was indicted on similar counts, and Defendant
and Mr. Garcia’s cases were joined.
{5} During the pretrial stage of the case, Defendant filed various motions, including,
in relevant part, a motion to suppress the statement that she made to detectives on the
date of her arrest, and a motion for a change of venue due to the pretrial publicity
surrounding the case. The district court denied both motions. Defendant also filed a
motion to dismiss the two counts of first degree felony murder brought against her. The
district court granted the motion. The State appealed the district court’s decision to our
Supreme Court, and the case was stayed pending the appeal. The Supreme Court
reversed the district court’s decision, and reinstated the felony murder charges against
Defendant. See State v. Groves, 2021-NMSC-003, ¶ 40, 478 P.3d 915. The mandate
on appeal was issued on December 18, 2020, nearly three years after the filing of the
State’s notice of appeal. Upon remand, the district court set an August 16, 2021, trial
date and the case moved forward.
{6} Approximately a month before Defendant’s trial, Mr. Garcia informed the State
that he wanted to enter into a plea deal. Mr. Garcia then filed a motion to sever his case
and Defendant’s case, which the district court granted. The State then amended its
witness list, specifically naming Mr. Garcia as a witness at Defendant’s trial. Defendant
filed a motion to exclude Mr. Garcia as a witness based on untimely notice, which the
district court denied.
{7} Defendant’s trial began August 10, 2021, approximately four years after her
arrest. Following trial, Defendant was convicted of the following seven offenses: two
counts of reckless vehicular homicide, pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-101
(2016); unlawful taking of a motor vehicle, pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 30-16D-
1(A)(1) (2009); conspiracy to commit an unlawful taking of a motor vehicle, pursuant to
NMSA 1978, Section 30-28-2 (1979); knowingly leaving the scene of an accident
resulting in death, pursuant to NMSA 1978, Sections 66-7-201 (1989), -203 (1978);
great bodily injury by vehicle, pursuant to Section 66-8-101; and aggravated fleeing of a
law enforcement officer, pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 30-22-1.1 (2003, amended
2022). The district court sentenced Defendant to serve twenty-five and a half years in
prison, assigning six-year sentences to Defendant’s convictions for reckless vehicular
homicide and knowingly leaving the scene of an accident resulting in great bodily harm
or death. The district court also designated Defendant’s convictions for reckless
vehicular homicide and great bodily injury by vehicle as serious violent offenses for
purposes of the EMDA. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
I. Defendant’s Unpreserved Speedy Trial Claim Does Not Support Reversal
for Fundamental Error
{8} The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 14
of the New Mexico Constitution establish an accused’s right to a speedy trial. Defendant
contends that her right to a speedy trial was violated by the delay of four years, six
months, and twenty days that elapsed from the date of her arrest to her trial. Defendant
acknowledges that her speedy trial claim was not preserved in the district court and
asks this Court to exercise its discretion to review for fundamental error. See State v.
Garcia, 2019-NMCA-056, ¶ 38, 450 P.3d 418 (explaining that this Court has the
discretion to review an unpreserved speedy trial argument for fundamental error).
{9} We review a speedy trial claim for fundamental error only where there has been
a “striking violation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial.” State v. Rojo, 1999-
NMSC-001, ¶ 53, 126 N.M. 438, 971 P.2d 829 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Defendant argues that the length of delay in this case, the bulk of which was
due to the State’s pursuit of an interlocutory appeal, is alone sufficient to constitute a
striking violation of her right to a speedy trial. We disagree and explain.
{10} To determine whether the right to a speedy trial has been violated, New Mexico
courts apply the Barker balancing test to the particular facts and circumstances of the
case. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972); see also State v. Garza, 2009-
NMSC-038, ¶ 13, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387. The Barker test allows us to balance the
parties’ interest in the prompt resolution of the case with the countervailing interests in
deliberate public justice. See Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 87 (1905) (“The right of
a speedy trial is necessarily relative. It is consistent with delays and depends upon
circumstances. It secures rights to a defendant. It does not preclude the rights of public
justice.”). We, therefore, under the Barker test, review the conduct of both the
prosecution and the defense guided by four factors: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the
reasons for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial; and (4)
the actual prejudice that the defendant suffered due to the delay. Garza, 2009-NMSC-
038, ¶ 13 (listing the factors in Barker, 407 U.S. at 530).
{11} The first Barker factor, length of delay, is an objective factor that serves two
functions: (1) first, the length of delay “acts as a triggering mechanism for considering
the four Barker factors if the delay crosses the threshold of being ‘presumptively
prejudicial’”; and (2) second, the length of delay “is an independent factor to consider in
evaluating whether a speedy trial violation has occurred.” State v. Serros, 2016-NMSC-
008, ¶ 22, 366 P.3d 1121. A delay is considered presumptively prejudicial “according to
the complexity of [the] case: one year for a simple case, [fifteen] months for a case of
intermediate complexity, and [eighteen] months for a complex case.” Id. Here, although
the length of the delay in Defendant’s case plainly exceeds the threshold for
presumptive delay even assuming this case is a complex case, the length of the delay,
standing alone, is first and foremost simply a triggering mechanism. See Garza, 2009-
NMSC-038, ¶ 21 (“[W]e abolish the presumption that a defendant’s right to a speedy
trial has been violated based solely on the threshold determination that the length of
delay is ‘presumptively prejudicial.’”).
{12} In considering the length of delay as a Barker factor, we agree that it weighs in
favor of Defendant. We go on, however, to consider the second Barker factor, the
reasons for the delay. Defendant’s speedy trial argument focuses solely on the delay
attributable to the State’s interlocutory appeal. An interlocutory appeal by the State does
not necessarily weigh heavily against the State in the speedy trial analysis. There are
competing concerns, which require the weighing of the value of orderly appellate review
on the one hand, and a speedy trial on the other. United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S.
302, 314 (1986). This is because there are important interests in public justice and the
rights of a defendant that are safeguarded through appellate review. Id. at 313. We,
therefore, evaluate the purpose and reasonableness of the State’s appeal, looking to
the strength of the State’s position, the importance of the issue in the case, and the
seriousness of the crime. See State v. Flores, 2015-NMCA-081, ¶ 28, 355 P.3d 81. The
State’s appeal of a “clearly tangential or frivolous” issue or an appeal brought in bad
faith or for the purposes of delay would weigh heavily against the State. See id. ¶¶ 28-
29.
{13} In this case, the State appealed from an order of the district court granting
Defendant’s motion to dismiss the felony murder charges brought against Defendant.
The Supreme Court ultimately ruled in the State’s favor and reinstated the felony
murder charges. See Groves, 2021-NMSC-003, ¶ 40. Defendant does not argue that
the State engaged in any tactical delay in pursuing its appeal. The appeal was plainly
meritorious and, since it addressed the validity of the highest degree of offense charged
against Defendant, cannot be characterized as tangential. We, therefore, conclude that
the delay challenged by Defendant weighs neutrally, and cannot be weighed against the
State. See Flores, 2015-NMCA-081, ¶ 29.
{14} Because the reasons for the delay do not weigh in Defendant’s favor, Defendant
must show particularized prejudice in order to prevail on his speedy trial claim. See
State v. Wood, 2022-NMCA-009, ¶ 21, 504 P.3d 579. Defendant does not argue
particularized prejudice, relying on her claim that the first two factors weigh heavily in
her favor. We, therefore, find no striking violation of Defendant’s right to a speedy trial
justifying reversal for fundamental error.
II. The District Court Properly Instructed the Jury on the Elements of
Aggravated Fleeing and There Is Sufficient Evidence to Support
Defendant’s Aggravated Fleeing Conviction
A. The Jury Instruction
{15} Defendant next argues that the district court improperly instructed the jury on the
elements of aggravated fleeing. “The standard of review we apply to jury instructions
depends on whether the issue has been preserved. If the error has been preserved[,]
we review the instructions for reversible error. If not, we review for fundamental error.”
State v. Benally, 2001-NMSC-033, ¶ 12, 131 N.M. 258, 34 P.3d 1134 (citation omitted).
{16} Focusing on the “had been given” a signal to stop language of UJI 14-2217
NMRA (2009), the instruction given to the jury, Defendant contends that the instruction
failed to alert the jury that Defendant must be shown to have driven recklessly “after
being given”—the language of the statute—a visual or audible signal to stop by a
uniformed law enforcement officer. Although Defendant claims she preserved her
challenge to the jury instruction in the district court by submitting a proposed alternative
instruction, Defendant’s proposed alternative instruction does not address the timing of
the signal to stop, the issue Defendant now argues on appeal. Defendant’s proposed
instruction states as follows: “[D]efendant drove willfully and carelessly in a manner that
endangered the life of another person while being pursued by an appropriately marked
law enforcement vehicle.” Defendant’s proposed instruction attempts to add to the
elements of aggravated fleeing a requirement that the police must continue to pursue a
defendant who is speeding and driving recklessly. To the extent that Defendant’s brief
suggests that the police must engage in a high-speed pursuit to establish aggravated
fleeing, this Court held in State v. Ortega that a high-speed pursuit by law enforcement
is not an element of aggravated fleeing. 2023-NMCA-032, ¶ 20, 528 P.3d 733 (“[T]he
crime of aggravated fleeing does not require that the police officer engage in a high-
speed chase of a defendant.”), cert. denied (S-1-SC-39767, Apr. 3, 2023). Because
Defendant raises a different issue on appeal from the issue she raised in the district
court—whether the jury was adequately instructed that the reckless driving must follow
the officer’s signal to stop—our review is for fundamental error. See In re Norwest Bank
of N.M., N.A., 2003-NMCA-128, ¶ 10, 134 N.M. 516, 80 P.3d 98 (providing that an issue
is preserved for appeal if the appellant “fairly invoked a ruling of the trial court on same
grounds argued on appeal” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also
State v. Barber, 2004-NMSC-019, ¶ 8, 135 N.M. 621, 92 P.3d 633 (holding that we
review a challenge to a jury instruction, which has not been preserved in the district
court for fundamental error).
{17} When our review is for fundamental error, we first look to whether the instruction
confused or misdirected the jury. See Benally, 2001-NMSC-033, ¶ 12. If we find that the
instruction confused or misdirected the jury, we then continue our analysis to determine
whether the error so undermined the reliability of the conviction or prejudiced the
defendant’s rights that it would “shock the conscience to permit the conviction to stand.”
Barber, 2004-NMSC-019, ¶ 14 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We will
reverse a conviction “if an error implicated a fundamental unfairness within the system
that would undermine judicial integrity if left unchecked.” Id. ¶ 18 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
{18} As noted previously, Defendant alleges that UJI 14-2217, the jury instruction that
the district court provided verbatim, confused the jury because it omitted the statutory
requirement that Defendant drive “willfully and carelessly . . . in a manner that
endangers the life of another person after being given a visual or audible signal to stop.”
Section 30-22-1.1(A) (emphasis added). The jury instruction given by the district court
provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
2. [D]efendant drove willfully and carelessly in a manner that
endangered the life of another person;
3. [D]efendant had been given a visual or audible signal to stop
by a uniformed law enforcement officer in an appropriately marked law
enforcement vehicle.
UJI 14-2217 (2009). We do not agree that the instruction given confused or misdirected
the jury. The instruction’s use of the phrase “had been given” adequately informed the
jury that the signal to stop had to precede the Defendant’s driving in a manner that
endangered the life of another person. We note that “[g]enerally, an instruction that
parallels the language of the statute and contains all essential elements of the crime is
sufficient.” State v. Cawley, 1990-NMSC-088, ¶ 16, 110 N.M. 705, 799 P.2d 574.
Because we conclude that no reversible error occurred, we do not address the second
prong of the fundamental error analysis.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
{19} Defendant’s sufficiency of the evidence argument focuses solely on the lack of
evidence that law enforcement continued their pursuit of Defendant after Defendant
started speeding and driving recklessly. Because continued pursuit by law enforcement
is not an element of aggravated fleeing, we do not consider this argument further. See
Ortega, 2023-NMCA-032, ¶ 20 (“[T]he crime of aggravated fleeing does not require that
the police officer engage in a high-speed chase of a defendant.”).
III. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Defendant’s
Motion to Exclude Mr. Garcia as a Witness
{20} Defendant next contends that the district court erred in denying her motion to
exclude Mr. Garcia as a witness because the State added him to the witness list only a
month prior to trial. We review a district court’s decision to exclude or not exclude a
witness for abuse of discretion. State v. Guerra, 2012-NMSC-014, ¶ 23, 278 P.3d 1031.
Abuse of discretion occurs when the district court’s decision is “against logic and not
justified by reason.” State v. McDaniel, 2004-NMCA-022, ¶ 6, 135 N.M. 84, 84 P.3d
701. “In reviewing the district court’s decision, this Court views the evidence—and all
inferences to be drawn from the evidence—in the light most favorable to the district
court’s decision.” State v. Le Mier, 2017-NMSC-017, ¶ 22, 394 P.3d 959.
{21} This Court considers four factors in reviewing decisions regarding the late
disclosure of evidence: “(1) whether the [s]tate breached some duty or intentionally
deprived the defendant of evidence; (2) whether the improperly non[]disclosed evidence
was material; (3) whether the non[]disclosure of the evidence prejudiced the defendant;
and (4) whether the [district] court cured the failure to timely disclose the evidence.”
State v. Mora, 1997-NMSC-060, ¶ 43, 124 N.M. 346, 950 P.2d 789, abrogated on other
grounds by Kersey v. Hatch, 2010-NMSC-020, 148 N.M. 381, 237 P.3d 683. Each
factor will be addressed in turn.
A. Whether the State Breached Its Duty to Disclose Witnesses
{22} We first consider whether the State breached its duty to disclose witnesses. Rule
5-501 NMRA governs the State’s duty to disclose. Under Rule 5-501(A)(5), the state
shall within ten days after a defendant’s arraignment disclose to the defendant “a written
list of the names and addresses of all witnesses which the prosecutor intends to call at
the trial.” Under LR2-308(C)(4) NMRA, the state also has “a continuing duty to disclose
additional information to the defendant, including the names and contact information for
newly-discovered witnesses and updated contact information for witnesses already
disclosed, within seven . . . days of receipt of such information.”
{23} Here, the district court found that the State complied with its duties to disclose
under both Rule 5-501 and LR2-308. The district court states, “The State disclosed any
codefendant on the State’s initial witness list, and the State’s subsequent witness list.
Codefendant . . . Garcia’s case was joined with [D]efendant’s case on February 2, 2017.
The State’s disclosure of . . . Garcia complies with LR2-308 and [Rule] 5-501.” On
appeal, Defendant does not attack the district court’s finding that the State complied
with its duty to disclose, only that the State entered into a plea deal with Mr. Garcia too
late to add him as a witness. See Rule 12-318(A)(4) NMRA (“[An] argument shall set
forth a specific attack on any finding, or the finding shall be deemed conclusive.”). We,
therefore, presume that the district court’s finding that the State complied with its duty to
disclose witnesses promptly when a witness was identified is correct. See State v.
Aragon, 1999-NMCA-060, ¶ 10, 127 N.M. 393, 981 P.2d 1211 (“There is a presumption
of correctness in the district court’s rulings,” and it is the appellant’s “burden on appeal
to demonstrate any claimed error below.” (alterations, internal quotation marks, and
citation omitted)).
B. Materiality and Prejudice
{24} We next consider materiality and prejudice. “Whether evidence is material
depends on if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to
the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” McDaniel,
2004-NMCA-022, ¶ 11 (text only) (citation omitted).
{25} To determine whether a defendant has suffered prejudice, we consider “whether
the defense’s case would have been improved by an earlier disclosure or how the
defense would have prepared differently for trial.” State v. Duarte, 2007-NMCA-012, ¶
15, 140 N.M. 930, 149 P.3d 1027 (text only) (citation omitted). The defendant must
affirmatively demonstrate that she suffered harm. See State v. Ruiz, 2007-NMCA-014, ¶
53, 141 N.M. 53, 150 P.3d 1003; see also State v. Vallejos, 2000-NMCA-075, ¶ 32, 129
N.M. 424, 9 P.3d 668 (“[The d]efendant has the burden of showing that [she] was
prejudiced by the untimely disclosure.”).
{26} Here, Defendant fails to argue materiality. She does not claim that the outcome
in this case would have been different had she had more notice that Mr. Garcia would
testify at her trial. Defendant, instead, attempts only to show that she suffered prejudice,
arguing that she had no time to obtain impeachment witnesses or investigate Mr.
Garcia’s account of the incident. We are not persuaded that Defendant was prejudiced.
As the district court correctly noted, Defendant and Mr. Garcia’s cases had been joined
for over four years, so that there was a possibility during that time that Mr. Garcia would
testify. Defendant had ample time to obtain witnesses and investigate Mr. Garcia’s
account of the incident. Moreover, the State made Mr. Garcia available for a pretrial
interview in a timely manner, defense counsel in this case extensively cross-examined
Mr. Garcia and attacked his character at trial. We, therefore, conclude that Defendant
has failed to make a showing that the delay in disclosure materially prejudiced her
defense.
C. Curative Action
{27} Finally, we consider the district court’s curative action. Curative action “concerns
the form of remedy, or sanction imposed by the district court in response to the untimely
disclosure.” Ruiz, 2007-NMCA-014, ¶ 54.
{28} Here, the district court indicated that it would be “flexible as far as permitting the
defense to add witnesses late or otherwise prepare for the testimony of Mr. Garcia.” The
district court also noted that it would consider granting Defendant a continuance if she
requested one. We conclude that this is adequate under the circumstances.
{29} In summary, Defendant has failed to demonstrate breach of the State’s duty to
disclose witnesses, materiality, prejudice, or that the district court’s curative action was
inadequate. We, therefore, reject her challenge to the district court’s denial of her
motion to exclude Mr. Garcia as a witness.
IV. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Defendant’s
Motion for a Change of Venue
{30} Defendant next argues that the district court erred in denying her motion for a
change of venue because of the pretrial publicity in this case. We review the district
court’s denial of a motion for change of venue for abuse of discretion. State v. Vasquez,
2010-NMCA-041, ¶ 35, 148 N.M. 202, 232 P.3d 438. The defendant bears the burden
of showing that the district court abused its discretion. State v. Barrera, 2001-NMSC-
014, ¶ 11, 130 N.M. 227, 22 P.3d 1177.
{31} As a general rule, the exposure of potential jurors to pretrial publicity does not in
and of itself require a change of venue. State v. Chamberlain, 1991-NMSC-094, ¶ 6,
112 N.M. 723, 819 P.2d 673. Further, “if the [district] court determines that a movant
has not demonstrated presumed prejudice and proceeds with voir dire, we will limit our
review to . . . evidence of actual prejudice.” Barrera, 2001-NMSC-014, ¶ 16. “A finding
of no actual prejudice following voir dire, if supported by substantial evidence,
necessarily precludes a finding of presumed prejudice.” Id. A district court determines
that no actual prejudice exists when it impanels a jury following voir dire. Vasquez,
2010-NMCA-041, ¶ 37.
{32} Here, the district court denied Defendant’s motion for a change of venue and
proceeded with voir dire, after which a jury was empaneled from that jury pool. Because
the district court determined that no actual prejudice existed by impaneling a jury
following voir dire, our review is limited to whether the district court abused its discretion
in determining that no actual prejudice existed.
{33} We conclude that substantial evidence supports the district court’s determination
that the impaneled jurors did not demonstrate actual prejudice. Indeed, Defendant does
not argue that any impaneled jury member exhibited actual prejudice. Defendant’s
argument instead relies solely on the fact that there were jurors who had previously
heard about the case. However, as the State correctly points out, the district court
screened the jurors who had heard about the case and ensured that they could be fair
and impartial. Moreover, the jurors who confirmed that they could not be fair and
impartial were struck for cause. Because Defendant fails to identify any impaneled jury
member who indicated an inability to be impartial, Defendant has failed to demonstrate
actual prejudice. See id. ¶ 38 (holding that where the defendant did not identify any
individual selected to serve on the jury who indicated an inability to be impartial, the
defendant failed to demonstrate actual prejudice). We, therefore affirm the district
court’s denial of Defendant’s motion for a change of venue.
V. Defendant Fails to Show That the District Court Judge Was Biased Against
Her
{34} Defendant next contends that the district court judge was biased against her in
this case. She acknowledges that she failed to preserve the judicial bias claim that she
now makes on appeal and asks this Court to instead exercise its discretion to review for
fundamental error. See Rule 12-321(B)(2) NMRA (“This rule does not preclude . . . the
appellate court . . . from considering . . . issues involving . . . fundamental error[] or . . .
fundamental rights of a party.”). The first step in reviewing for fundamental error is to
determine whether an error occurred. See Campos v. Bravo, 2007-NMSC-021, ¶ 8, 141
N.M. 801, 161 P.3d 846. If an error has occurred, we then consider whether the error
was fundamental. Id.{35} “As a general rule, a fair and impartial tribunal requires that the trier of fact be
disinterested and free from any form of bias or predisposition regarding the outcome of
the case.” State v. Fernandez, 1994-NMCA-056, ¶ 6, 117 N.M. 673, 875 P.2d 1104 (text
only) (citation omitted). Accordingly, to determine whether an error occurred, we
consider “whether the conduct of the judge deprived the defendant of a fair trial.” State
v. Muise, 1985-NMCA-090, ¶ 34, 103 N.M. 382, 707 P.2d 1192. A claim of judicial bias
must be “of a personal nature.” State v. Hernandez, 1993-NMSC-007, ¶ 44, 115 N.M. 6,
846 P.2d 312. “[I]t is firmly established that [a claim] of judicial bias cannot be
predicated upon unfavorable rulings, nor from the imposition of maximum allowable
prison sentences.” State v. Williams, 1986-NMCA-122, ¶ 19, 105 N.M. 214, 730 P.2d
1196 (citation omitted).
{36} Here, Defendant argues that the district court judge was biased against her
because he did not allow her to introduce the letter that she wrote to the family of the
victims in this case as evidence of her remorse. “The admission or exclusion of
evidence is within the discretion of the district court.” Fernandez, 1994-NMCA-056, ¶ 21.
Further, a claim of judicial bias cannot be based on an unfavorable evidentiary ruling. Id.{37} Next, Defendant contends that the district court judge was biased against her
because of the rulings entered against the defense in this case, including the district
court’s denial of the motion to suppress the statement that she made to the police on
the date of her arrest, and the harsh sentence that she received. As mentioned
previously, claims “of judicial bias cannot be predicated upon unfavorable rulings, nor
from the imposition of maximum allowable prison sentences.” Williams, 1986-NMCA-
122, ¶ 19 (citation omitted).
{38} Finally, Defendant claims that the district court judge was biased against her
because he permitted the case to “languish” while she remained in custody. Defendant,
however, fails to explain what she means, or where in the record this claim is
supported.1 We, therefore, decline to consider this claim further. See State v. Fuentes,
2010-NMCA-027, ¶ 29, 147 N.M. 761, 228 P.3d 1181 (explaining that this Court does
not review unclear or undeveloped arguments); see also Muse v. Muse, 2009-NMCA-
003, ¶ 72, 145 N.M. 451, 200 P.3d 104 (“We will not search the record for facts,
arguments, and rulings in order to support generalized arguments.”). Because we
conclude that no reversible error occurred, we do not address the second prong of the
fundamental error analysis.
VI. Defendant’s Argument That the District Court Erred in Denying Her Motion
to Suppress Is Moot
{39} Defendant next challenges the district court’s order denying her motion to
suppress the statement that she made to the police on the date of her arrest, claiming
that the statement was made involuntarily. Before addressing the merits of Defendant’s
claim, we first consider the State’s argument that Defendant’s claim is moot.
{40} Mootness is a limit on this Court’s jurisdiction. Howell v. Heim, 1994-NMSC-103,
¶ 7, 118 N.M. 500, 882 P.2d 541. As a result, we review whether an issue before us is
moot as a threshold matter, and do so de novo. See State v. Favela, 2013-NMCA-102,
¶ 6, 311 P.3d 1213. Generally, an issue is moot “when no actual controversy exists, and
an appellate ruling will not grant the appellant any actual relief.” State v. Sergio B.,
2002-NMCA-070, ¶ 9, 132 N.M. 375, 48 P.3d 764.
{41} In this case, Defendant contends that the district court erred in denying her
motion to suppress the statement that she made to the police on the date of her arrest.
Although the district court denied Defendant’s motion, Defendant’s statement was not
admitted at trial, nor was any evidence related to that statement.2 Accordingly, any
ruling that the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress would not grant
Defendant any relief. We, therefore, hold that Defendant’s argument is moot and decline
to consider it. See Gunaji v. Macias, 2001-NMSC-028, ¶ 9, 130 N.M. 734, 31 P.3d 1008(noting that this Court will not decide moot cases).
VII. Defendant’s Sentencing Argument Is Based on Inapplicable Law
{42} Defendant next argues that the district court erred in assigning six-year
sentences to each of her convictions for reckless vehicular homicide and knowingly
1To the extent that Defendant is restating her speedy trial violation claim, we held above that there is no
striking violation of Defendant’s speedy trial right justifying review for fundamental error.
2Defendant introduced a video of her police interrogation at trial to show her remorse about the incident.
The video has no sound.
leaving the scene of an accident resulting in great bodily harm or death. Defendant’s
argument is based solely on a recent amendment to NMSA 1978, Section 31-18-15(A)
(2016, amended 2022), which sets out the basic sentences of imprisonment for
noncapital felonies.
{43} The Section 31-18-15(A) amendment that Defendant uses to support her
argument went into effect on May 18, 2022. See 2022 N.M. Laws, 2nd Sess., ch. 56, §
29. Defendant was sentenced on November 24, 2021, approximately six months before
the amendment became effective. The amendment, therefore, is not applicable in this
case. See State v. Padilla, 1968-NMCA-004, ¶ 5, 78 N.M. 702, 437 P.2d 163 (“[I]t is
presumed that statutes . . . operate prospectively only.” (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)). We, therefore, do not consider this argument further.
VIII. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Designating Defendant’s
Convictions for Reckless Vehicular Homicide and Great Bodily Injury by
Vehicle as Serious Violent Offenses for Purposes of the EMDA
{44} Defendant finally challenges the district court’s designation of her convictions for
reckless vehicular homicide and great bodily injury by vehicle as serious violent
offenses for purposes of the EMDA. The EMDA allows a prisoner to earn meritorious
deductions from a sentence for active participation in recommended programs approved
by the warden of the prison. NMSA 1978, § 33-2-34(A) (2015). Under the EMDA, a
prisoner may earn up to thirty days per month of time served for a nonviolent offense,
and up to four days per month of time served for a serious violent offense. Section 33-2-
34(A)(1), (2).
{45} The EMDA classifies certain offenses as per se serious violent offenses. Section
33-2-34(L)(4). The EMDA also provides the district court with the discretion to designate
other offenses as serious violent offenses based on “the nature of the offense and the
resulting harm.” Section 33-2-34(L)(o). Such offenses include third degree homicide by
vehicle and great bodily injury by vehicle. Id. To designate third degree homicide by
vehicle and great bodily injury by vehicle as serious violent offenses, the district court
“must determine that the crime was ‘committed in a physically violent manner either with
an intent to do serious harm or with recklessness in the face of knowledge that one’s
acts are reasonably likely to result in serious harm.’” State v. Solano, 2009-NMCA-098,
¶ 10, 146 N.M. 831, 215 P.3d 769 (quoting State v. Morales, 2002-NMCA-016, ¶ 16,
131 N.M. 530, 39 P.3d 747). Here, Defendant challenges the district court’s
discretionary decision to designate her convictions for reckless vehicular homicide and
great bodily injury by a vehicle as serious violent offenses.
{46} This Court reviews a district court’s designation of an offense as a serious violent
offense for abuse of discretion. See State v. Scurry, 2007-NMCA-064, ¶ 4, 141 N.M.
591, 158 P.3d 1034. “A [district] court . . . abuse[s] its discretion when its decision is not
supported by substantial evidence,” State v. Montoya, 2005-NMCA-078, ¶ 8, 137 N.M.
713, 114 P.3d 393, or when it acts contrary to the law. Scurry, 2007-NMCA-064, ¶ 4.
{47} Here, while Defendant challenges the district court’s discretionary decision to
designate her convictions for reckless vehicular homicide and great bodily injury by a
vehicle as serious violent offenses, Defendant fails to provide any argument to support
her challenge. Defendant, instead, merely characterizes the court’s designation as
unfair. We, therefore, do not consider this argument further. See Fuentes, 2010-NMCA-
027, ¶ 29 (explaining that this Court does not review undeveloped arguments).
CONCLUSION
{48} We affirm the district court’s entry of judgment and sentence.
{49} IT IS SO ORDERED.
JANE B. YOHALEM, Judge
WE CONCUR:
ZACHARY A. IVES, Judge
MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge,
retired, Sitting by designation